Con-reasons and the causal theory of action

A con-reason is a reason which plays a role in motivating and explaining an agent's behaviour, but which the agent takes to count against the course of action taken. Most accounts of motivating reasons in the philosophy of action do not allow such things to exist. In this essay, I pursue two aims. First, I argue that, whatever metaphysical story we tell about the relation between motivating reasons and action, con-reasons need to be acknowledged, as they play an explanatory role not played by pro-reasons (the reason the agent takes to count in favour of the action taken). Second, I respond to an argument recently developed by David-Hillel Ruben to the effect that a causal theory of action – still known as ‘the standard story’ – cannot account for con-reasons. His argument attempts to show that a fundamental principle of the causal theory cannot be reconciled with the role con-reasons play in a certain kind of imagined case. I first argue that a causal theorist is not, in fact, committed to the problematic principle; this argument has an added benefit, since the principle has been taken by many to show that the causal theory generates a puzzle about the possibility of weak-willed action. I then argue that a causal theorist has good reason to reject the possibility of Ruben's imagined cases. If successful, my arguments make clearer the commitments of the causal theory and show that it can accommodate con-reasons in the way I think they ought to be accommodated.     

Delayed search for a concealed imprinted object in the domestic chick

Five-day-old chicks were accustomed to follow an imprinted object (a small red ball with which they had been reared) that was moving slowly in a large arena, until it disappeared behind an opaque screen. In experiments, each chick was initially confined in a transparent cage, from where it could see and track the ball while it moved towards, and then beyond, one of two screens. The screens could be either identical or differ in colour and pattern. Either immediately after the disappearance of the ball, or with a certain delay, the chick was released and allowed to search for its imprinted object behind either screen. The results showed that chicks took into account the directional cue provided by the ball movement and its concealment, up to a delay period of about 180 s, independently of the perceptual characteristics of the two screens. If an opaque partition was positioned in front of the transparent cage immediately after the ball had disappeared, so that, throughout the delay, neither the goal-object nor the two screens were visible, chicks were still capable of remembering and choosing the correct screen, though over a much shorter period of about 60 s. The results suggest that, at least in this precocial bird species, very young chicks can maintain some form of representation of the location where a social partner was last seen, and are also capable of continuously updating this representation so as to take into account successive displacements of the goal-object. Received: 17 January 1998 / Accepted after revision: 29 March 1998     

Imitative learning in Japanese quail (Coturnix japonica) using the bidirectional control procedure

In the bidirectional control procedure, observers are exposed to a conspecific demonstrator responding to a manipulandum in one of two directions (e.g., left vs. right). This procedure controls for socially mediated effects (the mere presence of a conspecific) and stimulus enhancement (attention drawn to a manipulandum by its movement), and it has the added advantage of being symmetrical (the two different responses are similar in topography). Imitative learning is demonstrated when the observers make the response in the direction that they observed it being made. Recently, however, it has been suggested that when such evidence is found with a predominantly olfactory animal, such as the rat, it may result artifactually from odor cues left on one side of the manipulandum by the demonstrator. In the present experiment, we found that Japanese quail, for which odor cues are not likely to play a role, also showed significant correspondence between the direction in which the demonstrator and the observer push a screen to gain access to reward. Furthermore, control quail that observed the screen move, when the movement of the screen was not produced by the demonstrator, did not show similar correspondence between the direction of screen movement observed and that performed by the observer. Thus, with the appropriate control, the bidirectional procedure appears to be useful for studying imitation in avian species.     

The play's the thing how the essential processes of therapy are seen most clearly in child therapy

Analytic child therapy techniques developed as modifications of techniques from adult psychoanalysis. Child therapy continues to be regarded as an adaptation of adult analysis and to give a central place to the methods and conditions of adult analysis, such as interpretation, in its understanding of how therapy heals. I propose that child therapy is not a modified form of therapy and that the essential processes of therapy are fully present in child therapy. In fact, they often may be seen more clearly there than in adult therapy. I suggest two interrelated processes as the essential ones in all analytic therapy. The first is play. I examine several interrelated aspects of play, specifically as they occur in child therapy. These include the emergence and integration of dissociated self‐states, symbolization, and recognition. The second process I propose as essential in analytic therapy is the renegotiation of self—other relationships through action. This renegotiation is what can help patients become able to play in therapy when they have difficulty doing so. Since I suggest that action is at the heart of analytic therapy, I go on to consider the role of talking in an action therapy. Finally, I explore the dimensions of mutuality in the relationship between child and therapist, including mutual influence and regulation, mutual recognition, and mutual regression. The intersubjective nature of psychotherapy, which is increasingly appreciated in adult analytic therapy but not in child therapy, provides a fertile context for the evolution of play and for the productive renegotiation of self—other relationships.     

Supererogation and Intentions of the Agent

It has been claimed, by David Heyd, that in order for an act to count as supererogatory the agent performing the act must possess altruistic intentions (1982 p.115). This requirement, Heyd claims, allows us to make sense of the meritorious nature of acts of supererogation. In this paper I will investigate whether there is good reason to accept that this requirement is a necessary condition of supererogation. I will argue that such a reason can be found in cases where two people act in the same way but with only the person who acted with altruistic intent counting as having performed an act of supererogation. In such cases Heyd’s intention requirement plays an important role in ruling out acts that intuitively are not supererogatory. Despite this, I will argue that we should reject Heyd’s requirement and replace it with a moral intention requirement. I will then investigate how to formulate this requirement and respond to two objections that might be raised against it.     

Perceptual organization in multistable apparent motion

Is motion perception based on a local piecemeal analysis of the image or do 'global' effects also play an important role? Use was made of bistable apparent-motion displays in trying to answer this question. Two spots were flashed simultaneously on diagonally opposite corners of a 1 deg wide square and then switched off and replaced by two spots appearing on the other two corners. One can either see vertical or horizontal oscillation and the display is bistable just as a Necker cube is. If several such bistable figures are randomly scattered on the screen and presented simultaneously, then one usually sees the same motion axis in all of them, suggesting the presence of field-like effects for resolving ambiguity in apparent motion. While viewing a single figure observers experience hysteresis: they tend to adhere to one motion axis or the other and can switch the axis only by looking away and looking back after 10-30 s have elapsed. The figure can be switched off and made to reappear at some other random location on the screen and it is then always found to retain its motion axis. Several such demonstrations are presented to show that spatial induction effects in metastable motion displays may provide a particularly valuable probe for studying 'laws' of perceptual organization.     

Narratives,culture, and folk psychology

In this paper, I aim to determine to what extent contemporary cross-cultural and developmental research can shed light on the role that narrative practices might play in the development of folk psychology. In particular, I focus on the role of narrative practices in the development of false belief understanding, which has been regarded as a milestone in the development of folk psychology. Second, I aim to discuss possible cognitive procedures that may underlie successful performance in false belief tasks. Methodologically, I distinguish between two kinds of narrative practices: ‘mentalistic narrative practice’ (which involves an explicit reference to another person’s mental states), and ‘behavioral-contextual narrative practice’ (which involves an explicit reference to the (normative) behavior of another person in a specific socio-situational context). Whereas the former is more prevalent in Western cultures than in Eastern cultures, the latter is predominantly used by members of Eastern cultures. Mentalistic narrative practices correlate with cultural divergences in the development of false belief understanding throughout ontogeny but do not seem to play the key role. The analysis shows that (i) conceptual change and the acquisition of mental state terms is essential for passing the false belief task, and that (ii) theory is likely to be the cognitive mechanism involved here such as proposed by Theory Theory. However, Hutto’s Narrative Practice Hypothesis trumps over Theory Theory to account for the varieties and ambiguities people typically meet when understanding each other in everyday life.     

Hume's Dispositional Account of the Self

This paper will argue that Hume's notion of the self in Book 2 of the Treatise seems subject to two constraints. First, it should be a succession of perceptions [THN 2.2.1.2, 2.1.2.3]. Second, it should be durable in virtue of the roles that it plays with regard to pride and humility, as well as to normativity. However, I argue that these two constraints are in tension, since our perceptions are too transient to play these roles. I argue that this notion of self should be characterized as a bundle of dispositions to our perceptions, such that these dispositions are durable and counterfactual-supporting. I argue that Hume confused his ‘philosophical’ notion of dispositions, as nothing above and beyond their effects, with the thicker notion of dispositions to which the passions respond—which explains his mistaken commitment to the durability constraint.     

The matching relation and situation-specific bias modulation in professional football play selection

The utility of a quantitative model depends on the extent to which its fitted parameters vary systematically with environmental events of interest. Professional football statistics were analyzed to determine whether play selection (passing versus rushing plays) could be accounted for with the generalized matching equation, and in particular whether variations in play selection across game situations would manifest as changes in the equation's fitted parameters. Statistically significant changes in bias were found for each of five types of game situations; no systematic changes in sensitivity were observed. Further analyses suggested relationships between play selection bias and both turnover probability (which can be described in terms of punishment) and yards-gained variance (which can be described in terms of variable-magnitude reinforcement schedules). The present investigation provides a useful demonstration of association between face-valid, situation-specific effects in a domain of everyday interest, and a theoretically important term of a quantitative model of behavior. Such associations, we argue, are an essential focus in translational extensions of quantitative models.     

‘Ought Implies Can’: Not So Pragmatic After All

Those who want to deny the ‘ought implies can’ principle often turn to weakened views to explain ‘ought implies can’ phenomena. The two most common versions of such views are (a) that ‘ought’ presupposes ‘can’, and (b) that ‘ought’ conversationally implicates ‘can’. This paper will reject both views, and in doing so, present a case against any pragmatic view of ‘ought implies can’. Unlike much of the literature, I won't rely on counterexamples, but instead will argue that each of these views fails on its own terms. ‘Ought’ and ‘can’ do not obey the negation test for presupposition, and they do not obey the calculability or the cancelability tests for conversational implicature. I diagnose these failures as partly a result of the importance of the contrapositive of ‘ought implies can’. I end with a final argument emphasizing the role the principle plays in moral thinking, and the fact that no pragmatic account can do it justice.     

Basic needs and complexes: similarities between feeling‐toned complexes,emotional schema and affective states

The aim of this paper is to examine feeling‐toned complexes from a developmental psychological perspective. From this perspective feeling‐toned complexes emerge when basic needs are not met. A very similar theory is put forward by Jeffery Young in his Schema Therapy (Young, Klosko, & Weishaar 2005). His basic needs concept, developed on the basis of empirical research, covers four basic needs which are: attachment, autonomy, and self‐worth, as well as play and spontaneity. My proposition is to deal with this conceptual view from a Jungian perspective insofar as we can integrate the four basic needs, however adding a fifth: the basic need for meaning in the theory of feeling‐toned complexes. Emotional schemas and feeling‐toned complexes are then comparable patterns. The strengths and weaknesses of Analytic Psychology compared to Jeffrey Young's schema therapy are further discussed. The foundation of the feeling‐toned complexes on unmet basic needs lends itself to including a further reference, namely Jaak Panksepp’s neuroscientific findings. Panksepp formulates seven basic affective systems which I discuss first, then I focus on what could be gained from the basic needs concept and finally I turn to the feeling‐complex in an attempt to integrate neuroscientific findings into complex theory.     

Theism and other minds: On the falsifiability of non-theories

In this paper I consider three necessary conditions for a proposition counting as a theory: that the proposition be posited for its explanatory power; that it derive its feasibility from the extent to which it provides such explanatory power; and that it be empirically falsifiable. I then argue that some propositions might fail as theories because they do not satisfy the first two conditions, yet still satisfy the third condition. Such propositions I label falsifiable non-theories. I offer folk psychology (the proposition that beliefs, desires, and other intentional phenomena exist and play essential motivational and causal roles in many human actions) as a paradigm example of a falsifiable non-theory. I then argue that theism is in an analogous position. Like folk psychology, it fails to satisfy the first two conditions above for most theists. However, the empirical implications that theism has do make it susceptible to falsification. I demonstrate such falsifiability by an extreme scenario from Keith Yandell. Then I argue that recent work by Paul Draper demonstrates how a well articulated empirical argument from evil might threaten just such falsification.     

On the Role of Group Membership in Stereotype-Based Performance Effects

Group memberships serve an important function in our lives. They help define who we are; thus, they are intimately involved in our daily functioning. But in certain situations, our group memberships may have a particularly profound influence on the way we behave, such as in situations where stereotypes apply. In this article, I examine the role group membership plays in distinguishing between different performance effects that are based on stereotypes associated with our group memberships. Knowing the role that group memberships play in such effects can refine existing theory and research while also providing insight into methods for combating the adverse effects of stereotypes on behavior. Accordingly, I review a number of stereotype-based performance effects that involve both negative and positive stereotypes as well as describe how group membership moderates these effects. I then discuss how stereotyped concerns associated with our group memberships can clarify the distinction between stereotype threat and priming effects. In the final portion of this article, I highlight how learning about a counter-stereotypic person from one's group can serve to reduce the negative effects of stereotypes on performance.     

Wide reflective equilibrium as a method of justification in bioethics

Carson Strong has recently argued that wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) is an unacceptable method of justification in bioethics. In its place, Strong recommends a methodology in which certain foundational moral judgments play a central role in the justification of moral beliefs, and coherence plays a limited justificatory role in that the rest of our judgments are made to cohere with these foundational judgments. In this paper, I argue that Strong??s chief criticisms of WRE are unsuccessful and that his proposed alternative is in fact just another version of WRE. In the course of doing so, I specify which theses are central to WRE and which are not, and thus, provide a response to an additional objection, advanced by Peter Singer, that WRE is vacuous. I conclude by arguing that there may be better prospects for advancing the debate regarding methodology in bioethics if we focus on restricted epistemic and methodological theses rather than broad approaches, such as WRE, that come in many different varieties.     

Shifting shadows: shaping dynamics in the cultural unconscious

Jung has suggested that wars, social upheavals and religions are 'but the superficial symptoms of a secret psychic attitude unknown even to the individual himself, and transmitted by no historian ...' (Jung 1964, para. 315; emphasis author's). With a focus on South Africa and some dream material, I explore this idea with particular emphasis on the cultural unconscious and the emerging theory of cultural complexes. Different cultures demand the repression of different aspects of the self and have different ways of actualizing a moral code. These repressions are part of what make up a dynamic and shifting cultural complex which inevitably plays a part in historical change. In turn, historical change plays its part in shifting these dynamics. In the analytic setting via the transference and countertransference, we are familiar with what is being repressed in relation to shadow dynamics, complexes and obsolete defences. Such dynamics relate to themes of boundary, identity and otherness which, in turn, reach back to early infantile strivings as well as forward in the service of unfolding. Central to this dynamic is the absorption of cultural attitudes--including that which must be repressed, allowed in or defended against. Major political shifts--historical change--inevitably affect cultural dynamics, 'secret psychic attitude(s)' and shifting shadows.     

Projective identification in Othello and Verdi's Otello

In this paper I explore how projective identification is depicted in Shakespeare's Othello (1603–4 [2006]) and in Verdi's Otello (1887). Both the play and the opera can be seen as studies in projection – in the evacuation into others of feelings that the subject finds unbearable, such as envious and jealous exclusion or unbearable sexual excitement. The essential issue is the same in both the play and the opera, which is that the very sight of love between Othello and Desdemona, or of contentment in anyone's mind, drives Iago mad with envy and jealousy, which he has to expel and project into others, particularly into Othello, who is susceptible to this attack because of his own narcissistic vulnerability. I take two episodes, which appear in both the play and the opera, to explore in detail how projective identification is represented both verbally and musically. I suggest that music, and words used musically, are particularly suited to conveying complex inter‐ and intra‐personal processes such as projective identification.     

On the vicissitudes of early primary surrogate mothering

I have noted estrangement from biological mothers and intolerance of intimate relationships in patients with an early history of primary surrogate mothering. This observation facilitated discovery of such early histories in 31 of 102 patients I examined during a five-year period. With a review of the literature, and clinical examples, I attempt to associate the estrangement and intolerance with the mother's exclusion resulting from her infant's close tie to a surrogate and the infant's inevitable traumatic loss of the latter. In the analyses of screen phenomena, mother and surrogate mother transferences, all peculiar to that caretaking, the surrogate is seen to emerge from obscurity. In the clinical examples (limited to losses of surrogates following the infant's eighteenth month) screen memories, dreams, and eclipse are found to possess a common feature: the image of the surrogate is screened by that of the mother. Biological mother and, in the countertransference, the analyst play a significant role in perpetuating the concealment of the surrogate.     

The Problem of Deep Competitors and the Pursuit of Epistemically Utopian Truths

According to standard scientific realism, science seeks truth and we can justifiably believe that our successful theories achieve, or at least approximate, that goal. In this paper, I discuss the implications of the following competitor thesis: Any theory we may favor has competitors such that we cannot justifiably deny that they are approximately true. After defending that thesis, I articulate three specific threats it poses for standard scientific realism; one is epistemic, the other two are axiological (that is, pertaining to the claim that science seeks truth). I also flag an additional axiological “challenge,” that of how one might justify the pursuit of a primary aim, such as truth. Bracketing epistemic realism, I argue that the axiological threats can be addressed by embracing a refined realist axiological hypothesis, one that specifies a specific subclass of true claims sought in science. And after identifying three potential responses to the axiological “challenge,” I contend that, while standard axiological realism appears to lack the resources required to utilize any of the responses, the refined realist axiology I embrace is well suited to each.