An intensional epistemic logic

One of the fundamental properties inclassical equational reasoning isLeibniz's principle of substitution. Unfortunately, this propertydoes not hold instandard epistemic logic. Furthermore,Herbrand's lifting theorem which isessential to thecompleteness ofresolution andParamodulation in theclassical first order logic (FOL), turns out to be invalid in standard epistemic logic. In particular, unlike classical logic, there is no skolemization normal form for standard epistemic logic. To solve these problems, we introduce anintensional epistemic logic, based on avariation of Kripke's possible-worlds semantics that need not have a constant domain. We show how a weaker notion of substitution through indexed terms can retain the Herbrand theorem. We prove how the logic can yield a satisfibility preserving skolemization form. In particular, we present an intensional principle for unifing indexed terms. Finally, we describe asound andcomplete inference system for a Horn subset of the logic withequality, based onepistemic SLD-resolution.     

An approach to intensional logic

A system of tensed intensional logic excluding iterations of intensions is introduced. Instead of using the type symbols (for ‘sense’), extensional and intensional functor types are distinguished. A peculiarity of the semantics is the general acceptance of value-gaps (including truth-value-gaps): the possible semantic values (extensions) of extensional functors are partial functions. Some advantages of the system (relatively to R. Montague's intensional logic) are briefly indicated. Also, applications for modelling natural languages are illustrated by examples.     

Classical second-order intensional logic with maximal propositions

Conclusion By the standards presented in the Introduction, CMFC2 is deficient on at least one ontological ground: ‘∀’ is a syncategorematic expression and so CMFC2 is not an ideal language. To some there may be an additional difficulty: any two wffs provably equivalent in the classical sense are provably identical. We hope in sequel to present systems free of these difficulties, free either of one or the other, or perhaps both. This work was done with the aid of Canada Council Grant S74-0551-S1.     

Extending probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic

This paper aims to extend in two directions the probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic provided in Kooi’s paper (J Logic Lang Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003) and to relate these extensions to ones made in van Benthem et al. (Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool, 2006). Kooi’s probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic adds to probabilistic epistemic logic sentences that express consequences of public announcements. The paper (van Benthem et al., Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool, 2006) extends (Kooi, J Logic Lang Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003) to using action models, but in both papers, the probabilities are discrete, and are defined on trivial σ-algebras over finite sample spaces. The first extension offered in this paper is to add a previous-time operator to a probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic similar to Kooi’s in (J Logic Lang Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003). The other is to involve non-trivial σ-algebras and continuous probabilities in probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic.     

Axiomatization and completeness of uncountably valued approximation logic

A first order uncountably valued logicL _Q(0,1) for management of uncertainty is considered. It is obtained from approximation logicsL _T of any poset type (T, ) (see Rasiowa [17], [18], [19]) by assuming (T, )=(Q(0, 1), ) — whereQ(0, 1) is the set of all rational numbersq such that 0<q<1 and is the arithmetic ordering — by eliminating modal connectives and adopting a semantics based onLT-fuzzy sets (see Rasiowa and Cat Ho [20], [21]). LogicL _Q(0,1) can be treated as an important case ofLT-fuzzy logics (introduced in Rasiowa and Cat Ho [21]) for (T, )=(Q(0, 1), ), i.e. asLQ(0, 1)-fuzzy logic announced in [21] but first examined in this paper.L _Q(0,1) deals with vague concepts represented by predicate formulas and applies approximate truth-values being certain subsets ofQ(0, 1). The set of all approximate truth-values consists of the empty set ø and all non-empty subsetss ofQ(0, 1) such that ifqs andqq, thenqs. The setLQ(0, 1) of all approximate truth-values is uncountable and covers up to monomorphism the closed interval [0, 1] of the real line.LQ(0, 1) is a complete set lattice and therefore a pseudo-Boolean (Heyting) algebra. Equipped with some additional operations it is a basic plain semi-Post algebra of typeQ(0, 1) (see Rasiowa and Cat Ho [20]) and is taken as a truth-table forL _Q(0,1) logic.L _Q(0,1) can be considered as a modification of Zadeh's fuzzy logic (see Bellman and Zadeh [2] and Zadeh and Kacprzyk, eds. [29]). The aim of this paper is an axiomatization of logicL _Q(0,1) and proofs of the completeness theorem and of the theorem on the existence ofLQ(0, 1)-models (i.e. models under the semantics introduced) for consistent theories based on any denumerable set of specific axioms. Proofs apply the theory of plain semi-Post algebras investigated in Cat Ho and Rasiowa [4].Presented byCecylia Rauszer     

Quantum logic as a dynamic logic

We address the old question whether a logical understanding of Quantum Mechanics requires abandoning some of the principles of classical logic. Against Putnam and others (Among whom we may count or not E. W. Beth, depending on how we interpret some of his statements), our answer is a clear “no”. Philosophically, our argument is based on combining a formal semantic approach, in the spirit of E. W. Beth’s proposal of applying Tarski’s semantical methods to the analysis of physical theories, with an empirical–experimental approach to Logic, as advocated by both Beth and Putnam, but understood by us in the view of the operational- realistic tradition of Jauch and Piron, i.e. as an investigation of “the logic of yes–no experiments” (or “questions”). Technically, we use the recently-developed setting of Quantum Dynamic Logic (Baltag and Smets 2005, 2008) to make explicit the operational meaning of quantum-mechanical concepts in our formal semantics. Based on our recent results (Baltag and Smets 2005), we show that the correct interpretation of quantum-logical connectives is dynamical, rather than purely propositional. We conclude that there is no contradiction between classical logic and (our dynamic reinterpretation of) quantum logic. Moreover, we argue that the Dynamic-Logical perspective leads to a better and deeper understanding of the “non-classicality” of quantum behavior than any perspective based on static Propositional Logic.