Moving Beyond Causes: Optimality Models and Scientific Explanation

A prominent approach to scientific explanation and modeling claims that for a model to provide an explanation it must accurately represent at least some of the actual causes in the event's causal history. In this paper, I argue that many optimality explanations present a serious challenge to this causal approach. I contend that many optimality models provide highly idealized equilibrium explanations that do not accurately represent the causes of their target system(s). Furthermore, in many contexts, it is in virtue of their independence of causes that optimality models are able to provide a better explanation than competing causal models. Consequently, our account of explanation and modeling must expand beyond the causal approach.     

On having bad persons as friends

Intuitively, one who counts a morally bad person as a friend has gone wrong somewhere. But it is far from obvious where exactly they have gone astray. Perhaps in cultivating a friendship with a bad person, one extends to them certain goods that they do not deserve. Or perhaps the failure lies elsewhere; one may be an abettor to moral transgressions. Yet another option is to identify the mistake as a species of imprudence—one may take on great personal risk in counting a bad person as a friend. In this paper, I argue that none of these intuitive explanations are entirely convincing; for many such proposals run contrary to widely accepted features of friendship. However, they do point us in the direction of a more satisfying explanation—one which concerns a person’s moral priorities. An individual who counts a morally bad person as a friend is, I propose, one who betrays a distinct kind of defect in her values.     

The use of psychological theories by ‘naive’ judges: A study in implicit personality theory

Sixty-three subjects judged the behaviour of one of two fictitious stimulus persons by means of five different types of explanation which corresponded with specific psychological theories. These types of explanation based behaviour on adaptation to external conditions, reward/punishment, fulfilment of role expectations, effects of unconscious motives and the imitation of models. The explanations were evaluated on graphic rating scales as to their truth and convincingness. Two-way analyses of variance with repeated measures on one factor showed significant main effects for type of explanation and interaction effects of stimulus person × type of explanation for both dependent variables. The results are discussed in the light of studies done so far in implicit personality theory.     

Goal-Based Explanation Evaluation

Many theories of explanation evaluation are based on context-independent criteria. Such theories either restrict their consideration to explanation towards a fixed goal, or assume that all valid explanations are equivalent, so that evaluation criteria can be neutral to the goals underlying the attempt to explain. However, explanation can serve a range of purposes that place widely divergent requirements on the information an explanation must provide. It is argued that understanding what determines explanations' goodness requires a dynamic theory of evaluation, based on analysis of the information needed to satisfy the many goals that can prompt explanation; this view conforms to the commonsense idea that people accept and apply explanations precisely if those explanations give the information they need. A range of goals that can underly explanation is examined, and a theory is presented for evaluating whether an explanation provides the information an explainer needs for these goals. The theory is illustrated by sketching its implementation in the computer program, ACCEPTER, which does goal-based evaluation of the goodness of explanations for surprising events in news stories.     

Two tales of functional explanation

This paper considers two ways functions figure into scientific explanations: (i) via laws—events are causally explained by subsuming those events under functional laws; and (ii) via designs—capacities are explained by specifying the functional design of a system. We argue that a proper understanding of how functions figure into design explanations of capacities makes it clear why such functions are ill-suited to figure into functional-cum-causal law explanations of events, as those explanations are typically understood. We further argue that a proper understanding of how functions enter into design explanations of capacities enables us to show why two prominent objections to functionalism in the philosophy mind—the argument from metaphysically necessary effects (Bennett, 2007; Rupert, 2006) and causal exclusion (Kim, 1993, 1998; Malcolm, 1968)—are misguided when interpreted as posing a threat to functional explanation in science across the board. If those arguments pose a threat at all, they pose it to instances of (i); however, a great number of the functional explanations we find in psychology—and the sciences generally—are instances of (ii).     

Are curmudgeon personality scales resistant to response distortion?

Curmudgeon personality, which is assessed by having participants evaluate a heterogeneous set of attitude objects, provides an applied value beyond that of more established personality traits. Recent research, for instance, suggests that curmudgeon personality is distinct from the Five Factor Model personality traits and that it predicts unique variance in important criteria, such as job attitudes and well-being. In the current paper we contribute to this literature by testing an explanation of how curmudgeon personality is distinct from other traits—their potential resistance to response distortion. We estimated response distortion for scales of curmudgeon personality and FFM traits across two quasi-experimental studies. As expected, the score shifts between nonapplicant and applicant conditions were smaller for scales of curmudgeon personality compared to scales of emotional stability and conscientiousness. We argue that curmudgeon personality scales may be more resistant to response distortion than are measures of other traits because curmudgeon personality items are semi-implicit and lack an obvious desirable response. The resistance to response distortion should serve as a call to future researchers to test the criterion validity of curmudgeon personality in regard to performance criteria.     

Tracing the Path from Personality — via Cooperativeness — to Conservation

Ecological behaviour is often conceptualized as an instance of cooperating in a social dilemma situation. Thus, it has been argued to relate to dispositional tendencies of moral virtue and pro‐social orientation. To embed such notions in models of basic personality, we herein predicted that the recently proposed sixth basic personality factor, Honesty–Humility — which specifically pertains to individual differences in cooperativeness — is linked to environmental attitudes and ecological behaviour. Results from two studies (N = 137 and N = 531, respectively) supported these hypotheses and showed that Honesty–Humility explains incremental variance beyond the remaining, more classical five factors of personality. In addition, mediation analyses revealed that Honesty–Humility exerts part of its influence via individual differences in pro‐social value orientations. Individual tendencies to cooperate in social dilemma situations could thus be shown to form a bridge between basic personality dimensions and ecological behaviour. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effect of Legitimizing Explanations on Applicants’ Perceptions of Selection Assessment Fairness1

This study investigated the effects of legitimizing explanations for selection test use on simulated applicants’ perceptions of fairness. The specificity of the explanation was varied. After receiving an explanation, a sample of 157 undergraduates completed 2 assessments (cognitive ability and personality), and reported their reactions to the assessments. Results indicate that for the cognitive ability assessment, general explanations increased fairness perceptions, but specific explanations did not. This relationship was fully mediated by perceptions of content and predictive validity. No effects for the personality assessment were found.     

Social Relations and Cyberbullying: The Influence of Individual and Structural Attributes on Victimization and Perpetration via the Internet

Current research indicates that an alarming number of students are affected by cyberbullying. However, most of the empirical research has focused on psychological explanations of the phenomenon. In an explorative survey study based on the reconstruction of 2 complete school networks (N_P = 408), we expand the explanation strategies of cyberbullying to higher levels of social abstraction. Using statistical and structural analysis, and visual inspection of network environments, we compare explanations on individual and structural levels. In line with previous research, the findings support traditional explanations via sociodemographic and personality factors. However, the findings also reveal network positioning to be a comparably strong predictor for cyberbullying. Therefore, we argue that without taking structural factors into account, individual explanations will remain insufficient.     

Do negative implicit associations indicate negative attitudes? Social explanations moderate whether ostensible “negative” associations are prejudice-based or empathy-based

The present work challenges the idea that implicit evaluative associations with outgroups necessarily provide information about negative or prejudiced attitudes. We argue that the manner in which one explains outgroup status and action shapes whether one's implicit “negative” associations are prejudice-based or empathy-based. Four studies are consistent with this possibility. Study 1 suggests that whereas implicit “negative” associations are predictive of negative explicit attitudes among those who reject external explanations for African American status and action, such implicit “negativity” predicts positive explicit attitudes among those who endorse external explanations. Study 2 provides experimental evidence that the provision of external explanations results in the formation of implicit “negative” associations that are predictive of compassionate responding. Study 3 provides more direct support for the idea that implicit “negative” associations are empathy-based among external explainers by showing that such “negative” associations are positively correlated with a measure of dispositional empathy-proneness. Finally, Study 4 demonstrates that IAT “negativity” is associated with automatic activation of empathy-related associations among those who strongly endorse external explanations. Discussion centers on the importance of considering factors—such as social explanations—that may moderate whether implicit “negativity” is prejudice-based or empathy-based.     

Seeing the Problem: An Explanation From Pólya

In this article, we focus on the instructional explanation of guessing as a heuristic for solving the Five Planes Problem (FPP), given in a lesson by George Pólya. We use the analysis of the lesson to test the applicability of what is known about instructional explanations in elementary mathematics to higher mathematics. The most salient characteristic of Pólya's lesson is the profusion of models and representations used to develop a sense of the problem and to support the instructional explanation. Pólya used analogical models to transform the complex FFT to a simpler one, and he used representations to extend the perspective on the problem. Introducing such models and representations requires keeping track of the links between them and the original problem. Pólya excelled in this endeavor, and his passage to each new representation or model was generally justified in terms of the goals of the explanation. Another very important feature of an instructional explanation is problem identification, a fragile goal state that needs to be constantly maintained when the problem being explained is complex. For this lesson, we examine how Pólya established and maintained that goal. Finally, we offer some insight on instructional explanations in a situation in which the teacher needs to fulfill two goals at the same time. Here, the first goal was to teach students both how to solve FPP and how to use guessing as a problem-solving heuristic or strategy; the second goal was to show us how to teach guessing. Keeping these goals in mind, we offer some suggestions on how to teach metaskills through mathematical problems in accordance with the current understanding of constructivist approaches to learning.     

Absence Causation and a Liberal Theory of Causal Explanation

For the framework of event causation—i.e. the framework according to which causation is a relation between events—absences or omissions pose a problem. Absences, it is generally agreed, are not events; so, under the framework of event causation, they cannot be causally related. But, as a matter of fact, absences are often taken to be causes or effects. The problem of absence causation is thus how to make sense of causation that apparently involves absences as causes or effects. In an influential paper, Helen Beebee offers a partial solution to the problem by giving an account of causation by absence (i.e. causation in which absences are supposed to be causes). I argue that Beebee's account can be extended to cover causation of absence (i.e. causation in which absences are supposed to be effects) as well. More importantly, I argue that the extended Beebeeian account calls for a major modification to David Lewis's theory of causal explanation, usually taken as standard. Compared to the standard theory, the result of this modification, which I shall call ‘the liberal theory of causal explanation’, has, among other things, the advantage of being able to accommodate causal explanations in which the explananda are not given in terms of events.     

UNTANGLING FALSE ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING ATHEISM AND HEALTH

Abstract In the past decade, the cognitive science of religion has worked to find an evolutionary explanation for supernatural belief. The explanations are convincing, but have created the stereotype that atheism is unnatural. In a similar way studies linking religious belief and health have vilified atheism as unhealthy. But belief is too complex, health is too nuanced, and the data are too varied to draw such a generalization. Catherine Caldwell‐Harris has developed a psychological profile to understand nonbelief as an expected outcome of individual difference and therefore natural. In a similar manner I argue that we should study the relationship between belief and health through the lens of individual differences. This approach is especially promising given recent research which indicates personality fully accounts for the relationship with well‐being previously attributed to belief. This approach has the added benefit of neutralizing the conversation by understanding atheism as the healthy expression of a natural personality.     

Belief,Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1

This paper compares two alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (i.e., the claim that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors). After reviewing the evidence for such pragmatic encroachment, we ask how it is best explained, assuming it obtains. Several authors have recently argued that the best explanation is provided by a particular account of belief, which we call pragmatic credal reductivism. On this view, what it is for an agent to believe a proposition is for her credence in this proposition to be above a certain threshold, a threshold that varies depending on pragmatic factors. We show that while this account of belief can provide an elegant explanation of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge, it is not alone in doing so, for an alternative account of belief, which we call the reasoning disposition account, can do so as well. And the latter account, we argue, is far more plausible than pragmatic credal reductivism, since it accords far better with a number of claims about belief that are very hard to deny.     

Targeting Item-level Nuances Leads to Small but Robust Improvements in Personality Prediction from Digital Footprints

In the past decade, researchers have demonstrated that personality can be accurately predicted from digital footprint data, including Facebook likes, tweets, blog posts, pictures, and transaction records. Such computer-based predictions from digital footprints can complement—and in some circumstances even replace—traditional self-report measures, which suffer from well-known response biases and are difficult to scale. However, these previous studies have focused on the prediction of aggregate trait scores (i.e. a person's extroversion score), which may obscure prediction-relevant information at theoretical levels of the personality hierarchy beneath the Big 5 traits. Specifically, new research has demonstrated that personality may be better represented by so-called personality nuances—item-level representations of personality—and that utilizing these nuances can improve predictive performance. The present work examines the hypothesis that personality predictions from digital footprint data can be improved by first predicting personality nuances and subsequently aggregating to scores, rather than predicting trait scores outright. To examine this hypothesis, we employed least absolute shrinkage and selection operator regression and random forest models to predict both items and traits using out-of-sample cross-validation. In nine out of 10 cases across the two modelling approaches, nuance-based models improved the prediction of personality over the trait-based approaches to a small, but meaningful degree (4.25% or 1.69% on average, depending on method). Implications for personality prediction and personality nuances are discussed. © 2020 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Criterion Validity of Complex Traits With Counterproductive Work Behaviors: Circumplex Versus Facet Traits

This study examined the criterion validity of factorially complex traits, specifically circumplex traits, in comparison to personality facets in explaining variance in interpersonally directed and organization-directed counterproductive work behavior (CWB-I and CWB-O). We examined whether circumplex traits’ explanation of unique variance was due to being narrower traits or a blend of multiple personality factors. We compared the Abridged Big Five Circumplex circumplexes and the Revised NEO Personality Inventory facets associated with Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism. Two hundred ninety-six student workers completed the study. Regression analysis supported our prediction that circumplex traits explain unique variance in CWB-Is and CWB-Os beyond that of personality facets. In addition, those personality facets with stronger relationships to the criteria had larger cross-loadings between personality domains.