Wittgenstein on the Place of the Concept “Noticing an Aspect”

Seeing aspects is a dominant theme in Wittgenstein's 1940s writings on philosophy of psychology. Interpreters disagree about what Wittgenstein was trying to do in these discussions. I argue that interpreting Wittgenstein's observations about the interrelations between “noticing an aspect” and other psychological concepts as a systematic theory of aspect‐seeing diminishes key lessons of Wittgenstein's explorations: these interrelations are enormously complicated and “noticing an aspect” resists neat classification. Further, Wittgenstein invites us to engage in his “placing activity,” and by doing so we are building a skill that is valuable for enabling us to help ourselves when we encounter conceptual difficulties.     

Tom Morawetz's “Robust Enterprise”: Jurisprudence after Wittgenstein

I examine one theme within Tom Morawetz's complex jurisprudential work (stemming from Wittgenstein): the concept of a practice. After considering this theme in some detail, I then sketch a different jurisprudential approach that still proceeds within the inspiration of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Here, I summarise Stanley Cavell's elaborate recounting of Wittgenstein's twin concepts, “criteria” and “grammar.” In a third and final section, I employ this alternative method to provide a brief example of how a Wittgensteinian approach might be made towards explicating and understanding Holmes’ classic claim regarding the need in jurisprudence to separate legal and moral concepts.     

Sense Generation: A “Quasi-Classical” Approach to Concepts and Concept Combination

This article presents a detailed formal approach to concepts and concept combination. Sense generation is a competence-level theory that attempts to respect constraints from the various cognitive sciences, and postulates “quasi-classical” conceptual structures where attributes receive only one value (but are defeasible and so do not represent necessary and sufficient conditions on category membership) and where classification is binary (but explicitly context-sensitive). It is also argued that any general theory of concepts must account for “privative” combinations (e.g., stone lion, fake gun, apparent friend) as extreme test-cases of representational and classificatory flexibility. The approach presented therefore provides a treatment of these combinations. The approach differentiates between the “lexical concept” (the stable information represented in a mental lexicon) which acts as a base from which the various “senses” (flexible contents associated with words and phrases in context, and used in classification) are “generated.” Generation allows nonmonotonicity, so that in different circumstances, different attributes may be defeated or modified. Classification is treated as relative to the perspective adopted, so that a classification acceptable from one perspective may be unacceptable from another, without contradiction. The result is a view that assumes bottom-up priority in concept combination, where the range of senses generated by bottom-up rules of combination is tempered by pragmatic-communicative constraints on classification. An account of the representational and classification behavior of privative combinations is outlined, and the article concludes with a discussion of some of the implications of the approach.     

Third-Party Consent Searches: Legal vs. Social Perceptions of “Common Authority”1

We investigate the degree of correspondence between legal concepts underpinning third-party consent searches (a co-resident permits police search of shared living space and belongings) and laypersons' sociocultural expectations. In accord with the legal concepts, we hypothesized that laypersons would be able to distinguish between authority over (1) exclusive-use vs. common-use areas, and (2) personal effects in exclusive-use vs. common-use areas. But, we also expected that (3) the interpretation of “common authority” would be influenced by the presence vs. absence of the co-resident, and (4) the type of intruder (social, commercial, civil authority, or criminal justice authority) would influence responses to requests for entry. These hypotheses were tested using a fully between-subjects, factorial design (N= 160). Results supported our first three hypotheses. Subjects understood the concept of a warrantless search and distinguished between “exclusive use” areas and “common authority” areas at the level of rooms within the shared residence. Subjects' interpretation of “common authority” for third-party consent purposes was influenced by physical presence of the co-resident. If the co-resident was absent, “common authority” was interpreted as independent consent power. There was no consensual interpretation of “common authority” when the co-resident was present and protested the proposed search. Results suggest situational dependence of lay understandings of “common authority” over jointly used areas.     

Why Do We Still Call Them “Paradoxes”

The fact that therapists label some events “paradoxical” may suggest that our current beliefs or theories are limited in their ability to adequately account for those phenomena. It is argued that our underlying belief in objectivity surrounds therapeutic “paradoxes” with a persistently paradoxical aura, and leads to confusion in our understanding of a variety of phenomena. Maturana's ideas regarding structure determinism, instructive interaction, and phenomenal domains are used to suggest an answer to these difficulties. It is claimed that the problematic status of many theoretical concepts (for example, communication, information, resistance, homeostasis, and pathology) is revealing of something quite important — that the experiential validity of instructive interaction repeatedly leads us into implicitly or explicitly employing instructive interaction in a domain where it can never be valid: the domain of theory and explanation.     

“A definite feel‐it moment”: Embodiment,externalisation and emotion during chair‐work in compassion‐focused therapy

Chair‐work is an experiential method used within compassion‐focused therapy (CFT) to apply compassion to various aspects of the self. This is the first study of CFT chair‐work and is focused on clients' lived experiences of a chair‐work intervention for self‐criticism. Twelve participants with depression were interviewed following the chair‐work intervention and the resulting data were examined using interpretative phenomenological analysis. Three superordinate themes were identified: “embodiment and enactment,” “externalising the self in physical form” and “emotional intensity.” The findings suggest the importance of accessing and expressing various emotions connected with self‐criticism, whilst highlighting the potential for client distress and avoidance during the intervention. The role of embodying, enacting and physically situating aspects of the self in different chairs is also suggested to be an important mechanism of change in CFT chair‐work. The findings are discussed in terms of clinical implications, emphasising how core CFT concepts and practices are facilitated by the chair‐work process.     

That “Ought” Does Not Imply “Right”: Why It Matters for Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethicists sometimes say that a right action is what a virtuous person would do, characteristically, in the circumstances. But some have objected recently that right action cannot be defined as what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances because there are circumstances in which a right action is possible but in which no virtuous person would be found. This objection moves from the premise that a given person ought to do an action that no virtuous person would do, to the conclusion that the action is a right action. I demon‐strate that virtue ethicists distinguish “ought” from “right” and reject the assumption that “ought” implies “right.” I then show how their rejection of that assumption blocks this “right but not virtuous” objection. I conclude by showing how the thesis that “ought” does not imply “right” can clarify a further dispute in virtue ethics regarding whether “ought” implies “can.”     

Intrusiveness and Closeness-Caregiving: Rethinking the Concept of Family “Enmeshment”

This article analyzes the concepts of “enmeshment” and “cohesion” and their entanglement in the field of family therapy. Early theories in this area were concerned primarily with processes of self/other differentiation. More recent theories have favored spatial metaphors that emphasize closeness-distance. We contend that self/other differentiation and closeness-distance are different classes of behavior and that their linkage in the literature has obscured useful distinctions. Our analysis reveals two separate dimensions that clinicians and researchers should consider: Intrusiveness (including coercive control, separation anxiety, possessiveness/jealousy, emotional reactivity, and projective mystification); and Closeness-Caregiving (including warmth, time together, nurturance, physical intimacy, and consistency). We give definitions of these constructs and briefly examine their clinical and gender-related implications.     

ECONOMY OF “INVISIBLE DEBT” AND ETHICS OF “RADICAL HOSPITALITY”: Toward a Paradigm Change of Hospitality from “Gift” to “Forgiveness”

The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct a Christian theology of “hospitality” through a critical reading of Jacques Derrida and Friedrich Nietzsche as well as through an in‐depth biblical and theological reflection on the ethics of hospitality. Out of this reconstructive investigation, I propose a new Christian ethics of hospitality as a radical kind. As a new paradigm, this radical hospitality is distinguished from other types in that it is no longer conceived on the model of “gift”. The new Christian ethics of hospitality is rather reconstructed on the model of “forgiveness” by critically appropriating the concept of “invisible debt” that lies between the hosting citizens and the migrants in the senses of “you owe us your presence” and “I owe you my security and success.” While the hospitality of the gift defines the relationship between the hosting citizens and the migrants as givers and givees, the new paradigm of hospitality identifies this relationship as between creditors and debtors. In this regard, a new Christian hospitality called for unto citizens of the hosting society is a radical kind that challenges them to transcend the creditor‐debtor consciousness.     

MAKING IT EXPLICIT AND CLEAR: FROM “STRONG” TO “HYPER‐” INFERENTIALISM IN BRANDOM AND PEIRCE

Abstract: This article explores how Robert Brandom's original “inferentialist” philosophical framework should be positioned with respect to the classical pragmatist tradition. It is argued that Charles Peirce's original attack (in “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man” and other early papers) on the use of “intuition” in nineteenth‐century philosophy of mind is in fact a form of inferentialism, and thus an antecedent relatively unexplored by Brandom in his otherwise comprehensive and illuminating “tales of the mighty dead.” However, whereas Brandom stops short at a merely “strong” inferentialism, which admits some non‐inferential mental content (although it is parasitic on the inferential and can only be “inferentially articulated”), Peirce embraces a total, that is, “hyper‐,” inferentialism. Some consequences of this difference are explored, and Peirce's more thoroughgoing position is defended.     

Objective Consequentialism and the Rationales of ‘ “Ought” Implies “Can” ’

This paper argues that objective consequentialism is incompatible with the rationales of ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’ – with the considerations, that is, that explain or justify this principle. Objective consequentialism is the moral doctrine that an act is right if and only if there is no alternative with a better outcome, and wrong otherwise. An act is obligatory if and only if it is wrong not to perform it. According to ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’, a person is morally obligated to φ only if the person can φ. The rationales of ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’ include considerations related to intuitive plausibility, action‐guidance, blameworthiness and fairness, and the nature of practical reasons. 1     

Understanding the “cognitive revolution” in psychology

In this paper it is argued that the “cognitive revolution” in psychology is not best represented either as a Kuhnian “paradigm shift,” or as a movement from an instrumentalist to a realist conception of psychological theory, or as a continuous evolution out of more “liberalized” forms of behaviorism, or as a return to the form of “structuralist” psychology practiced by Wundt and Titchener. It is suggested that the move from behaviorism to cognitivism is best represented in terms of the replacement of (operationally defined) “intervening variables” by genuine “hypothetical constructs” possessing cognitive “surplus meaning,” and that the “cognitive revolution” of the 1950s continued a cognitive tradition that can be traced back to the 1920s. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Objective Being and “Ofness” in Descartes

It is generally assumed that Descartes invokes “objective being in the intellect” in order to explain or describe an idea’s status as being “of something.” I argue that this assumption is mistaken. As emerges in his discussion of “materially false ideas” in the Fourth Replies, Descartes recognizes two senses of ‘idea of’. One, a theoretical sense, is itself introduced in terms of objective being. Hence Descartes can’t be introducing objective being to explain or describe “ofness” understood in this sense. Descartes also appeals to a pretheoretical sense of ‘idea of’. I will argue that the notion of objective being can’t serve to explain or describe this “ofness” either. I conclude by proposing an alternative explanation of the role of objective being, according to which Descartes introduces this notion to explain the mind’s ability to attain clear and distinct ideas.     

“I am NN”: A Reconstruction of Anscombe's “The First Person”

This paper develops a way of understanding G. E. M. Anscombe's essay “The First Person” at the heart of which are the following two ideas: first, that the point of her essay is to show that it is not possible for anyone to understand what they express with “I” as an Art des Gegebenseins—a way of thinking of an object that constitutes identifying knowledge of which object is being thought of; and second, that the argument through which her essay seeks to show this is itself first personal in character. Understanding Anscombe's essay in this light has the merit of showing much of what it says to be correct. But it sets us the task of saying what it is that we understand ourselves to express with “I” if not an Art des Gegebenseins, and in particular what it is that we understand ourselves to express with sentences with “I” as subject that might seem to express identity judgments, such as “I am NN”, and “I am this body”.     

Defensive reactions of “wild-type” and “Domesticated” wild rats to approach and contact by a threat stimulus

Selective breeding of wild rats over many generations on the basis of low or high defensive threat and attack to human approach and contact has produced highly polarized “domesticated” and “wild-type” animals. Because the selection procedure selectively involves these two defense patterns, and these clearly differ in the two groups, it is of interest to determine if other, nonselected, defensive behaviors to threat stimuli also change. “Domesticated” and “wild-type” rats of the thirty-fifth generation were run in a fear defense test battery (F/DTB) to systematically evaluate defensive behaviors to a variety of present threat stimuli. “Domesticated” rats showed reduced avoidance and slower flight speed to an approaching experimenter, reduced jump/startle response to handelap and dorsal contact, less vocalization and boxing to vibrissae stimulation or to an anesthetized conspecific, and reduced defensiveness to an attempted pickup by the experimenter. These results indicate that selective bi-directional breeding for defensive threat and attack to human approach and contact produces group differences in a variety of defensive behaviors, and in defensiveness to stimuli other than those on which the selection was based. © 1994 Wiley-Liss, Inc.