Randomness, game theory and free will

Libertarians claim that human behaviour is undetermined and cannot be predicted from knowledge of past history even in principle since it is based on the random movements of quantum mechanics. Determinists on the other hand deny thatmacroscopic phenomena can be activated bysub-microscopic events, and assert that if human action is unpredictable in the way claimed by libertarians, it must be aimless and irrational. This is not true of some types of random behaviour described in this paper. Random behaviour may make one unpredictable to opponents and may therefore be rational. Similarly, playing a game with a mixed strategy may have an unpredictable outcome in every single play, but the strategy is rational, in that it is meant to maximize the expected value of an objective, be it private or social. As to whether the outcome of such behaviour is genuinely unpredictable as in quantum mechanics, or predictable by a hypothetical outside observer knowing all natural laws, it is argued that it makes no difference in practice, as long as it is not humanly predictable. Thus we have a new version of libertarianism which is compatible with determinism.     

Portraying Myth More Convincingly: Critical Approaches to Myth in the Classical and Romantic Periods

The article examines the treatment of myth by Moritz, Goethe, Hegel and Schelling or the so‐called ‘Goethezeit’.     

Response to Oud & Folmer: Randomness and Residuals

This article presents our response to Oud and Folmer's “Modeling Oscillation, Approximately or Exactly?” (2011), which criticizes aspects of our article, “Latent Differential Equation Modeling of Self-Regulatory and Coregulatory Affective Processes” (2011). In this response, we present a conceptual explanation of the derivative-based estimation that we implemented in our original article, as well as the exact discrete model promoted by Oud &; Folmer. We describe relevant differences between each of the two methods, highlight some of their benefits and limitations, and offer justifications for our choice.     

7～14岁儿童随机性认知的发展

采用三个典型的随机性认知任务(点分布认知,一维分布认知,二维分布认知)系统考察了7~14岁儿童随机性认知的发展特点。结果发现,随机性认知的发展随年龄增长而动态变化,7~10岁表现出上升趋势,而11~14岁表现出下降趋势。点分布认知的发展在7~11岁为缓慢上升,至12~14岁保持稳定。一维分布认知的发展在7~10岁为缓慢上升,在11岁开始迅速下降,至13~14岁趋于稳定。二维分布认知的发展在7~14岁始终处于较低水平。10~11岁是随机性认知发展的重要时期。     

Efficacy of the three Randomness Validity Scales for the Jesness Inventory

Efficacies of the three randomness validity scales for the Jesness Inventory were investigated: the Jesness Variable Response Inconsistency scale (J-VRIN), the Variable Response scale (VR), and the Randomness scale (RD). Effectiveness was assessed by comparing the protocols of 93 male and 45 female delinquents ages 14 to 18 years screened for probable randomness, with a matched-pair MMPI-Adolescent with 500 computer-generated all- and half-random protocols. With the all-random set, for specificities of .90 or higher, scales showed sensitivities as high as .95 (VR), .90 (J-VRIN), and .14 (RD). With the half-random protocol, set sensitivities were .74 (VR), .70 (J-VRIN), and .07 (RD). Predictive power and overall effectiveness are reported for base rates of .20, .10, .067, and .05.     

Searching for Control: Priming Randomness Increases the Evaluation of Ritual Efficacy

Reestablishing feelings of control after experiencing uncertainty has long been considered a fundamental motive for human behavior. We propose that rituals (i.e., socially stipulated, causally opaque practices) provide a means for coping with the aversive feelings associated with randomness due to the perception of a connection between ritual action and a desired outcome. Two experiments were conducted (one in Brazil [n = 40] and another in the United States [n = 94]) to evaluate how the perceived efficacy of rituals is affected by feelings of randomness. In a between‐subjects design, the Scramble Sentence Task was used as a priming procedure in three conditions (i.e., randomness, negativity, and neutral) and participants were then asked to rate the efficacy of rituals used for problem‐solving purposes. The results demonstrate that priming randomness increased participants' perception of ritual efficacy relative to negativity and neutral conditions. Implications for increasing our understanding of the relationship between perceived control and ritualistic behavior are discussed.     

Reasons for Randomness: A Solution to the Axiological Problem for Theists

Abstract

In this paper we bring to light several ways randomness—i.e., undetermined and unintended events—may contribute to our understanding of God's providence and personality. We begin by making clearer a certain problem that randomness has been thought to pose to theism. We then discuss recent criticisms of certain contemporary solutions to this problem that emphasize the value of an autonomous creation. From there, we propose a fresh way of understanding the value of a semi-autonomous creation that does not succumb to these recent critiques. Our end goal is to explore new reasons God might have to value randomness. In particular, we highlight two plausible, interrelated candidate values: (1) There are certain aesthetic properties that a partially random, self-forming creation enjoys; and (2) Such a creation grants God and creatures certain pleasures, such as wonder, anticipation, curiosity, surprise, and appreciation. In articulating our version of the autonomy defense, we position it within two opposing accounts of divine providence, specifically open theism and simple foreknowledge.     

Randomness in retrospect: Exploring the interactions between memory and randomness cognition

People tend to believe that sequences of random events produce fewer and shorter streaks than is actually the case. Although this error has been demonstrated repeatedly and in many forms, nearly all studies of randomness cognition have focused on how people think about random events occurring in the present or future. This article examines how our biased beliefs about randomness interact with properties of memory to influence our judgments about and memory for past random events. We explore this interaction by examining how beliefs about randomness affect our memory for random events and how certain properties of memory alter our tendency to categorize events as random. Across three experiments, we demonstrate an interaction between randomness cognition and three well-established but distinct properties of memory: (1) the reconstructive nature of memory, (2) primacy and recency effects, and (3) duration neglect. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.