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1.
Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - This paper connects recent findings from experimental epistemology to several major themes in classical Indian epistemology. First, current... 相似文献
2.
EVELYN BRISTER 《Metaphilosophy》2009,40(5):671-688
Abstract: This essay explores the relation between feminist epistemology and the problem of philosophical skepticism. Even though feminist epistemology has not typically focused on skepticism as a problem, I argue that a feminist contextualist epistemology may solve many of the difficulties facing recent contextualist responses to skepticism. Philosophical skepticism appears to succeed in casting doubt on the very possibility of knowledge by shifting our attention to abnormal contexts. I argue that this shift in context constitutes an attempt to exercise unearned social and epistemic power and that it should be resisted on epistemic and pragmatic grounds. I conclude that skepticism is a problem that feminists can and should take up as they address the social aspects of traditional epistemological problems. 相似文献
3.
Character in Epistemology 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Jason S. Baehr 《Philosophical Studies》2006,128(3):479-514
This paper examines the claim made by certain virtue epistemologists that intellectual character virtues like fair-mindedness,
open-mindedness and intellectual courage merit an important and fundamental role in epistemology. I begin by considering whether
these traits merit an important role in the analysis of knowledge. I argue that they do not and that in fact they are unlikely
to be of much relevance to any of the traditional problems in epistemology. This presents a serious challenge for virtue epistemology.
I go on to examine the work of two other virtue epistemologists in light of this challenge and then sketch an alternative
approach that reveals how the intellectual virtues might merit a substantial role in epistemology even if not a role in connection
with more traditional epistemological projects. 相似文献
4.
The anti-metaphysical intentions of naturalism can be respected without abandoning the project of a normative epistemology.
The central assumptions of naturalism imply that (1.) the distinction between action and behaviour is spurious, and (2.) epistemology
cannot continue to be a normative project. Difficulties with the second implication have been adressed by Normative Naturalism,
but without violating the naturalistic consensus, it can only appreciate means-end-rationality. However, this does not suffice
to justify its own implicit normative pretensions. According to our diagnosis, naturalism succumbs to the lure of an absolute
observer's stance and thereby neglects the need for participation in communal practice. By contrast, methodical culturalism
ties down the concepts of epistemology to the success of such practice. Only from this perspective, the normative force of
epistemology can be appreciated. Also, the mind-body problem loosens its hold and the distinction between action and behaviour
is reestablished. In the last section, the mutual relation between philosophy andscience is reconsidered.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
5.
Tomoji Shogenji 《Erkenntnis》2012,76(1):59-72
This paper addresses the meta-epistemological dispute over the basis of epistemic evaluation from the standpoint of meliorative
epistemology. Meliorative epistemology aims at guiding our epistemic practice to better results, and it comprises two levels
of epistemic evaluation. At the social level (meliorative social epistemology) appropriate experts conduct evaluation for
the community, so that epistemic evaluation is externalist since each epistemic subject in the community need not have access
to the basis of the experts’ evaluation. While at the personal level (meliorative personal epistemology) epistemic evaluation
is internalist since each member of the community must evaluate the reliability of the (apparent) experts from the first-person
perspective. I argue that evaluation at the social level should be the primary focus of meliorative epistemology since meliorative
personal epistemology does not provide informative epistemic norms. It is then pointed out that epistemic evaluation at the
social level can be considered internalist in the extended sense (social internalism) in that every component of the evaluation
needs to be recognized by some members of the community at some points. As a result, some familiar problems of internalist
epistemology, such as regress and circularity of epistemic support, carry over to meliorative social epistemology. 相似文献
6.
Jane Duran 《Heythrop Journal》2001,42(4):480-488
7.
Jon Kenneth Newton 《Heythrop Journal》2018,59(4):733-746
Recent developments in Christian philosophy, in particular epistemology, need to be enriched by a study of epistemology in the Bible. This article uncovers the epistemological assumptions of the Book of Revelation (specifically related to spiritual experience, revelation, and eschatological vindication) and points out how they may advance the development of a contemporary Christian epistemology. 相似文献
8.
In this essay we advance the view that analytical epistemology and artificial intelligence are complementary disciplines. Both fields study epistemic relations, but whereas artificial intelligence approaches this subject from the perspective of understanding formal and computational properties of frameworks purporting to model some epistemic relation or other, traditional epistemology approaches the subject from the perspective of understanding the properties of epistemic relations in terms of their conceptual properties. We argue that these two practices should not be conducted in isolation. We illustrate this point by discussing how to represent a class of inference forms found in standard inferential statistics. This class of inference forms is interesting because its members share two properties that are common to epistemic relations, namely defeasibility and paraconsistency. Our modeling of standard inferential statistical arguments exploits results from both logical artificial intelligence and analytical epistemology. We remark how our approach to this modeling problem may be generalized to an interdisciplinary approach to the study of epistemic relations. 相似文献
9.
Western philosophy has been greatly influenced by visual metaphors. Knowing something has commonly, yet implicitly, been conceptualized
as seeing something clearly, learning has been framed as being visually exposed to something, and the mind has been understood
as a ‘mirror of nature’. A whole ‘epistemology of the eye’ has been at work, which has had significant practical implications,
not least in educational contexts. One way to characterize John Dewey’s pragmatism is to see it as an attempt to replace the
epistemology of the eye with an epistemology of the hand. This article develops the epistemology of the hand on three levels:
A level of embodiment and metaphors, of craftsmanship and social practices, and of schooling and education. 相似文献
10.
Brian S. Baigrie 《Argumentation》1994,8(2):125-144
Social Epistemology, as formulated by Steve Fuller, is based on the suggestion that rational knowledge policy must be held accountable to brute facts about the nature of our human cognitive pursuits, whatever these may be. One difficulty for Fuller concerns the conception of the social which underwrites social epistemology. I argue that social epistemology conflates the social with human psychological properties that are available for public scrutiny and, accordingly, that social epistemology is best viewed as a brand of psychologism. Though Fuller's proposal signifies an important step in the ongoing attempt by scholars to eradicate the last traces of Descartes' epistemological device of a disembodiedres cogitans, I conclude that his conception of the social is too weak to serve as the basis for a socially-embedded discipline in anything but name only. 相似文献
11.
12.
Epistemology and probability 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Probability is sometimes regarded as a universal panacea for epistemology. It has been supposed that the rationality of belief is almost entirely a matter of probabilities. Unfortunately, those philosophers who have thought about this most extensively have tended to be probability theorists first, and epistemologists only secondarily. In my estimation, this has tended to make them insensitive to the complexities exhibited by epistemic justification. In this paper I propose to turn the tables. I begin by laying out some rather simple and uncontroversial features of the structure of epistemic justification, and then go on to ask what we can conclude about the connection between epistemology and probability in the light of those features. My conclusion is that probability plays no central role in epistemology. This is not to say that probability plays no role at all. In the course of the investigation, I defend a pair of probabilistic acceptance rules which enable us, under some circumstances, to arrive at justified belief on the basis of high probability. But these rules are of quite limited scope. The effect of there being such rules is merely that probability provides one source for justified belief, on a par with perception, memory, etc. There is no way probability can provide a universal cure for all our epistemological ills. 相似文献
13.
Dale Jacquette 《Metaphilosophy》2001,32(3):261-278
Psychologism is a philosophical ideology that seeks to explain the principles of logic, metaphysics, and epistemology as psychological phenomena. Psychologism has been the storm center of concerted criticisms since the nineteenth century, and is thought by many to have been refuted once and for all by Kant, Frege, Husserl, and others. The project of accounting for objective philosophical or mathematical truths in terms of subjective psychological states has been largely discredited in mainstream analytic thought. Ironically, psychologism has resurfaced in unexpected guises in the form of intuitionistic logic and mathematics, cognitivism, and naturalized epistemology. I examine some of the principal objections to psychologism – distinguishing roughly between good and bad or philosophically acceptable versus unacceptable psychologism – and consider the extent to which a new wave of psychologism may be gaining prominence in contemporary philosophy, and the light its successes and failures may shed on the original concept and underlying perspective of classical psychologism. 相似文献
14.
MICHAEL DELLA ROCCA 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2005,70(1):1-33
This paper defends an interpretation of Descartes according to which he sees us as having normative (and not merely psychological) certainty of all clear and distinct ideas during the period in which they are apprehended clearly and distinctly . However, on this view, a retrospective doubt about clear and distinct ideas is possible. This interpretation allows Descartes to avoid the Cartesian Circle in an effective way and also shows that Descartes is surprisingly, in some respects, an epistemological externalist. The paper goes on to defend this interpretation against some powerful philosophical objections by Margaret Wilson and others by showing how Descartes'doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths can be brought in to support his epistemology. This doctrine and other analogous positions in Descartes can also reveal that Descartes, again surprisingly, takes important steps toward doing epistemology without direct appeal to God and God's veracity. 相似文献
15.
Philip Kitcher 《Erkenntnis》2011,75(3):505-524
In the spirit of James and Dewey, I ask what one might want from a theory of knowledge. Much Anglophone epistemology is centered
on questions that were once highly pertinent, but are no longer central to broader human and scientific concerns. The first
sense in which epistemology without history is blind lies in the tendency of philosophers to ignore the history of philosophical
problems. A second sense consists in the perennial attraction of approaches to knowledge that divorce knowing subjects from
their societies and from the tradition of socially assembling a body of transmitted knowledge. When epistemology fails to
use the history of inquiry as a laboratory in which methodological claims can be tested, there is a third way in which it
becomes blind. Finally, lack of attention to the growth of knowledge in various domains leaves us with puzzles about the character
of the knowledge we have. I illustrate this last theme by showing how reflections on the history of mathematics can expand
our options for understanding mathematical knowledge. 相似文献
16.
Andrew McGonigal 《Metaphilosophy》2003,34(1-2):69-77
In this article, I reply to Juli Eflin's "Epistemic Presuppositions and Their Consequences." I query Eflin's construal of the aims, scope and method of traditional epistemology, and go on to evaluate several of the central characteristics of Eflin's positive account – pluralistic virtue epistemology. 相似文献
17.
Andrew McGonigal 《Metaphilosophy》2003,34(1&2):69-77
In this article, I reply to Juli Eflin's "Epistemic Presuppositions and Their Consequences." I query Eflin's construal of the aims, scope and method of traditional epistemology, and go on to evaluate several of the central characteristics of Eflin's positive account – pluralistic virtue epistemology. 相似文献
18.
David G. Rowley 《Studies in East European Thought》1996,48(1):1-19
This paper explains how A. Bogdanov changed from a left Bolshevik impatient for armed insurrection into a moderate proponent
of revolution through cultural transformation by placing him in the context of a debate over epistemology among Russian Social
Democrats in the early twentieth century. By relying on neo-Kantian epistemology to justify socialist revolution, N. Berdyaev
actually began to turn away from Marxism. Lenin espoused a naive realism that was consistent with scientific socialism, but
which did not satisfy Bogdanov. Empiriomonism, Bogdanov’s neo-Positivist epistemology, led him away from violent revolution
and toward a proletarian cultural revolution. 相似文献
19.
Jeffrey W. Roland 《The Southern journal of philosophy》2009,47(2):205-223
Philip Kitcher has advanced an epistemology of science that purports to be naturalistic. For Kitcher, this entails that his epistemology of science must explain the correctness of belief-regulating norms while endorsing a realist notion of truth. This paper concerns whether or not Kitcher's epistemology of science is naturalistic on these terms. I find that it is not but that by supplementing the account we can secure its naturalistic standing. 相似文献
20.
Gordana Jovanović 《Integrative psychological & behavioral science》2010,44(4):310-328
The conflict between the psychometric methodological framework and the particularities of human experiences reported in psychotherapeutic
context led Michael Schwarz to raise the question whether psychology is based on a methodological error. I take this conflict
as a heuristic tool for the reconstruction of the early history of psychology, which bears witness to similar epistemological
conflicts, though the dominant historiography of psychology has largely forgotten alternative conceptions and their valuable
insights into complexities of psychic phenomena. In order to work against the historical amnesia in psychology I suggest to
look at cultural-historical contexts which decisively shaped epistemological choices in psychology. Instead of keeping epistemology
and history of psychology separate, which nurtures individualism and naturalism in psychology, I argue for historizing epistemology
and for historical psychology. From such a historically reflected perspective psychology in contemporary world can be approached
more critically. 相似文献