Self-consistency for low self-esteem in dissonance processes: the role of self-standards

The self-consistency revision of cognitive dissonance theory predicts that people with low self-esteem are less likely to experience dissonance arousal compared to people with high self-esteem. Two experiments investigated how the accessibility of different self-standards in the context of a dissonant act activates the consistency role of self-esteem in the process of cognitive dissonance arousal. In Experiment I, after participants wrote a counter-attitudinal essay, priming personal self-standards caused more attitude change for those with high compared to low self-esteem, whereas priming no standards or priming normative self-standards caused the same level of attitude change among both self-esteem groups. Experiment 2 showed that the self-consistency effect for low self-esteem participants only occurred among those who were high in self-certainty when personal self-standards were primed. The importance of self-standards for understanding the role of self-esteem in dissonance processes is discussed.     

Dissonance and importance: attitude change effects of personal relevance and race of the beneficiary of a counterattitudinal advocacy

The authors asked or instructed White college students to write an essay advocating a large tuition hike to increase scholarships for either students in general or Black students (yielding low or high racial symbolism, respectively) that would take effect in the near or far future (yielding high or low personal relevance, respectively). Especially when high-choice participants wrote highly compliant (i.e., unqualified) essays, attitude change was greater when the advocacy had either high (vs. low) personal relevance or high (vs. low) racial symbolism. Yet there was no attitude change when both symbolism and relevance were high. They may increase dissonance by making the dissonant elements more important and numerous. The coupling of relevance and symbolism, however, may link the attitude so strongly to personal values and self-concept that attitude change becomes untenable as a mode of dissonance reduction.     

The reinstatement of dissonance and psychological discomfort following failed affirmations

The research in this article examined the consequences of a failed attempt to reduce dissonance through a self‐affirmation strategy. It was hypothesized that disconfirming participants' affirmations would reinstate psychological discomfort and dissonance motivation. In Experiment 1, high‐dissonance participants who affirmed on a self‐relevant value scale and received disconforming feedback about their affirmations expressed greater psychological discomfort (Elliot & Devine, 1994) than either affirmation‐only participants or low‐dissonance/affirmation disconformed participants. In Experiment 2, disconfirmation of an affirmation resulted in increased attitude change. The results of both experiments suggested that a failed attempt to reduce dissonance reinstates psychological discomfort and dissonance motivation. We discuss how the reduction of psychological discomfort may play a role in the success of affirmations in reducing dissonance‐produced attitude change. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What drives self-affirmation effects? On the importance of differentiating value affirmation and attribute affirmation

In a series of studies, it is demonstrated that different types of self-affirmation procedures produce different effects. Affirming personally important values (value affirmation) increases self-clarity but not self-esteem. Affirming positive qualities of the self (attribute affirmation) increases self-esteem but not self-clarity (Study 1). As a consequence, attribute affirmation (which increases self-esteem) is more effective than value affirmation as a buffer against self-depreciating social comparison information. Attribute-affirmed participants more readily accept the self-evaluative consequences of threatening upward social comparisons than do value-affirmed participants (Study 2). However, value affirmation (which increases self-clarity) is a more effective buffer against dissonance threats. Value-affirmed participants showed less attitude change after writing a counterattitudinal essay than attribute-affirmed participants (Study 3).     

Self-affirmation versus self-consistency: a comparison of two competing self-theories of dissonance phenomena

High or low self-esteem individuals participated in a role-playing paradigm in which a friend stood them up for a dinner date. The participants received either a good explanation from the friend for the missed date (sufficient justification) or a poor explanation (insufficient justification). As predicted by self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), but not self-consistency theory (Aronson, 1999), low-esteem participants derogated the friend more than high-esteem participants under both insufficient and sufficient justification. Also supporting self-affirmation theory, sufficient/low-esteem participants reported more offense for being stood-up than sufficient/high-esteem participants. Discussion centers on the role of self-esteem in dissonance processes and on the need for more research that focuses on dissonance/self-threats that result from the behavior of other(s) rather than one’s own behavior.     

The Impact of the Antitobacco Norm on the Selected Mode of Cognitive Dissonance Reduction

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that when behavior violates an antismoking injunctive norm, dissonance is aroused, but the injunctive norm constrains how people reduce their discomfort. In Experiment 1, participants with positive or negative attitudes toward public smoking wrote an essay for or against a ban on public smoking. Whereas attitude change occurred for those whose counter‐attitudinal essay supported the antismoking norm, those whose counter‐attitudinal essay violated the antismoking norm did not change their attitudes to reduce dissonance. In Experiment 2, participants who wrote against the ban on public smoking eschewed attitude change in favor of reducing dissonance through trivialization and act rationalization. The discussion focuses on how maintaining social connections makes cognitions resistant to change when dissonance is aroused.     

Cognitive dissonance as a function of self-esteem and logical inconsistency

An experiment was conducted to test the importance of self-esteem in the arousal of cognitive dissonance. Recently, Aronson (1969) suggested that the reason an attitude-discrepant speech can arouse dissonance is that it is an indecent act committed by an individual who likes to think of himself as a good and decent person. Looking at counterattitudinal behavior as a discrepancy with one's self-concept rather than as a logical discrepancy between behavioral and attitudinal cognitions differs from Festinger and Carlsnuth's (1959) original notion In the experiment reported, subjects volunteered to take a personality inventory and received either neutral, very favorable, or very unfavorable feedback In this way, subjects' level of self-esteem was raised or lowered Following this procedure, subjects were induced to record a speech that was known to be discrepant with their private beliefs. They were offered either a small or a large inducement for their statements. It was predicted that, regardless of their level of self-esteem, subjects would manifest the inverse relationship between incentive magnitude and attitude change predicted by dissonance theory The major analysis of the results, and the concomitant internal analysis, generally supported the prediction With one qualification, the results were held to be consistent with Festinger and Carlsmith's version of dissonance arousal and inconsistent with the self-esteem analysis     

The effects of dispositional attachment orientations and contextual priming of attachment security on reckless driving

Three studies examined the effects of dispositional attachment orientations and contextual priming of attachment security on the willingness to drive recklessly. In all three, adolescents were exposed to primes of attachment security (a poster in Study 1, a video in Study 2, a guided imagination task in Study 3), positive affect, or neutral affect, and were then asked to report their willingness to drive recklessly. Participants were also asked to report on their attachment orientations (anxiety, avoidance), self-esteem, and self-relevance of driving. Attachment anxiety was related to higher willingness to drive recklessly. In addition, as compared to positive affect and neutral priming, attachment security priming exacerbated highly anxiously attached participants’ tendency to drive recklessly, but reduced this tendency among participants scoring low on attachment anxiety. Importantly, these effects could not be explained by variables unrelated to attachment. The discussion emphasizes the relevance of attachment theory for understanding risk-taking behavior, and relates to practical implications of the studies.     

Masked affective priming by name letters: Evidence for a correspondence of explicit and implicit self-esteem

In an affective priming experiment (N = 60), participants’ initials were used as masked primes. We found a significant priming effect (denoting positivity of the personal initials) if personal initials (compared to yoked participants’ initials) were followed by other-relevant positive or negative targets (e.g., honest, cruel). For possessor-relevant targets (e.g., healthy, lonely), there was no main effect of priming. However, this priming index positively correlated with explicit self-esteem. For participants with high self esteem, a positive effect was found, whereas for participants with low self-esteem, a negative effect was found.     

Do amnesics exhibit cognitive dissonance reduction? The role of explicit memory and attention in attitude change

In two studies, we investigated the roles of explicit memory and attentional resources in the process of behavior-induced attitude change. Although most theories of attitude change (cognitive dissonance and self-perception theories) assume an important role for both mechanisms, we propose that behavior-induced attitude change can be a relatively automatic process that does not require explicit memory for, or consciously controlled processing of, the discrepancy between attitude and behavior. Using a free-choice paradigm, we found that both amnesics and normal participants under cognitive load showed as much attitude change as did control participants.     

泛文化的自尊——基于中国大学生的研究证据

过去一直认为,自尊是人类普遍的需要,是泛文化的。但是,过去十多年来,这一观点受到严重挑战。其主要理由是许多跨文化的研究显示集体主义文化下个体的自尊显著低于西方,少有自我促进的迹象。但是,几乎所有这样的证据都是来自自陈式测量。由于自陈式测量难以避免自我展现（Self-presentation）或社会期许（Social Desirability）的影响,并且严重依赖于个体的自我报告,本研究采用新的能够防止社会期许的影响并能触及无意识的内隐测量——阈下评价性启动（Subliminal Evaluative Priming）程序,对中国大学生的自尊进行了研究。结果发现中国大学生对自我持有显著的积极、肯定的评价,中国人存在内隐自尊。这表明,集体主义文化下的个体的自尊需要是存在的,只是以内隐的方式表现或在自我展现的影响最小化后表现出来。这一发现和自尊的泛文化论是一致的     

The cognitive-behavioural treatment of low self-esteem in psychotic patients: a pilot study

Low self esteem in individuals with a psychotic disorder is common and may be related to poorer clinical outcomes. However, there has been little research on devising treatment methods to improve self-esteem either generally or in psychotic patients in particular. The aims of this study were to evaluate the efficacy of a simple cognitive behavioural intervention to improve self esteem in psychotic patients who scored poorly on a self-esteem measure. This pilot study was a randomised control trial with a convenience sample of chronic psychotic inpatients. The cognitive behavioural self-esteem intervention, as an adjunct to treatment as usual (TAU), was compared to TAU alone in patients with psychosis. The individual self-esteem intervention as described by Tarrier (The use of coping strategies and self-regulation in the treatment of psychosis. (2001)) consisted of working with participants to elicit positive self-attributes and then identify specific behavioural examples to provide evidence of this attribute. Emphasis was given to any consequential change in the patient's belief that they had the attribute. The results indicated that this cognitive behavioural treatment for self-esteem used as an adjunct treatment in psychosis, resulted in clinical benefits in terms of increased self-esteem, decreased psychotic symptomatology and improved social functioning. These benefits were largely maintained at 3-month follow-up.     

Defining Self-Worth: Trait Self-Esteem Moderates the Use of Self-Serving Trait Definitions in Social Judgment

People possess self-serving definitions of social traits and categories. When a trait is positive, people emphasize their own attributes in their definition of the trait. When the trait is negative, they de-emphasize self-attributes. Across three studies, we discovered that this tendency is moderated by dispositional self-esteem. High self-esteem individuals articulate more self-serving trait definitions than their low esteem counterparts. This was revealed in explicit reports of trait definitions, reaction times used to report trait definitions, as well as in judgments of other people. Although more muted, the trait definitions of low self-esteem participants tended to be self-serving in one study and more even-handed in two others. Implications of these findings for understanding the relation of self to social judgment are discussed.     

自尊对基于面孔吸引力人格特质推断的影响

自尊影响面孔吸引力刻板印象,然而由于能动性特质自我评价能够预测自尊,高自尊的个体拥有更高的能动性自我评价,因此自尊对面孔吸引力刻板印象的影响是否只体现在能动性特质维度上还未可知。60名女被试分别评价高、低吸引力女性目标在能动性和社群性人格特质维度上的符合程度。结果发现：能动性维度上,高自尊被试对高吸引力目标在积极特质形容词的符合程度评价显著高于低自尊被试,低自尊被试对低吸引力目标在积极特质形容词的符合程度评价显著高于高自尊被试;社群性维度上,高、低自尊被试均认为高吸引力目标与积极特质形容词更符合。研究结果表明,自尊对面孔吸引力刻板印象的影响主要体现在能动性评价上;在社群性评价上,高、低自尊被试都表现出面孔吸引力刻板印象。     

低阶层大学生的炫耀性消费:自尊补偿与地位追求

近年来低阶层大学生炫耀性消费负性事件频发,研究以补偿性消费理论为基础,考察低阶层大学生炫耀性消费的内因与外因。实验一通过比较高、低状态自尊条件下不同阶层被试的炫耀性消费倾向来考察自尊的作用,结果表明低阶层大学生的炫耀性消费倾向受到其状态自尊的调节; 实验二通过比较不同阶层被试对地位及非地位符号商品的支付意愿来考察商品符号价值的作用,结果表明低阶层大学生只有在商品具有地位符号价值时,才会表现出比高阶层大学生更强烈的炫耀性消费倾向。     

Using cognitive dissonance to enhance faculty members' attitudes toward teaching online courses

Adopting a reward strategy for inducing college faculty to teach online courses is expected to cause a positive shift of their attitudes. Based upon dissonance theory, a smaller reward will lead to greater attitude change, and this effect will be more pronounced in individualists. The results of an experimental study showed that individualist teachers exhibited greater attitude change under low reward than under high reward, but the reward effect was not prominent in collectivist teachers. Implications for enhancing college teachers' attitudes toward teaching online courses are discussed.     

Secure and defensive high self-esteem

Long-standing theories have suggested high self-esteem (SE) can assume qualitatively different forms that are related to defensiveness. The authors explored whether some high-SE individuals are particularly defensive because they harbor negative self-feelings at less conscious levels, indicated by low implicit SE. In Study 1, participants high in explicit SE but low in implicit SE showed the highest levels of narcissism--an indicator of defensiveness. In Studies 2 and 3, the correspondence between implicit and explicit SE predicted defensive behavior (in-group bias in Study 2 and dissonance reduction in Study 3), such that for high explicit-SE participants, those with relatively low implicit SE behaved more defensively. These results are consistent with the idea that high SE can be relatively secure or defensive.     

The relationship between cognitive dissonance and helping behavior

An experiment was conducted to study the relationship between cognitive dissonance and helping behavior. A counterattitudinal procedure was employed to arouse dissonance. For half of the participants, an experimental confederate entered the room and elicited an opportunity for them to offer help. In this situation, fewer subjects in the dissonance condition offered help than subjects in the no‐dissonance condition. The least helping occurred among dissonance subjects with the highest level of commitment to the counterattitudinal task. Those with a medium level of commitment offered significantly more help. Despite the fact that results in line with Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory (subjects' attitudinal change) were obtained in the no‐helping situation, in helping situations, dissonance subjects who offered help presented significantly less attitude change than those who did not offer it. This was considered to be a result of helpfulness reducing dissonance arousal.     

Belief discrepant behavior and the bogus pipeline: Impression management or arousal attribution

Based on recent studies impression management theorists conclude that following belief discrepant behavior, persons will feign attitude change on paper measures, but report their “true” beliefs when attached to a lie detector (the bogus pipeline). A dissonance arousal explanation of these bogus pipeline results suggests that subjects may attribute their arousal to the bogus pipeline equipment instead of to dissonance and therefore may not be motivated to change their attitudes. The present study examined these competing interpretations and yielded results which support the dissonance arousal attribution explanation. Subjects who were attached to a (bogus pipeline) lie detector exhibited attitude change if given the opportunity to get accustomed to the equipment (which made attribution of arousal to the equipment less plausible), but showed no attitude change if no habituation experience was provided.     

Dissonance motivation: Its nature,persistence, and reinstatement

This paper examines whether arousal is a necessary component of the motivation to reduce dissonance. Alternative responses to attitude-behavior inconsistency include attitude change, explaining the behavior by a consonant cognition (i.e., low choice), and attributing the dissonance-induced state to an alternative source, such as the purported side effects of an ingested “drug.” For conditions in which there are few consonant cognitions (i.e., high choice), a comparison of different “drug” conditions in which attitude change does or does not occur was expected to clarify which components of the dissonance-induced state mediate attitude change. Attitude change occurred in high choice conditions where the “drug” was described as pleasant, but not in high choice conditions where the “drug” was described as unpleasant or in a low choice condition. In addition, when the “drug” was descibed as arousing there was, if anything, more attitude change than when the “drug” was described as nonarousing. These results suggest that unpleasantness and not arousal per se is the motivating factor in dissonance reduction. The effects of the passage of time and reinstating the counterattitudinal behavior on the alternative responses to attitude-behavior inconsistency were also examined. Subjects returned 2 weeks later, stated their attitudes, recalled their original counterattitudinal essay, and again stated their attitudes. Although there was a general decrease in attitude change during this period, the pattern of attitude change remained basically the same. Attitude change following reinstatement increased from its original level only in those conditions where it had been initially attenuated through misattribution or a consonant cognition.