Is there an evolutionary advantage of schizophrenia?

Schizophrenia is a universal disorder with strongly genetic aetiology. A constant prevalence rate, universally, in the face of reduced fecundity leads to the argument here that an evolutionary advantage exists, but not solely for schizophrenia. Possible areas of advantage are examined and it is argued that schizophrenia exists as a costly trade-off, in the evolution of Homo sapiens, as a by-product of a yet unknown uniquely human quality. The reason it has stayed in existence is due to a combination of advantages bestowed upon the kin, the group and, to a lesser extent, individuals who suffer from the disorder; these all contribute a different type of advantage, each of which alone would not be sufficient. Further, the evidence for the other advantages alone lack the rigour of evidence seen in the by-product theories, which provide as yet unparalleled comprehensive evolutionary evidence.     

Enactivism,other minds,and mental disorders

Although enactive approaches to cognition vary in terms of their character and scope, all endorse several core claims. The first is that cognition is tied to action. The second is that cognition is composed of more than just in-the-head processes; cognitive activities are (at least partially) externalized via features of our embodiment and in our ecological dealings with the people and things around us. I appeal to these two enactive claims to consider a view called “direct social perception” (DSP): the idea that we can sometimes perceive features of other minds directly in the character of their embodiment and environmental interactions. I argue that if DSP is true, we can probably also perceive certain features of mental disorders as well. I draw upon the developmental psychologist Daniel Stern’s notion of “forms of vitality”—largely overlooked in these debates—to develop this idea, and I use autism as a case study. I argue further that an enactive approach to DSP can clarify some ways we play a regulative role in shaping the temporal and phenomenal character of the disorder in question, and it may therefore have practical significance for both the clinical and therapeutic encounter.

     

Affect, Social Behavior, and the Brain in Williams Syndrome

ABSTRACT— Williams syndrome (WS) is a rare genetic disorder characterized by intellectual impairment and a distinctive physical and neuropsychological profile. Relative to their level of intellectual functioning, individuals with WS exhibit strengths in language and face recognition, with deficits in visual-spatial cognition. A heightened appetitive drive toward social interaction is a strong behavioral feature. Relative to other neurodevelopmental disorders, WS has a clearly defined genetic basis, together with a consistent neurocognitive profile of strengths and deficits. Thus, this disorder offers unique opportunities for elucidating gene–brain–behavior relationships. We focus on manifestations of the unusual social profile in WS, by examining data within and across levels of cognition, brain, and molecular genetics.     

The primacy of cognition in schizophrenia

Cognitive tasks and concepts are used increasingly in schizophrenia science and treatment. Recent meta-analyses show that across a spectrum of research domains only cognitive measures distinguish a majority of schizophrenia patients from healthy people. Average effect sizes derived from common clinical tests of attention, memory, language, and reasoning are twice as large as those obtained in structural magnetic resonance imaging and positron emission tomography studies. Chronic stress, genes, brain disturbances, task structure, gender, and sociocultural background may all enhance the sensitivity of cognitive performance to schizophrenia. At the same time, disease heterogeneity and the presence of endophenotypes and subtypes within the patient population may place upper limits on the strength of any specific cognitive finding. Schizophrenia is a complex biobehavioral disorder that manifests itself primarily in cognition.     

An evolutionary look at oddity and schizotypy: How the rise of social brain informs clinical practice

A prominent facet of schizotypy is the recurrence of odd cognitions, emotions, and behaviors. This paper aims to present an evolutionary interpretation of oddity as a risk-minimizing and uniqueness-maximizing strategy for facing the complexity of our hyper-affiliative species. I discuss this hypothesis by exploring the intertwined role of social safety and social cognition in preventing or triggering psychopathology. Since schizotypy is reputed to be a polygenic dimension, its underlying genes are likely involved in both adaptive and maladaptive traits. Consequently, the oddity is presented as both an evolutionary trade-off and a possible advantage in the rise of our complex social brain. The clinical implications of conceptualizing schizotypy and supporting those struggling with maladaptive forms of oddity are discussed.     

The concept of mental disorder. On the boundary between biological facts and social values.

Although the concept of mental disorder is fundamental to theory and practice in the mental health field, no agreed on and adequate analysis of this concept currently exists. I argue that a disorder is a harmful dysfunction, wherein harmful is a value term based on social norms, and dysfunction is a scientific term referring to the failure of a mental mechanism to perform a natural function for which it was designed by evolution. Thus, the concept of disorder combines value and scientific components. Six other accounts of disorder are evaluated, including the skeptical antipsychiatric view, the value approach, disorder as whatever professionals treat, two scientific approaches (statistical deviance and biological disadvantage), and the operational definition of disorder as "unexpectable distress or disability" in the revised third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 1987). The harmful dysfunction analysis is shown to avoid the problems while preserving the insights of these other approaches.     

The felt presence of other minds: Predictive processing,counterfactual predictions,and mentalising in autism

The mental states of other people are components of the external world that modulate the activity of our sensory epithelia. Recent probabilistic frameworks that cast perception as unconscious inference on the external causes of sensory input can thus be expanded to enfold the brain’s representation of others’ mental states. This paper examines this subject in the context of the debate concerning the extent to which we have perceptual awareness of other minds. In particular, we suggest that the notion of perceptual presence helps to refine this debate: are others’ mental states experienced as veridical qualities of the perceptual world around us? This experiential aspect of social cognition may be central to conditions such as autism spectrum disorder, where representations of others’ mental states seem to be selectively compromised. Importantly, recent work ties perceptual presence to the counterfactual predictions of hierarchical generative models that are suggested to perform unconscious inference in the brain. This enables a characterisation of mental state representations in terms of their associated counterfactual predictions, allowing a distinction between spontaneous and explicit forms of mentalising within the framework of predictive processing. This leads to a hypothesis that social cognition in autism spectrum disorder is characterised by a diminished set of counterfactual predictions and the reduced perceptual presence of others’ mental states.     

How we think and act together

In this paper, I examine the challenges socially extended minds pose for mainstream, individualistic accounts of social cognition. I argue that individualistic accounts of social cognition neglect phenomena important to social cognition that are properly emphasized by socially extended mind accounts. Although I do not think the evidence or arguments warrant replacing individualistic explanations of social cognition with socially extended explanations, I argue that we have good reason to supplement our individualistic accounts so as to include the ways in which situational context affects social interactions. The result, I hope, is a more sophisticated individualism that offers a more comprehensive account of how we think and act together.     

Twelve issues for cognitive science

I am struck by how little is known about so much of cognition. One goal of this paper is to argue for the need to consider a rich set of interlocking issues in the study of cognition. Mainstream work in cognition—including my own—ignores many critical aspects of animate cognitive systems. Perhaps one reason that existing theories say so little relevant to real world activities is the neglect of social and cultural factors, of emotion, and of the major points that distinguish an animate cognitive system from an artificial one: the need to survive, to regulate its own operation, to maintain itself, to exist in the environment, to change from a small, uneducated, immature system to an adult, developed, knowledgeable one. Human cognition is not the same as artificial cognition, if only because the human organism must also be concerned with the problems of life, of development, of survival. There must be a regulatory system that interacts with the cognitive component. And it may well be that it is the cognitive component that is subservient, evolved primarily for the benefit of the regulatory system, working through the emotions, through affect. I argue that several concepts must become fundamental parts of the study of cognition, including the roles of culture, of social interaction, of emotions, and of motivation. I argue that there are at least 12 issues that should comprise the study of cognition, and thereby, the field of Cognitive Science. We need to study a wide variety of behavior before we can hope to understand a single class. Cognitive scientists as a whole ought to make more use of evidence from the neurosciences, from brain damage and mental illness, from cognitive sociology and anthropology, and from clinical studies of the human. These must be accompanied, of course, with the study of language, of the psychological aspects of human processing structures, and of artificially intelligent mechanisms. The study of Cognitive Science requires a complex interaction among different issues of concern, an interaction that will not be properly understood until all parts are understood, with no part independent of the others, the whole requiring the parts, and the parts the whole.     

The missing link: leadership, identity, and the social brain

How the cohesion of a social network is being maintained in spite of having different layers of social interaction is an important question. I argue that the evolution of both (political) hierarchy and social identity play a crucial role in scaling up and bonding social networks. Together they are missing links in the social brain hypothesis, and further research is needed to understand the functions of leadership and social identity.     

语言如何进化

人类语言具有复杂多变的递归结构,漫长的物种进化过程中唯独人类精通语言。语言的进化始于大约两百万年前的“更新世时期”,语言在当时作为一种认知适应对于人类应对自然界带给人类的挑战（如动物掠食与森林毁坏）有很大帮助。人类进化过程中学习与文化因素形成一种选择压力促使人际交流语法化,人际交流语法化引发大脑容量增加,然而,最初的语言进化与基因无关。学习与文化压力也使交流的媒介依次变为手语模式、表情模式与语言模式。交流媒介的逐渐变化最终导致了FOXP2基因突变,FOXP2基因突变让智人具有了自主的言语能力。与地球上其它的人科动物相比,人类的语言能力使人类在进化中具有明显的优势     

Establishing operations, cognition, and emotion

In this paper we argue that behavior analysts have tended to neglect the study of important aspects of complex human behavior, including cognition and emotion. This relative neglect has been costly in terms of mainstream psychology's perception of the field of behavior analysis and in terms of our ability to provide a more thorough account of human behavior. Observations and findings from the clinical context are offered as examples of behavior that are not readily explained by the three-term contingency, and we argue that an adequate account of these behaviors must include principles derived from recent behavior-analytic work, in particular a better understanding of the short- and long-term effects of establishing operations. The concept of the establishing operation and its implications for understanding complex human behavior are discussed.     

Extended cognition and fixed properties: steps to a third-wave version of extended cognition

This paper explores several paths a distinctive third wave of extended cognition might take. In so doing, I address a couple of shortcomings of first- and second-wave extended cognition associated with a tendency to conceive of the properties of internal and external processes as fixed and non-interchangeable. First, in the domain of cognitive transformation, I argue that a problematic tendency of the complementarity model is that it presupposes that socio-cultural resources augment but do not significantly transform the brain??s representational capacities during diachronic development. In this paper I show that there is available a much more dynamical explanation??one taking the processes of the brain??s enculturation into patterned practices as transforming the brain??s representational capacities. Second, in the domain of cognitive assembly, I argue that another problematic tendency is an individualistic notion of cognitive agency, since it overlooks the active contribution of socio-cultural practices in the assembly process of extended cognitive systems. In contrast to an individualistic notion of cognitive agency, I explore the idea that it is possible to decentralize cognitive agency to include socio-cultural practices.     

Neural resonance: Between implicit simulation and social perception

Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi have recently argued against a simulationist interpretation of neural resonance. Recognizing intentions and emotions in the facial expressions and gestures of others may be subserved by e.g. mirror neuron activity, but this does not mean that we first experience an intention or emotion and then project it onto the other. Mirror neurons subserve social cognition, according to Gallagher and Zahavi, by being integral parts of processes of enactive social perception. I argue that the notion of enactive social perception does not yet explain why social perception is subserved by mirroring. I also argue that this problem cannot be avoided by means of an appeal to multiple realization. Instead, I propose a holistic model of neural resonance-based social cognition that does give an explanatory role to mirroring by allowing for a partial experiential overlap between experiencing and recognizing emotions and intentions. This account avoids the simulationist step-wise conception of social cognition and recognizes the qualitative difference between first- and third-person emotion and intention attribution. It does capture too much of the simulationist intuitions, however, to warrant the label ‘social perception’.     

Bodily expressions,feelings, and the direct perception account of social cognition

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - In this paper, I will argue in favor of a direct perception account of social cognition (DP), focusing on the idea that we can directly grasp at least...     

Unlikely allies: embodied social cognition and the intentional stance

I argue that proponents of embodied social cognition (ESC) can usefully supplement their views if they enlist the help of an unlikely ally: Daniel Dennett. On Dennett??s view, human social cognition involves adopting the intentional stance (IS), i.e., assuming that an interpretive target??s behavior is an optimally rational attempt to fulfill some desire relative to her beliefs. Characterized this way, proponents of ESC would reject any alliance with Dennett. However, for Dennett, to attribute mental states from the intentional stance is not to attribute concrete, unobservable mental causes of behavior. Once this is appreciated, the kinship between IS??understood as a model of our quotidian interpretive practices??and ESC is apparent: both assume that quotidian interpretation involves tracking abstract, observable, behavioral patterns, not attributing unobservable, concrete, mental causes, i.e., both assume social cognition is possible without metapsychology. I argue that this affinity constitutes an opportunity: proponents of ESC can use IS as a characterization of the subpersonal basis for social cognition. In the process, I make my interpretation of IS more precise and relate it to current empirical literature in developmental psychology.     

Expression and Indication in Ethics and Political Philosophy

We sometimes have reasons to perform actions due to what they would communicate. Those who have discussed such reasons have understood what an action ‘communicates’ as what it conventionally expresses. Brennan and Jaworski argue that when a convention ensures that expressing the appropriate thing would be costly, we should change or flout the convention. I argue that what really matters is often what attitudes we indicate rather than conventionally express, using social science to show that indicating our attitudes is often unavoidably costly, and sometimes worth the cost. I use this account to defend communicative arguments for egalitarian distributive policies.

     

Lessons and new directions for extended cognition from social and personality psychology

This paper aims to expand the range of empirical work relevant to the extended cognition debates. First, I trace the historical development of the person-situation debate in social and personality psychology and the extended cognition debate in the philosophy of mind. Next, I highlight some instructive similarities between the two and consider possible objections to my comparison. I then argue that the resolution of the person-situation debate in terms of interactionism lends support for an analogously interactionist conception of extended cognition. I argue that this interactionism might necessitate a shift away from the dominant agent-artifact paradigm toward an agent–agent paradigm. If this is right, then social and personality psychology—the discipline(s) that developed from the person-situation debate—opens a whole new range of empirical considerations for extended cognition theorists which align with Clark & Chalmers original vision of agents themselves as spread into the world.     

OUTSOURCED COGNITION

Recent developments in technologically enabled social cognition call for a rethinking of many aspects of human cognition. According to the hypothesis of extended cognition, we must revise our psychological categories by eliminating allegedly superficial distinctions between internal cognition and external processes. As an alternative to this proposal, I outline a hypothesis of outsourced cognition which seeks to respect distinctions that are operative in both folk psychology and the social and cognitive sciences. According to this hypothesis, the cognitive states and processes of the individual are substantially and explanatorily distinct from the relevant external states and processes. In consequence, the individual remains a cognitive unit that is both central and indispensable in the explanations of cognitive science. As a case study, I consider the epistemology of testimony. I will argue that important epistemological categories may be preserved by adopting the hypothesis of outsourced cognition over the hypothesis of extended cognition. Moreover, I will argue that the outsourced cognition hypothesis deepens the problems that beset an extended epistemology of testimony.