The independence of size perception and distance perception

Research on distance perception has focused on environmental sources of information, which have been well documented; in contrast, size perception research has focused on familiarity or has relied on distance information. An analysis of these two parallel bodies of work reveals their lack of equivalence. Furthermore, definitions of familiarity need environmental grounding, specifically concerning the amount of size variation among different tokens of an object. To demonstrate the independence of size and distance perception, subjects in two experiments were asked to estimate the sizes of common objects from memory and then to estimate both the sizes and the distances of a subset of such objects displayed in front of them. The experiments found that token variation was a critical variable in the accuracy of size estimations, whether from memory or with vision, and that distance had no impact at all on size perception. Furthermore, when distance information was good, size had no effect on distance estimation; in contrast, at far distances, the distances to token variable or unknown objects were estimated with less accuracy. The results suggest that size perception has been misconceptualized, so that the relevant research to understand its properties has not been undertaken. The size-distance invariance hypothesis was shown to be inadequate for both areas of research.     

Trans-saccadic perception

A basic question in cognition is how visual information obtained in separate glances can produce a stable, continuous percept. Previous explanations have included theories such as integration in a trans-saccadic buffer or storage in visual memory, or even that perception begins anew with each fixation. Converging evidence from primate neurophysiology, human psychophysics and neuroimaging indicate an additional explanation: the intention to make a saccadic eye movement leads to a fundamental alteration in visual processing itself before and after the saccadic eye movement. We outline five principles of 'trans-saccadic perception' that could help to explain how it is possible - despite discrete sensory input and limited memory - that conscious perception across saccades seems smooth and predictable.     

Pitch perception

This article is a review of the psychophysical study of pitch perception. The history of the study of pitch has seen a continual competition between spectral and temporal theories of pitch perception. The pitch of complex stimuli is likely based on the temporal regularities in a sound’s waveform, with the strongest pitches occurring for stimuli with low-frequency components. Thus, temporal models, especially those based on autocorrelationlike processes, appear to account for the majority of the data.     

The independence of size perception and distance perception.

Research on distance perception has focused on environmental sources of information, which have been well documented; in contrast, size perception research has focused on familiarity or has relied on distance information. An analysis of these two parallel bodies of work reveals their lack of equivalence. Furthermore, definitions of familiarity need environmental grounding, specifically concerning the amount of size variation among different tokens of an object. To demonstrate the independence of size and distance perception, subjects in two experiments were asked to estimate the sizes of common objects from memory and then to estimate both the sizes and the distances of a subset of such objects displayed in front of them. The experiments found that token variation was a critical variable in the accuracy of size estimations, whether from memory or with vision, and that distance had no impact at all on size perception. Furthermore, when distance information was good, size had no effect on distance estimation; in contrast, at far distances, the distances to token variable or unknown objects were estimated with less accuracy. The results suggest that size perception has been misconceptualized, so that the relevant research to understand its properties has not been undertaken. The size-distance invariance hypothesis was shown to be inadequate for both areas of research.     

Keeping perception accurate

Perception should change if an error in perception is detected. Yet how can information that comes through the senses ever indicate that those very senses aren't accurate? Knowledge of objects that arises independently of sensory experience can be used to check the sensory information for errors. For instance, an a priori constraint that one object cannot be in two places at the same time would lead to error detection if the sensory systems suggest that one object is in two places. Variants on the classic prism-adaptation phenomenon have revealed new rules about changes in space perception. These variants involve specifying new unusual mappings between visual space and motor (proprioceptive) space, and testing for generalization to novel untrained locations. The research has suggested that there is a preference for changes in space perception that shift space rigidly everywhere, that shrink or expand space uniformly, and that preserve the one-to-one relationship between modalities. Finally, this review discusses the issue that perception must change to remain accurate in the face of childhood growth and adult drift.     

Unity of perception

Perceptual scientists have recently enjoyed success in constructing mathematical theories for specific perceptual capacities, capacities such as stereovision, auditory localization, and color perception. Analysis of these theories suggests that they all share a common mathematical structure. If this is true, the elucidation of this structure, the study of its properties, the derivation of its consequences, and the empirical testing of its predictions are promising directions for perceptual research. We consider a candidate for the common structure, a candidate called an "observer". Observers, in essence, perform inferences; each observer has a characteristic class of perceptual premises, a characteristic class of perceptual conclusions, and its own functional relationship between these premises and conclusions. If observers indeed capture the structure common to perceptual capacities, then each capacity, regardless of its modality or manner of instantiation, can be described as some observer. In this paper we develop the definition of an observer. We first consider two examples of perceptual capacities: the measurement of visual motion, and the perception of depth from visual motion. In each case, we review a formal theory of the capacity and abstract its structural essence. From this essence we construct the definition of observer. We then exercise the definition in discussions of transduction, perceptual illusions, perceptual uncertainty, regularization theory, the cognitive penetrability of perception, and the theory neutrality of observation.     

Three-dimensional anorthoscopic perception

When a rotating 3-D wireframe object passes behind a narrow slit, it is often perceived as a 3-D object, even though only a small portion of it is visible at any one instant. This result constitutes a new finding in connection with both anorthoscopic perception and the perception of structure-from-motion.     

Understanding person perception

Bruce and Young's (1986) theoretical framework was actually a synthesis of ideas contributed by several people. Some of its insights have stood the test of time - especially the importance of using converging evidence from as wide a range of methods of enquiry as possible, and an emphasis on understanding the demands that are made by particular face perception tasks. But there were also areas where Bruce and Young failed to obey their own edicts (emotion recognition), and some topics they simply omitted (gaze perception). We discuss these, and then look at how the field has been transformed by computing developments, finishing with a few thoughts about where things may go over the next few (25?) years.     

Understanding voice perception

Voices carry large amounts of socially relevant information on persons, much like 'auditory faces'. Following Bruce and Young (1986)'s seminal model of face perception, we propose that the cerebral processing of vocal information is organized in interacting but functionally dissociable pathways for processing the three main types of vocal information: speech, identity, and affect. The predictions of the 'auditory face' model of voice perception are reviewed in the light of recent clinical, psychological, and neuroimaging evidence.