Guilt and Shame,Justice and Mercy

This essay argues that the criminal justice system in the United States is flawed because it focuses principally on punishment of illegal actions without considering offenders as persons in their entirety. It considers the role that constructive shame and mercy can play in addressing this flaw. The essay concludes by applying this argument to the case of shaming penalties within criminal justice.     

自尊、归因方式与内疚和羞耻的关系研究

通过对1040名中学生施测问卷,建立自尊、归因方式与内疚和羞耻的结构方程模型。结果表明：1）自尊与内疚和羞耻呈显著正相关,归因方式与内疚或羞耻呈显著负相关;2）自尊是归因方式与内疚和羞耻之间的中介变量,归因方式对自尊的直接作用大于对内疚和羞耻的直接作用,对内疚和羞耻的间接作用大于直接作用;3）个体对内疚事件更倾向于内归因,对羞耻事件更倾向于外归因。     

大学生心理控制源与内疚感和羞耻感对反事实思维的影响

研究以128名大学生为研究对象,采用2 (心理控制源: 外控型、内控型)×2 (自我道德感: 内疚感、羞耻感) 两因素被试间实验设计,考察了外控和内控大学生在内疚感和羞耻感两种不同的自我道德情感下反事实思维内容的差异。结果表明:(1) 心理控制源对大学生反事实思维不同内容的诱发具有重要的影响:外控者更倾向于产生行为和情境导向的反事实思维,而内控者更倾向于产生自我导向的反事实思维。内疚感和羞耻感对大学生反事实思维内容的产生没有直接的影响;(2) 反事实思维内容的产生受到了心理控制源与内疚感和羞耻感两种自我道德情感的交互影响:外控者在羞耻感的启动条件下比在内疚感的启动条件下表现出了更多的行为和情境导向的反事实思维,而内控者在内疚感的启动条件下比在羞耻感的条件下表现出了更多的自我导向的反事实思维。研究结果有助于解释以中西方不同被试而得出的内疚感和羞耻感与反事实思维关系的矛盾结论。     

Individual Differences in Experiences of and Responses to Guilt and Shame: Examining the Lenses of Gender and Gender Role

How are experiences of and reactions to guilt and shame a function of gendered views of the self? Individual differences in guilt and shame responses were explored in a sample of 104 young adults, most of whom were European American. Results indicated that, although women reported greater proneness to guilt and shame, men reported more trait guilt. Heightened levels of guilt- and shame-proneness were observed among both men and women with traditionally feminine gender roles, whereas a more traditionally masculine self-concept was associated with decreased shame-proneness for women. Gender schematic women favored verbal responses to ameliorate the experience of guilt, whereas gender schematic men preferred action-oriented responses. These results are discussed as gendered outcomes of schematic versus aschematic gender role socialization.     

The Approach and Avoidance Function of Guilt and Shame Emotions: Comparing Reactions to Self-Caused and Other-Caused Wrongdoing

Although theory suggests that guilt motivates approach tendencies and shame motivates avoidance tendencies, research has not always supported these relationships. The present study examined the degree to which shame and guilt are uniquely predictive of avoidance and approach motives, respectively, for both self-caused and other-caused wrongdoings. Results revealed that shame and guilt are more highly correlated for self-caused compared to other-caused wrongdoings. This greater blending of shame and guilt in response to self-caused acts makes it somewhat more difficult to distinguish between different unique motivational correlates of these two emotions. However, in response to other-caused wrongdoings, shame uniquely predicted avoidance tendencies (distancing from the event), whereas guilt uniquely predicted approach tendencies (repairing the event). The implications for research on motivation, emotion, and social relations are discussed.

羞愧研究综述

近年来羞愧作为自我意识情绪研究中一个重要的主题而再度得到心理学家的关注,本文从羞愧的概念、发展理论、羞愧和内疚的差异研究、羞愧的动机作用等几个方面总结了对羞愧的研究结果,在此基础上探讨该领域未来的研究趋势。     

Parental Apologies,Empathy, Shame,Guilt, and Attachment: A Path Analysis

The authors investigated the complex relationships of parental attitudes toward apologies, empathy, shame, guilt, and the parent's attachment orientation. Survey responses were obtained from 327 parents. A path analysis of the developed model demonstrated a close model fit (root‐mean‐square error of approximation = .07; comparative fit index = .93; incremental fit index = .94; χ² = 30.71, p < .001), supporting previous research on apologies as beneficial to relationships. A parent's proclivity toward apologies, positively influenced by empathy and guilt and negatively influenced by shame‐withdraw behaviors, produced a more secure parent–child attachment.     

On Irrational Guilt

A person raised in a religious family may have been taught that going to the theater is not allowed, and even if he has rejected this taboo years ago, he still feels guilty when attending theater. These kinds of cases may not be rare, but they are strange. Indeed, one may wonder how they are even possible. This is why an explanation is needed, and in my paper I aim to give such an explanation. In particular, I will first provide a brief review of the explanations of irrational guilt that are compatible with the cognitive theories of emotions, that is, theories that presuppose that there is a causal or a constitutional connection between emotions and cognitive factors, such as judgments, beliefs or thoughts. Following many other reviewers, I found most of the explanations of irrational guilt unsatisfactory, although my reasons for critical conclusions will partly differ from the usual ones. After the review, I will defend a solution according to which it is possible to believe that an act does not have any moral costs and at the same time to have an impression that is has, which explains the guilty feelings.     

Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings

Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it.     

Guilt and focusing in decision-making

In this paper we examined the impact of a specific emotion, guilt, on focusing in decision-making. Through the focusing mechanism, when making decisions, individuals tend to restrict their thoughts to what is explicitly represented in the decisional task, disregarding alternatives. In this paper, three experiments are performed to investigate whether an emotional state of guilt can critically guide individuals' focusing, and even prevailing over the focusing mechanism. Guilty emotional state was induced by asking participants to write about a guilty related life event. The emotional state was thus neither generated by nor related to the tasks used in the experiments. Results of the first two studies show that guilt affects focusing in decision-making in the case of only one explicitly specified option (a positive or a negative one). Guilty participants, when presented with a stated option that has predominantly positive characteristics, prefer other, unspecified options over the positive one. Guilty participants faced with a stated option that has predominantly negative features tend to prefer it to other, unspecified, options, instead. Finally, experiment 3 shows that guilty participants presented with two different options (a negative vs. a positive one) having different degrees of explicitness (i.e. they are not equally represented in the decision frame), focus on the negative option, even though the latter was not explicitly represented but only hinted at the end of the text. Overall, these results suggest that guilt emotion state can play a crucial role in either strengthening or reducing the focusing mechanism. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Severity of Self-Reported Depression in Patients with a Schizoaffective Disorder

  To investigate the severity of self-reported depression in patients diagnosed with a schizoaffective disorder (SZA), the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) was administered to 75 patients with a SZA. For comparative purposes, the BDI-II was also administered to 75 patients with a major depressive disorder without psychotic features (MDD) who were matched to the SZA sample with respect to sex, being Caucasian, and age. The Cronbach coefficient αs of the BDI-II total scores for the patients with a SZA or a MDD were, respectively, .94 and .92. The mean BDI-II total score (M = 23.71, SD = 15.44) of the patients with a SZA was minimally lower than the mean BDI-II score (M = 28.73, SD = 12.46) of the patients with a MDD. The BDI-II was discussed as being useful for assessing self-reported depression in patients diagnosed with a SZA.     

羞耻和内疚的差异

羞耻和内疚是日常生活中经常出现的两种十分相似的情感,难以对此作出明确的区分。近年来研究发现两者在概念、认知评价、情感体验和外显表现等方面都有着明显的差异,而且在与心理障碍之间的关系上羞耻比内疚更密切。这些研究发现无疑对情绪的理论研究和心理障碍的临床治疗都起到积极的作用。     

Rabbinic-Psychological Interventions in Cases of Pathological Guilt

Several cases are presented of the intervention of a communal rabbi in the treatment of psychiatric patients. The rabbi was requested to intervene by the therapist when the issue of pathological guilt was encumbering further therapeutic progress.     

霍夫曼虚拟内疚理论述评

该文从涵义及类型、发生机制和影响因素等方面,介绍了霍夫曼的虚拟内疚理论,并对其理论意义进行了评述。该文认为。霍夫曼的虚拟内疚理论不仅拓展了内疚研究的心理学领域。而且深化了人们对道德情感在个体道德发展中的地位和作用的认识。     

Blameless Guilt: The Case of Carer Guilt and Chronic and Terminal Illness

My ambition in this paper is to provide an account of an unacknowledged example of blameless guilt that, I argue, merits further examination. The example is what I call carer guilt: guilt felt by nurses and family members caring for patients with palliative-care needs. Nurses and carers involved in palliative care often feel guilty about what they perceive as their failure to provide sufficient care for a patient. However, in some cases the guilty carer does not think that he has the capacity to provide sufficient care; he has, in his view, done all he can. These carers cannot legitimately be blamed for failing to meet their own expectations. Yet despite acknowledging their blamelessness, they nonetheless feel guilty. My aims are threefold: first, to explicate the puzzling nature of the carer guilt phenomenon; second, to motivate the need to solve that puzzle; third, to give my own account of blameless guilt that can explain why carers feel guilty despite their blamelessness. In doing so I argue that the guilt experienced by carers is a legitimate case of guilt, and that with the right caveats it can be considered an appropriate response to the progressive deterioration of someone for whom we care.     

At the Point of Death—A Case Study

In 1979 Pastoral Psychology published my first autobiographical case study: the story of a near-fatal automobile accident, collateral damage of a high speed police chase in downtown Chicago. Providence was evident in my survival of that collision, as well as in the present case study: a massive heart attack during a psychotherapy session in 2001. By comparing these two crises, I find that I must call into focus a psychological propensity: if a near-fatal experience occurs from the “outside in” (e.g. automobile accident), guilt may well surface as the emotion of conflict; but if a near-fatal experience occurs from the “inside out” (e.g. heart attack), the emotion of conflict may emerge as shame. In the former the body is assaulted; in the latter it revolts.     

Shame, Women, and Group Psychotherapy

This paper addresses gender-related experiences of shame, focusing on the shame-prone woman. Specifically the varied manifest behaviors, dynamics, and defenses commonly observed in shame-prone women are described. It is recommended that the addition of group therapy to individual treatment, once the client is ready, can expedite progress for these patients, as they are more able to integrate previously disowned and shamed aspects of themselves. A number of potential problems when working with these patients in group are identified and explored.