A logical learning theory explanation of why personality scales predict behavior

An explanation of why personality scales predict is drawn from the tenets of logical learning theory (Rychlak, 1977). This theory holds that behavior is not only responsive in nature, but also telosponsive, i.e., enacted intentionally for the sake of premises. Personality scales tap the subject's premises concerning some aspect of behavior, the meanings of which are then extended in behavior telosponsively so that a prediction to some criterion performance becomes possible. The subject in effect creates the behavior based on his or her premises. An important telosponse inhuman learning is that of affective assessment, which is operationalized as reinforcement value (like-dislike). Two experiments establish the role of reinforcement value in scale measurement and prediction. The first demonstrates that subjects score higher on personality dimensions which they like very much than on dimensions which they greatly dislike. The second experiment then establishes that a personality dimension which a subject both likes and scores highly on is more predictive to an independently assessed manifestation of this personality characteristic than is a comparable dimension which is disliked.     

Support for an explanation of the guidance effect in motor skill learning

The authors investigated whether the knowledge of results (KR) schedule influences the extent to which intrinsic feedback is noticed and used. Fifty-six participants received KR that was either delayed over 2 trials (Delay-2) or provided directly after each trial (Delay-0) during 160 trials of an unfamiliar aiming task. No-KR retention tests were given after 80 trials and 1 min and 24 hr after the end of acquisition. After retention, all participants were questioned about their use of intrinsic feedback during practice and whether those sources changed as a function of practice. The Delay-2 group performed significantly less accurately on the 1st and last blocks of acquisition trials but showed a significantly smaller performance decline from acquisition to retention. Moreover, the Delay-2 group noticed and used a greater variety of intrinsic feedback sources and its members were more likely to report that their usage changed with practice.     

Children balance theories and evidence in exploration, explanation, and learning

We look at the effect of evidence and prior beliefs on exploration, explanation and learning. In Experiment 1, we tested children both with and without differential prior beliefs about balance relationships (Center Theorists, mean: 82 months; Mass Theorists, mean: 89 months; No Theory children, mean: 62 months). Center and Mass Theory children who observed identical evidence explored the block differently depending on their beliefs. When the block was balanced at its geometric center (belief-violating to a Mass Theorist, but belief-consistent to a Center Theorist), Mass Theory children explored the block more, and Center Theory children showed the standard novelty preference; when the block was balanced at the center of mass, the pattern of results reversed. The No Theory children showed a novelty preference regardless of evidence. In Experiments 2 and 3, we follow-up on these findings, showing that both Mass and Center Theorists selectively and differentially appeal to auxiliary variables (e.g., a magnet) to explain evidence only when their beliefs are violated. We also show that children use the data to revise their predictions in the absence of the explanatory auxiliary variable but not in its presence. Taken together, these results suggest that children's learning is at once conservative and flexible; children integrate evidence, prior beliefs, and competing causal hypotheses in their exploration, explanation, and learning.     

Causal learning is collaborative: Examining explanation and exploration in social contexts

Causal learning in childhood is a dynamic and collaborative process of explanation and exploration within complex physical and social environments. Understanding how children learn causal knowledge requires examining how they update beliefs about the world given novel information and studying the processes by which children learn in collaboration with caregivers, educators, and peers. The objective of this article is to review evidence for how children learn causal knowledge by explaining and exploring in collaboration with others. We review three examples of causal learning in social contexts, which elucidate how interaction with others influences causal learning. First, we consider children’s explanation-seeking behaviors in the form of “why” questions. Second, we examine parents’ elaboration of meaning about causal relations. Finally, we consider parents’ interactive styles with children during free play, which constrains how children explore. We propose that the best way to understand children’s causal learning in social context is to combine results from laboratory and natural interactive informal learning environments.     

Discrimination learning as a function of differences in materials: A proposed explanation

The present study affords an explanation for the consistent, but not always statistically significant, pattern showing superior verbal discrimination learning performance for low- as compared to high-frequency words. In a frequency judgment task, it was found that relative to high-frequency words, low-frequency words for which Ss (sixth graders) knew the meanings produced apparent frequency measures consistent with superior verbal discrimination learning, while low-frequency words that were unknown to the children did not. These results, taken together with those based on comparisons of pictures and high-frequency words, lend themselves to a modified Weber’s law interpretation of stimulus material differences in discrimination learning.     

Theory of mind for learning and teaching: the nature and role of explanation

The relationship between “theory of mind” and teaching is deep and complex. We focus on one particularly powerful link that is based on the role of children's psychological explanations in their learning. Psychological explanations involve explaining persons’ actions and lives as the causes and consequences of their mental states. We begin by showing that psychological explanations are central to children's developing theories of mind—they are part of the mechanism for development in this domain. We then review theory and data suggesting that psychological explanations are also critically important for learning and being taught more generally.     

Functional explanation and the function of explanation

Teleological explanations (TEs) account for the existence or properties of an entity in terms of a function: we have hearts because they pump blood, and telephones for communication. While many teleological explanations seem appropriate, others are clearly not warranted--for example, that rain exists for plants to grow. Five experiments explore the theoretical commitments that underlie teleological explanations. With the analysis of [Wright, L. (1976). Teleological Explanations. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press] from philosophy as a point of departure, we examine in Experiment 1 whether teleological explanations are interpreted causally, and confirm that TEs are only accepted when the function invoked in the explanation played a causal role in bringing about what is being explained. However, we also find that playing a causal role is not sufficient for all participants to accept TEs. Experiment 2 shows that this is not because participants fail to appreciate the causal structure of the scenarios used as stimuli. In Experiments 3-5 we show that the additional requirement for TE acceptance is that the process by which the function played a causal role must be general in the sense of conforming to a predictable pattern. These findings motivate a proposal, Explanation for Export, which suggests that a psychological function of explanation is to highlight information likely to subserve future prediction and intervention. We relate our proposal to normative accounts of explanation from philosophy of science, as well as to claims from psychology and artificial intelligence.     

Retention over time in relation to arousal during learning: An explanation of discrepant results

Arousal increment (more simply, arousal) during learning is related to subsequent retention. Published results are discrepant. In some studies physiologically higher arousal, relative to lower, is related to better short-term (a few minutes) and long-term (30 min or more) retention. In other studies higher arousal is related to poorer short-term and better long-term retention. Both results are explained here in terms of the retentivity-accessibility hypothesis, which is derived in this article on the basis of an analysis of methodological differences between studies obtaining the two results. The hypothesis states that high arousal is associated with strong retentivity but poor short-term accessibility. The hypothesis is evaluated on the basis of its compatibility with published results.     

Functional explanation,consequence explanation,and Marxism

I argued in Karl Marx's Theory of History that the central claims of historical materialism are functional explanations, and I said that functional explanations are consequence explanations, ones, that is, in which something is explained by its propensity to have a certain kind of effect. I also claimed that the theory of chance variation and natural selection sustains functional explanations, and hence consequence explanations, of organismic equipment. In Section I I defend the thesis that historical materialism offers functional or consequence explanations, and I reject Jon Elster's contention that game theory can, and should, assume a central role in the Marxist theory of society. In Section II I contrast functional and consequence explanation, thereby revising the position of Karl Marx's Theory of History, and I question whether evolutionary biology supports functional explanations. Section III is a critique of Elster's views on functional explanation, and Sections IV and V defend consequence explanation against metaphysical and epistemological doubts. A concluding section summarizes my present understanding of the status of historical materialist explanations.     

Learning to fear outgroups: An associative learning explanation for the development and reduction of intergroup anxiety

Pavlovian conditioning is a form of associative learning shown to contribute to the development and reduction of clinical anxiety and fear, and more recently, intergroup anxiety and fear. The current review provides a synthesis of the literature on associative learning of fear toward outgroups. Findings are reviewed that outline how fear toward the outgroup, relative to the ingroup, can be preferentially learnt and is resistant to extinction‐based techniques. Novel future research directions for intergroup anxiety are then identified based upon previous research on clinical anxiety. It is proposed that processes known to enhance the extinction of specific phobia should be investigated with social stimuli. Specifically, it is argued that exploring cognitive factors during extinction and conducting extinction in multiple contexts may provide new avenues to pursue intergroup harmony through reduced intergroup anxiety. The review concludes by suggesting innovative research designs are needed to validate an associative learning account of fear toward outgroups outside of experimental settings.