Attentional bias for words and faces in social anxiety

Conflicting findings concerning the nature and presence of attentional bias in social anxiety and social phobia have been reported in the literature. This paper reports the findings of two studies comparing people with high and low social anxiety on dot probe tasks using words, faces photographed in front view, and faces photographed in profile as stimuli. In Study 1 those with high social anxiety displayed an attentional bias towards negative faces. The low social anxiety group showed an attentional bias towards positive faces. No significant effects were observed on the dot probe using words as stimuli. Study 2 used pairs of faces presented in profile as though looking at each other. One of the faces displayed either a positive, negative or neutral expression. The second face always had a neutral expression, and in half of the trials it was the subject's own face. The findings of this more ecologically valid procedure replicated those of Study 1. Facilitated attention to dots following emotional faces was specific to threatening facial stimuli. From these studies it appears that the facial dot probe task is a more sensitive index of attentional bias than the word task in a non-clinical sample with social anxiety.     

Expectancy bias mediates the link between social anxiety and memory bias for social evaluation

Social anxiety (SA) involves a multitude of cognitive symptoms related to fear of evaluation, including expectancy and memory biases. We examined whether memory biases are influenced by expectancy biases for social feedback in SA. We hypothesised that, faced with a socially evaluative event, people with higher SA would show a negative expectancy bias for future feedback. Furthermore, we predicted that memory bias for feedback in SA would be mediated by expectancy bias. Ninety-four undergraduate students (55 women, mean age = 19.76 years) underwent a two-visit task that measured expectations about (Visit 1) and memory of (Visit 2) feedback from unknown peers. Results showed that higher levels of SA were associated with negative expectancy bias. An indirect relationship was found between SA and memory bias that was mediated by expectancy bias. The results suggest that expectancy biases are in the causal path from SA to negative memory biases for social evaluation.     

The role of egocentrism and focalism in the emotion intensity bias

People sometimes judge their emotions, preferences, and attitudes to be more intense than those of other people. Two experiments tested whether this emotion intensity bias in direct comparisons results from two non-motivated cognitive processes—egocentrism and focalism. In Study 1, the intensity bias was found even when comparing a friend’s preferences to peers. In Study 2, attention given to own versus other’s preferences, and the referent of the comparison (self or others) were manipulated. Results indicated that attention to others reduced the bias, presumably by reducing egocentrism. Consistent with focalism, the bias also emerged when a friend was the target of comparison, and the bias was eliminated when the self was the referent rather than the target of comparison. In the discussion, we evaluate these accounts in light of some alternative explanations for the intensity bias.     

Autobiographical memory bias in social anxiety

In social anxiety the psychological self is closely related to the feared stimulus. Socially anxious individuals are, by definition, concerned about how the self is perceived and evaluated by others. As autobiographical memory is strongly related to views of the self it follows that biases in autobiographical memory play an important role in social anxiety. In the present study high (n = 19) and low (n = 29) socially anxious individuals were compared on autobiographical memory bias, current goals, and self-discrepancy. Individuals high in social anxiety showed a bias towards recalling more negative and more social anxiety-related autobiographical memories, reported more current goals related to overcoming social anxiety, and showed larger self-discrepancies. The pattern of results is largely in line with earlier research in individuals with PTSD and complicated grief. This suggests that the relation between autobiographical memory bias and the self is a potentially valuable trans-diagnostic factor.     

Effects of divided attention and social categorization on the own-race bias in face recognition

Perceivers remember own-race faces more accurately than other-race faces (i.e., Own-Race Bias). In the current experiments, we manipulated participants' attentional resources and social group membership to explore their influence on own and other-race face recognition memory. In Experiment 1, Chinese participants viewed own-race and Caucasian faces, and between-subjects we manipulated whether participants attention was divided during face encoding. We found that divided attention eliminated the Own-Race Bias in memory due to a reduction of memory accuracy for own-race faces, implicating that attention allocation plays a role in creating the bias. In Experiment 2, Chinese participants completed an ostensible personality test. Some participants were informed that their personality traits were most commonly found in Caucasian (i.e., other-race) individuals, resulting in these participants sharing a group membership with other-race targets. In contrast, other participants were not told anything about the personality test, resulting in the default own-race group membership. The participants encoded the faces for a subsequent recognition memory test either with or without performing a concurrent arithmetic distracting task. Results showed that other-race group membership and reducing attention during encoding independently eliminated the typical Own-Race Bias in face memory. The implications of these findings on perceptual-expertise and social-categorization models are discussed.     

Comorbid interpretation and expectancy bias in social anxiety and alcohol use

Background: In two studies, the present research examined whether being high in both social anxiety and alcohol use disorder symptoms is associated with a comorbid interpretation and expectancy bias that reflects their bidirectional relationship.

Design: Cross-sectional, quantitative surveys.

Methods: Measures of social anxiety and alcohol use disorder symptoms, as well as an interpretation and expectancy bias task assessing biases for social anxiety, drinking, and comorbid social anxiety and drinking.

Results: In Study 1 (N?=?447), individuals high (vs. low) in social anxiety had stronger social threat bias and individuals high (vs. low) in alcohol use disorder symptoms had stronger drinking bias. Those high in both social anxiety and alcohol use disorder symptoms endorsed interpretations and expectancies linking social interaction with alcohol use. Comorbid bias predicted membership into the high social anxiety/drinking group, even after taking into account single-disorder biases. In Study 2 (N?=?325), alcohol use disorder symptoms predicted drinking bias and social anxiety symptoms predicted social anxiety bias. Alcohol use disorder symptoms, social anxiety symptoms, and their interaction predicted comorbid interpretation and expectancy bias.

Conclusion: Results indicate unique cognitive vulnerability markers for persons with comorbid social anxiety and alcohol use disorder symptoms, which may improve detection and treatment of this serious comorbidity.     

BIS, BAS, and bias: The role of personality and cognitive bias in social anxiety

The goal of the present research was to test the hypothesis that cognitive biases for negative and threatening social information mediate the effects of behavioral inhibition system (BIS) and behavioral approach system (BAS) sensitivity on social anxiety. Participants completed self-report measures of BIS and BAS and then underwent a social-threat induction procedure in which they were told they would have to perform a speech. A battery of cognitive bias measures was then administered, followed by a battery of state anxiety measures. Audience members also rated participants’ anxiety during the speech. Structural equation modeling was used to test the hypothesized model. As predicted, the fully-mediated model showed the best fit to the data, and higher BIS and lower BAS were found to have significant indirect effects on social anxiety via cognitive bias.     

Fear-relevant selective associations and social anxiety: absence of a positive bias

An illusory correlation paradigm was used to compare high and low socially anxious individuals' initial, on-line and a posteriori covariation estimates between emotional faces and aversive, pleasant and neutral outcomes. Overall, participants demonstrated an initial expectancy bias for aversive outcomes following angry faces, and pleasant outcomes following happy faces. On-line expectancy biases indicated that initial biases were extinguished during the task, with the exception of low socially anxious individuals who continued to over-associate positive social cues with pleasant outcomes. In addition to lacking this protective positive on-line bias, the high social anxiety group reported retrospectively more negative social cues than the low socially anxious group. Findings are discussed in relation to similar evidence from recent interpretive and memory paradigms.     

Recognition bias for critical faces in social phobia: a replication and extension

Studies using linguistic stimuli have provided little support for explicit memory biases among individuals with social phobia (SP). However, using facial stimuli rated on their criticalness, Lundh and Ost (1996) found that individuals with SP recognized more critical than accepting faces, whereas non-anxious controls tended to show the opposite pattern. Since the publication of Lundh and Ost's findings, additional studies using a variety of facial stimuli have produced inconsistent findings (J. Anxiety Disord. 14 (2000) 501; Behav. Res. Ther. 39 (2001) 967). Unfortunately, these inconsistencies are difficult to reconcile given great variation in methods and stimuli. Therefore, we designed a study to replicate and extend the work of Lundh and Ost (Behav. Res. Ther. 34 (1996) 787). Similar to Lundh and Ost, individuals with SP identified a significantly higher proportion of old critical faces as old than did non-anxious controls. Further, extending the work of Lundh and Ost, signal detection analyses revealed group differences on response bias according to face type. Specifically, controls showed a response bias towards indicating that accepting faces were previously seen, whereas individuals with SP did not. Finally, signal detection analyses failed to reveal group differences in the accuracy of memory.     

判断与决策中的投射偏差

投射偏差是指个体常常会高估未来偏好与当前偏好的一致性, 从而把当前偏好投射到未来的心理倾向性。本文从情感–认知加工、时间修正和心理模拟等视角对投射偏差的心理机制进行了解释, 并概括出投射偏差的内源性(含内脏感觉、情绪状态和需要)和外源性(含事件相关信息、天气状况和选择情境)影响因素, 还总结归纳出投射偏差的三种应对策略, 最后指出了投射偏差在未来研究的方向。     

Working memory load moderates late attentional bias in social anxiety

The vigilance–avoidance hypothesis suggests that socially anxious individuals attempt to detect signs that they are being evaluated (vigilance) and subsequently direct attention away from such stimuli (avoidance). Although extensive evidence supports vigilance, data concerning subsequent avoidance is equivocal. Drawing from models of attention, the current study hypothesised that working memory load moderates late attentional bias in social anxiety such that avoidance occurs if working memory load is low, and difficulty disengaging attention occurs if working memory load is high. Forty-one undergraduates (19 socially anxious; 22 non-anxious controls) completed a dot-probe task with emotional (happy and disgust) and neutral facial expressions and a concurrent n-back task. Results supported the hypothesis such that socially anxious subjects demonstrated avoidance of disgust faces when working memory load was absent, but had difficulty disengaging attention during high working memory load. Theoretical implications and directions for future research are discussed.     

状态焦虑对回溯式时距判断的影响：认知评价和记忆偏向有调节的中介作用

探讨状态焦虑对回溯式时距判断的影响, 并检测记忆偏向与认知评价在其中的中介和调节作用。实验1招募大学生60人, 随机分为高、低状态焦虑组, 采用情绪诱导程序诱导高、低状态焦虑; 采用口头估计任务测量回溯式时距判断, 考察高、低状态焦虑诱导后的回溯式时距判断差异。实验2在实验1的基础上, 招募大学生60人, 增加自由回忆任务测量记忆偏向, 考察状态焦虑对回溯式时距判断的影响中记忆偏向的中介作用。实验3在实验1和实验2的基础上, 招募大学生90人, 增加视觉模拟心境量表测量认知评价, 考察状态焦虑对回溯式时距判断的影响, 并检测认知评价与记忆偏向在其中的作用。结果发现：(1)在回溯式时距判断中, 高状态焦虑比低状态焦虑更高估时距; (2)在状态焦虑对回溯式时距判断的影响中, 记忆偏向具有中介作用; (3)在状态焦虑对回溯式时距判断的影响中, 认知评价和记忆偏向存在有调节的中介作用：只有当认知评价得分较低时, 即对于认为焦虑对身体健康有害程度较低的个体而言, 在状态焦虑影响回溯式时距判断中, 记忆偏向具有完全中介作用, 即状态焦虑只通过记忆偏向影响回溯式时距判断。研究结果揭示了焦虑个体回溯式时距判断的内部过程, 验证了注意闸门模型中有关用于计时的记忆资源越多对于时距越高估的假设, 丰富了焦虑通过记忆偏向影响回溯式时距判断的解释视角, 为通过调整认知评价改善焦虑个体时距偏差提供了重要参考。     

The association between ruminative thinking and negative interpretation bias in social anxiety

Cognitive models propose that both, negative interpretations of ambiguous social situations and ruminative thoughts about social events contribute to the maintenance of social anxiety disorder. It has further been postulated that ruminative thoughts fuel biased negative interpretations, however, evidence is rare. The present study used a multi-method approach to assess ruminative processing following a social interaction (post-event processing by self-report questionnaire and social rumination by experience sampling method) and negative interpretation bias (via two separate tasks) in a student sample (n?=?51) screened for high (HSA) and low social anxiety (LSA). Results support the hypothesis that group differences in negative interpretations of ambiguous social situations in HSAs vs. LSAs are mediated by higher levels of post-event processing assessed in the questionnaire. Exploratory analyses highlight the potential role of comorbid depressive symptoms. The current findings help to advance the understanding of the association between two cognitive processes involved in social anxiety and stress the importance of ruminative post-event processing.     

Attention bias modification for reducing speech anxiety

The mechanisms mediating the anxiolytic effects of attention bias modification (ABM) remain unclear. Accordingly, we randomly assigned speech-anxious subjects to receive four sessions of one of three training conditions: ABM, inverse ABM, and control. In the ABM condition, subjects viewed pairs of photographs of models displaying facial expressions of disgust and joy on a computer screen. Probes always replaced the positive face, and subjects pushed a button to indicate the identity of the probe (E or F) as rapidly as possible. In the inverse condition, the probes always replaced the negative face, and in the control condition, the probes replaced each face type equally often. After four training sessions, all groups exhibited statistically indistinguishable, but significant, reductions on self-report, behavioral, and physiological measures of speech anxiety. Self-report and behavioral measures of attentional control improved likewise. Contrary to early studies, ABM was not superior to control procedures in producing reductions on measures of social anxiety.     

Regulatory focus as a predictor of omission bias in moral judgment: Mediating role of anticipated regrets

Omission bias occurs when people are more reluctant to accept negative consequences caused by their actions than by their inaction. Recent research on omission bias in decision‐making has found evidence for individual differences, thus indicating that some people are more likely to show omission inclination than others. The present research aims to explore the role of regulatory focus as individual difference variables in omission bias. Moreover, we examine whether anticipated regret mediates the relationship between regulatory focus and moral judgement. Moral judgement tasks utilized include: (i) moral dilemma scenarios (Study 1); and (ii) ethical scenarios embracing apparent legal rule violations (Study 2). The results of both studies show that only prevention focus is significantly related to omission bias in moral judgement. Specifically, this relationship holds regardless of the nature of the ‘omission’ (whether they are deontological or utilitarian). In addition, anticipated regret/guilt for action was found to mediate the relationship between prevention focus and omission bias. Implications and limitations are discussed based on the results of the current study.     

Neural correlates of social perception on response bias

Accurate person perception is crucial in social decision-making. One of the central elements in successful social perception is the ability to understand another’s response bias; this is because the same behavior can represent different inner states depending on whether other people are yea-sayers or naysayers. In the present study, we have tried to investigate how the internal biases of others are perceived. Using a multi-trial learning paradigm, perceivers made predictions about a target’s responses to various suggested activities and then received feedback for each prediction trial-by-trial. Our hypotheses were that (1) the internal decision criterion of the targets would be realized through repeated experiences, and (2) due to positive–negative asymmetry, yea-sayers would be recognized more gradually than naysayers through the probabilistic integration of repeated experiences. To find neural evidence that tracks probabilistic integration when forming person knowledge on response biases, we employed a model-based fMRI with a State-Space Model. We discovered that person knowledge about yea-sayers modulated several brain regions, including caudate nucleus, DLPFC, hippocampus, etc. Moreover, when person knowledge was updated with incorrect performance feedback, brain regions including the caudate nucleus, DLPFC, dmPFC, and TPJ were also involved. There were overlapping regions for both processes, caudate nucleus and DLPFC, suggesting that these regions take crucial roles in forming person knowledge with repeated feedback, while reflecting acquired information up to the current prediction.     

Racial bias in behavioral assessment of children's social skills

The social skills of 20 second- and sixth-grade students were assessed by 20 trained raters using the Social Skills Test for Children (SST-C). Rater and child characteristics were examined to determine whether differences in social skills ratings were due to the race of the rater or the race of the children being rated or due to the interactive effects of these characteristics, which would suggest racial bias in the ratings procedure. The results showed that the race of the rater did affect some behavioral observations. Black raters gave higher scores than white raters on four behavioral categories: response latency, appropriate assertion, effective assertion, and smiling. White raters gave higher scores for head position and gestures. The results of this study replicated earlier findings of significant differences in social skills ratings due to the race and age of the child being rated. The results also showed modest racial bias effects in that black and white raters scored black and white children differentially on two behavioral categories: overall skill ratings and smiling. These results suggested that most behavioral categories of the SST-C were not systematically affected by racial bias. However, the most subjective rating, overall skill, did evidence racial bias effects. This finding is consistent with previous data showing that subjective ratings may be most affected by racial bias.     

Social interpretation bias and generalized social phobia: the influence of developmental experiences

Patients with generalized social phobia (N = 42) and non-phobic community controls (N = 42) engaged in a social interaction with an experimental assistant whose behavior was used to create either a positive or an ambiguous social environment. Participants then rated their own performance and their partner's behavior. As a group, social phobic patients displayed negatively biased self-judgments, but failed to display biased social interpretations. Among the social phobia group, a social developmental history marked by parental hostility was associated with negative interpretations of partner behavior and a history of parental overprotection was associated with less sensitivity to partner behavior. The results supported cognitive models of social phobia, which implicate negative learning experiences in the development of information processing biases.