On the utility of looking in the “wrong” direction1

In his reply to Lamiell, Foss, and Cavenee (1980), Shweder (1980) fails to address an important question: Did the behavior report task used by Lamiell et al. meet his requirements for a “diffieult memory condition,” or did it not? In light of the nature of the illusory correlation hypothesis and Lamiell et al.'s findings, it is explained that for any of three possible answers to this question (yes, no, or maybe) the integrity of the illusory correlation hypothesis in its present form is compromised. It is also explained that further research on the hypothesis is likely to be pointless, because Lamiell et al.'s findings suggest that it is not salvageable in any form. Finally, it is explained that the incompatibility between lay persons' usage of personality concepts and the study of individual differences does not lead inextricably to the conclusion that the former have no legitimate role to play in a science of personality.     

A New Perspective Concerning Experiments on Semantic Intuitions

Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich [2004; forthcoming] use experimental methods to raise a spectre of doubt about reliance on intuitions in developing theories of reference which are then deployed in philosophical arguments outside the philosophy of language. Machery et al. ran a cross-cultural survey asking Western and East Asian participants about a famous case from the philosophical literature on reference (Kripke's Gödel example). They interpret their results as indicating that there is significant variation in participants' intuitions about semantic reference for that case. We argue that this interpretation is mistaken. We detail a type of ambiguity found in Machery et al.'s probe but not yet noted in the response literature. We argue that this epistemic ambiguity could have affected their results. We do not stop there, however: Rather than rest content with a possibility claim, we ran four studies to test the impact of this ambiguity on participants' responses. We found that this accounts for much of the variation in Machery et al.'s original experiment. We conclude that in the light of our new data, their argument is no longer convincing.     

A Multiple‐Channel Model of Task‐Dependent Ambiguity Resolution in Sentence Comprehension

Traxler, Pickering, and Clifton (1998) found that ambiguous sentences are read faster than their unambiguous counterparts. This so‐called ambiguity advantage has presented a major challenge to classical theories of human sentence comprehension (parsing) because its most prominent explanation, in the form of the unrestricted race model (URM), assumes that parsing is non‐deterministic. Recently, Swets, Desmet, Clifton, and Ferreira (2008) have challenged the URM. They argue that readers strategically underspecify the representation of ambiguous sentences to save time, unless disambiguation is required by task demands. When disambiguation is required, however, readers assign sentences full structure—and Swets et al. provide experimental evidence to this end. On the basis of their findings, they argue against the URM and in favor of a model of task‐dependent sentence comprehension. We show through simulations that the Swets et al. data do not constitute evidence for task‐dependent parsing because they can be explained by the URM. However, we provide decisive evidence from a German self‐paced reading study consistent with Swets et al.'s general claim about task‐dependent parsing. Specifically, we show that under certain conditions, ambiguous sentences can be read more slowly than their unambiguous counterparts, suggesting that the parser may create several parses, when required. Finally, we present the first quantitative model of task‐driven disambiguation that subsumes the URM, and we show that it can explain both Swets et al.'s results and our findings.     

Newman and Quasi-Fideism: A Reply to Duncan Pritchard

Abstract: In recent years, Duncan Pritchard has developed a position in religious epistemology called quasi-fideism that he claims traces back to John Henry Newman's treatment of the rationality of religious belief. In this paper, we give three reasons to think that Pritchard's reading of Newman as a quasi-fideist is mistaken. First, Newman's parity argument does not claim that religious and non-religious beliefs are on a par because both are groundless; instead, for Newman, they are on a par because both often stem from implicit rather than explicit reasoning. Second, pace Pritchard, Newman's distinction between simple and complex assent does not map onto the Wittgensteinian distinction between groundless hinge commitments and beliefs that flow from these hinges. For Newman, simple and complex assent differ in terms of the believer's level of awareness of their grounds. Third, and finally, Newman does not reject Locke's evidentialism in toto. Instead, he argues that certitude is not restricted to beliefs stemming from intuition and demonstration but often rightly includes probabilistically supported (or fallibly evidenced) beliefs.     

Two Dogmatists

Grice and Strawson's ‘In Defense of a Dogma’ is admired even by revisionist Quineans such as Putnam (1962) who should know better. The analytic/synthetic distinction they defend is distinct from that which Putnam successfully rehabilitates. Theirs is the post‐positivist distinction bounding a grossly enlarged analytic. It is not, as they claim, the sanctified product of a long philosophic tradition, but the cast‐off of a defunct philosophy ‐ logical positivism. The fact that the distinction can be communally drawn does not show that it is based on a real difference. Sub‐categories that can be grouped together by enumeration will do the trick. Quine's polemical tactic (against which Grice and Strawson protest) of questioning the intelligibility of the distinction is indeed objectionable, but his argument can be revived once it is realized that ‘analytic’ et al. are theoretic terms, and there is no extant theory to make sense of them. Grice and Strawson's paradigm of logical impossibility is, in fact, possible. Their attempt to define synonymy in Quinean terms is a failure, nor can they retain analyticity along with the Quinean thesis of universal revisability. The dogma, in short, is indefensible.     

On the meaning and the epistemological relevance of the notion of a scientific phenomenon

In this paper I offer an appraisal of James Bogen and James Woodward’s distinction between data and phenomena which pursues two objectives. First, I aim to clarify the notion of a scientific phenomenon. Such a clarification is required because despite its intuitive plausibility it is not exactly clear how Bogen and Woodward’s distinction has to be understood. I reject one common interpretation of the distinction, endorsed for example by James McAllister and Bruce Glymour, which identifies phenomena with patterns in data sets. Furthermore, I point out that other interpretations of Bogen and Woodward’s distinction do not specify the relationship between phenomena and theories in a satisfying manner. In order to avoid this problem I propose a contextual understanding of scientific phenomena according to which phenomena are states of affairs which play specific roles in scientific practice and to which we adopt a special epistemic attitude. Second, I evaluate the epistemological significance of Bogen and Woodward’s distinction with respect to the debate between scientific realists and constructive empiricists. Contrary to what Bogen and Woodward claim, I argue that the distinction does not provide a convincing argument against constructive empiricism.     

Reducing cognitive complexity in a hypothetico-deductive reasoning task

The confusion/non-consequential thinking explanation proposed by Newstead, Girotto, and Legrenzi (1995) for poor performance on Wason's THOG problem (a hypothetico-deductive reasoning task) was examined in three experiments with 300 participants. In general, as the cognitive complexity of the problem and the possibility of non-consequential thinking were reduced, correct performance increased. Significant but weak facilitation (33-40% correct) was found in Experiment 1 for THOG classification instructions that did not include the indeterminate response option. Substantial facilitation (up to 75% correct) was obtained in Experiment 2 with O'Brien et al.'s (1990) one-other-THOG classification instruction. In Experiment 3, a revised version of O'Brien et al.'s pre-test problem format also led to substantial facilitation, even with the use of the standard three-choice THOG classification instruction. These findings are discussed in terms of Newstead et al.'s theoretical proposal and possible attentional factors.     

The Wonder and Spirit of Phenomenology and Theology: Rubenstein and Derrida on Heidegger's Formal Distinction of Philosophy from Theology

While Heidegger's earlier phenomenological writings inform much contemporary discourse in the continental philosophy of religion, his 1927 essay on ‘Phenomenology and Theology’ offers a largely uncontested distinction between philosophy and theology on the basis of their possibilities as sciences following ontological difference. This paper reconsiders Heidegger's distinction by invoking spirit and wonder, concepts Jacques Derrida and Mary‐Jane Rubenstein have more recently emphasized as central to thought that is open to that which ruptures metaphysical schemas. I contend Heidegger's use of ontological difference as a formal distinction between philosophy and theology distances us from the wonder, spirit, and truth (alētheia) that undoes the binaries behind which we take shelter. However, I temper this critique with the recognition that Heidegger, Derrida, and Rubenstein equally recognize an inescapable repetition of metaphysical thinking in the philosophy of religion.     

Election predictions: Reply

Contrary to Aubert's claim, my paper on election predictions does not seek to draw empirical conclusions from mathematical premisses alone. The empirical premiss, approximated by the continuity assumption, is that sufficiently small changes in the predicted vote will cause only small changes in the actual vote. The technical criticisms by Øfsti and Østerberg of the reaction function are answered by specifying the function's domain. Other criticisms are also answered, and the reply concludes by placing the election prediction theorem in the context of other theorizing about human expectations and outguessing phenomena.     

Delinquency in gangs — Selection or socialization?

Thornberry, Krohn, Lizotte, and Chard-Wierschem's (1993) introduced three models to account for why gangs are associated with high levels of delinquency. Existing research using Thornberry et al.'s (1993) models to explain the gang-delinquency association has been inconclusive. This paper seeks to address this gap in research by incorporating Moffitt's (1993) developmental taxonomy of delinquency within Thornberry et al.'s (1993) explanatory models. A few proposals are put forth in this paper: (1) support for Thornberry et al.'s (1993) models depends on developmental stage of the individual, (2) the selection model explains delinquency of life-course-persistent gang members, while social facilitation model explains delinquency of adolescence-limited gang members, and (3) support for the enhancement model is an artifact of assuming a homogenous gang sample.     

A META-ANALYSIS OF CONDITIONAL REASONING TESTS OF AGGRESSION

James et al. (2005) reported an estimate of criterion-related validity (corrected only for dichotomization of criteria) of r = .44 across 11 conditional reasoning test of aggression (CRT-Aggression) validity studies. This meta-analysis incorporated a total sample size more than twice that of James et al. Our comparable validity estimate for CRT-Aggression scales predicting counterproductive work behaviors was r = .16. Validity for the current, commercially marketed test version (CRT-A) was lower (r = .10). These validity estimates increased somewhat (into the .24–.26 range) if studies using dichotomous criteria with low base rates were excluded from the meta-analysis. CRT-Aggression scales were correlated r = .14 with measures of job performance. As we differed with James et al. in some of our coding decisions, we reran all analyses using James et al.'s coding decisions and arrived at extremely similar results.     

Loneliness and social monitoring: A conceptual replication of Knowles et al.

Contrary to the claim that loneliness routinely impairs the decoding of social cues such as emotion displays, Knowles, Lucas, Baumeister, and Gardner (2015) proposed that lonely adults “choke under pressure,” experiencing impairments only when social monitoring is framed as diagnostic of general social skill. In four experiments, Knowles et al. showed that lonely individuals performed worse than nonlonely individuals at decoding social cues when the decoding task was framed as a test of social aptitude, but not when it was framed as a test of academic aptitude. The studies were small (N's ranging from 78 to 203), and all employed a convenience sample of mostly female undergraduate students, impairing both statistical power and external validity. In addition, the lack of a true control group precluded the studies from establishing whether loneliness inhibits social monitoring ability if no frame is offered. This study conceptually replicates the central hypothesis of Knowles et al. using a sample of adults that is substantially larger and more diverse demographically and geographically, and using a true control group in addition to the comparison group. Results revealed a significant main effect of loneliness on social monitoring ability but did not replicate the choking under pressure phenomenon.     

Analyzing the scientific foundation of Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome: A reply to Lyon et al.

The issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Frye hearing New Jersey v. J.L.G. (2018) was whether the scientific community agreed that Summit's (1983) Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome rested on a firm scientific foundation. Lyon et al. (this issue) critique our approach to describing child sexual abuse disclosure, which involved extrapolating rates from children who came to the attention of authorities. Lyon et al. claim that our conclusions are marred by sampling biases resulting from what they term the ground truth problem, suspicion bias and substantiation bias. The points Lyon et al. claim we “fell victim to” were the very points we acknowledge are inherent difficulties in estimating the extent to which children will come forward to tell others about sexual maltreatment. Lyon et al. offer an alternative solution to the inherent difficulties in studying a difficult-to-identify population, relying in large part on 21 papers published mostly in the 1960s and 1970s. We argue that the method they propose has more flaws than the one it is intended to replace. Points of agreement and disagreement, along with suggestions for future research, are discussed. Moving forward, we argue that studies are needed that embrace both validity and generalizability in order to foster data-driven theories rather than invoking the intuitive suppositions of Summit's (1983) syndromal evidence.     

Dual-process morality and the personal/impersonal distinction: A reply to McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, and Mackenzie

A substantial body of research supports a dual-process theory of moral judgment, according to which characteristically deontological judgments are driven by automatic emotional responses, while characteristically utilitarian judgments are driven by controlled cognitive processes. This theory was initially supported by neuroimaging and reaction time (RT) data. McGuire et al. have reanalyzed these initial RT data and claim that, in light of their findings, the dual-process theory of moral judgment and the personal/impersonal distinction now lack support. While McGuire and colleagues have convincingly overturned Greene et al.’s interpretation of their original RT data, their claim that the dual-process theory now lacks support overstates the implications of their findings. McGuire and colleagues ignore the results of several more recent behavioral studies, including the study that bears most directly on their critique. They dismiss without adequate justification the results of a more recent neuroimaging study, three more recent patient studies, and an emotion-induction study. Their broader critique is based largely on their conflation of the dual-process theory with the personal/impersonal distinction, which are independent.     

Probing the Boundaries of the Relational Paradigm: Commentary on Paper by Jeremy Safran

In discussing the complexities and dialectical tensions inherent in the relational point of view, this commentary seeks to alert the reader to the simplifying dichotomies that can lead theory and clinical practice to be hostage to ideology. In exploring those dichotomies and their problematic implications for our work, emphasis is placed particularly on the nature of what constitutes evidence for our formulations and conclusions; the different blind spots that different epistemological positions are designed to alert us to or, at least partially, to overcome; the ways in which our efforts to transcend those blind spots often themselves create new blind spots; the relation between insight and new relational experience; the ambiguities associated with the (highly important but at times conceptually perilous) distinction between the one-person and the two-person models; and the tensions between the need to hear patients in a fashion that is affirming and accepting and the equally important need to hear their fervent wish to change what they also want to have accepted. Many of these tensions and complexities are examined in the context of a critique of Bion's claim that analysts should be “without memory or desire.”     

The Blind Men and the Elephant: Selective Examination of the Public-Private Literature Gives Rise to a Faulty Perception

ABSTRACT Wicklund and Gollwitzer make two claims that the distinction between public and private self-awareness/self-consciousness is “Aristotelian,” and that the distinction is fallacious For the distinction to be Aristotelian, as Wicklund and Gollwitzer use that term, requires that the distinction not be embedded in a “process” model of behavior Thus, the first claim is easily shown to be false The second claim rests on a variety of empirical and theoretical issues An examination of these issues reveals (a) that Wicklund and Gollwitzer's alternative interpretations for public self-attention effects are themselves Aristotelian—involving labels but no processes, (b) that their citation of literature relevant to their case is highly selective and misleading, and (c) that their abolition of the public-private distinction would leave an embarrassing contradiction among self-awareness effects, which Wicklund and Gollwitzer apparently are unable to address The vast preponderance of evidence thus supports the utility and the importance of the public-private self-focus distinction     

From a fixation on sports to an exploration of mechanism: The past,present, and future of hot hand research

We review the literature on the hot hand fallacy by highlighting the positive and negative aspects of hot hand research over the past 20 years, and suggesting new avenues of research. Many researchers have focused on criticising Gilovich et al.'s claim that the hot hand fallacy exists in basketball and other sports, instead of exploring the general implications of the hot hand fallacy for human cognition and probabilistic reasoning. Noting that researchers have shown that people perceive hot streaks in a gambling domain in which systematic streaks cannot possibly exist, we suggest that researchers have paid too much attention to investigating the independence of outcomes in various sporting domains. Instead, we advocate a domain-general mechanistic approach to understanding the hot hand fallacy, and conclude by suggesting approaches that might refocus the literature on the important general implications of the hot hand fallacy for human probabilistic reasoning.     

The effects of formal order and spatial content on reasoning in three dimensions

This study investigates the effects of formal order and spatial content on reasoning in three dimensions in view of the Formal Rules theory and the Mental Models theory of spatial reasoning. Twenty‐six subjects solved 144 spatial deductive problems that varied by the formal order of the entities (referential order, referential continuity) and the spatial content (dimension, orientation, and direction). There were two dependant variables: the correct responses and their response times. The number of mental models and the formal derivations underlying the deductions allowed comparison of opposite predictions made by the Formal Rules theory and the Mental Models theory of spatial reasoning. The results overwhelmingly supported the Mental Models theory's predictions. The effects of referential order showed that problems yielding two possible mental models were significantly more difficult than problems based on one mental model, although the former problems involved a shorter formal derivation than the latter. The effects of referential continuity also generalized the Mental Models theory's prediction to reasoning in all three dimensions. The effects of referential continuity showed that problems that required independent layouts in memory were reliably more difficult than problems that allowed the continuous integration of the entities in a mental model. We obtained these results despite the fact that the former condition required a shorter formal derivation than the latter. The effects of spatial content were also reliable despite the fact that the formal derivations were the same across spatial content. Thus, spatial deductions were significantly easier to make in 1D than in 2D and in 2D than 3D. Deductions were also significantly easier to make from left to right along the horizontal axis of a mental model, and from top to bottom along the vertical axis rather than from the respective opposite directions. The effects of spatial content suggest that mental models reproduce spatial relations relative to reference frames.     

What does principled versus conventional moral reasoning convey to others about the politics and psychology of the reasoner?

The well‐documented relationship between political orientation and moral reasoning has most often been interpreted in terms of the influence of level of moral development (cf. Kohlberg, 1984) upon an individual's political inclinations: those who have reached the conventional level (or stage 4) in Kohlberg's terms will as a result tend to favour the political right, whereas those who progress to the principled level (stage 5) shift their political preferences to the left. An alternative, ‘social communication’ view is that these different forms of moral reasoning are expressions of contrasting political identities, and differ in ideological content rather than developmental level. We compared the inferences that American and British students (n=211) drew about the political, moral and cognitive attributes of a target who, in response to moral dilemmas, used either stage 4A, stage 4B or stage 5 moral arguments as defined by Kohlberg. Perception of the target's political attributes varied consistently and significantly as a function of the target's moral reasoning, but there were no corresponding effects on perception of moral or cognitive attributes. The results are interpreted as supporting a social communication view of moral reasoning and its relation to political orientation, and at the same time questioning the claim that conventional (stage 4) and principled (stage 5) moral reasoning are distinct levels of socio‐cognitive development. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Alternative measures of cognitive complexity as predictors of communication performance

Two studies were conducted to compare the predictive validity of the two of the most popular measures of cognitive complexity: Bieri et al.'s (1966) grid-based measure (elicited and provided versions) and Crockett's (1965) Role Category Questionnaire (RCQ). Two other grid-based measures of construct system quality also were included. Criterion measures included indices of the accommodative, person-centered quality of communication behavior and social reasoning in a variety of contexts.

Results of both studies consistently show Crockett's measure to be a significant predictor of all criterion measures. Bieri et al.'s measures were generally unrelated, although the elicited construct version performed best as a predictor. The two measures of complexity were essentially unrelated in both studies. Implications of the findings for future use of the RCQ and grid-based measures of complexity are discussed. For those interested in the relation of constructs and communication behavior, the RCQ is recommended.