文化演化的认知视角——从个体社会学习出发探究文化动态性

文化演化是多学科共同关心的文化研究主题。文化演化的认知视角是心理学家切入该研究主题的一种方式, 它着眼于社会文化环境中的个体认知, 研究个体在社会学习过程中对文化信息的加工、改变、记忆与提取。文化演化的认知视角借用达尔文生物演化理论, 涉及文化传承、创新、选择三个子领域, 提出了文化演化的三原则: 遗传、变异、选择。文化传承的路径包括模仿和教导, 类型分为工具性与习俗性文化传承; 文化创新具有层次性, 人类特有的累积性文化演化建立在文化创新的基础之上, 体现了文化创新的代际传递; 基于行为生态学和人类认知机制的文化选择造成了文化信息的差异化适应。未来研究可以从研究概念、研究思路、研究方法三方面推进认知视角下的文化演化研究, 探索更高层次的文化创新, 扩展文化演化的前因变量, 结合新技术加深对文化演化的理解; 发挥文化演化对文化心理学研究的助推作用, 研究文化混搭、个性心理特征对文化演化的影响。     

A NATURALISTIC THEORY OF ARCHAIC MORAL ORDERS

Abstract. Cultural evolution, producing group-level adaptations, is more problematic than the cultural evolution of individually confirmable skills, but it probably has occurred. The "conformist transmission," described by Boyd and Richerson (1985), leads local social units to become homogeneous in anadaptive, as well as adaptive, beliefs. The resulting intragroup homogeneity and inter-group heterogeneity makes possible a cultural selection of adaptive group ideologies.
All archaic urban, division-of-labor social organizations had to overcome aspects of human nature produced by biological evolution, due to the predicament of genetic competition among the cooperators. The universal norms found in archaic moral systems are seen as curbs to this human nature, reinforced by beliefs in invisible sanction systems and rewarding and punishing afterlives (as in heaven or reincarnation). Perhaps the ubiquity of lavishly wasteful royal funerals is to be explained as contributing to this function.     

What Does It Mean to Be Human? A Personal and Catholic Perspective

A philosopher-poet-theologian ponders the implications of the multimillion-year biogenetic process that produced Homo sapiens and is beginning to reveal itself ever more clearly as evolution of the mind and consciousness. As meaning trappers and makers, called to actualize the divine image imprinted upon us, we are now facing biological and cultural evolution with deliberate human input as well as the evolution of evolution. As communicating animals that are becoming ever more aware of our adaptive behavior, we have the potential of affecting our own destiny by listening to the spirit within and nurturing the genes and memes that give rise to physical, intellectual, creative, and moral excellence. In the matrix of cyberspace we have the opportunity to heal the two-culture split, to reinvent ourselves, to incubate/weave the emergent religions of the future, and to create our multiple "Ways" appropriate to the dawning Age of Global Dialogue.     

Pluralism and Ambivalence in the Evolution of Morality

Much good work has been done on the evolution of human morality by focusing on how “selfish genes” can give rise to altruistic human beings. A richer research program is needed, however, to take into account the ambivalence of naturally evolved biopsychological motivators and the historical pluralism of human morality in religious systems. Such a program is described here. A first step is to distinguish the ultimate cause of natural selection from proximate causes that are the results of natural selection. Next, some proximate causes are suggested as possible conditions of biological and emotional valuing as well as of customary social morality and individual rational ethical thought. Finally, different moral perspectives of Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity are briefly presented in order to illustrate how one might inquire about the selection of a variety of biopsychological and cultural proximate causes that enable the evolution of a plurality of religious moral systems.     

Moral Philosophers as Ethical Engineers: Limits of Moral Philosophy and a Pragmatist Alternative

Ever since Kant, moral philosophers have been more or less animated by the mission of discovering inescapable law‐like rules that would provide a binding justification for morality. Recently, however, many have started to question (a) whether this is possible and (b) what, after all, this project could achieve. An alternative vision of the task of moral philosophy starts from the pragmatist idea that philosophizing begins and ends in human experiencing. It leads to a view where morality is seen as a “social technology” that aims to make living together possible, and strengthens people's capability to live a good life within a society. The role of moral philosophy is, accordingly, to develop our moral tools further. Moral philosophers become ethical engineers who use their expertise in ethical topics to criticize existing “moral technology” and construct new concepts, tools, and theories that better answer the current challenges for living a good life.     

A tale of two processes: On Joseph Henrich’s the secret of our success: How culture is driving human evolution,domesticating our species,and making us smarter

We situate Henrich’s book in the larger research tradition of which it is a part and show how he presents a wide array of recent psychological, physiological, and neurological data as supporting the view that two related but distinct processes have shaped human nature and made us unique: cumulative cultural evolution and culture-driven genetic evolution. We briefly sketch out several ways philosophers might fruitfully engage with this view and note some implications it may have for current philosophic debates in moral and political theory and over the nature of extended cognition. We end by noting how Henrich’s view of the source of cultural design and innovation, and the prominence of place he gives to the extended process of cultural evolution, cuts against a cluster of broad but common views about human minds, recasting putative bugs as features and indicating that many of the distinctive features of our individual minds evolved to allow them to be effective cogs in the larger, more productive cultural machine.     

RESPONSE TO WILLIAMS: SELFISHNESS IS NOT ENOUGH

Abstract. I agree with George Williams's most significant point: both questions and answers about our moral natures lie in our biological origins. He fails, however, to show that nature is morally evil and that therefore we should vigilantly resist it. The products of evolution are morally neutral, but the human moral sense is arguably a positive good. Morality is functional. It does not require ultimate justification in the sense of correspondence with or attack upon reality "out there." It is an adaptation "intended" to make us social, and sociality—with its sense of right and wrong—makes us fitter than otherwise     

The cultural part of cognition

This paper discusses the role of cultural anthropology in Cognitive Science. Culture is described as a very large pool of information passed along from generation to generation, composed of learned “programs” for action and understanding. These cultural programs differ in important ways from computer programs. Cultural programs tend to be unspecified and inexplicit rather than clearly stated algorithms learned through a slow process of guided discovery, and involve the manipulation of content based rather than formal symbol systems. Cultural symbol systems often have affective as well as objective referents, giving them a strong directive effect. The argument is made that in the process of repeated social transmission and use, cultural programs come to take forms which have a good “fit” to the natural capacities and constraints of the human information processing system.     

Theorizing inquiry in the moral space of practice

Moral realism has been advanced as a central theme in contemporary hermeneutic thought. From this standpoint, participation in cultural practices is made possible and meaningful by ontologically real moral goods and reference points. Cultural practices thus constitute a moral referential totality for human action. This article suggests that these and related hermeneutic insights offer a unique perspective for taking account of practical involvement in the world and can form the basis of an interpretive frame for research that foregrounds this practice-based moral realism. An emphasis on moral realist concepts such as participation in practice, distinctions of worth, strong evaluations, and moral reference points can allow interrelated phenomena to show up as aspects of a moral ecology and reveal something about their moral significance within a form of practice. Moreover, inquiry of this sort can reveal something about that form of practice as a space of moral possibilities for action.     

Evolution of Destructive Aggression

Aggression is defined as a mechanism of spacing by means of force or displays. It has evolved independently in different animal groups. The mechanisms underlying it are therefore not homologous throughout the animal kingdom. The phenomenon of aggression is so widespread, however, that strong selection pressures must be responsible for its development along analogous lines. Its most obvious functions are in competition for mates, natural resources, and territories, and in the preservation of group identity in many gregarious species. Aggression is often ritualized so that no damage is done to conspecifics. This ritualization may appear as modification of fighting into a tournament, or as the development of submissive postures which block further aggression in the opponent shortly after the onset of a potentially damaging fight. Animal aggression is preprogrammed by phylogenetic adaptation in well-defined ways, but can be modified by experience. The inborn programs involve motor patterns, innate releasing mechanisms, releasers, motivating mechanisms, and learning dispositions specific for the species. Aggression on this biological level can be observed in humans as intragroup aggression. Certain motor patterns and signals which lead to the release of aggression are universal. Some can even be found in deaf- and blind-born people, proving their innateness. A number of patterns of aggression in man are highly ritualized and - in a way analogous to that found in many animals - mechanisms of control have evolved inhibiting the killing of a conspecific. There are strong indications of the existence of motivating mechanisms within the brain, e.g., in the form of neuronal circuits, that show a degree of spontaneity. The type of destructive aggression which we call war, is a product of cultural evolution. War takes advantage of the given motivational structure of man, including his fear of strangers, which develops in every baby independently of experience and makes men inclined to form closed groups and causes them to be wary of or hostile to strangers. Based on these tendencies, man underwent a process of cultural subspeciation. Groups demarcated themselves from others by custom, erecting communication barriers. The development of languages demonstrates how fast and efficient this process is. Members of the same group, during this process, were defined as the “real man,” outsiders often were to be valued less -or even considered nonhuman. On the basis of this self-indoctrination, cultural codes of conduct developed, which allowed members of other groups to be killed when groups competed for resources. A cultural fiiter of norms was established which demanded killing under defined conditions, and was superimposed upon the biological filter of norms which inhibits the killing of a human being. This results in a conflict of norms, which is universally felt as guilt, since the biological filter of norms, though superimposed, is nonetheless working, particularly in the circumstance of a personal encounter. The more advanced the technique of armament, which allows fast and distant killing, the less the inhibitions are activated. Nonetheless, ritualizations occur on the cultural level. Warfare is sometimes ritualized and conventions are developed to prevent escalation into massacres, or the wholesale destruction of the subjugated enemy. To a great extent, this is certainly a result of our inborn moral code, If nothing like this were given to man our situation would be disastrous indeed. Whether cultural evolution will, in the future, be guided by moral maxims in accord with our human nature is a deeision men must make rationally. Although a ruthless ethnocentrism may bring advantage to a warring group, this may eventually prove fatal to mankind as a whole. In the escalating competition mankind runs the danger not only of exhausting its resources, but of destroying itself with its new weapons. If the outcome were not selfdestruction but domination by one group it would impoverish the diversity of human cultures, and thus seriously cut down man's spectrum of adaptability. War fulfills certain functions, similar to those found in animals. It is mainly a mechanism for preserving and extending one's territory, and a means of getting access to scarce resources. It is therefore dangerous to consider war merely as a pathological form of human behavior because this may distract our attention from the fact that, h order to overcome war, the functions of war have to be fulfilled by nonviolent means. Cultural evolution phenocopies biological evolution, due to similarities in the selection pressures shaping its course. This allows us to define the point of the evolutionary spiral we are at currently and to predict our future course.     

道德推脱对员工道德决策的影响：德行领导的调节作用

运用问卷调查的方法,以819名员工为研究被试,探讨了德行领导在道德推脱影响道德决策过程中的调节作用。采用层次回归分析的方法研究发现：德行领导对道德推脱与道德识别、道德判断之间的关系具有调节作用;但德行领导不会对道德推脱与道德意图之间的关系产生调节作用,而会对道德意图产生显著的直接影响。     

Does change in ethical education influence core moral values? Towards history- and culture-aware morality model with application in automatic moral reasoning

In this study, we focus on ethical education as a means to improve artificial companion’s conceptualization of moral decision-making process in human users. In particular, we focus on automatically determining whether changes in ethical education influenced core moral values in humans throughout the century. We analyze ethics as taught in Japan before WWII and today to verify how much the pre-WWII moral attitudes have in common with those of contemporary Japanese, to what degree what is taught as ethics in school overlaps with the general population’s understanding of ethics, as well as to verify whether a major reform of the guidelines for teaching the school subject of “ethics” at school after 1946 has changed the way common people approach core moral questions (such as those concerning the sacredness of human life). We selected textbooks used in teaching ethics at school from between 1935 and 1937, and those used in junior high schools today (2019) and analyzed what emotional and moral associations such contents generated. The analysis was performed with an automatic moral and emotional reasoning agent and based on the largest available text corpus in Japanese as well as on the resources of a Japanese digital library. As a result, we found out that, despite changes in stereotypical view on Japan’s moral sentiments, especially due to historical events, past and contemporary Japanese share a similar moral evaluation of certain basic moral concepts, although there is a large discrepancy between how they perceive some actions to be beneficial to the society as a whole while at the same time being inconclusive when it comes to assessing the same action’s outcome on the individual performing them and in terms of emotional consequences. Some ethical categories, assessed positively before the war, while being associated with a nationalistic trend in education have also disappeared from the scope of interest of post- war society. The findings of this study support suggestions proposed by others that the development of personal AI systems requires supplementation with moral reasoning. Moreover, the paper builds upon this idea and further suggests that AI systems need to be aware of ethics not as a constant, but as a function with a correction on historical and cultural changes in moral reasoning.     

The Moral Implications of Immorality

This essay focuses on the issue of immorality, an issue that has largely been understudied in anthropology. It examines two types of immoral behavior in contemporary Chinese society, drawing on cases widely agreed upon by ordinary people to be morally wrong. Next, it analyzes moral experiences and moral sentiments among individuals who either were victims of immoral acts or recalled their own feelings of being immoral. Ethnographic evidence shows that immorality tends to be intuitive and emotional in actual social actions but in recollections of moral experiences it is reflected upon with rational reasoning and justification. Immorality is essentially the violation of the social, which may explain why ordinary people use immorality to define and defend their social behavior in everyday life. The recent emphasis on moral reasoning and ethical choice in anthropological studies of moralities has overlooked the social in the moral as well as the role of moral sentiments and intuitions in social actions.     

Toward ethical cognitive architectures for the development of artificial moral agents

New technologies based on artificial agents promise to change the next generation of autonomous systems and therefore our interaction with them. Systems based on artificial agents such as self-driving cars and social robots are examples of this technology that is seeking to improve the quality of people’s life. Cognitive architectures aim to create some of the most challenging artificial agents commonly known as bio-inspired cognitive agents. This type of artificial agent seeks to embody human-like intelligence in order to operate and solve problems in the real world as humans do. Moreover, some cognitive architectures such as Soar, LIDA, ACT-R, and iCub try to be fundamental architectures for the Artificial General Intelligence model of human cognition. Therefore, researchers in the machine ethics field face ethical questions related to what mechanisms an artificial agent must have for making moral decisions in order to ensure that their actions are always ethically right. This paper aims to identify some challenges that researchers need to solve in order to create ethical cognitive architectures. These cognitive architectures are characterized by the capacity to endow artificial agents with appropriate mechanisms to exhibit explicit ethical behavior. Additionally, we offer some reasons to develop ethical cognitive architectures. We hope that this study can be useful to guide future research on ethical cognitive architectures.     

人类基因组计划在西方引发的人性观思考

人类基因组计划在西方世界引起了相当广泛深入的关于人性观的思考。分子生物学的研究成果正在重新塑造人们对人类进化史和人类本身的认识。基因工程、干细胞研究等前沿领域产生的问题促使人们转向西方的传统哲学去寻找思想资源。尽管遗传决定论的陈旧观点在大众文化中仍时有所见。新的基因组学研究已开始采纳一种更全面的、兼顾历史与社会文化因素的角度。     

道德信仰的发生机制

道德信仰的发生机制至少包括三个方面 ,即 :需要的体认机制 ;伦理义务的内化机制 ;道德心理的整合机制。需要的体认机制涉及到对人性、人生的价值、人的使命等问题 ,它是道德信仰形成的主体基础 ;伦理义务的内化机制涉及到人的社会伦理关系、社会规定性和制约性、社会价值、社会道德规范及其教化等问题 ,它是道德信仰形成的客观条件 ;道德心理的整合机制涉及到道德认知、道德情感、道德意志和道德人格等问题 ,它是道德信仰形成的主、客观方面的动态的统一。     

小康社会与公民道德断想

应当把社会伦理关系的变革和主体道德人格的完善列为全面建设小康社会的基本的价值目标 ,不仅要切实理顺经济伦理关系 ,而且必须逐步建立起与社会主义市场经济体制相适应的、公正的政治伦理关系和文化伦理关系。小康社会的道德要求包括经济交往中的效率与公平、政治生活中的正义与民主、文化领域中的服务与奉献。小康社会的人格理想将以追求人性的自我完善和人格的自主、自觉、自由为基本特点。小康社会也将使人们的行为方式发生这样或那样的变化。     

TRACING DISTINCTIVE HUMAN MORAL EMOTIONS? THE CONTRIBUTION OF A THEOLOGY OF GRATITUDE

Darwin thought that the moral sense was among the most challenging aspects of human life to account for through evolutionary explanations. This article seeks to probe the question about human uniqueness primarily from a theological perspective by focusing in depth on one distinctive moral sentiment, gratitude, particularly in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. It uses that example as a case study about how to consider the validity of arguments for human uniqueness within the broader compass of the cultural evolution of sociality and morality within the human sciences, including evolutionary anthropology. Further questions about the evolution of religion surface in this discussion since gratitude, from a theological perspective, necessarily includes gratitude to God as a fundamental aspect of religious faith and practice.