法律与自由

本文主要从法哲学的角度探讨了法律与自由的关系问题。本文认为,传统的有关积极自由与消极自由的二分法已经不能准确厘清自由与法律之关系,需要在综合的方法下审视自由观念所包含的法律价值意义。为此,本文系统地考察了禁止论、意志论和规则论三种法律下的自由观,并对作为一项基本的政治与法律权利的自由权利给予了具体的分析,文章认为我们既要保有自由诸权利不受侵犯,更需要为这些自由权利而作为,建设一个法治的宪政制度,则是所有个人自由的基础。     

无知与道德责任

常言道:不知者无罪。很多情况下无知的确可以成为开脱责任的理由,但也并非总是如此。什么条件的无知可以(或不可以)开脱责任?为什么?这是有关道德责任的知识条件的核心问题之一。我们将对当前两种主流理论进行分析,对比各自理论的优缺点来揭示人们在面对某些无知情形时进行责任判断的深层困境。然后通过引入道德责任的两面观来解释这一困境的产生,并为如何应对提供建设性意见。     

试论宗教信仰自由的法律保障

宗教是人类社会发展到一定阶段的产物，而宗教信仰自由作为人的基本权利，随着社会的不断进步，已经越来越引起人们的关注，尤其是主张唯物论、无神论的中国，国外友好或不怎么友好的人士常常持有疑惑不信任的态度。但是只要我们心平气和，客观公正地思考一下中国宗教的     

性自由及其限度

性的自由和解放是人的自由解放的重要组成部分,性自由权利是人权的一部分.但是性自由的权利不是无条件的、随心所欲的,而是一定社会规则限定下的人们的自觉自主活动.性自由必须在法律的界限内实现,且必须承担由此而带来的道德责任.     

恶、自由与康德的善人概念

本文将借鉴康德哲学的资源来重新思考自由与恶的问题.之所以以康德为中心,主要是因为康德与自由主义(Liberalism)之间存在着微妙的关系.一方面,两者有很多共同的价值诉求,如在凯克斯看来,"自由主义归属给个人的核心重要性通过康德所表达的自主观念得到极大的提高";而在另一方面,康德与自由主义在诸如自主这样的基本概念层面并不完全相同,而康德哲学的复杂性与深刻性也许能为容纳这些基本价值提供另一种可能的空间.     

法律上干涉个人自由的原则

一个理想的社会应当给个人自由提供最大的空间.然而,最大空间的个人自由也是有条件、有限制的.这种对个人自由的限制必须有充分的理由,以证明限制的正当性和必要性.     

精神自由与心灵自由——庄子与萨特自由精神之比较

庄子和萨特虽然都不约而同地呼唤自由,但他们关于自由的理念却是有很大的区别的。庄子的精神自由是消极的,萨特的心灵自由是积极的。庄子认为要想实现自由理想,就要顺任自然、“洗心去欲”;萨特则认为“人命定是自由”,实现自由理想,就是要让人认识到自己是自由的,勇于自我选择、自我造就、自我实现。     

柏林式焦虑症与自由的价值

以赛亚·伯林的消极/积极自由二分法建立在一系列误解之上.一方面,即使我们接受伯林指派的观点,把自由价值当作一种具有内在善性的东西,这也并不意味着我们就能像伯林所希望的那样,可以将对自由价值的消极理解设想为一个融贯的思想.另一方面,如果我们对伯林的“不受他人故意干涉”思想作出反思,我们也并不能将其当作是具有内在善性的价值的一个要件.伯林的误解根源于他对客观价值观念的某种过度焦虑.     

自由、自主、生育权与处境论(下)

“Ｅｉｓｅｎｓｔａｄｔｖ .Ｂａｉｒｄ”的判决指出 ,生育不仅是受精 ,还包括继续怀孕 ,因此此案其实预审了 1973年的ＲｏｅｖＷａｄｅ案 ,后者被认为是“近年来美国最高院裁决的最重要、最具争议性也是最著名的案子” ,在这个美国历史上最重大的生育权案例中 ,高院根据一系列有关个人隐私权或者对私人某些领域的保护的案例 ,确认“隐私权”存在于美国宪法第十四项修正条款中有关个人自由和限制政府行为的概念之中。并由此认为 ,这种权利“极其广泛 ,可以包括妇女是否终止怀孕的决定。”然而法院同时又宣称 ,妇女的隐私权和堕胎权并不是绝…     

论康德的消极自由与积极自由——兼与柏林两种自由概念的比较

康德的文本表明康德在自由概念上区分了消极自由与积极自由。康德消极自由的基本内涵是意志的实践法则独立于经验质料的先天形式;而先验层面的分析则表明康德消极自由指的是独立于自然因果法则的自由因果性。消极自由与积极自由的关系在一定意义上说明了康德自由观念内在的融贯性和统一性。相比于伯林两种自由概念的经验性本质,康德自由的先验特性与之形成了鲜明的对比,但这种差异应在康德与伯林迥然不同的哲学背景之中予以把握。     

马克思的自由平等观与法国自由主义

马克思主义经典作家关于自由、平等问题的论述以及马克思主义的整个思想体系,都与西方近代自由主义理论有着密切的关系,两者之间存在着一些可以相互会通、参照的空间。该文主要以19世纪法国自由主义理论为例,对马克思的自由、平等观与近代自由主义做一平行的初步考察,旨在说明马克思的自由平等观是马克思主义思想体系中一个重要但往往被人忽视的组成部分,而马克思主义体系本身也包含着明显的自由主义倾向。     

The absolutism problem in On Liberty

Mill argues that, apart from the principle of utility, his utilitarianism is incompatible with absolutes. Yet in On Liberty he introduces an exceptionless anti-paternalism principle—his liberty principle. In this paper I address ‘the absolutism problem,’ that is, whether Mill's utilitarianism can accommodate an exceptionless principle. Mill's absolute claim is not a mere bit of rhetoric. But the four main solutions to the absolutism problem are also not supported by the relevant texts. I defend a fifth solution—the competence view—that turns on his attention to decision-making structures and, in particular, on the role of expertise considerations in his account.     

阿马蒂亚·森的自由观述评

阿马蒂亚·森在自由问题上提出的一些重要观点包括：自由与偏好相关．也与个人的理性相关。而他影响最大的贡献是证明了帕累托自由的不可能,后者为他赢得诺贝尔经济学奖奠定了基础,其基本含义指不存在一种可以同时满足无限制域、帕累托原则和最低限度的自由这三个条件的社会决策函数。森的论述对自由意志论一厢情愿的信念构成了深刻的挑战,其贡献值得我们记取。但应看到,从理论建构的角度来看,森的各种观点缺乏有机的综合,呈现出折衷的特点。     

自由、宽和与法的精神:孟德斯鸠关于政治宽和的讨论

在孟德斯鸠笔下,宽和政府是作为专制主义的对立面出现的,有别于专制主义下的极端平等及其简单而脆弱的社会结构。宽和政府能够使不同维度的权力均得到考量,并形成结构复杂多元、具有内在稳定性的政制与社会秩序。作为一名亲英派,孟德斯鸠尝试借助英国宪制这一具体的政体形态来展现宽和政府得以形成的机制,并由此勾连出自由与宽和的内在联系,揭示出人的自由意志经由法的规约而形成的内在约束对于维系宽和精神的实质性作用,并据此阐发了封建贵族适度而有原则的独立精神及其所涵育的自由精神。在此基础上最终阐明了"宽和"的新意涵,即立法者如何保存、维持、协调政制与民情的技艺。     

马克思每个人自由而全面发展思想的四个维度

马克思每个人自由而全面发展的理论内蕴着四个维度的内涵：人类的历史发展导向每个人自由而全面发展;个人自由发展的普遍性和全面性;从虚幻的集体到真实的集体的发展;建立在“共同占有的基础上”“重新建立个人所有制”的基础上。     

Analytical methods in the theory of psychophysical discrimination II: The Near-miss to Weber's Law, Falmagne's Law, the Psychophysical Power Law and the Law of Similarity

We examine the possibility of accounting for an empirical phenomenon in auditory psychophysics called the “Near-Miss to Weber's Law” [Jesteadt, W., Weir, C., & Green, D. (1977). Intensity discrimination as a function of frequency and sensation level. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, A, 61, 169-177], within the framework of Fechner's Psychophysics. To this end, we introduce a pair of Psychophysical Laws governing the behavior of Weber sensitivities. One of these, the Power Law, embodies ideas that Jesteadt et al. introduced in their original discussion of the near-miss phenomenon. Falmagne's Law captures ideas of Falmagne and colleagues [Falmagne, J.-Cl. (1985). Elements of psychophysical theory. New York: Oxford University Press; Doble, C., Falmagne, J.-Cl., & Berg, B.G. (2003). Theoretical note: Recasting (the near-miss to) Weber's Law. Psychological Review, 110, 365-375]. These two laws, which account for the near-miss phenomenon in quite different ways, are shown to be special cases of a more general Psychophysical Law of Similarity. We find all (smooth) solutions of this Law of Similarity that are compatible with Fechnerian psychophysics. Of the 11 solutions, four are relevant to the near-miss phenomenon; two of these solutions reproduce the models of Jesteadt et al. and Doble et al. and the other two solutions each provide a new accounting of the near-miss phenomenon. We discuss the possibility of distinguishing among these four models in empirical data.     

Vulnerability,Ignorance, and Oppression

This paper aims to understand the relationship between ignorance and vulnerability by drawing on recent work on the epistemology of ignorance. After elaborating how we might understand the importance of human vulnerability, I develop the claim that ignorance of vulnerability is produced through the pursuit of an ideal of invulnerability that involves both ethical and epistemological closure. The ignorance of vulnerability that is a prerequisite for such invulnerability is, I contend, a pervasive form of ignorance that underlies and grounds other oppressive forms of ignorance. Thus, undoing such forms of ignorance requires working toward a particular form of vulnerability: epistemic vulnerability.     

Ignorance,Information and Autonomy

People have a powerful interest in geneticprivacy and its associated claim to ignorance,and some equally powerful desires to beshielded from disturbing information are oftenvoiced. We argue, however, that there is nosuch thing as a right to remain in ignorance,where a right is understood as an entitlementthat trumps competing claims. This doesnot of course mean that information must alwaysbe forced upon unwilling recipients, only thatthere is no prima facie entitlement to beprotected from true or honest information aboutoneself. Any claims to be shielded frominformation about the self must compete onequal terms with claims based in the rights andinterests of others. In balancing the weightand importance of rival considerations aboutgiving or withholding information, if rightsclaims have any place, rights are more likelyto be defensible on the side of honestcommunication of information rather than indefence of ignorance. The right to free speechand the right to decline to acceptresponsibility to take decisions for othersimposed by those others seem to us moreplausible candidates for fully fledged rightsin this field than any purported right toignorance. Finally, and most importantly, ifthe right to autonomy is invoked, a properunderstanding of the distinction between claimsto liberty and claims to autonomy show that theprinciple of autonomy, as it is understood incontemporary social ethics and English law,supports the giving rather than the withholdingof information in most circumstances.