Why did this happen to me? Religious believers’ and non-believers’ teleological reasoning about life events

People often believe that significant life events happen for a reason. In three studies, we examined evidence for the view that teleological beliefs reflect a general cognitive bias to view the world in terms of agency, purpose, and design. Consistent with this hypothesis, we found that individual differences in mentalizing ability predicted both the tendency to believe in fate (Study 1) and to infer purposeful causes of one’s own life events (Study 2). In addition, people’s perception of purpose in life events was correlated with their teleological beliefs about nature, but this relationship was driven primarily by individuals’ explicit religious and paranormal beliefs (Study 3). Across all three studies, we found that while people who believe in God hold stronger teleological beliefs than those who do not, there is nonetheless evidence of teleological beliefs among non-believers, confirming that the perception of purpose in life events does not rely on theistic belief. These findings suggest that the tendency to perceive design and purpose in life events—while moderated by theistic belief—is not solely a consequence of culturally transmitted religious ideas. Rather, this teleological bias has its roots in certain more general social propensities.     

Cognitive Pathways to Belief in Karma and Belief in God

Supernatural beliefs are ubiquitous around the world, and mounting evidence indicates that these beliefs partly rely on intuitive, cross-culturally recurrent cognitive processes. Specifically, past research has focused on humans' intuitive tendency to perceive minds as part of the cognitive foundations of belief in a personified God—an agentic, morally concerned supernatural entity. However, much less is known about belief in karma—another culturally widespread but ostensibly non-agentic supernatural entity reflecting ethical causation across reincarnations. In two studies and four high-powered samples, including mostly Christian Canadians and mostly Hindu Indians (Study 1, N = 2,006) and mostly Christian Americans and Singaporean Buddhists (Study 2, N = 1,752), we provide the first systematic empirical investigation of the cognitive intuitions underlying various forms of belief in karma. We used path analyses to (a) replicate tests of the previously documented cognitive predictors of belief in God, (b) test whether this same network of variables predicts belief in karma, and (c) examine the relative contributions of cognitive and cultural variables to both sets of beliefs. We found that cognitive tendencies toward intuitive thinking, mentalizing, dualism, and teleological thinking predicted a variety of beliefs about karma—including morally laden, non-agentic, and agentic conceptualizations—above and beyond the variability explained by cultural learning about karma across cultures. These results provide further evidence for an independent role for both culture and cognition in supporting diverse types of supernatural beliefs in distinct cultural contexts.     

Mental health, belief deficit compensation, and paranormal beliefs

The present study examined the relationship between religious and nonreligious paranormal beliefs and mental health, as well as the possibility that nonreligious subjects compensate for a lack of identification with traditional religion by increased nonreligious paranormal beliefs. Subjects were 80 undergraduates categorized as religious or nonreligious on the basis of scores on the Traditional Religion subscale of the Paranormal Belief Scale. Religious subjects had significantly higher total paranormal belief scores than nonreligious subjects. Those adopting religious paranormal beliefs were actually somewhat more likely to adopt other nonreligious paranormal beliefs. The failure of nonreligious subjects to compensate fully for this traditional religious belief deficit was reflected in their mental health ratings on the Langer's Mental Health Scale (Langer, 1962). Paranormal beliefs were found to be negatively correlated with reported symptoms of psychopathology, supporting the formulation that paranormal beliefs may serve to ensure psychic integrity by acting as "self-serving cognitive biases."     

Mental Health,Belief Deficit Compensation,and Paranormal Beliefs

The present study examined the relationship between religious and nonreligious paranormal beliefs and mental health, as well as the possibility that nonreligious subjects compensate for a lack of identification with traditional religion by increased nonreligious paranormal beliefs. Subjects were 80 undergraduates categorized as religious or nonreligious on the basis of scores on the Traditional Religion subscale of the Paranormal Belief Scale. Religious subjects had significantly higher total paranormal belief scores than nonreligious subjects. Those adopting religious paranormal beliefs were actually somewhat more likely to adopt other nonreligious paranormal beliefs. The failure of nonreligious subjects to compensate fully for this traditional religious belief deficit was reflected in their mental health ratings on the Langer's Mental Health Scale (Langer, 1962). Paranormal beliefs were found to be negatively correlated with reported symptoms of psychopathology, supporting the formulation that paranormal beliefs may serve to ensure psychic integrity by acting as “self-serving cognitive biases.”     

Conceptions about the mind-body problem and their relations to afterlife beliefs,paranormal beliefs,religiosity, and ontological confusions

We examined lay people’s conceptions about the relationship between mind and body and their correlates. In Study 1, a web survey (N = 850) of reflective dualistic, emergentistic, and monistic perceptions of the mind-body relationship, afterlife beliefs (i.e., common sense dualism), religiosity, paranormal beliefs, and ontological confusions about physical, biological, and psychological phenomena was conducted. In Study 2 (N = 73), we examined implicit ontological confusions and their relations to afterlife beliefs, paranormal beliefs, and religiosity. Correlation and regression analyses showed that reflective dualism, afterlife beliefs, paranormal beliefs, and religiosity were strongly and positively related and that reflective dualism and afterlife beliefs mediated the relationship between ontological confusions and religious and paranormal beliefs. The results elucidate the contention that dualism is a manifestation of universal cognitive processes related to intuitions about physical, biological, and psychological phenomena by showing that especially individuals who confuse the distinctive attributes of these phenomena tend to set the mind apart from the body.     

THE DUALISTIC,DISCARNATE PICTURE THAT HAUNTS THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

A dualistic, discarnate picture haunts contemporary cognitive science of religion (CSR). Cognitive scientists of religion generally assert or assume a reductive physicalism, primarily through unconscious mental mechanisms that detect supernatural agency where none exists and a larger purpose to life when none exists. Accompanying this focus is a downplaying of conscious reflection in religious belief and practice. Yet the mind side of dualism enters into CSR in interesting ways. Some cognitive scientists turn practitioners of religion into dualists who allegedly believe in disembodied spirits. By emphasizing supernatural agency, CSR neglects nonpersonal powers and meanings in religion, both in terms of magical thinking and practice and of nonpersonal conceptions of divinity. Additionally, some cognitive scientists of religion declare that all humans are innate dualists. They use this alleged dualism to explain beliefs about both an afterlife and transfers of consciousness. Finally, some call on this dualism to serve a salvific function, trying to salvage some meaning to human life.     

Analytic cognitive style predicts religious and paranormal belief

An analytic cognitive style denotes a propensity to set aside highly salient intuitions when engaging in problem solving. We assess the hypothesis that an analytic cognitive style is associated with a history of questioning, altering, and rejecting (i.e., unbelieving) supernatural claims, both religious and paranormal. In two studies, we examined associations of God beliefs, religious engagement (attendance at religious services, praying, etc.), conventional religious beliefs (heaven, miracles, etc.) and paranormal beliefs (extrasensory perception, levitation, etc.) with performance measures of cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style. An analytic cognitive style negatively predicted both religious and paranormal beliefs when controlling for cognitive ability as well as religious engagement, sex, age, political ideology, and education. Participants more willing to engage in analytic reasoning were less likely to endorse supernatural beliefs. Further, an association between analytic cognitive style and religious engagement was mediated by religious beliefs, suggesting that an analytic cognitive style negatively affects religious engagement via lower acceptance of conventional religious beliefs. Results for types of God belief indicate that the association between an analytic cognitive style and God beliefs is more nuanced than mere acceptance and rejection, but also includes adopting less conventional God beliefs, such as Pantheism or Deism. Our data are consistent with the idea that two people who share the same cognitive ability, education, political ideology, sex, age and level of religious engagement can acquire very different sets of beliefs about the world if they differ in their propensity to think analytically.     

A study of paranormal belief, magical ideation as an index of schizotypy and cognitive style

This study examined the proposal that the association between paranormal belief and magical ideation may be mediated by distinctive cognitive styles for schizotypes as compared to believers in the paranormal. Schizotypes were found to differ from an atypical group of believers in the paranormal and to resemble schizophrenics in terms of cognitive style. Believers expressed a cognitive style reliant on notions of personal responsibility while schizotypes emphasised the role of randomness. Believers differed from schizotypes on more deviant aspects of schizotypy measures yet unexpectedly these groups did not differ on specific facets of paranormal belief. It is tentatively proposed that for some people certain paranormal beliefs represent a cognitive ‘defence’ against acceptance of the uncertainty of life events, while for others paranormal belief may be indicative of psychopathology.     

Cognition and belief in paranormal phenomena: gestalt/feature-intensive processing theory and tendencies toward ADHD, depression, and dissociation

Belief in paranormal phenomena and cryptids--unknown animals such as Bigfoot--may predispose individuals to interpret real-world objects and events in the same way that eyewitness identification can be biased by unrelated information (P. James and N. Thorpe, 1999). Psychological tendencies toward attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), dissociation, and depression, even at subclinical levels, may be associated systematically with particular paranormal or cryptozoological beliefs. The authors evaluated these psychological tendencies using the Conners Adult ADHD Rating Scales (C. K. Conners, D. Erhardt, and E. Sparrow, 1999), the Dissociative Experiences Scale (L. Coleman & J. Clark, 1999), and the Beck Depression Inventory-II (A. T. Beck, 1996). They performed regression analyses against beliefs in ghosts, unidentified flying objects (UFOs), extrasensory perception (ESP), astrology, and cryptids. ADHD, dissociation, and depression were associated with enhanced tendencies toward paranormal and cryptozoological beliefs, although participants who believed in each of the phenomena differed from one another in predictable and psychologically distinguishable ways. Cognitively biasing influences of preexisting psychological tendencies may predispose individuals to specific perceptual and cognitive errors during confrontation of real-world phenomena.     

Belief in Pseudoscience,Cognitive Style and Science Literacy

Most studies of superstitious belief have focused on paranormal phenomena, but this study extended existing findings to non‐paranormal pseudoscience by exploring links between belief and dual‐process thought (cognitive ability and intuitive‐analytical thinking styles). In the present study, Japanese participants (N = 264; 188 women, 76 men; mean age = 25.0; range = 18–81) completed questionnaires on cognitive style and ability and level of beliefs and science literacy. Results showed that belief in paranormal and non‐paranormal pseudoscience correlated positively; after controlling for demographic variables, level of science literacy and cognitive ability, both analytic and intuitive cognitive styles positively predicted paranormal belief. Belief in non‐paranormal pseudoscience associated positively with analytic, but not intuitive style. These results follow the dual‐process view of belief perseverance; however, analytic style affected beliefs oppositely from previous studies. This discrepancy might emerge from Western and Eastern cultural differences in reasoning. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Analytic thinking reduces belief in conspiracy theories

Belief in conspiracy theories has been associated with a range of negative health, civic, and social outcomes, requiring reliable methods of reducing such belief. Thinking dispositions have been highlighted as one possible factor associated with belief in conspiracy theories, but actual relationships have only been infrequently studied. In Study 1, we examined associations between belief in conspiracy theories and a range of measures of thinking dispositions in a British sample (N = 990). Results indicated that a stronger belief in conspiracy theories was significantly associated with lower analytic thinking and open-mindedness and greater intuitive thinking. In Studies 2–4, we examined the causational role played by analytic thinking in relation to conspiracist ideation. In Study 2 (N = 112), we showed that a verbal fluency task that elicited analytic thinking reduced belief in conspiracy theories. In Study 3 (N = 189), we found that an alternative method of eliciting analytic thinking, which related to cognitive disfluency, was effective at reducing conspiracist ideation in a student sample. In Study 4, we replicated the results of Study 3 among a general population sample (N = 140) in relation to generic conspiracist ideation and belief in conspiracy theories about the July 7, 2005, bombings in London. Our results highlight the potential utility of supporting attempts to promote analytic thinking as a means of countering the widespread acceptance of conspiracy theories.     

Erosion of belief and disbelief: effects of religiosity and negative affect on beliefs in the paranormal and supernatural

The authors investigated the effects of religiosity and negative affect on beliefs in the paranormal and supernatural among 94 undergraduate students enrolled in psychology classes at a small, private U.S. university. They hypothesized that religiosity would predict differential beliefs in the supernatural versus the paranormal but that negative affect would attenuate these beliefs. In addition, the authors predicted that belief in the supernatural and negative affect would interact to predict belief in the paranormal. Overall, the results were consistent with predictions. The religious participants were skeptical of paranormal phenomena but were accepting of supernatural phenomena. In addition, increased reports of negative affect over the preceding year appeared to attenuate belief in the supernatural for the religious participants. By contrast, for the nonreligious participants, increased belief in both the supernatural and paranormal was predicted when reports of negative affect were high. Finally, the interaction of supernatural belief and negative affect significantly predicted belief in the paranormal.     

Superstitious,magical, and paranormal beliefs: An integrative model

Lack of conceptual clarity has hampered theory formation and research on superstitious, magical, and paranormal beliefs. This study offers a conceptual framework where these concepts are differentiated from other unfounded beliefs and defined identically as a confusion of core knowledge about physical, psychological, and biological phenomena. When testing this definition with questionnaire items (N = 239), the results showed that superstitious individuals accepted more violations of core ontological distinctions than skeptics did and that ontological confusions discriminated believers from skeptics better than intuitive thinking, analytical thinking, or emotional instability. The findings justify the present conceptualization of superstitious, magical, and paranormal beliefs, and offer new theoretical propositions for the familiar everyday beliefs that are yet scientifically so poorly understood.     

Countervailing Forces: Religiosity and Paranormal Belief in Italy

Due to the unique cultural niche inhabited by “paranormal” beliefs and experiences, social scientists have struggled to understand the relationship between religion and the paranormal. Complicating matters is the fact that extant research has primarily focused upon North America, leaving open the possible relationship between these two spheres of the supernatural in less religiously pluralistic contexts. Using data from a random, national survey of Italian citizens, we examine the nature of the relationship between religiosity and paranormal beliefs in a largely Catholic context. We find a curvilinear relationship between religiosity and paranormal beliefs among Italians, with those at the lowest and highest levels of religious participation holding lower average levels of “paranormal” belief than those with moderate religious participation. This pattern reflects how two influential social institutions, religion and science, simultaneously define the paranormal as outside of acceptable realms of inquiry and belief.     

Conferring humanness: The role of anthropomorphism in hoarding

Hoarding is characterized by a persistent and extreme difficulty with discarding one’s possessions, often resulting in cluttered living spaces and marked distress or impairment. Despite being increasingly recognized as a substantial public health burden, much remains unknown about the etiology. One facet within the cognitive-behavioral model of hoarding that remains poorly understood is the strong emotional attachment to possessions. The tendency to anthropomorphize (i.e., see human-like qualities in non-human entities) may be one possible mechanism contributing to this emotional attachment. The current report is the first empirical study to examine the association between anthropomorphism and hoarding. Non-clinical participants (n = 72) completed a battery of self-report measures focused on hoarding symptoms, saving cognitions, anthropomorphism, and emotional attachments to personal and novel items. Anthropomorphic tendencies were significantly associated with greater saving behaviors and the acquisition of free things. Levels of anthropomorphism moderated the relationship between specific hoarding beliefs and acquiring tendencies, as well as the emotional attachment towards a novel item. Results are discussed with regard to future research directions, and implications for the cognitive-behavioral model of hoarding.     

Diverse Supernatural Portfolios: Certitude,Exclusivity, and the Curvilinear Relationship Between Religiosity and Paranormal Beliefs

Studies have attempted to understand the association between more conventional supernatural (religious) beliefs and practices and less conventional “paranormal” supernatural beliefs. Some have posited that the two comprise incompatible cultural spheres and belief systems, while others have argued that supernatural religious beliefs are “small steps” toward less conventional paranormal views (such as belief in astrology and telekinesis). We build upon recent scholarship outlining a more nuanced, nonlinear relationship between religiosity and paranormal beliefs by identifying a specific niche of believers who are particularly likely to dabble in unconventional supernatural beliefs. Strong believers in the paranormal tend to be characterized by a nonexclusive spiritualist worldview, as opposed to materialist or exclusive religious outlooks. Paranormal believers tend to be characterized by moderate levels of religious belief and practice, and low levels of ideological exclusivity. In general, the relationship between more conventional religiosity and paranormal beliefs is best conceptualized as curvilinear.     

The Implicit Relationship Between Religious and Paranormal Constructs

Several decades worth of research have produced mixed results concerning the relationship between beliefs in religious and paranormal phenomena. While this previous work focused on the explicit measurement of these beliefs, these studies focused on a new level of analysis. Specifically, what is the implicit relationship between religious and paranormal constructs? In Study 1, participants completed a version of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) to assess the association between religious and paranormal stimuli, as well as completed measures of religiosity and paranormal belief. Results supported an association between these constructs that was moderated by intrinsic religiosity and faith in science. Study 2 again provided evidence for an association while addressing a methodological concern regarding the IAT. The results are discussed in their impact on the understanding of the cognitive representation of religious and paranormal constructs and the respective belief systems.     

Bias versus bias: Harnessing hindsight to reveal paranormal belief change beyond demand characteristics

Psychological change is difficult to assess, in part because self-reported beliefs and attitudes may be biased or distorted. The present study probed belief change, in an educational context, by using the hindsight bias to counter another bias that generally plagues assessment of subjective change. Although research has indicated that skepticism courses reduce paranormal beliefs, those findings may reflect demand characteristics (biases toward desired, skeptical responses). Our hindsight-bias procedure circumvented demand by asking students, following semester-long skepticism (and control) courses, to recall their precourse levels of paranormal belief. People typically remember themselves as previously thinking, believing, and acting as they do now, so current skepticism should provoke false recollections of previous skepticism. Given true belief change, therefore, skepticism students should have remembered themselves as having been more skeptical than they were. They did, at least about paranormal topics that were covered most extensively in the course. Our findings thus show hindsight to be useful in evaluating cognitive change beyond demand characteristics.     

Critical thinking ability and belief in the paranormal

A study was conducted to assess the relationship between critical thinking and belief in the paranormal. 180 students from three departments (psychology, arts, computer science) completed one measure of reasoning, the Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983), and a scale of paranormal experiences. Half of the subjects filled out the Cornell Critical Thinking Test (Ennis & Millmann, 1985) and the Watson–Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser, 2002), respectively. The results show no significant correlations between critical thinking and paranormal belief or experiences. Reasoning ability, however, had a significant effect on paranormal belief scores, but not on paranormal experiences. Subjects with lower reasoning ability scored higher on Traditional Paranormal Belief and New Age Philosophy than did subjects with higher reasoning abilities. Results suggest that those who have better reasoning abilities scrutinise to a greater extent whether their experiences are sufficient justification for belief in the reality of these phenomena.     

The Religious, the Paranormal, and Church Attendance: A Response to Orenstein

Orenstein's (2002) JSSR article "Religion and Paranormal Belief" uses Reginald Bibby's 1995 Project Canada data to argue that religious and paranormal belief are positively correlated, but that church attendance and paranormal belief are negatively correlated. In this response, I use the same data to show that while his basic model is true, we also need to consider the interaction between church attendance and religious belief. Religious attendance conditions the effect of religious beliefs on paranormal beliefs in an important fashion. I find that religious and paranormal belief are positively correlated, but only for those who do not attend church regularly.