Depressive symptoms enhance loss-minimization, but attenuate gain-maximization in history-dependent decision-making

Individuals with depressive symptoms typically show deficits in decision-making. However, most work has emphasized decision-making under gain-maximization conditions. A gain-maximization framework may undermine decision-making when depressive symptoms are present because depressives are generally more sensitive to losses than gains. The present study examined decision making in a non-clinical sample of depressive and non-depressive individuals under gain-maximization or loss-minimization conditions using a task for which the currently available rewards depend upon participants' previous history of choices. As predicted, we found a cross over interaction whereby depressive individuals were superior to non-depressive individuals under loss-minimization conditions, but were inferior to non-depressive individuals under gain-maximization conditions. In addition, we found that loss-minimization performance was superior to gain-maximization performance for depressive individuals, but that gain-maximization performance was superior to loss-minimization performance for non-depressive individuals. These results suggest that decision making deficits observed when depressive symptoms are present may be attenuated when decisions involve minimizing losses rather than maximizing gains.     

Navigating through abstract decision spaces: Evaluating the role of state generalization in a dynamic decision-making task

Research on dynamic decision-making tasks, in which the payoffs associated with each choice vary with participants’ recent choice history, shows that humans have difficulty making long-term optimal choices in the presence of attractive immediate rewards. However, a number of recent studies have shown that simple cues providing information about the underlying state of the task environment may facilitate optimal responding. In this study, we examined the mechanism by which this state knowledge influences choice behavior. We examined the possibility that participants use state information in conjunction with changing payoffs to extrapolate payoffs in future states. We found support for this hypothesis in an experiment in which generalizations based on this state information worked to the benefit or detriment of task performance, depending on the task’s payoff structure.     

When time is money: The effect of hourly payment on the evaluation of time

Empirical research shows decisions about time are often made differently than decisions about money, belying the oft-quoted maxim that “time is money”. However, there are organizational practices such as payment on the basis of time that can make the equivalence of time and money salient and are associated with an economic evaluation of time. Study 1 showed that people paid by the hour applied mental accounting rules to time that are typically only applied to money. Using data from a nationally representative survey, Study 2 documented that people paid by the hour weighed economic returns more strongly in making tradeoffs between time and money. Study 3 showed that participants’ prior exposure to hourly payment was associated with a greater willingness to trade more time for money and that participants randomly assigned to calculate their hourly wage rate expressed greater willingness to trade more time for money. The interaction of prior experience with whether or not participants calculated an hourly wage in predicting participants’ willingness to trade more time for money was fully mediated by the salience of economic criteria in participants’ decision-making.     

Pliers,not fingers: Tool-action effect in a motor intention paradigm

Tool-use representations have been suggested to be supported by the representation of hand actions and/or by the representation of tool actions. A major issue is to know which one of these two representations is preferentially activated when people intend to use a tool. To address this issue, we developed a paradigm in which, in 20% of trials, participants had to press a button and actually use pliers to move an object in response to a predefined target symbol. Importantly, two masks hiding the symbols performed “opening” or “closing” actions before symbols appeared. In Experiment 1, participants used normal pliers: Hand’s opening actions induced pliers’ opening actions and vice versa for hands’ closing actions. Results indicated a compatibility effect between masks’ actions and pliers’ actions. Participants were faster to press the button in response to the target symbol when opening and closing actions of the masks were congruent with the corresponding actions of the hand. In Experiment 2 participants used inverse pliers: Hand’s opening actions involved pliers’ closing actions and vice versa. In this situation, results showed that the congruency of masks’ actions occurred with pliers’ actions and not hand’s actions. Altogether, these findings demonstrate that intention of use is preferentially based on the representation of tool actions, and have important implications for the domain of neuropsychology of tool use and the theories of goal-directed behavior.     

语言理解中主体职业特征与动作表征的激活

运用句-配范式以及句子理解与身体反应相互作用的实验范式,探讨 “做某事的是某人”与“某人做某事”两类句式理解过程中主体职业特征与动作表征的激活。结果发现,在“做某事的是某人”句子理解过程中,主体的职业特征和动作表征得到了激活,但在“某人做某事”句子理解过程中,主体职业特征表征和动作表征只有其中一种表征处于匹配状态时,另一种表征才能得到明显的激活。这表明,句子理解过程中,主体职业特征表征得到了激活,而主体职业特征表征与动作执行器表征的同时激活则受到对方匹配情况的影响,知觉符号理论得到了进一步的证明。     

Listeners invest in an assumed other's perspective despite cognitive cost

We explored perspective-taking behavior in a visuospatial mental rotation task that requires listeners to adopt an egocentric or “other-centric” frame of reference. In the current task, objects could be interpreted relative to the point-of-view of the listener (egocentric) or of a simulated partner (other-centric). Across three studies, we evaluated participants’ willingness to consider and act on partner-specific information, showing that a partner’s perceived ability to contribute to collaborative mutual understanding modulated participants’ perspective-taking behavior, either by increasing other-centric (Study 2) or egocentric (Study 3) responding. Moreover, we show that a large proportion of participants resolved referential ambiguity in terms of their partner’s perspective, even when it was more cognitively difficult to do so (as tracked by online movement measures), and when the presence of a social partner had to be assumed (Studies 1 and 2). In addition, participants continued to consider their partner’s perspective during trials where visual perspectives were shared. Our results show that participants will thoroughly invest in either an other-centric or egocentric mode of responding, and that perspective-taking strategies are not always dictated by minimizing processing demands, but by more potent (albeit subtle) factors in the social context.     

The conflicting choices of alternating selves

Participants made choices after the salience of their social identities was manipulated. Choices assimilated to the salient identity, whether that identity stemmed from a person’s role (e.g., student, family member) or culture (e.g., Chinese, American). Thus, the preferences that participants expressed depended on the identity that happened to be salient at the moment of choice, with participants expressing preferences when one identity was salient that conflicted with the preferences they would express were another identity salient. These effects only arose for those who held and identified with the evoked identity. Studies further revealed that such identity-congruent choices influence post-choice satisfaction and regret: participants were less satisfied with their prior choices when the identity salient during post-choice evaluation or consumption was different from the identity salient during choice, compared to when the “choosing” and “consuming” identities were the same. Implications of the findings are discussed.     

The perceptual push: The interplay of implicit cues and explicit situational construals on behavioral intentions in the Prisoner’s Dilemma

Although it is clear that nonconscious primes can affect behavioral decisions, the extent to which the prime-to-behavior link is mediated by intervening interpretative processes is still unknown. The present research examined the mediational role of “situational construals” by assessing the effects of cooperative versus competitive primes on participants’ construals of, and responses to, the prisoner’s dilemma. As predicted, this priming manipulation influenced participants’ construals of the game (assessed by the participants’ ratings of the appropriateness of different “names for the game” and their estimates of how random others would play), and their own expressed willingness to cooperate versus defect. Most crucially, a mediational analysis and a manipulation of the order in which these dependent variables were measured established that the prime-to-behavior link can be strengthened by an intervening task calling for explicit construal of the situation. The interplay of situational construal and implicit primes in producing deliberative behavior is discussed.     

Individual differences in Sternberg’s memory scanning task

This study provides a new perspective on both the cognitive processes actually implemented and the effect of a simple experimental control - the recall constraint - in Sternberg’s memory scanning task. These findings were highlighted by adopting a new approach based on the comparison of qualitative and quantitative results.The analysis of individual processing, on 72 adults, each participating in one of two experimental conditions (with or without sequence recall), highlighted a large variability in quantitative results as well as qualitative procedures. Based on the participants’ retrospective verbalisations, two categories of strategies were identified: (1) the procedures used to memorize the sequence of digits, and (2) the procedures used to compare this sequence with the test digit, which includes strategies for coding the items and processes for searching them in memory. The analysis of the strategies shows that their frequencies of use depend not only on the experimental condition, but also on the participants, the level of task difficulty and the interaction between participants and level of difficulty. This variability questions the accuracy of Sternberg’s mean model. Furthermore, this approach suggests some answers to the old debate concerning the exhaustive search pattern for the yes response. Indeed, our results show three types of strategies that can be identified according to the different models of search suggested in the literature. The “exhaustive” search, that would only be involved in the recall condition and only for some of the participants, the “self-terminating” search and the “immediate” strategy, which can be identified with a model of parallel search with limited resources. Thus our study suggests that the different search models are appropriate but depend on both the specific experimental conditions and participant’s strategy. Our results should help to improve the interpretation of data collected with this paradigm in cognitive and neuroscientific studies of memory.     

公正世界信念对记忆偏差的影响

公正世界信念指人们需要相信他们所处的世界是一个公正有序的世界。本研究考察的是公正世界信念是否影响人们的记忆,让人产生记忆偏差。实验一中,被试首先阅读一则彩票中奖的新闻,然后阅读关于中奖者人品的描述,最后被试需要回忆中奖金额。结果发现,中奖者的个性品质影响对奖金数额的记忆。实验二中,两组被试分别阅读一则维护公正世界信念或威胁公正世界信念的无关故事,接下来程序与实验一相同。结果发现,预先激活的公正世界信念状态与中奖者个性品质在记忆结果上存在显著的交互效应。结果表明,公正世界信念能够导致记忆偏差。     

Hypocrites or maligned cooperative participants? Experimenter induced normative conflict in zero-sum situations

The failure to recognize the influence of two distinct forms of moral norms can lead to the misattribution of moral behavior to egoistic motives. This is illustrated in the research of Batson and his colleagues (e.g., Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997). They reported the appearance of moral failure and hypocrisy motivation in several experiments employing essentially the same “zero-sum” experimental situation. They cited as evidence the discrepancy between participants’ apparently self-serving private acts and their subsequent public ratings of the morality of what they had done as well as their recognition of the “most” moral way to behave. The research reported here supported an alternative explanation that located the experimenter’s implicit and explicit instructions as the source of the discrepancy between the participants’ private acts and their public ratings. The findings confirmed the hypothesis that Batson and his colleagues had not merely made moral norms “salient”. They had actually presented their participants with contradictory “demands”: explicitly inviting them to meet the norm of justified self-interest in private but then give public lip-service to the experimenter’s instructions as to a supererogatory way to behave. When either of the demands was removed, the “hypocrisy” no longer occurred.     

“It’s not funny if they’re laughing”: Self-categorization, social influence, and responses to canned laughter

Pre-recorded, or “canned” laughter is often used to encourage audience laughter. Previous research suggests that hearing others laugh can influence an audience, although several variables moderate its effects. We examined an unexplored moderator, hypothesizing that canned laughter would influence listeners only if they believed the laughter came from fellow in-group members. We manipulated the presence or absence of canned laughter in a potentially humorous recording and participants’ beliefs about the in-group or out-group composition of the laughing audience. The results confirmed our hypothesis: participants laughed and smiled more, laughed longer, and rated humorous material more favorably when they heard in-group laughter rather than out-group laughter or no laughter at all.     

Mood-as-input and depressive rumination

This article describes a test of mood-as-input theory predictions as applied to a rumination task in a nonclinical population. An experimenter-controlled interview was used to allow participants to reflect on a personal period of depression while in an experimentally-induced mood state (either negative or positive) or while deploying a specific stop rule for the task (either an “as many as can” or “feel like continuing” stop rule). As predicted by mood-as-input theory, persistence at the rumination task was greatest in the group experiencing negative mood while deploying an “as many as can” stop rule, and this suggests a mechanism that may contribute to perseverative depressive rumination. It is argued that the variables that contributed to perseveration in this study are already known to be characteristic of ruminative thinkers (e.g. negative mood and positive metacognitive beliefs about rumination that will command the deployment of “as many as can” stop rules for rumination). It is also argued that mood-as-input processes may provide a common mechanism for perseverative rumination and perseverative worry, and this common mechanism may account for many of the similarities between these two functionally-distinct activities.     

Driving without awareness: The effects of practice and automaticity on attention and driving

This research examined the development of proceduralised “driving without awareness” in a driving simulator by paying participants to drive a simulated road regularly over 12 weeks of testing. This longitudinal research paradigm is a significant departure from previous studies which have examined drivers in a conscious attentional mode using short experimental sessions or cross-sectional designs comparing expert and novice performance. During each session, participants took two “trips” on the simulated road; sometimes travelling on a “to and from” journey on one half of the road, sometimes traversing the entire road in one direction. A range of measures, including driving performance, vehicle detection, perceptual speed regulation, and hazard reactions were collected. The results showed the development of driving patterns and changes in object detection performance indicative of proceduralised driving. Speed and lane position variability quickly decreased with practice, as did participants’ subjective experiences of driving difficulty. Performance on an embedded detection task appeared to become a proceduralised part of the driving task, becoming highly efficient in later stages of the experiment. The changes in attentional focus and driving performance over time provide new light on previous research findings and allow us to critically re-examine several established models of driver behaviour.     

A dynamic context model of interactive behavior

A dynamic context model of interactive behavior was developed to explain results from two experiments that tested the effects of interaction costs on encoding strategies, cognitive representations, and response selection processes in a decision-making and a judgment task. The model assumes that the dynamic context defined by the mixes of internal and external representations and processes are sensitive to the interaction cost imposed by the task environment. The model predicts that changes in the dynamic context may lead to systematic biases in cognitive representations and processes that eventually influence decision-making and judgment outcomes. Consistent with the predictions by the model, results from the experiments showed that as interaction costs increased, encoding strategies and cognitive representations shifted from perception-based to memory-based. Memory-based comparisons of the stimuli enhanced the similarity and dominance effects, and led to stronger systematic biases in response outcomes in a choice task. However, in a judgment task, memory-based representations enhanced only the dominance effects. Results suggested that systematic response biases in the dominance context were caused by biases in the cognitive representations of the stimuli, but response biases in the similarity context were caused by biases in the comparison process induced by the choice task. Results suggest that changes in interaction costs not only change whether information was assessed from the external world or from memory but also introduce systematic biases in the cognitive representation of the information, which act as biased inputs to the subsequent decision-making and judgment processes. Results are consistent with the idea of interactive cognition, which proposes that representations and processes are contingent on the dynamic context defined by the information flow between the external task environment and internal cognition.     

Looking good versus doing good: which factors take precedence when children learn about new tools?

We present two experiments exploring whether individuals would be persuaded to imitate the intentional action of an adult model whose actions suggest that the correct way to complete a task is with an inefficient tool. In Experiment 1, children ages 5–10 years and a group of adults watched an adult model reject an efficient tool in favor of one that was inefficient, but claim it was “made for” the task. Results indicated low rates of imitation of the model’s intentional choice until 9 and 10 years of age. In Experiment 2, children ages 3–11 years again watched a model reject a functional tool in favor of a nonfunctional one. This time, the demonstration took place on video. For half of the participants, the model from the video was present to offer a choice between the two tools (high-pressure condition), and for the other half, she was absent (low-pressure condition). Children also completed a social desirability questionnaire to explore relationships between imitation choices and personality. Results indicated that rates of imitation were associated with higher scores on the social desirability scale among children ages 3–7 years. Among 8- to 11-year-olds – and especially among 9- and 10-year-olds – the decision to copy the model’s intentional choice was more likely when the model was present than when she was absent. The findings reveal the contributions of age, personality, and social pressure to differences in imitation.     

Making decisions about now and later: Development of future-oriented self-control

This study explored factors underlying preschoolers’ ability to make future-oriented choices. In a delay-of-gratification choice task, quantity and visibility of the reward was systematically varied. Participants included 90 typically developing children aged 2–4 years. Children made more choices to delay gratification as the quantity of the reward increased from 1 to 4 stickers, but covering the reward did not have an effect. The study extends previous findings on delay of gratification choice tasks in suggesting a developmental pattern beginning with an early appearing “hot” motivational system. Having children think about the present self versus the future self presumably activates a second “cool” representational system. Age differences in the development of this system and its integration with the motivational system may be at the heart of the “U” shaped function observed in the present work, one in which simpler abilities underlying self-control develop in parallel and integrate to produce more complex behaviour. The study thus contributes to our understanding of the development of future-oriented self-control, a milestone central to socialization and the definition of the self.     

Perceived benefits of using an Internet-based interactive career planning system

Making Better Career Decisions (MBCD) is an Internet-based interactive career planning system designed to help deliberating individuals. The present research examined the benefits of a dialogue with MBCD, by analyzing 712 users’ perceptions of its contribution to their career decision-making process, and locating variables associated with these perceptions. A pre-dialogue and a post-dialogue questionnaire were used to collect the users’ perceptions of its benefits and measure the change in the degree of decidedness. Perceived benefit was derived from participants’ ratings of the degree of progress they had made in their career decision-making process, whether they had learned about additional factors to be considered and their career-related preferences, as well as their ratings of the quality of the list of “promising” career alternatives presented to them during their dialogue with MBCD. This composite perceived benefit was found to be positively associated with the users’ decidedness at the completion of the dialogue with MBCD. Users’ satisfaction with the length and variety of their personal “promising alternatives” list was associated with a higher perceived benefit.     

Effort denial in self-deception

We propose a mixed belief model of self-deception. According to the theory, people distribute belief over two possible causal paths to an action, one where the action is freely chosen and one where it is due to factors outside of conscious control. Self-deceivers take advantage of uncertainty about the influence of each path on their behavior, and shift weight between them in a self-serving way. This allows them to change their behavior to provide positive evidence and deny doing so, enabling diagnostic inference to a desired trait. In Experiment 1, women changed their pain tolerance to provide positive evidence about the future quality of their skin, but judgments of effort claimed the opposite. This “effort denial” suggests that participants’ mental representation of their behavior was dissociated from their actual behavior, facilitating self-deception. Experiment 2 replicated the pattern in a hidden picture task where search performance was purportedly linked to self-control.     

Can semi-supervised learning explain incorrect beliefs about categories?

Three experiments with 88 college-aged participants explored how unlabeled experiences—learning episodes in which people encounter objects without information about their category membership—influence beliefs about category structure. Participants performed a simple one-dimensional categorization task in a brief supervised learning phase, then made a large number of unsupervised categorization decisions about new items. In all three experiments, the unsupervised experience altered participants’ implicit and explicit mental category boundaries, their explicit beliefs about the most representative members of each category, and even their memory for the items encountered during the supervised learning phase. These changes were influenced by both the range and frequency distribution of the unlabeled stimuli: mental category boundaries shifted toward the middle of the range and toward the trough of the bimodal distribution of unlabeled items, whereas beliefs about the most representative category members shifted toward the modes of the unlabeled distribution. One consequence of this shift in representations is a false-consensus effect (Experiment 3) where participants, despite receiving very disparate training experiences, show strong agreement in judgments about representativeness and boundary location following unsupervised category judgments.