Assessment of delusional beliefs during the modification of delusional verbalizations

This study examined the strength of delusional beliefs during the modification of delusional verbalizations of a 51 year-old chronically mentally ill inpatient. The changing-criterion design was used to document the effectiveness of a behavioral treatment package to alter the rate of delusional responses to personal background questions. The results revealed a stepwise decline in the frequency of delusional responses. Generalization effects to novel interviewers were obtained. No changes were obtained on the subject's ratings of delusional beliefs, with the subject assigning ratings of absolute conviction to his beliefs throughout the duration of the study.     

Delusional thinking and cognitive disorder

A hypothesis is presented regarding the genesis of paranoid delusion that attempts to take into account certain data. The data of interest are (a) the failure to find evidence of cognitive impairment in diagnosed paranoid patients, (b) the evidence of perceptual disorder as a primary and prior condition in the natural history of the clinical development of delusions and the empirical relationship of the perceptual disorder to presence of “thought disorder,” (c) the failure to find evidence supporting universal psychodynamic patterns of etiology, (d) appearance of “delusional” phenomena in normal subjects in situations of deviant sensory experience, and (e) the reports of articulate patients writing of their experiences.     

Erroneous verbalizations and risk taking at video lotteries

This study examined the effect of erroneous perceptions verbalized by a game accomplice on participants' gambling. The sample consisted of 22 men and 10 women, aged 18 and older, who did not show excessive gambling problems, but who had played video lotteries at least once during the last 6 months. The participants were randomly assigned into one of three groups, where they gambled in the presence of an accomplicewho verbalized three types of perceptions: (1) the accomplice emitted erroneous thoughts about gambling,(2) the accomplice verbalized adequate thoughts about gambling, or (3) the accomplice did not speak. Results showed that players exposed to an accomplice's erroneous verbalizations took significantly more risksthan players in the other two groups. Erroneous perceptions appear to be easily transmissible and have impacts on gambling behaviour. The practical and theoretical implications of these results are discussed.     

Reducing and measuring inappropriate verbalizations in a token classroom

A procedure was employed that enabled a teacher to bring inappropriate verbalizations under control in a classroom of approximately 25 fifth- and sixth-grade students. Contingent point loss for inappropriate verbalizations was correlated with a low but steady rate of such verbalizations. Point gain contingent upon quiet behavior produced a marked decrease in inappropriate verbalizations. A return to contingent point loss was accompanied by an increasing rate of inappropriate verbalizations. Verbalizations decreased when quiet behavior was reinforced again. A noteworthy feature of the study was the utilization of students from within the class to act as data recorders. A reliability check indicated satisfactory agreement between the recorders.     

Increasing mentally retarded adolescents' verbalizations about current events

The effects of antecedent and consequent events on the verbal behavior of three institutionalized mentally retarded adolescents were examined. Verbal statements, related to current national and international events, were recorded after exposures to television news programs. The study examined the accuracy of verbalizations as a function of: (1) exposures to television news presentations in massed (i.e., viewing the entire news program before an opportunity to describe it) versus distributed from (i.e., viewing each news item separately with each followed by an opportunity to describe it), and (2) contingent tokens and social praise for correct verbal responses (i.e., statements corresponding to news items presented). Both the temporal distribution of news presentations and the reinforcement procedures improved the accuracy of verbal statements emitted by the subjects.     

Stakes and beliefs

The idea that beliefs may be stake-sensitive is explored. This is the idea that the strength with which a single, persistent belief is held may vary and depend upon what the believer takes to be at stake. The stakes in question are tied to the truth of the belief—not, as in Pascal’s wager and other cases, to the belief’s presence. Categorical beliefs and degrees of belief are considered; both kinds of account typically exclude the idea and treat belief as stake-invariant, though an exception is briefly described. The role of the assumption of stake-invariance in familiar accounts of degrees of belief is also discussed, and morals are drawn concerning finite and countable Dutch book arguments.     

The functional role of preschoolers' verbalizations in the generalization of self-instructional training

We examined the functional role of verbalizations in the generalization of self-instructional training with preschoolers. Children learned to overtly self-instruct during classroom work periods prior to covert training. Data were collected on children's acquisition of verbal regulation during training and on overt use of self-instructions in the classroom generalization setting. Results of a multiple baseline design across subjects indicated that treatment effects were evident in the training setting but did not generalize to the classroom until children were emitting overt self-instructions in the classroom itself. The production of self-verbalizations in the generalization setting was related to changes in correct responding, on-task behavior, and efficiency in completing academic work.     

Autonomy and false beliefs

The majority of current attention on the question of autonomy has focused on the internal reflection of the agent. The quality of an agent’s reflection on her potential action (or motivating desire or value) is taken to determine whether or not that action is autonomous. In this paper, I argue that there is something missing in most of these contemporary accounts of autonomy. By focusing overwhelmingly on the way in which the agent reflects, such accounts overlook the importance of what the agent is reflecting upon. Whichever of these current formulations of autonomy we accept, reflection could be undertaken in full accordance with the conditions set, and yet the action fail to be autonomous. This will occur, I argue, if the agent is mistaken about the object of her reflection. More precisely, if she has a particular kind of false belief about the action she is contemplating undertaking, then no amount of reflection can render that action autonomous. This suggests the need for externalist conditions to be incorporated into an account of autonomy.     

Irrational beliefs and personality

This study investigated the relationship between irrational beliefs and the nonpathological personality characteristics origence and intellectence described by Welsh (1972, 1975b). The Adjective Check List (ACL) and the Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT) were administered to 319 college students. Data were analyzed for the entire sample and for males and females separately. In each case, two combinations of scores yielding significant canonical correlation coefficients were produced. The results offer a refinement to Ellis' personality model and suggest that irrational beliefs are insufficient as indications of psychopathology.