Is color an intrinsic property of object representation?

The role of color in object representation was examined by using a variation of the Stroop paradigm in which observers named the displayed colors of objects or words. In experiment 1, colors of color-diagnostic objects were manipulated to be either typical or atypical of the object (eg a yellow banana versus a purple banana). A Stroop-like effect was obtained, with faster color-naming times for the typical as compared to the atypical condition. In experiment 2, naming colors on words specifying these same color-diagnostic objects reversed this pattern, with the typical condition producing longer response times than the atypical condition. In experiment 3, a blocked condition design that used the same words and colors as experiment 2 produced the standard Stroop-like facilitation for the typical condition. These results indicate that color is an intrinsic property of an object's representation at multiple levels. In experiment 4, we examined the specific level(s) at which color-shape associations arise by following the tasks used in experiments 1 and 2 with a lexical-decision task in which some items were conceptually related to items shown during color naming (eg banana/monkey). Priming for these associates was observed following color naming of words, but not pictures, providing further evidence that the color-shape associations responsible for the differing effects obtained in experiments 1 and 2 are due to the automatic activation of color-shape associations at different levels of representation.     

Is a pre-change object representation weakened under correct detection of a change?

We investigated whether a pre-change representation is inhibited or weakened under correct change detection. Two arrays of six objects were rapidly presented for change detection in three experiments. After detection, the perceptual identification of degraded stimuli was tested in Experiments 1 and 2. The weakening of a pre-change representation was not observed under correct detection. The repetition priming effect was observed for a pre-change object and the magnitude was equivalent to the effect for a post-change object. Under change blindness, repetition priming for a pre-change representation was observed when detection did not require report of location in Experiment 1 and was not observed when location was required to be reported in Experiment 2. The results of Experiment 3 showed that a pre-change representation was recognized at a higher rate under correct detection than under change blindness, reflecting a stronger rather than a weaker pre-change representation in the former context.     

Does degree of handedness in a group of right-handed individuals affect language comprehension?

The impact of handedness on language processing has been studied extensively and the results indicate that there is a relationship between the two variables; however, the nature of the relationship is not at all clear. In the current study we explored degree of handedness (DH) opposed to direction in a group of right-handed individuals. fMRI was used to explore the impact of DH on the sentence comprehension network. The results revealed that during sentence comprehension activation in regions linked to semantic memory (e.g., anterior temporal cortex) were modulated by DH. Also, unexpectedly the precuneus/posterior cingulate gyrus which has been linked to episodic memory was also affected by DH. These results extend those reported previously by showing that the neural architecture that supports sentence comprehension is modulated by DH. More specifically, together the results presented here support the hypothesis proposed by Townsend, Carrithers, and Bever (2001) that DH interacts with the language system and impacts the strategy used during sentence comprehension.     

Does the body image exist in three dimensions? The study of visual mental representation of a body and a nonbody object

Do the mental images of 3-dimensional objects recreate the depth characteristics of the original objects? This investigation of the characteristics of mental images utilized a novel boundary-detection task that required participants to relate a pair of crosses to the boundary of an image mentally projected onto a computer screen. 48 female participants with body attitudes within expected normal range were asked to image their own body and a familiar object from the front and the side. When the visual mental image was derived purely from long-term memory, accuracy was better than chance for the front (64%) and side (63%) of the body and also for the front (55%) and side (68%) of the familiar nonbody object. This suggests that mental images containing depth and spatial information may be generated from information held in long-term memory. Pictorial exposure to views of the front or side of the objects was used to investigate the representations from which this 3-dimensional shape and size information is derived. The results are discussed in terms of three possible representational formats and argue that a front-view 2 1/2-dimensional representation mediates the transfer of information from long-term memory when depth information about the body is required.     

On the unavoidability of power in child-rearing: Is the language of rights educationally appropriate?

I am indebted to Graham Haydon for his help with the correct English wording of my thoughts.     

Is two a plural marker in early child language?

Is two ever a plural marker in child language? By some accounts, children bootstrap the distinction between the words one and two by observing their use with singular-plural marking (one ball/two balls). Others argue that the numeral two marks plurality before children begin using numerals to denote precise quantities. We tested the relation between numerals and singular-plural marking in English-speaking 2- and 3-year-olds by asking them to label sets of objects. When children were not prompted to use numerals they hardly ever did so, although they did frequently use plural marking. Thus, it does not appear that children spontaneously use numerals like two as plural markers. Also, children who used numerals when labeling sets were significantly more likely to use a plural marker than children who did not use numerals, suggesting that most children view plural marking as obligatory when numerals are used, rather than viewing the 2 forms as alternative markers of plurality. Finally, two was no more likely than other numerals to be used with unmarked nouns (i.e., as an alternative to the plural), suggesting that it does not have a special status as a plural marker. We conclude that two is not a plural marker in early child language.     

Is color an integral part of a rich mental simulation?

Research suggests that language comprehenders simulate visual features such as shape during language comprehension. In sentence-picture verification tasks, whenever pictures match the shape or orientation implied by the previous sentence, responses are faster than when the pictures mismatch implied visual aspects. However, mixed results have been demonstrated when the sentence-picture paradigm was applied to color (Connell, Cognition, 102(3), 476–485, 2007; Zwaan & Pecher, PLOS ONE, 7(12), e51382, 2012). One of the aims of the current investigation was to resolve this issue. This was accomplished by conceptually replicating the original study on color, using the same paradigm but a different stimulus set. The second goal of this study was to assess how much perceptual information is included in a mental simulation. We examined this by reducing color saturation, a manipulation that does not sacrifice object identifiability. If reduction of one aspect of color does not alter the match effect, it would suggest that not all perceptual information is relevant for a mental simulation. Our results did not support this: We found a match advantage when objects were shown at normal levels of saturation, but this match advantage disappeared when saturation was reduced, yet still aided in object recognition compared to when color was entirely removed. Taken together, these results clearly show a strong match effect for color, and the perceptual richness of mental simulations during language comprehension.     

Is attention necessary for object identification? Evidence from eye movements during the inspection of real-world scenes

Eye movements were recorded during the display of two images of a real-world scene that were inspected to determine whether they were the same or not (a comparative visual search task). In the displays where the pictures were different, one object had been changed, and this object was sometimes taken from another scene and was incongruent with the gist. The experiment established that incongruous objects attract eye fixations earlier than the congruous counterparts, but that this effect is not apparent until the picture has been displayed for several seconds. By controlling the visual saliency of the objects the experiment eliminates the possibility that the incongruency effect is dependent upon the conspicuity of the changed objects. A model of scene perception is suggested whereby attention is unnecessary for the partial recognition of an object that delivers sufficient information about its visual characteristics for the viewer to know that the object is improbable in that particular scene, and in which full identification requires foveal inspection.     

Is Humility a Virtue in the Context of Sport?

I define humility as a virtue that includes both proper self‐assessment and a self‐lowering other‐centeredness. I then argue that humility, so understood, is a virtue in the context of sport, for several reasons. Humility is a component of sportspersonship, deters egoism in sport, fuels athletic aspiration and risk‐taking, fosters athletic forms of self‐knowledge, decreases the likelihood of an athlete seeking to strongly humiliate her opponents or be weakly humiliated by them, and can motivate an athlete to achieve greater levels of excellence in her sport. In the context of team sports, humility can contribute to an athlete being a better teammate, foster unity amidst diversity within a team, and contribute to the overall moral and athletic excellence of a team. I also argue that an individual who is truly the world's greatest athlete can know and communicate this truth, while remaining humble.     

Languages on the screen: Is film comprehension related to the viewers’ fluency level and to the language in the subtitles?

This research aimed at studying the role of subtitling in film comprehension. It focused on the languages in which the subtitles are written and on the participants' fluency levels in the languages presented in the film. In a preliminary part of the study, the most salient visual and dialogue elements of a short sequence of an English film were extracted by the means of a free recall task after showing two versions of the film (first a silent, then a dubbed-into-French version) to native French speakers. This visual and dialogue information was used in the setting of a questionnaire concerning the understanding of the film presented in the main part of the study, in which other French native speakers with beginner, intermediate, or advanced fluency levels in English were shown one of three versions of the film used in the preliminary part. Respectively, these versions had no subtitles or they included either English or French subtitles. The results indicate a global interaction between all three factors in this study: For the beginners, visual processing dropped from the version without subtitles to that with English subtitles, and even more so if French subtitles were provided, whereas the effect of film version on dialogue comprehension was the reverse. The advanced participants achieved higher comprehension for both types of information with the version without subtitles, and dialogue information processing was always better than visual information processing. The intermediate group similarly processed dialogues in a better way than visual information, but was not affected by film version. These results imply that, depending on the viewers' fluency levels, the language of subtitles can have different effects on movie information processing.     

What drives the organization of object knowledge in the brain?

Various forms of category-specificity have been described at both the cognitive and neural levels, inviting the inference that different semantic domains are processed by distinct, dedicated mechanisms. In this paper, we argue for an extension of a domain-specific interpretation to these phenomena that is based on network-level analyses of functional coupling among brain regions. On this view, domain-specificity in one region of the brain emerges because of innate connectivity with a network of regions that also process information about that domain. Recent findings are reviewed that converge with this framework, and a new direction is outlined for understanding the neural principles that shape the organization of conceptual knowledge.     

How to control a white bear? Individual differences involved in self-perceived and actual thought-suppression ability

Thought suppression is generally considered a maladaptive mental control strategy, leading to increased intrusions. In the experimental psychopathology literature, thought suppression is assigned a central role in anxiety and depression, disorders characterised by a high level of negative intrusive thoughts. We examined predictors of self-perceived and actual thought suppression ability in an undergraduate sample. It was found that self-perceived suppression ability was predicted by anxiety and depression scores, attentional control, and distraction strategies. Immediate and rebound effects of actual suppression were predicted by depression scores. Interestingly, higher levels of attentional control and distraction were related to more successful thought suppression on the questionnaires, yet were related to increased intrusions during suppression.     

Is there a world Lutheranism? Accountability and representation in ecumenical dialogue

The following thoughts were occasioned by my experiences representing the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA) in a variety of international ecumenical dialogues over the past thirteen years. I reflect on some of the fundamental challenges faced by many Lutherans as we seek to represent, as conscientiously as possible, the global communion of which we are members. The question we face is a very simple one: Whom do we represent?     

Is the processing of words during eye fixations in reading strictly serial?

Extant models of oculomotor control during reading maintain that allocation of attention confines word recognition to one (target) word at a time, and that an eye movement to a new (posttarget) word is computed before attention is shifted to it. To test these assumptions, properties of the posttarget's preview were manipulated during the fixation of the preceding target word. The main results revealed longer target viewing durations when the posttarget preview was visually distinctive or when it was orthographically illegal. The meaning of posttarget text did not affect initial target word reading, although it affected the time spent rereading the target. To account for these findings, extant attention-shift models must assume that readers obtain at least visuospatial and orthographic information from a parafovelly visible word before it is attended. This view has shortcomings, however, and several considerations favor less restrictive model assumptions according to which attention can be allocated to more than one word at a time.     

Can readers ignore implausibility? Evidence for nonstrategic monitoring of event-based plausibility in language comprehension

We present evidence for a nonstrategic monitoring of event-based plausibility during language comprehension by showing that readers cannot ignore the implausibility of information even if it is detrimental to the task at hand. In two experiments using a Stroop-like paradigm, participants were required to provide positive and negative responses independent of plausibility in an orthographical task (Experiment 1) or a nonlinguistic color judgment task (Experiment 2) to target words that were either plausible or implausible in their context. We expected a nonstrategic assessment of plausibility to interfere with positive responses to implausible words. ANOVAs and linear mixed models analyses of the response latencies revealed a significant interaction of plausibility and required response that supported this prediction in both experiments, despite the use of two very different tasks. Moreover, it could be shown that the effect was not driven by the differential predictability of plausible and implausible words. These results suggest that plausibility monitoring is an inherent component of information processing.     

How do use and comprehension of mental-state language relate to theory of mind in middle childhood?

This study investigates the relationship between mental-state language and theory of mind in primary school children. The participants were 110 primary school students (mean age = 9 years and 7 months; SD = 12.7 months). They were evenly divided by gender and belonged to two age groups (8- and 10-year-olds). Linguistic, metacognitive and cognitive measures were used to assess the following competencies: verbal ability, use of mental-state terms, understanding of metacognitive language, understanding of second-order false beliefs, and emotion comprehension. Correlations between children’ use of mental-state language and their performance on theory-of-mind tasks were moderate, whereas correlations between children's comprehension of such language and ToM abilities were high. In addition, regression analyses showed that comprehension of metacognitive language was the variable which best explained children's performance on both false belief tasks and an emotion comprehension test when verbal ability and age were controlled for.