Construal levels and self-control

The authors propose that self-control involves making decisions and behaving in a manner consistent with high-level versus low-level construals of a situation. Activation of high-level construals (which capture global, superordinate, primary features of an event) should lead to greater self-control than activation of low-level construals (which capture local, subordinate, secondary features). In 6 experiments using 3 different techniques, the authors manipulated construal levels and assessed their effects on self-control and underlying psychological processes. High-level construals led to decreased preferences for immediate over delayed outcomes, greater physical endurance, stronger intentions to exert self-control, and less positive evaluations of temptations that undermine self-control. These results support a construal-level analysis of self-control.     

Seeing the Forest Beyond the Trees: A Construal‐Level Approach to Self‐Control

Self‐control failure is a ubiquitous and troubling problem people face. This article reviews psychological models of self‐control and describes a new integrative approach based on construal level theory (e.g., Trope & Liberman, 2003 ). This construal‐level perspective proposes that people's subjective mental construals or representations of events impacts self‐control. Specifically, more abstract, global (high‐level) construals promote self‐control success, whereas more concrete, local (low‐level) construals tend to lead to self‐control failure. That is, self‐control is promoted when people see the proverbial forest beyond the trees. This article surveys research findings that demonstrate that construing events at high‐level versus low‐level construals promotes self‐control. This article also discusses how a construal‐level perspective promotes understanding of self‐control failures.     

A Multi‐Factor Account of Degrees of Awareness

In this paper we argue that awareness comes in degrees, and we propose a novel multi‐factor account that spans both subjective experiences and perceptual representations. At the subjective level, we argue that conscious experiences can be degraded by being fragmented, less salient, too generic, or flash‐like. At the representational level, we identify corresponding features of perceptual representations—their availability for working memory, intensity, precision, and stability—and argue that the mechanisms that affect these features are what ultimately modulate the degree of awareness. We conclude the paper by demonstrating why the original interpretations of certain empirical findings that apparently pose problems for our account are, in fact, flawed.     

Promoting prospective self-control through abstraction

When people anticipate that future temptations may undermine valued goals, they use a number of prospective self-control strategies (or “precommitment devices”) to increase the likelihood of future self-control success. Little is known, however, about the conditions under which people are more or less likely to use them. Drawing from construal level theory (e.g., Trope & Liberman, 2003), we argue that people are more likely to engage in prospective self-control when they construe events more abstractly (at higher-level construals). Results from two experiments demonstrated that higher-level construals promote use of two well-documented prospective strategies: choice bracketing and self-imposing punishment. Higher-level construals thus appear to enhance people's efforts to protect their valued goals from anticipated temptations.     

社会距离对他人行为表征的影响:评价内容效价的作用

心理距离的建构水平理论认为,人与人之间的亲密度具有心理距离特性(即社会距离),人们对心理上远距离的客体或事件的表征倾向于采用高水平建构,而对心理上近距离的客体或事件的表征倾向于采用低水平建构。本研究以特质性和行动性行为描述句子为实验材料,通过两个实验考察了社会距离(亲密舍友/公选课上认识的同性同学)对他人正性和负性行为评价的影响,以探讨评价内容效价对于建构水平的心理距离效应的调节作用。实验结果发现:(1)随着社会距离的延伸,被试对社会远距离他人的正性行为更倾向于高水平的特质性表征,但在负性行为上未获得明确的类似效应;(2)相对于社会远距离他人,被试对社会近距离他人正性行为和负性行为的评价分数均较高,提示人际熟悉度对他人行为的表征具有一定的调节作用。     

Unconscious Representations 1: Belying the Traditional Model of Human Cognition

The traditional model of human cognition (TMHC) postulates an ontological and/or structural gap between conscious and unconscious mental representations. By and large, it sees higher-level mental processes as commonly conceptual or symbolic in nature and therefore conscious, whereas unconscious, lower-level representations are conceived as non-conceptual or sub-symbolic. However, experimental evidence belies this model, suggesting that higher-level mental processes can be, and often are, carried out in a wholly unconscious way and/or without conceptual representations, and that these can be processed unconsciously. This entails that the TMHC, as well as the theories on mental representation it motivates and that in turn support it, is wrong.     

无意识自我控制目标启动对自我损耗的补偿效应

本研究基于对无意识目标启动的研究,采用阈上、阈下启动方式探讨无意识目标启动对自我损耗的补偿作用。实验1发现,阈上无意识目标启动能够有效提高自我控制,促进自控表现。实验2发现,阈下无意识目标启动对自我损耗存在补偿效应。上述结果提示,通过无意识启动方式激活自我控制目标,可以克服自我损耗的不良效应,且无需意识参与。     

过去时间距离对自我行为表征的影响

建构水平理论认为,人们对心理上远距离(如远期过去)的客体或事件的表征倾向于采用高水平建构,而对心理上近距离(如近期过去)的客体或事件的表征倾向于采用低水平建构。本研究以特质性和行动性行为描述句子为实验材料,通过两个实验考察了过去时间距离对自我正性行为和负性行为的表征特征的影响。实验结果发现:(1)相对于近期过去,被试对远期过去自我的正性行为更倾向于特质性表征,但在负性行为上未获得明确的类似效应;(2)相对于远期过去的自我行为,个体对近期过去的自我行为倾向于负性表征,提示被试对近期过去自我的满意度较低和对未来自我提升的心理期待。     

概率与事物表征

概率表达着世界的可能性。近年来研究发现, 人们倾向于在更抽象的和更核心的水平上表征低概率事件, 而倾向于在更具体和更次要的水平上表征高概率事件。相应的, 高水平表征事物会导致人们的概率估计偏低, 而低水平表征事物会导致概率估计偏高。此外, 习得的刺激间联系也会影响人们的概率估计。未来研究应注意探讨概率影响事物表征的内在原因、概率估计的动态性与多重概率估计、以及其更深层次的内部机制等问题。     

Investigating the Awareness of Remembering

ABSTRACT— There is a marked lack of consensus concerning the best way to learn how conscious experiences arise. In this article, we advocate for scientific approaches that attempt to bring together four types of phenomena and their corresponding theoretical accounts: behavioral acts, cognitive events, neural events, and subjective experience. We propose that the key challenge is to comprehensively specify the relationships among these four facets of the problem of understanding consciousness without excluding any facet. Although other perspectives on consciousness can also be informative, combining these four perspectives could lead to significant progress in explaining a conscious experience such as remembering. We summarize some relevant findings from cognitive neuroscience investigations of the conscious experience of memory retrieval and of memory behaviors that transpire in the absence of the awareness of remembering. These examples illustrate suitable scientific strategies for making progress in understanding consciousness by developing and testing theories that connect the behavioral expression of recall and recognition, the requisite cognitive transactions, the neural events that make remembering possible, and the awareness of remembering.     

Subjective measures of consciousness in artificial grammar learning task

Consciousness can be measured in various ways, but different measures often yield different conclusions about the extent to which awareness relates to performance. Here, we compare five different subjective measures of awareness in the context of an artificial grammar learning task. Participants (N=217) expressed their subjective awareness of rules using one of five different scales: confidence ratings (CRs), post-decision wagering (PDW), feeling of warmth (FOW), rule awareness (RAS), and continuous scale (SDS). All scales were equally sensitive to conscious knowledge. PDW, however, was affected by risk aversion, and both RAS and SDS applied different minimal criteria for rule awareness. CR seems to capture the largest range of consciousness, but failed to indicate unconscious knowledge with the guessing criterion. We close by discussing the theoretical implications of scale sensitivity and propose that CR's unique features enable (in conjunction with RAS and FOW) a finer assessment of subjective states of awareness.     

Make it real: Belief in occurrence within episodic future thought

While the cognitive and neural bases of episodic future thinking are well documented, questions remain as to what gives the sense that an imagined event belongs to one’s personal future. Capitalizing on previous research on metacognitive appraisals in autobiographical remembering, we propose that episodic future thinking involves, in varying degrees, a subjective belief in the potential occurrence of imagined future events and we explore the nature and determinants of such belief. To this aim, participants provided justifications for belief in occurrence for a series of past and future events. For each event, they also assessed their subjective feelings (belief in occurrence, autonoetic experience, and belief in accuracy) and rated various characteristics of mental representations that might contribute to these feelings. Results showed that belief in the occurrence of future events mostly related to their integration in a broader autobiographical context, especially their relevance to personal goals and their personal plausibility. We also found that belief in occurrence, autonoetic experience, and belief in accuracy represented distinct subjective appraisals of future events, which depended in part on different determinants. Based on these findings, we propose a new theoretical model of subjective feelings associated with episodic future thinking that conceives of belief in occurrence as arising from metacognitive appraisals that shape the sense that imagined events belong to one’s personal future.     

Good Moral Judgment and Decision‐Making Without Deliberation

It is widely accepted in psychology and cognitive science that there are two “systems” in the mind: one system (System 1) is characterized as quick, intuitive, perceptive, and perhaps more primitive, while the other (System 2) is described as slower, more deliberative, and responsible for our higher‐order cognition. I use the term “reflectivism” to capture the view that conscious reflection—in the “System 2” sense—is a necessary feature of good moral judgment and decision‐making. This is not to suggest that System 2 must operate alone in forming our moral decisions, but that it plays a normatively ineliminable role. In this paper, I discuss arguments that have been offered in defense of reflectivism. These arguments fit into two broad categories; let us think of them as two sides of a coin. On the first side are arguments about the efficaciousness of conscious reasoning—for example, without conscious deliberation we will make bad moral judgments and decisions. On the other side of the coin are arguments about the centrality of conscious deliberation to normative actions—for example, without conscious deliberation we are no more agential than animals or automatons. Despite their attractiveness, I argue that these arguments do not successfully establish that reflection is a necessary component of good moral judgment and decision‐making. If I am right, the idea that good moral judgment and decision‐making can result from entirely automatic and subconscious processes gains traction. My goal in this paper is to show that reflectivism fails to include the full range of cases of moral decision‐making and that a theory of automaticity may do a better job. I briefly discuss at the end of the paper how an account of successful automatic moral judgment and decision‐making might begin to take shape.     

Think, blink or sleep on it? The impact of modes of thought on complex decision making

This paper examines controversial claims about the merit of "unconscious thought" for making complex decisions. In four experiments, participants were presented with complex decisions and were asked to choose the best option immediately, after a period of conscious deliberation, or after a period of distraction (said to encourage "unconscious thought processes"). In all experiments the majority of participants chose the option predicted by their own subjective attribute weighting scores, regardless of the mode of thought employed. There was little evidence for the superiority of choices made "unconsciously", but some evidence that conscious deliberation can lead to better choices. The final experiment suggested that the task is best conceptualized as one involving "online judgement" rather than one in which decisions are made after periods of deliberation or distraction. The results suggest that we should be cautious in accepting the advice to "stop thinking" about complex decisions.     

The influence of expertise and of physical complexity on visual short-term memory consolidation

This paper examines controversial claims about the merit of “unconscious thought” for making complex decisions. In four experiments, participants were presented with complex decisions and were asked to choose the best option immediately, after a period of conscious deliberation, or after a period of distraction (said to encourage “unconscious thought processes”). In all experiments the majority of participants chose the option predicted by their own subjective attribute weighting scores, regardless of the mode of thought employed. There was little evidence for the superiority of choices made “unconsciously”, but some evidence that conscious deliberation can lead to better choices. The final experiment suggested that the task is best conceptualized as one involving “online judgement” rather than one in which decisions are made after periods of deliberation or distraction. The results suggest that we should be cautious in accepting the advice to “stop thinking” about complex decisions.     

Virtue, personality, and social relations: self-control as the moral muscle

Morality is a set of rules that enable people to live together in harmony, and virtue involves internalizing those rules. Insofar as virtue depends on overcoming selfish or antisocial impulses for the sake of what is best for the group or collective, self-control can be said to be the master virtue. We analyze vice, sin, and virtue from the perspective of self-control theory. Recent research findings indicate that self-control involves expenditure of some limited resource and suggest the analogy of a moral muscle as an appropriate way to conceptualize virtue in personality. Guilt fosters virtuous self-control by elevating inter-personal obligations over personal, selfish interests. Several features of modern Western society make virtue and self-control especially difficult to achieve.     

The organization of construal networks and functional adaptation

This review examined the association of construal network organizations with functional adaptation and psychological well-being. Recent neuropsychological research supports the presence of distinct construal networks in the brain that organize action at different levels of goals and tasks. Construal networks are sets of connected construals, or mental representations of objects, events, and behaviors. Little attention, however, has been given to how the organization of construal networks promotes functional adaptation. Cognitive processes, construal levels, personal meaning, cultures, and situations influence the configurations of construal networks. The reviewed evidence indicated that construal network organization facilitates functional adaptation and well-being, either though the coherence or fit of the assembled construals with each other or through the mediation of their fit with situations or contexts, like a culture. This review goes beyond previous studies by describing the constructive, creative, and hypothetical aspects of construal organizations and their effects on functional adaptation and psychological well-being.     

Temporal construal

Construal level theory proposes that temporal distance changes people's responses to future events by changing the way people mentally represent those events. The greater the temporal distance, the more likely are events to be represented in terms of a few abstract features that convey the perceived essence of the events (high-level construals) rather than in terms of more concrete and incidental details of the events (low-level construals). The informational and evaluative implications of high-level construals, compared with those of low-level construals, should therefore have more impact on responses to distant-future events than near-future events. This article explores the implications of construal level theory for temporal changes in evaluation, prediction, and choice. The authors suggest that construal level underlies a broad range of evaluative and behavioral consequences of psychological distance from events.     

The role of personal goals in autonoetic experience when imagining future events

Although autonoetic experience—a sense of mental time travel—has been considered as the hallmark of episodic future thinking, what determines this subjective feeling is not yet fully understood. Here, we investigated the role of autobiographical knowledge by manipulating the relevance of imagined events for personal goals. Participants were asked to imagine three types of events (goal-related future events, experimenter-provided future events, and atemporal events) and to assess various characteristics of their mental representations. The results showed that the three types of events were represented with similar levels of detail and vividness. Importantly, however, goal-related future events were associated with a stronger autonoetic experience. Furthermore, autonoetic experience was significantly predicted by the importance of imagined events for personal goals. These findings suggest that the subjective feeling of pre-experiencing one’s personal future in part depends on the extent to which imagined events can be placed in an autobiographical context.     

The Soul,as an Uninhibited Mental Activity,is Reduced into Consciousness by Rules of Quantum Physics

This paper is an effort to describe, in neuroscientific terms, one of the most ambiguous concepts of the universe—the soul. Previous efforts to understand what the soul is and where it may exist have accepted the soul as a subjective and individual entity. We will make two additions to this view: (1) The soul is a result of uninhibited mental activity and lacks spatial and temporal information; (2) The soul is an undivided whole and, to become divided, the soul has to be reduced into unconscious and conscious mental events. This reduction process parallels the maturation of the frontal cortex and GABA becoming the main inhibitory neurotransmitter. As examples of uninhibited mental activity, we will discuss the perceptual differences of a newborn, individuals undergoing dissociation, and individuals induced by psychedelic drugs. Then, we will explain the similarities between the structure of the universe and the structure of the brain, and we propose that consideration of the rules of quantum physics is necessary to understand how the soul is reduced into consciousness.