Natural laws and the problem of provisos

Hempel and Giere contend that the existence of provisos poses grave difficulties for any regularity account of physical law. However, Hempel and Giere rely upon a mistaken conception of the way in which statements acquire their content. By correcting this mistake, I remove the problem Hempel and Giere identify but reveal a different problem that provisos pose for a regularity account — indeed, for any account of physical law according to which the state of affairs described by a law-statement presupposes a Humean regularity. These considerations suggest a normative analysis of law-statements. On this view, law-statements are not distinguished from accidental generalizations by the kind of Humean regularities they describe because a law-statement need not describe any Humean regularity. Rather, a law-statement says that in certain contexts, one ought to regard the assertion of a given type of claim, if made with justification, as a proper way to justify a claim of a certain other kind.     

A problem for the alternative difference measure of confirmation

Among Bayesian confirmation theorists, several quantitative measures of the degree to which an evidential proposition E confirms a hypothesis H have been proposed. According to one popular recent measure, s, the degree to which E confirms H is a function of the equation P(H|E) ? P(H|~E). A consequence of s is that when we have two evidential propositions, E1 and E2, such that P(H|E1) = P(H|E2), and P(H|~E1) ≠ P(H|~E2), the confirmation afforded to H by E1 does not equal the confirmation afforded to H by E2. I present several examples that demonstrate the unacceptability of this result, and conclude that we should reject s (and other measures that share this feature) as a measure of confirmation.     

The oldest solution to the circularity problem for Humeanism about the laws of nature

According to Humeanism about the laws, the laws of nature are nothing over and above certain kinds of regularities about particular facts (the “Humean mosaic”). Humeanism has often been accused of circularity: according to scientific practice laws often explain their instances, but on the Humean view they also reduce to the mosaic, which includes those instances. In this paper I formulate the circularity problem in a way that avoids a number of controversial assumptions routinely taken for granted in the literature, and against which many extant responses are therefore ineffective. I then propose a solution that denies the alleged Humean commitment that laws are explained by their instances. The solution satisfies three desiderata that other solutions don’t: it provides independent motivation against the idea that Humean laws are explained by their instances; it specifies the sense in which Humean laws are nonetheless “nothing over and above” their instances; and it gives an alternative account of what does explain the laws, if not their instances. This solution, I will argue, is not only the simplest but also the oldest one: it appeals only to tools and theses whose first appearance predates the earliest statements of the circularity problem itself.

     

Prior probabilities and confirmation theory: A problem with the fine-tuning argument

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

The laws of modality

Philosophical Studies - Nomic realists have traditionally put laws to work within a theory of natural modality, in order to provide a metaphysical source for causal necessitation, counterfactuals,...     

The illocutionary force of laws

This article provides a speech act analysis of ‘crime-enacting’ provisions in criminal statutes, focusing on the illocutionary force of these provisions. These provisions commonly set out not only particular crimes and their characteristics but also their associated penalties. Enactment of a statute brings into force new social facts, typically norms, through the official utterance of linguistic material. These norms are supposed to guide behaviour: they tell us what we must, may, or must not do. Our main claim is that the illocutionary force of such provisions is primarily ‘world-creating’, i.e. effective, or declarational, rather than directive (behaviour-guiding). We assume that directive illocutionary force is either direct or indirect, showing that provisions need not contain the linguistic items that make for direct directives and that according to standard tests no indirect directive is present. A potential counter-argument is that any utterance serving to direct behaviour is necessarily a directive. We show that this behaviour-directing property is shared by some clear non-directives.     

The role of bottom-up confirmation in the phonemic restoration illusion

Phonemic restoration is an illusion in which listeners hear spoken words as intact, even though parts of them have been replaced by an extraneous sound. An improved methodology was used to investigate how much the illusion depends upon the bottom-up confirmation of expectations generated at higher levels. A powerful bottom-up factor was phone class of the sound to be restored, and its acoustic similarity to the sound that replaced it. When white noise was the replacement sound, fricatives were better restored than vowels, whereas the pattern reversed with a pure tone replacement. Including a short silence period increased restoration of stop consonants. The data indicate that phonemic restoration depends upon the interplay between the listener's expectations and the acoustic signal.     

The logical status of natural laws

In this note I have presented the essentials of a view of how laws are falsified, a view which has been held by some notable philosophers but which is radically opposed to that of Professor Popper. I have not scrupled to ‘improve? upon it, so the view of no one philosopher is presented. I try to show that an interesting and convincing account of scientific simplicity is implicit in the theory and I conclude by suggesting how we can bring the argument to bear on the problem of the logical status of laws of nature, showing that through their manner of falsifiability, laws share some characteristics with necessary statements as well as with empirical generalizations.     

The role of perceptual laws in the Rorschach test

The purpose of this study is twofold: to ascertain the perceptual deficits in schizophrenic subjects and to test the assumption that the Rorschach is mainly a perceptual task. Forty-eight subjects participated in the study, distributed in six groups of eight subjects each: normals, affective disorders, and four groups of schizophrenics (chronic paranoid, chronic nonparanoid, acute paranoid, and acute nonparanoid). They were given a perceptual test developed by Fernández-Trespalacios, Bermudez, and Luna (1979). Contrary to previous findings, no differences in the perceptual test were found among the groups. In the second part of the study, a group of schizophrenic subjects was given the Rorschach and the perceptual test in a balanced order. Subsequently, subjects in the experimental group were trained in the perceptual laws they had failed. Comparison of the Rorschach protocols obtained before and after this training failed to show any significant differences in the expected direction, thus questioning the perceptual nature of this test. Interestingly, an increase in negative categories of the Rorschach subsequent to the perceptual training was observed.     

The fundamental laws of physics can tell the truth

Nancy Cartwright's arguments in favour of phenomenological laws and against fundamental ones are discussed. Her criticisms of the standard covering‐law account are extended using Vyacheslav Stjopin's analysis of the structure of fundamental theories. It is argued that Cartwright's thesis (that the laws of physics lie) is too radical to accept. A model of theory change is presented which demonstrates how the fundamental laws of physics can, in fact, be confronted with experience.     

Determinants of confirmation

Epistemologists often suppose that the extent to which evidencee confirms hypothesisH depends on probabilities involvinge andH, and nothing more. We show experimentally that human reasoners sometimes violate this assumption.     

The quality and effectiveness of confirmation classes in Finland

Every year some 90% of 15‐year‐olds in Finland attend confirmation classes in the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, which is greater than the percentage of that age group belonging to the Church. What is behind the popularity of Finnish confirmation classes? This article scrutinizes the quality and effectiveness of confirmation classes. Classes and their quality are approached from three angles: (1) equivalence of confirmation expectations and experiences; (2) participants’ satisfaction; 3) effectiveness of confirmation classes. As its theoretical basis the study leans on the quality of service thinking typically used in market research. The study is based on questionnaire data gathered from young people (n = 1109–1322) before and after participating in confirmation classes. Response rates were 90 and 76%. The findings of the study show that there is no contradiction between the three perspectives of the quality of confirmation classes: those classes for which satisfaction was reported and in which expectations and experiences were fulfilled or exceeded were also those which had the most positive effects on attitudes to Christianity.