Truths qua Grounds

A number of philosophers have recently found it congenial to talk in terms of grounding. Grounding discourse features grounding sentences that are answers to questions about what grounds what. The goal of this article is to explore and defend a counterpart‐theoretic interpretation of grounding discourse. We are familiar with David Lewis's applications of the method of counterpart theory to de re modal discourse. Counterpart‐theoretic interpretations of de re modal idioms and grounding sentences share similar motivations, mechanisms, and applications. I shall explain my motivations and describe two applications of a counterpart theory for grounding discourse. But, in this article, my main focus is on counterpart‐theoretic mechanisms.     

Hope as Grounds for Forgiveness

It is widely assumed that Christianity enjoins its followers to practice universal, unconditional forgiveness. But universal, unconditional forgiveness is regarded by many as morally problematic. Some Christian scholars have denied that Christianity in fact requires universal, unconditional forgiveness, but I believe they are mistaken. In this essay, I show two things: (1) that Christianity does enjoin universal, unconditional forgiveness of a certain sort, and (2) that Christians, and perhaps other theists, are always justified in exercising unconditional forgiveness. Though most philosophers treat forgiveness as grounded in our beliefs about the offender's current state, I argue that we might more fruitfully ground forgiveness in hope for the wrongdoer. Christianity's commitment to the existence of an omnipotent God who is concerned about the moral status of His creatures always justifies such hope and thus always justifies forgiveness.     

More Grounds for Grounding Nominalism

Philosophia - In this paper, I examine Peter Schulte’s “Grounding Nominalism” (Schulte, 2018), understood as the claim that first-order properties and relations are grounded in...     

论点一定要有论据支撑

本刊上两期发表了几篇批评风水说的文章,引起了一些关注,其中包括声称是“反对迷信,支持无神论”的任重、陈仪先生。他们认为本刊的“风水专题”“基本上认为风水十恶不赦,应该彻底否定”,而他们认为这是值得商榷的。于是,他们随信寄来了《古代风水的本质是人与自然的和谐》(《和谐》)一文,和本刊商榷。商榷自然是可以的。认为古代风水是人与自然的和谐,也是作者的学术自由。不过本刊坚持的宗旨是,论点有自由,但论据必须真实可靠。真实可靠的论据未必有正确的论点,假如论据就不可靠,论点也就难以置信了。所以我们不想和任重、陈仪先生争论风…     

The Moral Grounds of Reasonably Mistaken Self-Defense

Some, but not all, of the mistakes a person makes when acting in apparently necessary self-defense are reasonable: we take them not to violate the rights of the apparent aggressor. I argue that this is explained by duties grounded in agents’ entitlements to a fair distribution of the risk of suffering unjust harm. I suggest that the content of these duties is filled in by a social signaling norm, and offer some moral constraints on the form such a norm can take.     

Subjectivism and the Framework of Constitutive Grounds

Philosophers have applied the framework of constitutive grounds to make sense of the disagreement between subjectivism and objectivism. The framework understands the two theories as being involved in a disagreement about the extent to which value is determined by attitudes. Although the framework affords us with some useful observations about how this should be interpreted, the question how value can be determined by attitudes in the first place is left largely unanswered. Here we explore the benefits of a positive interpretation which aims to address this oversight and make the framework more informative. This interpretation, which is inspired by the recent work of Schroeder (2007) and Sobel (2016), claims that the relevant sense in which value can be determined by attitudes is discovered by seeing how facts can be endowed with the normative property of being a reason. We argue that this interpretation significantly deepens our understanding of the disagreement between subjectivism and objectivism.     

教育转化工作理论与方法研究（一）

本文从教育转化工作实践出发．对教育转化工作的基础理论进行了研究和探讨。     

Search for the Grounds for Mutual Reinforcement

Both PP and IP are the outgrowth of disenchantment with the mainstream western psychology. However, it is argued that these two psychologies are rooted in irreconcilable epistemological traditions. PP calls for a correction in western psychology, to focus less on human pathology and negativity and more on strengths and virtues. Indian Psychology has begun as an alternative psychology, shaped by the spiritual traditions, with emphasis on development of human potentials. IP, in its modern incarnation, is still at a nascent stage and must grow independently till it acquires its own identity and strength. Unless IP collaborates from the position of strength, the danger is real that it may be eventually usurped by the western psychology.     

A test of self‐determination theory in school physical education

Background. Contemporary research conducted in the context of school physical education (PE) has increasingly embraced various tenets of self‐determination theory ( Deci & Ryan, 1985 , 1991 ). Despite this increase in research attention, some postulates of the framework remain unexplored (e.g. impact of a need‐supportive climate). As such, the present study sought to provide a more comprehensive test of self‐determination theory. The present work also examined Deci and Ryan's claim that the motivational sequence embraced by their framework is invariant across gender. Aims. (i) To examine a model of motivation based on the tenets of self‐determination theory, and (ii) explore the invariance of the model across gender. Sample. Participants were 950 British secondary school students (443 male, 490 female, 17 gender not specified) Method. Participants completed a questionnaire that included measures of need support, need satisfaction, motivation, positive and negative affect, task challenge, and concentration. Results. Structural equation modelling (SEM) analysis revealed that students who perceived a need‐supporting environment experienced greater levels of need satisfaction. Need satisfaction predicted intrinsic motivation, which, in turn, linked to adaptive PE‐related outcomes. In contrast, need satisfaction negatively predicted amotivation, which, in turn, was positively predictive of feelings of unhappiness. Multi‐sample SEM invariance testing revealed the model to be largely invariant for male and female students. Conclusions. The results of the study provide support for self‐determination theory and corroborate the application of the framework to the context of school PE. Further, we largely found support for the invariance of the motivational processes embraced by self‐determination theory across gender.     

Framing,Reciprocity and the Grounds of Egalitarian Justice

John Rawls famously claims that ‘justice is the first virtue of social institutions’. On one of its readings, this remark seems to suggest that social institutions are essential for obligations of justice to arise. The spirit of this interpretation has recently sparked a new debate about the grounds of justice. What are the conditions that generate principles of distributive justice? I am interested in a specific version of this question. What conditions generate egalitarian principles of distributive justice and give rise to equality as a demand of justice? My paper focuses on relationalist answers to this question. Advocates of relationalism assume that ‘principles of distributive justice have a relational basis’, in the sense that ‘practice mediated relations in which individuals stand condition the content, scope and justification of those principles’. To say that principles of justice are ‘based’ on and ‘conditioned’ by practice mediated relations is ambiguous. I will here be concerned with advocates of what I call the relationalist requirement, viz. positions which assume that ‘practice mediated relations’ constitute a necessary existence condition for principles of egalitarian distributive justice. Relationalists who endorse this view come in different varieties. My focus is on relationalists that view social and political institutions as the relevant ‘practice mediated relation’. The question at stake, then, is this: Are institutionally mediated relations a necessary condition for equality to arise as a demand of justice? Strong relationalists of the institutionalist cast, call them advocates of the institutionalist requirement, differ in important respects. They argue about what set of institutions is foundationally significant, and they disagree on why only that institutional relation gives rise to egalitarian obligations of justice. My paper engages two ways of arguing for the institutionalist requirement: Julius’s framing argument and Andrea Sangiovanni’s reciprocity argument. The issue at stake are the grounds of egalitarian justice and I will argue that the institutionalist requirement is mistaken. It is not the case that egalitarian obligations of distributive justice arise only between and solely in virtue of individuals sharing a common institution.     

Questions of Strategy: Rejoinder to Jacob and Grounds

Perhaps the best way to respond to Jacob and Grounds' critique is to focus on the more important issues they raise and to clarify some of the apparent confusion. It seems there are several general classes of criticism that Jacob and Grounds have offered: arbitrariness in selection of studies, inconsistency in reporting findings, inaccuracies in the data reported, and an overly favorable conclusion with respect to the communication deviance literature. Each of these issues will be dealt with here, using as many specific illustrations and examples as space permits.     

The theory of multiple stupidities: education,technology and organisation in Arabia

Traditional perspectives have envisaged intelligence as one entity dominated by a single set of abilities (i.e. cognitive abilities), whereas modern perspectives have defined intelligence in various shapes (e.g. linguistic, musical and interpersonal intelligences). By the same token, traditional perspectives have examined stupidity as one set of inabilities (i.e. cognitive inabilities). However, it is not clear whether modern perspectives have discussed whether stupidity exists in various forms—in the same way as they have envisaged intelligence. To address this limitation, 257 university members were asked to share what they perceived as being stupid educational and technological practices in their institutions. Analysis of the data suggested three concepts were important to the members: moral, spatial and administrative stupidities. That is, stupidity is perceived to come in the form of failing to meet certain moral, spatial and administrative values. This implies that modern perspectives may conceptualise stupidity differently from traditional perspectives, seeing it as going beyond cognitive inabilities and viewing it as existing in various forms (e.g. moral, spatial and administrative stupidities). Thus, there are multiple stupidities as there are multiple forms of intelligence. A strength of this research is that it views stupidity through an organisational and qualitative lens, although some may traditionally expect such a topic to be examined quantitatively through psychometric and biological approaches.