Frege's Puzzle is About Identity After All

Many philosophers have argued or taken for granted that Frege's puzzle has little or nothing to do with identity statements. I show that this is wrong, arguing that the puzzle can only be motivated relative to a thinker's beliefs about the identity or distinctness of the relevant object. The result is important, as it suggests that the puzzle can be solved, not by a semantic theory of names or referring expressions as such, but simply by a theory of identity statements. To show this, I sketch a framework for developing solutions of this sort. I also consider how this result could be implemented by two influential solutions to Frege's puzzle, Perry's referential‐reflexivism and Fine's semantic relationism.     

Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson as Cultural Icons of U.S. Foreign Policy

The conventional account of American diplomacy in the modern era is marked by a cultural tension between realist and idealist themes symbolized by the statecraft of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. However, a revisionist account has emerged to challenge and even reverse the conventional account of Roosevelt and Wilson. This poses an intriguing empirical puzzle that is essentially psychological, as it pertains to the belief systems of these two presidents. In order to investigate this puzzle and its implications for U.S. strategic culture, we employ an automated content analysis of the public statements by the two leaders regarding their operational code beliefs about the nature of the political universe and the best approach to effective political action. The results reveal similarities and differences in their belief systems and illustrate how psychological models can provide insights into the psychocultural origins of U.S. diplomacy that remain relevant to the present day.     

A puzzle about epistemic akrasia

In this paper I will present a puzzle about epistemic akrasia, and I will use that puzzle to motivate accepting some non-standard views about the nature of epistemological judgment. The puzzle is that while it seems obvious that epistemic akrasia must be irrational, the claim that epistemic akrasia is always irrational amounts to the claim that a certain sort of justified false belief—a justified false belief about what one ought to believe—is impossible. But justified false beliefs seem to be possible in any domain, and it’s hard to see why beliefs about what one ought to believe should be an exception. I will argue that when we get clearer about what sort of psychological state epistemic akrasia is, we can resolve the puzzle in favor of the intuitive view that epistemic akrasia is always irrational.     

A Puzzle about Consent in Research and in Practice

In this paper, I will examine a puzzling discrepancy between the way clinicians are allowed to treat their patients and the way researchers are allowed to treat their subjects: in certain cases, researchers are legally required to disclose quite a bit more information when obtaining consent from prospective subjects than clinicians are when obtaining consent from prospective patients. I will argue that the proper resolution of this puzzling discrepancy must appeal to a pragmatic criterion of disclosure for informed consent: that what needs to be disclosed in order for consent to be valid depends on what the patient/subject needs to know in order to make a decision. I will then use this pragmatic criterion of disclosure to argue that when obtaining consent researchers should be permitted to omit the same information clinicians are, given certain qualifications. I will also examine how this puzzle forces us to confront some perhaps surprising truths about valid consent. My broader aim in this paper is to examine, not so much the puzzle itself, but rather what this particular puzzle can teach us about more theoretical issues surrounding informed consent.     

Plato on the role of contradiction in education

In this paper, I will look at two passages from the discussion of education in Book VII of Plato’s Republic: 523b-524d and 537e-539d. These passages, when taken together, present a puzzle for the coherency of the educational programme Socrates describes. Both discuss contradiction. One says that contradiction is educationally edifying, the other, that it is corrupting. This sounds like a contradiction about contradiction. As far as I know, no one has noticed this puzzle before. By the end of this paper, I hope to have not only provided a solution to the apparent contradiction about contradiction that is compelling, but also one that shows that this puzzle, which might at first have seemed restricted to a textual issue about the educational programme in the Republic, is in fact one that has far reaching implications for a range of Plato’s theories across several dialogues. Along with education, corruption, and contradiction, I will discuss Plato’s theory of psychology, and his theory of forms.     

A Puzzle About Ineffable Propositions

I will argue for localism about credal assignments: the view that credal assignments are well-defined only relative to suitably constrained sets of possibilities. I will motivate the position by suggesting that it is the best way of addressing a puzzle devised by Roger White.     

Estimating Conditional Chances and Evaluating Counterfactuals

The paper addresses a puzzle about the probabilistic evaluation of counterfactuals, raised by Ernest Adams as a problem for his own theory. I discuss Brian Skyrms’s response to the puzzle. I compare this puzzle with other puzzles about counterfactuals that have arisen more recently. And I attempt to solve the puzzle in a way that is consistent with Adams’s proposal about counterfactuals.     

Why are dunkels sticky? Preschoolers infer functionality and intentional creation for artifact properties learned from generic language

Artifacts pose a potential learning problem for children because the mapping between their features and their functions is often not transparent. In solving this problem, children are likely to rely on a number of information sources (e.g., others’ actions, affordances). We argue that children’s sensitivity to nuances in the language used to describe artifacts is an important, but so far unacknowledged, piece of this puzzle. Specifically, we hypothesize that children are sensitive to whether an unfamiliar artifact’s features are highlighted using generic (e.g., “Dunkels are sticky”) or non-generic (e.g., “This dunkel is sticky”) language. Across two studies, older—but not younger—preschoolers who heard such features introduced via generic statements inferred that they are a functional part of the artifact’s design more often than children who heard the same features introduced via non-generic statements. The ability to pick up on this linguistic cue may expand considerably the amount of conceptual information about artifacts that children derive from conversations with adults.     

The paradoxes of analysis and synonymy

The very idea of informative analysis gives rise to a well-known paradox. Yet a parallel puzzle, herein called the paradox of synonymy, arises for statements which do not express analyses. The paradox of synonymy has a straightforward metalinguistic solution: certain words are referring to themselves. Likewise, the paradox of analysis can be solved by recognizing that certain expressions in an analysis statement are referring to their own semantic structures.     

Number words and reference to numbers

A realist view of numbers often rests on the following thesis: statements like ‘The number of moons of Jupiter is four’ are identity statements in which the copula is flanked by singular terms whose semantic function consists in referring to a number (henceforth: Identity). On the basis of Identity the realists argue that the assertive use of such statements commits us to numbers. Recently, some anti-realists have disputed this argument. According to them, Identity is false, and, thus, we may deny that the relevant statements commit us to numbers. The present paper argues that the correct linguistic analysis of the relevant number statements supports the anti-realist view that Identity is false. However, as will further be shown, pace the anti-realist, this analysis does not establish that such statements do not commit us to numbers after all.     

A puzzle about epistemic value and steps towards a solution

Synthese - This paper exposits and makes steps towards solving a puzzle about epistemic value. The puzzle is that several principles about the epistemic value of true beliefs and epistemic disvalue...     

Belief,quasi-belief,and obsessive-compulsive disorder

Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) poses a puzzle about beliefs: Those with OCD experience anxiety and motivation suggesting that they believe something, even though they may profess not to believe that very thing. OCD also poses a puzzle about free will, since persons with OCD often describe their behavior as compelled, though it is unclear how it is compelled. This paper argues that at least some cases of OCD are best described as being driven by “quasi-beliefs” which have some, but not all, of the functional properties of beliefs. (A brief discussion contrasts these quasi-beliefs with the “aliefs” recently posited by Tamar Gendler.) An alternative to the quasi-belief account of OCD is the claim is that OCD can be explained in terms of ordinary beliefs that simply have irrational contents. The paper argues that the quasi-belief account of OCD fits the empirical details of the disorder better than alternative accounts.     

An empirical solution to the puzzle of weakness of will

This paper presents an empirical solution to the puzzle of weakness of will. Specifically, it presents a theory of action, grounded in contemporary cognitive neuroscientific accounts of decision making, that explains the phenomenon of weakness of will without resulting in a puzzle.     

Fundamentality without Foundations

A commonly held view is that a central aim of metaphysics is to give a fundamental account of reality which refers only to the fundamental entities. But a puzzle arises. It is at least a working hypothesis for those pursuing the aim that, first, there must be fundamental entities. But, second, it also seems possible that the world has no foundation, with each entity depending on others. These two claims are inconsistent with the widely held third claim that the fundamental just is the foundational. It is tempting to resolve the puzzle by rejecting the first or second claim, perhaps because it is obscure how the third claim might plausibly be challenged. But I develop a new analysis of fundamentality which challenges the third claim by allowing for an entity to be fundamental without being foundational. The analysis, roughly, is that an entity is fundamental (or ineliminable, as I call it) just in case not all facts about it are grounded in facts about other entities. The possibility of fundamentality without foundations not only provides for a novel resolution to the puzzle, but has applications to some live debates: for example, it undermines Jonathan Schaffer's modal argument for priority monism.     

Maximum vs. minimum values: Preferences of speakers and listeners for upper and lower limit estimates

Estimates about uncertain quantities can be expressed in terms of lower limits (more than X, minimum X), or upper limits (less than Y, maximum Y). It has been shown that lower limit statements generally occur much more often than upper limit statements (Halberg & Teigen, 2009). However, in a conversational context, preferences for upper and lower limit statements will be moderated by the concerns of the interlocutors. We report three studies asking speakers and listeners about their preferences for lower and upper limit statements, in the domains of distances, durations, and prices. It appears that travellers prefer information about maximum distances and maximum durations, and buyers (but not sellers) prefer to be told about maximum prices and maximum delivery times. Mistaken maxima are at the same time regarded as more “wrong” than mistaken minima. However, this preference for “worst case” information is not necessarily shared by providers of information (advisors), who are also concerned about being blamed if wrong.     

Intentions and Causes, Actions and Right Actions

I argue in this essay that belief/desire explanations are not logically true and not causal, and further that the antecedent of a true belief/desire conditional cannot be strengthened in such a way as to transform it into a true causal statement. I also argue that belief/desire explanations are not dispensable: they are presupposed in our justifications of scientific claims. The proposal is not that psychological determinism is false, but that some at least of our activities are not describable in causal terms. These arguments prepare the ground for a puzzle. If all human intentional behaviour is caused, then all actual linkages between psychological states and behaviour should be expressed in causal statements. But neither the action of asserting a causal statement nor the action of justifying the assertion can be described as the result of a cause. Therefore if one accepts that scientific claims can be justified, not all linkages between psychological states and subsequent action are expressible in causal statements. I do not offer a solution to this puzzle.     

How to refrain from answering Kripke’s puzzle

In this paper, I investigate the prospects for using the distinction between rejection and denial to resolve Saul Kripke??s puzzle about belief. One puzzle Kripke presents in ??A Puzzle About Belief?? poses what would have seemed a fairly straightforward question about the beliefs of the bilingual Pierre, who is disposed to sincerely and reflectively assent to the French sentence ??Londres est jolie??, but not to the English sentence ??London is pretty??, both of which he understands perfectly well. The question to be answered is whether Pierre believes that London is pretty, and Kripke argues, of each answer, that it is unacceptable. On my proposal, either answer to the question is to be rejected, but neither answer is to be denied, using the resource of partially-defined predicates. After demonstrating how this serves as a solution to the puzzle, I illustrate some philosophical motivations??independent of Kripke??s puzzle??for adopting a view on which belief is a partially defined predicate. I conclude that there are decent prospects for the proposed response to Kripke??s puzzle.     

Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs

The author presents and defends a general view about belief, and certain attributions of belief, with the intention of providing a solution to Saul Kripke's puzzle about belief. According to the position developed in the paper, there are two senses in which one could be said to have contradictory beliefs. Just one of these senses threatens the rationality of the believer; but Kripke's puzzle concerns only the other one. The general solution is then extended to certain variants of Kripke's original puzzle, which have to do with belief attributions containing empty names and kind terms.     

Revising Benardete’s Zeno

The majority of disucssions of Benardete’s Paradox conclude that the traveller approaching the infinite series of gods will be mysteriously halted despite none of the gods erecting any barriers. Using a revision-theoretic analysis of Benardete’s puzzle, four distinct possible outcomes that might occur given Benardete’s set-up are distinguished. This analysis provides additional insight into the puzzle at hand, via identifying heretofore unnoticed possible outcomes, but it also serves as an example of how the revision theoretic framework can be used to construct exhaustive taxonomies of potential outcomes in apparently contradictory situations.

     

Chisholm's Grand Move

Abstract: Roderick Chisholm famously held that our knowledge of the world is supported entirely by a foundation of self‐justifying statements, none of which logically implies the existence of any physical object in that world. The only contingent statements to be found in the foundation, he maintained, are those that are “about our own psychological states and the ways we are ‘appeared to’.” It is a view that, as Chisholm was well aware, tallies poorly with our ordinary practice of justifying statements. We are typically happy to justify statements by ultimate appeal to what we have seen or heard; that is, by ultimate appeal to statements that logically imply that certain things in the world are as we take them to be. This essay examines how Chisholm sought to explain away this apparent disconfirmation of foundationalism by ordinary practice—in effect, how Chisholm responded to one of the chief criticisms of foundationalism launched by J. L. Austin. My suggestion will be that, when the dust clears, it is Austin who comes out ahead.