Are allies who we think they are?: A comparative analysis

Although dominant group allies have been increasingly studied by social psychologists interested in positive intergroup relations and the promotion of social justice, most of the existing research focuses on self‐identified allies or dominant group individuals who are engaging in social justice activities. Little comparative work has examined white allies who were specifically identified as such by people of color. Two studies assessed qualities associated with affirming attitudes (low prejudice, high internal motivation to respond without prejudice, allophilia, and awareness of privilege) and informed action (activism) expected to be distinctively characteristic of allies. Nominated white allies in Study 1 had lower prejudice and higher levels of internal motivation to respond without prejudice than nonnominated white participants; this was replicated in Study 2, which compared nominated “allies” and “friends.” In Study 2, nominated white allies rated themselves as lower on prejudice than nominated white friends. They also scored higher on internal motivation to respond without prejudice, understanding of white privilege, and activism than nominated white friends. There were no differences on self‐reported allophilia between the two groups. Allies were rated by the people of color who nominated them as higher on qualities of outgroup affirmation and informed action than were nominated friends. Limitations of and implications for these findings are discussed.     

Meta-perception for pathological personality traits: do we know when others think that we are difficult?

The self allows us to reflect on our own behavior and to imagine what others think of us. Clinical experience suggests that these abilities may be impaired in people with personality disorders. They do not recognize the impact that their behavior has on others, and they have difficulty understanding how they are seen by others. We collected information regarding pathological personality traits--using both self and peer report measures--from groups of people who knew each other well (at the end of basic military training). In previous papers, we have reported that agreement between self-report and peer-report is only modest. In this paper, we address the question: Do people know that others disagree with their own perceptions of themselves? We found that expected peer scores predicted variability in peer report over and above self-report for all 10 diagnostic traits. People do have some incremental knowledge of how they are viewed by others, but they do not tell you about it unless you ask them to do so; the knowledge is not reflected in ordinary self-report data. Among participants who expect their peers to describe them as narcissistic, those who agree with this assessment are viewed as being less narcissistic by their peers than those who deny being narcissistic. It therefore appears that insight into how one is viewed by others can moderate negative impressions fostered by PD traits.     

Stereotypes of singles: are singles what we think?

Four studies examined the accuracy of the single stereotype by comparing perceptions of single and partnered targets with self‐ratings and ratings by others of single and partnered participants. Results revealed that single targets were evaluated more negatively than partnered targets in terms of a wide range of personality characteristics, overall well‐being, and satisfaction with relationships status. These findings were very robust and not qualified by target sex, participant sex, and participant relationship status. In contrast, self‐ratings of single and partnered participants were remarkably similar for all personality characteristics as well as overall well‐being, which was corroborated by ratings of participants by others. However, partnered participants were indeed more satisfied with their relationship status than single participants. When all is considered, the single stereotype is largely inaccurate. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Multimedia: where are we now and where do we go from here?

This paper comments on the current state and future role of computer-based multimedia in psychology instruction. It includes practical tips on getting started with successful multimedia production. It also introduces a new World-Wide Web site archiving this information as well as other useful multimedia production and teaching resources.     

Incarnational Christian psychology and psychotherapy: What do we believe and what do we do?

The following paper proposes a viewpoint regarding the working assumptions, theology and practice for an “incarnational” psychology or “Christian psychology,” particularly with regard to psychotherapy. This essay is primarily meant to be an affirmation and guide for those Christian psychologists and others working in the allied professions. However, both veteran theorists and newcomers to such inquiry will benefit from this essay. Discussion begins with the dynamic of surrendering and receiving a personal relationship with Jesus Christ. The understanding of the unique person as soul: in mind, body, life and spirit is discussed. In addition, the working of the incarnate Holy Spirit is elaborated for both therapist and patient in the regenerative and therapeutic process. Psychopathology is reframed in reference to the Judeo-Christian revelation of sin and evil. In addition, truth, falsity and psychopathology are considered in light of the essentially regenerated man/woman or “new creation” in Christ. Some practical examples for psychotherapeutic intervention are offered, including the unique role of the Christian psychologist and his or her relationship with both patient and Christ. Seven major assumptions of “incarnational” or Christian psychology, which diverge from purely secular (psychological) theory and practice, are presented. Lastly, Christian psychology is distinguished from both “integrated” psychology and theology; and Biblical counseling.

How do we know that we are unique?

This paper aims to examine the notion of uniqueness as one aspect of the self that is taken for granted in psychotherapy. This paper attempts to address the question 'how do we know that we are unique individuals?' and in so doing, points out some difficulties. One plausible, but not problem-free answer is the notion of privileged access. Some of the problems will be briefly outlined.     

Are we born and do we die?

The stranglehold on our imagination by the mind-body dualisms that permeate the culture is such that most people seem to suppose that "body" and "soul" name distinct and separable entities. Resisting such dualisms in favour of an old-fashioned Aristotelean view of the soul as the form of the body, this essay considers two questions: do human parents produce human beings, and do human beings die? The doctrine of the special creation of the individual soul seems to require us to answer the first question in the negative because, according to this doctrine, parents only produce matter for the God-given soul to form. As to the second, many people seem to suppose that human beings do not die, only their bodies do. Arguing against the view that immortality is a natural property of human minds, the essay suggests (with the help of Joseph Ratzinger) that, whether we speak of "immortality" or of "resurrection", life from death is neither nature, nor achievement, but gift.     

What are we doing to the earth's climate and what are we going to do about it?

Climatic considerations are critical if our planet is to survive. The environment, and in particular the atmosphere, is particularly sensitive to man. The time has come to act in favor of that which gives us life. This is why, in a field which knows no boundaries, only an international strategy can be effective.     

Structures and strategies: Where are we now?

Summary Psychological opinion tends to sway between a view that people are almost infinitely flexible and a view that there are definite and unchangeable fundamental mechanisms that always work in the same way and set limits of flexibility. A popular compromise has been to suppose that lower mechanisms are as determinate as typewriters, while higher ones are unanalysable, autonomous, and perhaps even beyond scientific enquiry. The point of view in this paper favours a different compromise; very early and elementary operations are thought to be done in different ways, depending on the goals and experience of the person. There is, however, a good deal of constraint, which allows laws and principles to be laid down. Yet, there is also a degree of strategic flexibility in the operations actually performed that goes further than would be allowed by theorists of a different persuasion. The selective operations of attention are not due to unalterable mechanisms, nor does there seem to be convincing evidence of universal and invariant computation of all aspects of the input. What is computed, briefly, is the minimum necessary to perform the task before the person.     

Why do we think? Consequences of regarding thinking as behavior

Cognitive psychologists have made significant progress in explaining how people think. However, relatively little time and energy have been invested in understanding why we think--the factors that make us start or stop thinking, choose and change strategies and solutions. Such questions are linked to motivation and to discriminative and reinforcing stimuli. In this article, the idea that studying thinking as a form of behavior closely connected to antecedent stimuli and consequences leads to potentially important questions that are not presently being studied in the field of cognitive psychology. This is not an argument for reverting to behaviorism--rather, the argument is made that integrating a behavioral perspective on thinking would enrich cognitive psychology.     

Being mixed: who claims a biracial identity?

What factors determine whether mixed-race individuals claim a biracial identity or a monoracial identity? Two studies examine how two status-related factors-race and social class-influence identity choice. While a majority of mixed-race participants identified as biracial in both studies, those who were members of groups with higher status in American society were more likely than those who were members of groups with lower status to claim a biracial identity. Specifically, (a) Asian/White individuals were more likely than Black/White or Latino/White individuals to identify as biracial and (b) mixed-race people from middle-class backgrounds were more likely than those from working-class backgrounds to identify as biracial. These results suggest that claiming a biracial identity is a choice that is more available to those with higher status.     

Recording therapy sessions: What do clients and therapists really think?

Aims: Recording therapy sessions has become part of routine practice amongst trainee psychotherapists. To date most research has focused on the benefits of recording sessions to support clinical supervision. There are few data about the benefits or risks for clients. This study aimed to explore the views of clients who had had their therapy sessions recorded and therapists who had recorded sessions. Design: Five clients and 25 therapists completed a qualitative survey, the results of which were analysed using thematic analysis. Findings: All clients and several therapists reported that the recording devices are soon forgotten. Both therapists and clients reported the benefits of recording as being purely for the therapist with none identified for clients. Conclusions: It was observed that clients perhaps did not always understand how recordings were used, suggesting the need for clearer practice guidance.     

How do we know what we are doing? Time, intention and awareness of action

Time is a fundamental dimension of consciousness. Many studies of the "sense of agency" have investigated whether we attribute actions to ourselves based on a conscious experience of intention occurring prior to action, or based on a reconstruction after the action itself has occurred. Here, we ask the same question about a lower level aspect of action experience, namely awareness of the detailed spatial form of a simple movement. Subjects reached for a target, which unpredictably jumped to the side on some trials. Participants (1) expressed their expectancy of a target shift during the upcoming movement, (2) pointed at the target as quickly and accurately as possible before returning to the start posiment to the target shift if required and (3) reproduced the spatial path of the movement they had just made, as accurately as possible, to give an indication of their awareness of the pointing movement. We analysed the spatial disparity between the initial and the reproduced movements on those with a target shift. A negative disparity value, or undershoot, suggests that motor awareness merely reflects a sluggish record of coordinated motor performance, while a positive value, or overshoot, suggests that participants' intention to point to the shifting target contributes more to their awareness of action than their actual pointing movement. Undershoot and overshoot thus measure the reconstructive (motoric) and the preconstuctive (intentional) aspects of action awareness, respectively. We found that trials on which subjects strongly expected a target shift showed greater overshoot and less undershoot than trials with lower expectancy. Conscious expectancy therefore strongly influences the experience of the detailed motor parameters of our actions. Further, a delay inserted either between the expectancy judgement and the pointing movement, or between the pointing movement and the reproduction of the movement, had no effect on visuomotor adjustment but strongly influenced action awareness. Delays during either interval boosted undershoots, suggesting increased reliance on a time-limited sensory memory for action. The experience of action is thus strongly influenced by prior thoughts and expectations, but only over a short time period. Thus, awareness of our actions is a dynamic and relatively flexible mixture of what we intend to do, and what our motor system actually does.     

What do you think I think you think?: Strategic reasoning in matrix games

In reasoning about strategic interpersonal situations, such as in playing games, an individual's representation of the situation often includes not only information about the goals and rules of the game, but also a mental model of other minds. Often such mental models involve a hierarchy of reflexive reasoning commonly employed in social situations ("What do you think I think you think..."), and may be related to the developmental notion of 'theory of mind'. In two experiments, the authors formally investigate such interpersonal recursive reasoning in college-age adults within the context of matrix games. Participants are asked to predict the moves of another player (experimenter's confederate) in a two-choice, sequential-move game that may terminate at various stages with different payoffs for each player. Participants are also asked to decide optimally on their own moves based on the prediction made. Errors concerning the prediction, or translation of those predictions into decisions about one's action, were recorded. Results demonstrate the existence of a "default" mental model about the other player in the game context that is dynamically modified as new evidence is accumulated. Predictions about this other player's behavior are, in general, used consistently in decision-making, though the opponent tends to be modeled, by default, to behave in a myopic fashion not anticipating the participant's own action.     

Coping and defence mechanisms: What are we assessing?

The present research study addresses the disparity between theoretical considerations and empirical evidence regarding the relationships between coping strategies and defence mechanisms. Self‐reported measures of coping and defences were administered to a Romanian adult sample (N = 542; 74.53% female, mean age = 31.28). Using structural equation modelling, models that assumed independence between coping and defences were compared with models that assumed the existence of relationships between the two concepts. Findings identified strong relationships between coping and defences, indicating large common variance between the two concepts. Furthermore, results suggested that coping and defences can be classified into two independent types of adaptation processes. Results of this research study suggested that coping and defences are facets of common adaptation processes.