On Gratitude to Nature

In this article, I argue that it cannot be fitting to be grateful to nature. I start by arguing that gratitude to someone/something can be fitting even if they do not intentionally benefit one. I then argue that a recent view on which it can be fitting to be grateful to nature faces counterexamples. Finally, I argue that it cannot be fitting to be grateful to nature, because it is fitting to be grateful to someone/something only if they manifest the right kind of goodwill or care toward one. In particular, I argue that it is fitting to be grateful to someone/something only if they manifest a level of final care toward one beyond what can be legitimately expected or demanded of them. However, because nature does not manifest any level of goodwill or care, it cannot be fitting to be grateful to nature. I end by noting that it can still be fitting to be grateful that certain things are true about nature (e.g. that it provides many benefits to humans).     

Failed-Art and Failed Art-Theory

An object being non-art appears only trivially informative. Some non-art objects, however, could be saliently ‘almost’ art, and therefore objects for which being non-art is non-trivially informative. I call these kinds of non-art objects ‘failed-art’ objects—non-art objects aetiologically similar to art-objects, diverging only in virtue of some relevant failure. I take failed-art to be the right sort of thing, to result from the right sort of action, and to have the right sort of history required to be art, but to be non-art by having failure where being art requires success. I assume that for something to be art that thing must be the product of intention-directed action. I then offer an account of attempts that captures the success conditions governing the relationship between intention-directed actions and their products. From this, I claim that to be failed-art is to be the product of a failed art-attempt, i.e., to be non-art as the result of the particular way in which that art-attempt failed. An art-attempt I take to be an attempt with success conditions, that, if satisfied, entail the satisfaction of the conditions for being art—whatever those may be. To be art, then, is to be the product of a successful art-attempt. As such, any art theory incompatible with my account of failed-art is an art theory for which the notions of success and failure do not matter, and therefore an art theory for which being art needn't be substantively intention-dependent. So, any theory of art unable to accommodate my account of failed-art is ipso facto false.     

对角线元素与不同复杂度的系统的关系

<正>对角线方法是指德国学者康托尔 ( G. Cantor) 在证明实数集不可数时所运用的一种技术方法。在这种意义上,康托尔的实数集不可数论本身便是对角线方法的一种重要运用。此外,对角线方法还有两种重要运用,即哥德尔对角线定理和汤姆逊引理的证明。哥德尔对角线定理又叫 "哥德尔自指定     

Whatever it is better to be than not to be

The Anselmian claim that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought in virtue of being ‘whatever it is better to be than not to be’ may be accused of incoherence or even unintelligibility. By proposing a non-relative but apparently meaningful analysis thereof, I attempt to defend it against such criticism. In particular, I argue that ‘whatever it is better to be than not to be’ can be plausibly interpreted so as to imply very many attributes traditionally predicated of that than which a greater cannot be thought. Central to this line of reasoning is the assumption that whatever is an actual moral being is greater, simpliciter, than whatever is not an actual moral being.     

Assessing the costs, benefits, cost-effectiveness, and cost-benefit of psychological assessment: we should, we can, and here's how

To the extent that assessment improves the effectiveness of treatment, prevention, or other services, it can be said to be effective. If an assessment is as effective as alternatives for improving treatment and less costly, it can be said to be cost-effective. If that improvement in the effectiveness of the service is monetary or monetizable, the assessment can be judged beneficial. And, if the sum of monetary and monetizable benefits of assessment exceeds the sum of the costs of treatment, the assessment can be said to be cost-beneficial. An overview of cost-related issues is followed by practical strategies that researchers and administrators can use to measure incremental costs, incremental effectiveness, and incremental benefits of adding psychological assessments to other psychological interventions.     

Problems for Linguistic Solutions to the Paradox of Analysis

G. E. Moore opined that the paradox of analysis might be avoided if it could be shown that sentences expressing conceptual analyses convey information not only about concepts, but also about the expressions they use. If so, "to be a brother is to be a male sibling" and "to be a brother is to be a brother" might express the same proposition, and yet not be identical in information value as the paradox suggests. How sentences might do this, Moore could not see. Many philosophers have pointed out an obvious way in which sentences might be said to convey information about the expressions they use. Some have suggested this information might be used to develop Moore's intuition and resolve the paradox of analysis. I argue that this approach fails. I present a version of the paradox of analysis that resists this sort of solution.     

Hear No Evil,See No Evil,Think No Evil: Ethics and the Appeal to Experience

This essay distinguishes three types of appeals to experience in ethics, identifies problems with appealing to experience, and argues that appeals to experience must be open to critical assessment, if experientially-based arguments are to be useful. Unless competing and potentially irreconcilable experiences can be assessed and adjudicated, experientially-based arguments will be problematic. The paper recommends thinking of the appeal to experience as a kind of story telling to be evaluated as other stories are.     

Character changes in epilepsy?]

There are no personality structures which are typical of epilepsies in the sense of a change in character that can be seen in cross and especially in longitudinal sections. Reported changes of character due to epilepsies cannot be exactly defined reproducibly for the forms of fits to be differentiated and cannot, therefore, be used operationally. There is no doubt, however, that several causal factors must be considered to be responsible for the manifestation of certain frequently observed peculiarities and characteristics, respectively. In addition to organic, psychodynamic, and socio-situational causes, long-time antiepileptic medication is an essential factor of changes in character due to diseases characterized by fits. A better understanding has now been obtained of the importance of this particular factor, and this allows to conclude that there can only be epileptic functioning and reacting.     

Objectivist conditions for defeat and evolutionary debunking arguments

I make a case for distinguishing clearly between subjective and objective accounts of undercutting defeat and for rejecting a hybrid view that takes both subjective and objective elements to be relevant for whether or not a belief is defeated. Moderate subjectivists claim that taking a belief to be defeated is sufficient for the belief to be defeated; subjectivist idealists add that if an idealised agent takes a belief to be defeated then the belief is defeated. Subjectivist idealism evades some of the objections levelled against moderate subjectivism but can be shown to yield inconsistent results in some cases. Both subjectivisms should be rejected. We should be objectivists regarding undercutting defeat. This requirement, however, is likely to be problematic for a popular interpretation of evolutionary debunking arguments in metaethics as it can be shown that existing objectivist accounts of defeat do not support such arguments. I end by discussing the constraints of developing such an account.     

The other other: when the exotic other subjugates the familiar other

In this paper, the theme of the other will be examined and it will be argued that it is important to differentiate between two distinct types of other--the 'exotic' other which is distant and very different from the subject, and the 'familiar' other which is closer to the subject. The dynamic relationship between these two others will be investigated, and emphasis will be given to the process through which the exotic other tends to subjugate the familiar other. This relationship will then be discussed in its various applied forms, in the contexts of clinical practice and socio-political dimensions. In particular, a new reading of Jung's approach to the 'primitive' will be developed, based on the subjugation of the 'familiar' other by the 'exotic' other. A similar line of investigation will be followed to examine the concept of psychological trauma. In addition, Freud's 'narcissism of minor differences' and Bion's distinction between 'narcissism' and 'socialism' will be considered in the light of this differentiation between these two others.     

Soritic thinking, vagueness, and weakness of will

Soritic thinking based on reasoning that is involved in the sorites paradox plays a crucial role in some forms of weakness of will. Such soritic reasoning leads to failures of behavior, but cannot be shown to be irrational by standard means. Thus weakness of will appears to be rational, whereas strength of will is irrational when viewed soritically. The puzzle is how to undermine weakness of will and expose it as irrational. Even though such weakness of will is not moral, moral-type reasoning involving the principle of equality can be brought to bear. Weakness of will can also be seen to be analogous to free-rider problems and the prisoner's dilemma.     

The metric‐frequency measure of similarity for ill‐structured data sets,with an application to family therapy

Similarity measures have been studied extensively in many domains, but usually with well‐structured data sets. In many psychological applications, however, such data sets are not available. It often cannot even be predicted how many items will be observed, or what exactly they will entail. This paper introduces a similarity measure, called the metric‐frequency (MF) measure, that can be applied to such data sets. If it is not known beforehand how many items will be observed, then the number of items actually observed in itself carries information. A typical feature of the MF is that it incorporates such information. The primary purpose of our measure is that it should be pragmatic, widely applicable, and tractable, even if data are complex. The MF generalizes Tversky's set‐theoretic measure of similarity to cases where items may be present or absent and at the same time can be numerical as with Shepard's metric measure, but need not be so. As an illustration, we apply the MF to family therapy where it cannot be predicted what issues the clients will raise in therapy sessions. The MF is flexible enough to be applicable to idiographic data.     

In the best interests of the deceased: A possible justification for organ removal without consent?

Opt-out systems of postmortem organ procurement are often supposed to be justifiable by presumed consent, but this justification turns out to depend on a mistaken mental state conception of consent. A promising alternative justification appeals to the analogical situation that occurs when an emergency decision has to be made about medical treatment for a patient who is unable to give or withhold his consent. In such cases, the decision should be made in the best interests of the patient. The analogous suggestion to be considered, then, is, if the potential donor has not registered either his willingness or his refusal to donate, the probabilities that he would or would not have preferred the removal of his organs need to be weighed. And in some actual cases the probability of the first alternative may be greater. This article considers whether the analogy to which this argument appeals is cogent, and concludes that there are important differences between the emergency and the organ removal cases, both as regards the nature of the interests involved and the nature of the right not to be treated without one’s consent. Rather, if opt-out systems are to be justified, the needs of patients with organ failure and/or the possibility of tacit consent should be considered.     

On Applying Applied Philosophy

If 'applied philosophy'is really to be applied it is necessary for its practical implications to be spelled out in some detail: both the specific goals implied if not entailed, and the life-style that would be expected to support such goals. To be as specific as this would only be to emulate the ancient Greek philosophers whose influence may still be discerned and is often claimed. Contributions to a recent issue of this Journal are taken as a basis for the discussion.     

技术的两面性与责任的类型

一、技术的两面性难题所有的技术均有可能成为好的技术或坏的技术,这一点和人类行为的其他方面并无二致。尽管如此,技术的两面性难题在当前尤其引发了人们的关注,大家都想得到一个关于它的正确理解。我的问题是:技术的两面性有哪些具体的方面?面对技术的两面性,如何界定我们的责任?1.技术的两面性先让我们来看一下对技术与使用简单工具的一个类比:无论两者的效用是正面的还是负面的,它     

Relationships of Functional Flexibility with Individual and Work Factors

To investigate how functional flexibility is related to demographics, personality traits, and work perceptions, 250 employees of a large Dutch passenger transport firm filled out a written questionnaire. Two dimensions of functional flexibility were discerned: willingness and ability to be flexible. Analysis of variance showed the support staff and managers were higher on willingness and ability to be flexible than workers. Hierarchic regression analysis showed that willingness to be flexible was positively related to initiative and trust in management, and was negatively related to age and task formalization. Ability to be flexible was positively related to general self-efficacy and initiative, and was negatively related to task formalization. It was concluded that willingness to be flexible depends on fair treatment and freedom provided by their organization and that ability to be flexible is part of the development of general self-efficacy.     

The competency of criminal defendants to refuse,for delusional reasons,a viable insanity defense recommended by counsel

This article addresses the issues of whether mentally ill defendants charged with serious crimes who refuse to plead a viable and counsel-recommended insanity defense for delusional reasons (but who are otherwise competent to stand trial) should be considered to be competent, or incompetent, to stand trial; whether such defendants should be allowed to represent themselves with a delusional defense; and whether an insanity defense may properly be imposed upon such defendants. Based on an analysis of relevant Supreme Court decisions and other relevant cases, it is concluded that such defendants should not be allowed to go forward with a delusional defense (at least until reasonable efforts to treat the defendants' delusions are made). It is also argued, however, that unless an insanity defense would be viable (as well as recommended by counsel) delusional defendants who are otherwise competent to stand trial should be permitted to go forward, and represent themselves, with the defense of their choosing.     

The Importance of Construct Validity in Consumer Research

Vosgerau, Scopelliti, and Huh (2020) question the construct validity of the most commonly used measures of self‐control and argue that many studies that claim to be examining self‐control may in fact be examining something else. In this comment, we generalize this argument and propose that this criticism could be leveraged against many other areas of consumer research. Indeed, many studies fail to properly establish the construct validity of their measures. Consequently, they may not be examining the construct they purport to be studying, which can lead to unreliable and conflicting findings.     

Good Soldiers, A Traditional Approach

This article contends that in crucial respects effective soldiers are ethical soldiers, that good soldiers in the military sense are good soldiers in the moral sense, and that this is so for quite traditional reasons. The thesis is defended by identifying and then resolving basic paradoxes regarding what soldiers must be trained to do or be, e.g.: be trained to kill but also not to be brutal; be trained to react in combat situations almost automatically but also to deliberate and decide if a command is unlawful; as peacekeepers, be trained to be impartial but also to know right from wrong and be firmly committed to upholding the former and opposing the latter. It is shown that contradictory things are not really thus being called for. With the aid of a blend of deontology and virtue theory, it is argued that certain standard qualities of effective soldiers have an associated moral dimension. For example, true military courage implies an unwillingness to engage in cruelty; the self-control on which success of missions depends implies eschewing motives of personal vengeance; and the capacity for comprehending complex equipment and data implies a mentality for assessing the validity of orders.