Cue location does not account for all selective associations in food aversion learning

Studies of food aversion learning have been widely interpreted as yielding evidence for selectivity in the associability of cues and consequences. On the one hand, taste cues were easily conditioned to interoceptive consequences (e.g. “illness”), but only with difficulty to exteroceptive consequences (e.g. shock). On the other hand, audiovisual stimuli were easily conditioned to shock, but only with difficulty to illness (Revusky and Garcia, 1970). Sullivan (1984) has emphasized that cue location and temporality have been important uncontrolled variables in many food-aversion studies and has argued that when these factors are taken into account, the supposed selectivity related to sensory modality is lost. Thus, Sullivan (1984) argues that shocks, like “illness”, are readily associated with tastes provided that the tastes are intrinsic attributes of the substances ingested.

Sullivan's important article may have demonstrated significant weaknesses in the evidence for specific associations of exteroceptive cues with shock rather than with “illness”, and this point will not be considered further. However, there are two aspects of Sullivan's case that cannot be substantiated. Firstly, the attempt to demonstrate that taste cues are as readily associated with shock as they are with “illness” is unconvincing. Secondly, unjustified assumptions are made about the nature of the unconditioned stimulus in conditioning with interoceptive consequences, which is presumed to be “illness” despite extensive evidence to the contrary.     

Visual pattern recognition: Size preprocessing re-examined

Template theories of visual pattern recognition assume the operation of preprocessing routines to deal with irrelevancies such as discrepancies in stimulus size. In three experiments where size was an irrelevant dimension, observers classified pairs of forms as either “same” or “different”. In Experiment I, the classification “different” was required when the stimuli shared the same form but a different orientation, and “same” when the stimuli shared the same form and orientation. Under these conditions RT was an increasing function of the magnitude of the size disparity between stimuli with equal slopes for “same” and “different” judgements. In Experiment II, “different” classifications were made to stimuli that had different forms, and “same” to figures with the same form. This stimulus set produced a size disparity function that interacted with response type; “different” responses had a shallower slope. Experiment III consisted of a mixed stimulus set drawn from both Experiment I and II. Stimuli that produced additive effects of size disparity and response type in Experiment I now produced an interaction between these two factors similar to the one observed in Experiment II. The results of these experiments are interpreted as evidence that previous contradictory results reported in the literature stem from differences in the way the stimulus set is constructed, and that size transformations can not be a necessary operation, at least when “different” judgements are made. The results are problematic for the view that size disparity effects in matching tasks are easily interpretable in terms of a primitive size normalization stage that precedes any comparison operations.     

A preliminary study of distinctive features in problem solving

The abstract logical structure of family relationship problems, such as, “What relationship to a man is his mother's father?” was described in terms of a “distinctive-feature-transition count (dft)”, where the answer to the problem was characterized in terms of the distinctive features of descendancy, co-linearity, and sex. On average, it proved possible to predict the difficulty of such problems from such a count; thus tending to support the idea of a relational rather than an associative memory structure.     

Size constancy in monkeys with inferotemporal lesions

In a study of size constancy, monkeys were trained with extended practice to choose the larger of two projected stimulus discs independently of distance. When surgical brain lesions were made following pre-operative training, it was found that posterior parietal lesions caused no deficit on this task while inferotemporal lesions caused a severe breakdown from which three out of four animals showed almost no recovery. Mathematical analysis showed that the pattern of performance after inferotemporal lesions could be described as due to a tendency to oscillate between a “correct” and two “incorrect strategies” and that this tendency was also apparent to at least some extent in the unoperated animals. It is argued that the two incorrect strategies might have resulted from a disturbance of size constancy, such that the animal became unable to use both retinal size and distance information in computing physical size and instead used either retinal size or distance information alone. Parallels are drawn between such an hypothetical perceptual disorder and certain clinical disturbances in man.     

Discriminability and central intermittency in same-different judgements

Four sets of paired visual stimuli (OO, XX, XO, or OX) were judged by 48 subjects to be either “same” or “different.” Decision latencies of the same and different judgement were studied as a function of the inter-stimulus interval (ISI). In Experiments I and II, in which stimulus durations were 70 millisec., decision latencies showed marked increases when the ISI was reduced to 100 millisec., but in Experiments III and IV, in which the stimulus durations were only 40 millisec., comparable increases did not occur until the ISI was reduced to 50 millisec. These increases were more marked for “same” than for “different” judgements, although overall decision latencies were generally shorter for “same” judgements. The effects of varying ISIs and stimulus durations are interpreted in terms of masking; they fail to support an hypothesis of central intermittency.     

Crossmodal integration in the identification of consonant segments

Although speechreading can be facilitated by auditory or tactile supplements, the process that integrates cues across modalities is not well understood. This paper describes two “optimal processing” models for the types of integration that can be used in speechreading consonant segments and compares their predictions with those of the Fuzzy Logical Model of Perception (FLMP, Massaro, 1987). In “pre-labelling” integration, continuous sensory data is combined across modalities before response labels are assigned. In “post-labelling” integration, the responses that would be made under unimodal conditions are combined, and a joint response is derived from the pair. To describe pre-labelling integration, confusion matrices are characterized by a multidimensional decision model that allows performance to be described by a subject's sensitivity and bias in using continuous-valued cues. The cue space is characterized by the locations of stimulus and response centres. The distance between a pair of stimulus centres determines how well two stimuli can be distinguished in a given experiment. In the multimodal case, the cue space is assumed to be the product space of the cue spaces corresponding to the stimulation modes. Measurements of multimodal accuracy in five modern studies of consonant identification are more consistent with the predictions of the pre-labelling integration model than the FLMP or the post-labelling model.     

The effect of an irrelevant dimension on “same-different” judgements of multi-dimensional stimuli

Subjects made “same”-“different” judgements of simultaneously presented pairs of visual stimuli which could vary either in shape and colour independently, or in shape alone. In both conditions only shape was relevant to the “same”-“different” judgement. In the former condition “same” and “different” reaction times (RTs) were shorter when the states (“same” or “different”) of the relevant and the irrelevant dimension, colour, were the same. This result is interpreted as support for either a perceptual or a response interference hypothesis. The presence of an irrelevant dimension did not appear to affect differentially “same” and “different” judgements. The need for a re-evaluation of the results from other studies of multi-dimensional stimulus discrimination is discussed.     

Nonstutterers'' perceptions of stuttering and speech difficulty

Two versions of Woolf's (1967) Perception of Stuttering Inventory (PSI) were administered to nonstuttering college students in three experiments. In one (Woolf's published version) the word “stuttering” appeared and in another [a version developed by Daly, Oakes, Breen, and Mishler (1981)] “stuttering” was replaced by “speech difficulty.” Nonstutterers' scores on the PSI were found to be affected by knowledge of—or attention to—“stuttering” or “stutterers” as well as orientation toward speech or speech pathology. It was concluded that a total PSI score of 5 is presently a more defensible criterion of normality for stutterers than the more commonly used score of 10.     

Lowering of an auditory threshold by a near threshold warning signal

Following previous experiments on the effect of suprathreshold “warning” signals in lowering the threshold for stimuli in another modality, we have used visual “warning” signals which are themselves within the threshold range. These near threshold “warnings” appear to act in exactly the same way as suprathreshold “warnings” provided they are seen. Very weak “warnings” have a reduced effect, probably because they are not always seen. The experiment is of interest in that it supports the theory that the effect is due to the “warning” signal reducing the subject's uncertainty about when the threshold stimulus will occur, and secondly because it indicates that under these conditions at least, the subject can attend effectively to two simultaneous near-threshold stimuli.     

On the locus of dual-task interference: Is there a bottleneck at the stimulus classification stage?

Recent studies have provided evidence that dual-task interference is typically caused by a single-channel bottleneck, but the processing locus of the bottleneck has yet to be pinned down. A bottleneck locus at the response-selection stage is widely advocated, but an earlier locus would be consistent with most previous evidence. Four new experiments used the “locus of slack” method to investigate whether the stages postponed by the central bottleneck include stimulus classification, a very late stage of perceptual processing. The experiments varied stimulus classification difficulty for two different analogueue perceptual judgements. Experiment 1 found only modest absorption into slack for the difficulty of a spatial position judgement. Experiments 2-4 found virtually no absorption into slack for the difficulty of a box-width judgement. These results support a bottleneck locus beginning at or before the stage of stimulus classification and hence prior to the stage of response selection. Other evidence, however, leaves no doubt that response selection is also subject to bottleneck postponement. Two architectures are discussed that can account parsimoniously for both old and new results. One posits a single bottleneck resulting from a unified CPU-like central processor; the other posits multiple bottlenecks resulting from multiple processors accomplishing different substages of central processing.     

Binocular rivalry and stereoscopic depth perception

An investigation was made of stimulus factors causing retinal rivalry or allowing stereoscopic depth perception, given a requisite positional disparity. It is shown that similar colour information can be “filtered” out from both eyes; that stereopsis is not incompatible with rivalry and suppression of one aspect of the stimulus, and that the strongest cue for perception of stereoscopic depth is intensity difference at the boundaries of the figures in the same direction at each eye. Identity of colour can also act as a cue for stereopsis. The brightness of different monocular figures seen in the stereoscope in different combinations was estimated by a matching technique, and it is suggested that the perceived brightness is a compromise between the monocular brightness difference between figure and ground seen in relation to the binocular fused background, and the mean brightness of the figures. The results are discussed in terms of neurophysiological “on,” “off” and continuous response fibres.     

Information relevance, working memory, and the consideration of alternatives

People routinely focus on one hypothesis and avoid consideration of alternative hypotheses on problems requiring decisions between possible states of the world--for example, on the “pseudodiagnosticity” task (Doherty, Mynatt, Tweney, & Schiavo, 1979). In order to account for behaviour on such “inference” problems, it is proposed that people can hold in working memory, and operate upon, but one alternative at a time, and that they have a bias to test the hypothesis they think true. In addition to being an ex post facto explanation of data selection in inference tasks, this conceptualization predicts that there are situations in which people will consider alternatives. These are:

1. “action” problems, where the alternatives are possible courses of action;

2. “inference” problems, in which evidence favours an alternative hypothesis.

Experiment 1 tested the first prediction. Subjects were given action or inference problems, each with two alternatives and two items of data relevant to each alternative. They received probabilistic information about the relation between one datum and one alternative and picked one value from among the other three possible pairs of such relations. Two findings emerged; (1) a strong tendency to select information about only one alternative with inferences; and (2) a strong tendency, compared to inferences, to select information about both alternatives with actions.

Experiment 2 tested the second prediction. It was predicted that data suggesting that one alternative was incorrect would lead many subjects to consider, and select information about, the other alternative. For actions, it was predicted that this manipulation would have no effect. Again the data were as predicted.     

Reasoning about a rule

Two experiments were carried out to investigate the difficulty of making the contra-positive inference from conditional sentences of the form, “if P then Q.” This inference, that not-P follows from not-Q, requires the transformation of the information presented in the conditional sentence. It is suggested that the difficulty is due to a mental set for expecting a relation of truth, correspondence, or match to hold between sentences and states of affairs. The elicitation of the inference was not facilitated by attempting to induce two kinds of therapy designed to break this set. It is argued that the subjects did not give evidence of having acquired the characteristics of Piaget's “formal operational thought.”     

The effect of orthographic structure and lexical meaning on “same-different” judgments

Pairs of high frequency English words, orthographically acceptable pseudo-words, and non-word letter strings were presented in a “same”-“different” task. The mean reaction times for “same” judgments were ordered; real words were faster than pseudo-words, and pseudo-words were faster than non-words. The RTs for the “different”, judgments showed no differences among the three types of words, except in the first two days of practice in a blocked presentation condition when the difference between the real words and non-words was marginally significant. These and other results suggest that “same” judgments are based upon a comparison process which efficiently uses higher order semantic and orthographic information in words, whereas “different” judgments are based upon comparison process which performs a self-terminating search of the graphemic information in words. The results were also discussed with reference to hierarchical models of word perception and reading.     

Information processing by performers and observers in a paired associate learning task

The effects of two training procedures on learning and performance are compared. Performers select a response alternative for each stimulus on Trial 1 and receive feedback in terms of “Right” or “Wrong”. Observers receive the same information by listening to the experimenter. Experiment I tests the hypothesis that performers and observers are using a different learning strategy when there are only two response alternatives available for each stimulus on Trial 1. A recognition procedure was used on Trial 2; each stimulus was followed by four alternatives, two of them being the same as presented on Trial 1. Subjects have to recognize the two “old” alternatives. Performers are always better at recognizing the chosen alternative, whereas observers are better at recognizing the correct alternative. Experiment II extends the comparison between performers and observers to a task with four response alternatives on Trial 1. There are no longer differences in performance between the two training procedures.     

A memory-based, Simon-like, spatial congruence effect: Evidence for persisting spatial codes

The Simon effect refers to the finding that in a task where stimulus location is irrelevant, reaction time is faster when stimulus and response locations are congruent than when they are not. Dominant theories of the Simon effect have generally attributed this spatial congruence effect to a spatial code automatically generated upon stimulus presentation. A common assumption of these theories is that this spatial code decays in less than a few hundred milliseconds following stimulus onset. We report two working-memory experiments suggesting a reexamination of this assumption—a Simon-like spatial congruence effect persisted over a delay of as long as 2400 ms. We propose that, in addition to generating short-lived perceptual codes, spatial information may be coded in working memory as part of the context associated with stimulus events. When reactivated by cues from the original event, such information may influence response selection and produce spatial congruence effects (in this case, positive when participants made a “yes” response and negative when they made a “no” response).     

A study of position habits induced by reward and “frustration”

Predictions from Maier's theory of “frustration”-instigated behaviour have been tested in an experimental situation differing significantly from that in which the theory was propounded yet containing the central element of “frustration”—the insoluble problem.

A water discrimination unit was employed in which the performance of rats would be observed during attacks on insoluble problems, position problems or symbol problems.

Two groups, each containing ten Wistar albino rats, served as subjects. The research design consisted of the following phases: preliminary training, development of position responses, exposure to a symbol-reward problem with 50 per cent, punishment and exposure to a symbol-reward problem with 100 per cent, punishment. The design differed for the two groups only at the phase in which the position responses were established. During this phase one group was exposed to a position-reward problem and the other to an insoluble problem.

Position responses were established as frequently under position-“frustration” (position stereotypes) as under position-reward (position habits) conditions. Position stereotypes were more rigid—more resistant to extinction—than position habits under conditions of 50 per cent, punishment. Position stereotypes were as readily extinguished under 100 per cent, punishment as were position habits under 30 per cent, punishment.

The first two observations conform to predictions made from Maier's theory. The third does not. That is to say, not all situations containing the basic elements of “frustration” give rise to stereotyped behaviour patterns which are as rigid or “fixated” as Maier's theory would predict. It is a reasonable hypothesis that the characteristics of stereotyped responses established in certain “frustration” situations may be described adequately in terms of conventional learning principles without the necessity of resorting to a distinction between “goal-motivated” and “frustration-instigated” behaviour.     

Modification of expectations in cases with obsessional rituals

Some theoretical issues in relation to the nature of obsessional rituals and the most commonly adopted method of behaviour therapy for this disorder are critically considered. On the basis of these considerations, a different method—“modification of expectations” or “reality testing” is put forward and its successful application to two patients described and discussed.     

Acoustic similarity and interference in short-term recognition memory: Some results of a decision-theory analysis

The following three studies of single-probe recognition memory set out to show the effect on the signal-detectability measures of d' and β (Tanner and Swets, 1954) of variations in the acoustic similarity of interfering material, which may either precede or follow the item to be remembered (proactive or retroactive interference --PI or RI). The first experiment studies a situation employed by Wickelgren (1966a), who reported that acoustically similar RI substantially reduced d'. It is shown that this effect could have been due to biases in Wickelgren's original designs, and that when a bias-free design is used, the fall in d' is only of borderline significance.

To investigate this problem further, a design was evolved in which two items were presented for memorizing, which varied in acoustic similarity to each other, and (after a distracting task) a probe was presented with one of three questions: Was this the first item of the pair? Was it the second? or, Did it occur in either position? In the first case, recognition-memory with RI of varying acoustic similarity was being studied, and as in the first experiment, it was found that similarity slightly reduced d'. With the second question, PI effects were being studied, and here negligible differences were found. With the third type of question, a “location-free” test, no effects of similarity were found. The last result rules out Posner's (1967) “acid-bath” explanation of similarity effects in interference: an explanation in terms of “differentiation” (or “filtering”) was also invalidated by the results of a third experiment, in which the same effects were found even though similarity varied only between stimulus items and interference, and not between these and the probe. Wickelgren's (1966b) associative model appears to have least difficulty in accommodating these results, though even this needs certain ad hoc assumptions to be able to do so.     

An improved technique for monitoring fixation in tachistoscopic tasks

A monocular lens mounted behind a stimulus screen was used to monitor fixation in a tachistoscopic recognition task. This technique was found superior to the often used “sideview technique” and as accurate as the method involving identification of a fixation stimulus. It was found that the “telescope technique” is preferable in those studies where presentation of a fixation stimulus might interfere with recognition or report of the experimental stimulus.