Stereotypes,Prejudice, and the Taxonomy of the Implicit Social Mind1

How do cognition and affect interact to produce action? Research in intergroup psychology illuminates this question by investigating the relationship between stereotypes and prejudices about social groups. Yet it is now clear that many social attitudes are implicit (roughly, nonconscious or involuntary). This raises the question: how does the distinction between cognition and affect apply to implicit mental states? An influential view—roughly analogous to a Humean theory of action—is that “implicit stereotypes” and “implicit prejudices” constitute two separate constructs, reflecting different mental processes and neural systems. On this basis, some have also argued that interventions to reduce discrimination should combat implicit stereotypes and prejudices separately. We propose an alternative (anti‐Humean) framework. We argue that all putative implicit stereotypes are affect‐laden and all putative implicit prejudices are “semantic,” that is, they stand in co‐activating associations with concepts and beliefs. Implicit biases, therefore, consist in “clusters” of semantic‐affective associations, which differ in degree, rather than kind. This framework captures the psychological structure of implicit bias, promises to improve the power of indirect measures to predict behavior, and points toward the design of more effective interventions to combat discrimination.     

“Internally Wicked”: Investigating How and Why Essentialism Influences Punitiveness and Moral Condemnation

Kant argued that individuals should be punished “proportional to their internal wickedness,” and recent work has demonstrated that essentialism—the notion that observable characteristics reflect internal, biological, unchanging “essences”—influences moral judgment. However, these efforts have yielded conflicting results: essentialism sometimes increases and sometimes decreases moral condemnation. To resolve these discrepancies, we investigated the mechanisms by which essentialism influences moral judgment, focusing on perceptions of actors’ control over their behavior, the target of essentialism (particular behaviors vs. actors’ character), and the component of essentialism (biology vs. immutability). Participants punished people described as having a criminal essence more than those with a non-criminal essence or no essence. Probing potential mechanisms underlying this effect, we found a mediating role for perceptions of control and weak influences of essentialism focus (behavior vs. character) and component of essentialism (biology vs. immutability). These results extend prior work on essentialism and moral cognition, demonstrating a causal link between perceptions of “internal wickedness” and moral judgment. Our findings also resolve discrepancies in past work on the influence of essentialism on moral judgment, highlighting the role that perceptions of actors’ control over their behavior play in moral condemnation.     

Reaching Up,Down, In,and Around: Couple and Family Coping During the Coronavirus Pandemic

The worldwide coronavirus (COVID-19) has had profound effects on all aspects of life: physical health, the ability to travel locally or to more distant destinations, material and financial resources, and psychosocial wellbeing. Couples, families, and communities and individual persons in those relationships have struggled to cope with emerging depression, anxiety, and trauma, and the rise of relational conflict. In this article, we suggest that the existential nature of the pandemic’s challenges requires more than just the usual psychosocial interventions. We propose a taxonomy of responses to foster coping and resilience—“Reaching Up, Down, In, and Around.” “Reaching Up” includes accessing spiritual, religious, and ethical values. “Reaching Down” includes ideas and practices that foster a revised relationship with the Earth and its resources, and that engage families to participate in activities that aid the Earth’s recovery from decades of human-caused damage. “Reaching In” represents a turn towards experiences available in the mind and in shared minds in relationships that provide pleasure, excitement, joy, and peace, given that external sources of these emotions are of limited availability due to quarantine. “Reaching Around” involves reframing the mandate for “social distancing” as fostering social connection and support while maintaining physical distancing. The challenges for family therapists, whose practices are confined largely to online therapy, and who are struggling with the same fears and constraints as those persons they are attempting to help, are also discussed.     

Enactivism,other minds,and mental disorders

Although enactive approaches to cognition vary in terms of their character and scope, all endorse several core claims. The first is that cognition is tied to action. The second is that cognition is composed of more than just in-the-head processes; cognitive activities are (at least partially) externalized via features of our embodiment and in our ecological dealings with the people and things around us. I appeal to these two enactive claims to consider a view called “direct social perception” (DSP): the idea that we can sometimes perceive features of other minds directly in the character of their embodiment and environmental interactions. I argue that if DSP is true, we can probably also perceive certain features of mental disorders as well. I draw upon the developmental psychologist Daniel Stern’s notion of “forms of vitality”—largely overlooked in these debates—to develop this idea, and I use autism as a case study. I argue further that an enactive approach to DSP can clarify some ways we play a regulative role in shaping the temporal and phenomenal character of the disorder in question, and it may therefore have practical significance for both the clinical and therapeutic encounter.

     

The Zhuangzi on Coping with Society

Stories in the Zhuangzi detailing expert artisans and other extraordinary people are often read as celebrations of “skills” or “knacks.” In this paper, I will argue that they would be more accurately understood as “coping” stories. Taken as a celebration of one’s “skill” or “knack” they transform the Zhuangzi into an implicit advocate of conforming to, or even identifying with, one’s social roles. I will argue that the stories of artisans and extraordinarily skilled people are less about cultivating one’s talents so as to “find one’s calling,” better fulfill social expectations, or achieve oneness with Dao, than they are concerned with developing strategies for coping with natural and social contingencies. Read in this way, there is much to learn from the Zhuangzi when reflecting on contemporary social and political issues, especially those related to meritocratic hubris.     

Going beyond with Bayesian updating

It all started innocently enough. One spring-like winter day, I happened to ask Brendan whether economists ever dealt with escalation. “With what?” he replied. “A phenomenon where people keep investing in the face of continuing losses,” I answered. Then I described how industrial/organizational psychologists had become intrigued with situations in which investors seemed to throw good money after bad, how their explanations for the phenomenon centered on individual characteristics such as commitment, how Sonia Goltz (1992) used a standard bread-and-butter operant procedure—fixed and variable schedules of reinforcement—to explain their persistence, and how Goltz's experiments had shown that during the extinction phase investors even increased their investments for a while when the news was all bad. Without a moment's hesitation, he exclaimed, “I bet I can predict the turning point.” Another arrogant-economist remark, I thought to myself. “How?” “Bayesian updating.” Then we talked at length about Bayesian analysis techniques and how they could be used to predict the shape of extinction curves. I realized that these techniques might be just what psychologists needed as an enticement to study sequences of behavior over time. And that's how this commentary got started.     

Primary-school stutterers: Have attitudes changed?

How concerned are primary-school-aged stuttering children about their communication problem? What are the clinical implications of this concern?Fifteen years ago, Silverman (1970) suggested that primary-school-aged children who stuttered were not concerned about their disfluencies. A clinical implication of that report was that the interpreted lack of concern might negatively affect the children's motivation and desire for change in therapy. Scant research exists to support or refute this implication. While research is available on reactions to stuttering, pretherapeutic attitudes—especially those of children—have not been systematically reported. Guitar (1976) measured the pre-treatment attitudes of 38 adult stutterers and reported that, “those stutterers with more negative attitudes measured just prior to treatment, were most likely to have high levels of stuttering a year later, even though all subjects left therapy entirely fluent.” In related areas, research by Kolb, Winter, and Berlen (1968), McFall (1970), and McFall and Hammen (1971) has indicated that clients who are more motivated do better in behavior modification programs.Whether or not these findings may be generalized to children, in the midst of a developmental process, is purely speculative.     

Theory of Mind in Infants and Young Children: A Review

Theory of mind, or mindreading, refers to our uniquely human capacity to infer what is in other people's minds. Recent research suggests that “implicit” elements of this ability can be seen as early as the second year of life, in infants’ spontaneous helping, communicative, and eye‐gaze behaviours. More “explicit” verbally mediated mindreading skills emerge in the preschool period, and these are positively linked to social competence. Research with typically developing children as well as those with autism spectrum disorders suggests that exposure to conversation about mental states promotes theory of mind development.     

Living (dys)regulated and alienated young masculinity—Young men's embodied experiences of mental disorders and suicidality

Introduction

Mental disorders, such as depression and anxiety with interlinked suicidality, are the leading cause of health-related disability among young men. Knowledge of the interaction between emotional, bodily, social and gendered mental health processes in young men is limited and therefore needed.

Aim

This study aimed to explore young men's lived embodied experiences of mental disorders and suicidality, and to conceptualise these by integrating affective–emotional, physiological, social and gendered processes.

Methods

Semistructured individual interviews were conducted with 13 young men who had sought professional help for mental disorders and suicidality. Grounded theory (GT) was used with a social constructivist perspective.

Results

The results comprise one core category—Living (dys)regulated and alienated young masculinity—with related categories “battling with the emotional body,” “suffering in social silence” and “balancing embodied darkness and distress.” The GT illustrates how young men navigate and manage their embodied and emotional suffering in a context of “regulative” masculine and social norms alongside insufficient social support.

Conclusion

Our results suggest that young men's lived embodied experiences of mental disorders and suicidality can be understood as a dynamic process of internal and external “(dys)regulation and alienation.” The generated GT provides a broad tentative explanation model, contributing to theory development, and serves as a basis for gender-sensitive interventions—in both psychotherapy and physiotherapy—integrating body, mind and the social context.     

Reflections on Hollander’s “Hegemonic Mind” and How to Treat It

This response to Hollander’s consideration of the “hegemonic mind” critiques her social psychoanalytic formulation of man’s inclination to disempower the many to serve the personal, particularly the financial desires of the few. In the spirit of her point of view, I propose that this inclination is a function of active if not always conscious motivation, not a manifestation of “social malaise.” Further, I raise for consideration the fact that hegemonic “fever” is quite contagious, noting that those perpetrating it, and those on its receiving end, are attracted to it. I also consider that hegemony is an important manifest content, the latent determinant of which is a stubborn universal tendency for humans to show ill will toward one another. Through clinical examples I show that hegemonic formulations add to but do not replace other conceptualizations of how to understand and work with our patients’ personal and social dysfunction.     

心理理论对幼儿白谎行为的影响：认知移情的部分中介作用

采用失望礼物研究范式考察心理理论与幼儿白谎行为的关系,及认知移情和情绪移情在其中的中介作用。结果发现：（1）幼儿的白谎行为发生率、心理理论、认知移情和情绪移情能力随年龄的增长而提高;（2）控制年龄与言语能力后,幼儿的心理理论与认知移情呈显著正相关、与白谎行为也呈显著正相关,且认知移情与白谎行为呈显著正相关;（3）幼儿的认知移情在心理理论和白谎行为间起部分中介的作用。结果表明：幼儿的心理理论可直接影响其白谎行为,也可通过认知移情的中介作用间接影响其白谎行为。     

The “Own” and the “Wise”: Does Stigma Status Buffer or Exacerbate Social Rejection of College Students with a Mental Illness?

Applying Goffman’s stigma-status framework and using data from a survey administered to college students (N = 556), we find that respondents who have been diagnosed with a mental illness (the “own”) or who know a family member or friend with a mental illness diagnosis (the “wise”) express lower desired social distance from persons with a mental illness than other respondents (“normals”). Also, informally labeling symptoms as “mental illness” reduced social distance among those similarly diagnosed. However, perceived dangerousness did not vary across stigma status, and the socially-distancing effects of perceived dangerousness were more pronounced among the “own.”     

“That’s Unhelpful,Harmful and Offensive!” Epistemic and Ethical Concerns with Meta-argument Allegations

“Meta-argument allegations” consist of protestations that an interlocutor’s speech is wrongfully offensive or will trigger undesirable social consequences. Such protestations are meta-argument in the sense that they do not interrogate the soundness of an opponent’s argumentation, but instead focus on external features of that argument. They are allegations because they imply moral wrongdoing. There is a legitimate place for meta-argument allegations, and the moral and epistemic goods that can come from them will be front of mind for those levelling such allegations. But I argue there is a dark side to such allegations, and their epistemic and moral costs must be seriously weighed. Meta-argument allegations have a concerning capacity to derail discussions about important topics, stymieing argumentational interactions and the goods they provide. Such allegations can license efforts to silence, punish and deter—even as they provoke the original speaker to retaliate in kind. Used liberally, such allegations can escalate conflicts, block open-mindedness, and discourage constructive dialogues. In response, I defend “argumentational tolerance”—a principled wariness in employing meta-argument allegations—as a virtue of ethical argument.

     

Do negative implicit associations indicate negative attitudes? Social explanations moderate whether ostensible “negative” associations are prejudice-based or empathy-based

The present work challenges the idea that implicit evaluative associations with outgroups necessarily provide information about negative or prejudiced attitudes. We argue that the manner in which one explains outgroup status and action shapes whether one's implicit “negative” associations are prejudice-based or empathy-based. Four studies are consistent with this possibility. Study 1 suggests that whereas implicit “negative” associations are predictive of negative explicit attitudes among those who reject external explanations for African American status and action, such implicit “negativity” predicts positive explicit attitudes among those who endorse external explanations. Study 2 provides experimental evidence that the provision of external explanations results in the formation of implicit “negative” associations that are predictive of compassionate responding. Study 3 provides more direct support for the idea that implicit “negative” associations are empathy-based among external explainers by showing that such “negative” associations are positively correlated with a measure of dispositional empathy-proneness. Finally, Study 4 demonstrates that IAT “negativity” is associated with automatic activation of empathy-related associations among those who strongly endorse external explanations. Discussion centers on the importance of considering factors—such as social explanations—that may moderate whether implicit “negativity” is prejudice-based or empathy-based.