Radical behaviorism: A productive and needed philosophy for education

Radical behaviorism is the philosophy of the science of behavior originating in the work of B. F. Skinner and elaborated over the years by a community of researchers, scholars, and practitioners. Radical behaviorism is a complete, or thoroughgoing behaviorism in that all human behavior, public and private, is explained in terms of its functional relations with environmental events. Radical behaviorism is often misrepresented in the literatures of education and psychology. Two fundamental misconceptions of radical behaviorism are that its followers (1) are logical positivists who require that a phenomenon be observed by two or more people before it qualifies for scientific analysis, and (2) either will not or cannot incorporate private events (e.g., thoughts, feelings) into their analyses of human behavior. This paper offers an advocacy perspective on contemporary radical behaviorism. In particular, we define radical behaviorism and briefly outline the history of the term's use in psychological literature, discuss the scientific practice of behavior analysts, explain the intolerance exhibited by radical behaviorists, and comment on the use of popularity as a criterion for good science. The paper concludes with a discussion of the recent shift in educational research and practice from empiricism and outcome-oriented intervention toward a holistic/constructivist philosophy described by its advocates as incompatible with behaviorally-based instruction.     

Psychopathology according to behaviorism: a radical restatement

This article is a radical restatement of the predominant psychopathology, which is characterized by nosological systems and by its approach towards a neurobiological conception of the so-called mental disorders. The "radical" sense of this restatement is that of radical behaviorism itself. As readers will recall, "radical" applied to behaviorism means total (not ignoring anything that interests psychology), pragmatic (referring to the practical sense of knowledge), and it also derives from the Latin word for "root" (and thus implies change beginning at a system's roots or getting to the root of things, in this case, of psychological disorders). Based on this, I introduce the Aristotelian distinction of material and form, which, besides being behaviorist avant la lettre, is used here as a critical instrument to unmask the hoax of psychopathology as it is presented. The implications of this restatement are discussed, some of them already prepared for clinical practice.     

Epistemological barriers to radical behaviorism

The historian and philosopher of science Gaston Bachelard proposed the concept of epistemological barriers to describe the intellectual challenges encountered by scientists in their work. In order to embrace novel ways of approaching a problem in science, scientists must overcome barriers or obstacles posed by their prior views. For example, Einsteinian physics presents scientists with claims that space is curved and that time and space are on the same continuum. We utilize Bachelard's concept of epistemological barriers to describe the differences between the intellectual journeys students pursuing advanced studies face when attempting to accept cognitive psychology or radical behaviorism. We contend that the folk psychological beliefs that students typically hold when entering these studies pose less challenge to cognitive psychology than to radical behaviorism. We also suggest that these barriers may also partly be involved in the problematic exegesis that has plagued radical behaviorism. In close, we offer some suggestions for dealing with these epistemological barriers.     

Teleological behaviorism.

A psychological science of efficient causes, using internal mechanisms to explain overt behavior, is distinguished from another psychological science, based on Aristotelian final causes, using external objects and goals to explain overt behavior. Efficient-cause psychology is designed to answer the question of how a particular act is emitted; final-cause psychology is designed to answer the question of why a particular act is emitted. Physiological psychology, modern cognitive psychology, and some parts of behaviorism including Skinnerian behaviorism are efficient-cause psychologies; final-cause psychology, a development of Skinnerian behaviorism, is here called teleological behaviorism. Each of these two conceptions of causality in psychology implies a different view of the mind, hence a different meaning of mental terms.     

Origins of the cognitive (r)evolution

The well documented cognitive "revolution" was, to a large extent, an evolving return to attitudes and trends that were present prior to the advent of behaviorism and that were alive and well outside of the United States, where behaviorism had not developed any coherent support. The behaviorism of the 1920 to 1950 period was replaced because it was unable to address central issues in human psychology, a failure that was inherent in part in J. B. Watson's founding manifesto with its insistence on the seamless continuity of human and nonhuman animal behavior. The "revolution" was often slow and piecemeal, as illustrated by four conferences held between 1955 and 1966 in the field of memory. With the realization that different approaches and concepts were needed to address a psychology of the human, developments in German, British, and Francophone psychology provided some of the fuel of the "revolution."     

The case for praxics

Since the early 1900s a variety of names has been proposed for the scientific study of behavior, but none has come into general use. "Praxics," a recent entry, is defensible on several grounds. "Behaviorism," on the other hand, is the name of a school of philosophy. Though praxics has roots in behaviorism, the term "behaviorism" should not be applied to praxics. Confusion between the science and the philosophy has retarded the growth of the science immeasurably. Its growth has also been impeded by its association with psychology, which is still primarily the study of mind. Efforts are underway to establish praxics as an independent field.     

Studies in Binocular Interdependence: III. an Active Principle

Explanations of the nature of thought and the methods of study underlying such explanations were explored from the viewpoints of introspective psychology, methodological behaviorism, and radical behaviorism. Empirical support for the radical behaviorists' interpretation of thought as covert operant behavior was examined. An experimental method was developed which attempted to analyze the functional properties of responsereinforcement connections in the environment inside our skins. Verbal reports of the thought behaviors of a group of graduate students in educational psychology were examined and coded in terms of B. F. Skinner's verbal operant categories. The reported thought units were coded in relation to the environmental contexts in which they were reported, and in relation to the environmental contexts in which the thoughts had actually occurred. Major differences in the verbal operant codings, and in the interrater reliabilities of such codings were discovered depending upon the particular environmental context utilized. Results obtained by scoring the reported thought units in relation to the environments in which the thoughts actually occurred were congruent with the paradigm of operant behavior.     

From mechanistic to functional behaviorism.

A shift from mechanistic behaviorism to functional behaviorism is presented against the background of two historical traditions, one with an emphasis on form, the other with an emphasis on function. Skinner's work, which made more contributions to a functional behaviorism than to a mechanistic behaviorism, exemplifies this shift. The two traditions and an account of Skinner's development of functional relations are presented in order to show Skinner's contributions to aligning modern behavior analysis with the functional tradition.     

论现象学心理学的理论特征

现象学心理学将现象学哲学落实到心理学中,反对自然科学心理学的自然主义主张,以维护心理现象的原本面目为己任,成为一种激进的人文科学心理学。其理论特征表现为：严格的现象学哲学观;激进的人文科学观;鲜明的生活面向观;独特的意向性心理本质观;坚实的质性研究观;批判的价值负载观。     

BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY: PAST,PRESENT, AND FUTURE. A REVIEW OF HARRY HEFT'S ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY IN CONTEXT

Relations between behavior analysis and ecological psychology have been strained for years, notwithstanding the occasional comment on their affinities. Harry Heft's (2001) Ecological Psychology in Context provides an occasion for reviewing anew those relations and affinities. It describes the genesis of ecological psychology in James's radical empiricism; addresses Holt's neorealism and Gestalt psychology; and synthesizes Gibson's ecological psychology and Barker's ecobehavioral science as a means for understanding everyday human behavior. Although behavior analysis is excluded from this account, Heft's book warrants a review nonetheless: It describes ecological psychology in ways that are congruent and complementary with behavior analysis (e.g., nonmediational theorizing; the provinces of natural history and natural science). After introducing modern ecological psychology, I comment on (a) Heft's admirable, albeit selective, historiography; (b) his ecological psychology—past and present—as it relates to Skinner's science and system (e.g., affordances, molar behavior); (c) his misunderstandings of Skinner's behaviorism (e.g., reductionistic, mechanistic, molecular); and (d) the theoretical status of Heft's cognitive terms and talk (i.e., in ontology, epistemology, syntax). I conclude by considering the alliance and integration of ecological psychology and behavior analysis, and their implications for unifying and transforming psychology as a life science, albeit more for the future than at present.     

Behavior analysts and cultural analysis: Troubles and issues

THREE STRATEGIC SUGGESTIONS ARE OFFERED TO BEHAVIOR ANALYSTS WHO ARE CONCERNED WITH EXTENDING THE INTERESTS OF OUR DISCIPLINE INTO DOMAINS TRADITIONALLY ASSIGNED TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: (1) to expand our world-view perspectives beyond the boundaries commonly accepted by psychologists in general; (2) to build a cultural analytic framework upon the foundations we have developed for the study of individuals; and (3) to study the works of those social scientists whose views are generally compatible with, and complementary to, our own. Sociologist C. Wright Mills' distinction between troubles and issues and anthropologist Marvin Harris's principles of cultural materialism are related to topics raised by these three strategies. The pervasiveness of the "psychocentric" world view within psychology and the social sciences, and throughout our culture at large, is discussed from the points of view of Skinner, Mills, and Harris. It is suggested that a thorough commitment to radical behaviorism, and continuation of interaction between radical behaviorism and cultural materialism, are necessary for maintaining and extending an issues orientation within the discipline of behavior analysis and for guarding against dilutions and subversions of that orientation by "deviation-dampening" contingencies that exist in our profession and in our culture at large.     

Utopianism in psychology: the case of Wilhelm Reich

This article examines utopian elements in Wilhelm Reich's writings in his American phase (1939-1957) in order to illustrate utopian sources of dynamic psychology. Although there are scholars who have used the term "psychological utopia" and applied it to individual thinkers (Reich, Marcuse, Fromm) and to specific psychological disciplines (psychoanalysis, behaviorism, cognitive psychology), the term itself has remained elusive and vague. Furthermore, there have been few attempts to systematically examine utopian elements in twentieth-century psychology in general and the basic assumptions of psychological utopianism in particular. While pointing out that Reich's orgonomic theories have no scientific merit, this article argues for the relevancy of his ideas for understanding the nature of utopianism in dynamic psychology.     

Conflicts and missed signals in psychoanalysis, behaviorism, and Gestalt psychology

At the turn of the 20th century, European psychologists found themselves in conflict situations with respect to the role that private mental states should play in a scientific psychology. Out of this conflict arose 3 of the best-known schools of the 20th century: psychoanalysis, behaviorism, and Gestalt psychology. Each of these schools is discussed with respect to two characteristics. First, the authors discuss the attitude of each school on the meaning of the word unconscious as it was understood around 1900. Second, the authors discuss the influence of each school on the reception accorded to books written around 1900 espousing viewpoints that did not cohere with the school's beliefs. Such books may be considered "missed signals" in the history of psychology. "Hits" associated with each school are also highlighted.     

Some historical and conceptual relations among logical positivism, operationism, and behaviorism

Historical and conceptual relations among logical positivism, conventional operationism, and behaviorism are examined from the standpoint of Skinner's radical behaviorism. Although logical positivism and conventional operationism sought the formulation and application of an epistemology based strictly upon physicalistic principles and experiential verification, the application of that epistemology in psychology has resulted in the perpetuation, rather than the resolution, of a number of mentalistic, if not outright dualistic, problems.     

Hypothetical high-level cognitive functions cannot be localized in the brain: another argument for a revitalized behaviorism

A key epistemological difference between behaviorism and cognitivism concerns their respective attitudes toward the analysis of so-called cognitive processes into functional modules. Behaviorists generally say it is not possible. Cognitivists argue that this is an achievable goal. The question has been concretized by recent developments in brain imaging technology. A consideration of the matter suggests that technical and conceptual difficulties abound in the effort to localize "high-level cognitive functions" in narrowly circumscribed regions of the brain. Some of the most serious involve the ambiguous definition of the putative mental components that are to be localized and the generally unacknowledged nonlinear complexity of both psychological processes and the brain. In addition, the imaging techniques themselves are replete with technical difficulties that raise additional questions about this particular application, even though these wonderful machines can make extraordinary contributions to our knowledge of brain anatomy and physiology. The cumulative implication of these difficulties is that the cognitive approach to the study of scientific psychology has once again set out on a search for a chimera. New approaches to behaviorism may be required to set psychology back on the correct track.     

未完结的本能：郭任远与中国本能论战

受到达尔文生物进化论的深刻影响, “本能”这一概念在19世纪末至20世纪初逐渐成为人类和动物心理学的核心议题。年轻的中国发展心理生物学家郭任远在美国心理学界掀起了一场声势浩大的反本能运动。返回中国后, 他持续阐发其激进行为主义思想, 推动了“中国现代心理学史上三场争论之一”的本能论战。这场争论不仅促使艾伟、潘菽、高觉敷等心理学家纷纷参与, 还吸引了周建人、李石岑等公共知识分子的目光。郭任远的理论主张与实验工作, 桥接起了本能争论的中国与世界战场, 并激荡起诸多积极、消极与混合反应。论战加速了本能的心理学研究在方法论上从“扶手椅”迈向“实验室”, 也深陷混淆发育解释与进化解释的历史圈套。虽然郭任远及其推动的中国本能论战并没有实现对本能心理学的“完结”, 但却揭示出语义和信仰在科学研究中的认识论价值。这种理论渗透的意识形态最终确立起郭氏在行为科学史上独特的学术地位, 并为本能演变成“未完结”的、开放的科学问题提供动力。