Subjective awareness scale length influences the prevalence,not the presence,of graded conscious states

There is an ongoing debate about the graded or dichotomous form of visual consciousness. Studies involved in the disagreement have typically employed subjective awareness ratings in psychophysical experiments. Variations in scale length have made comparisons across studies difficult and have even been suspected of influencing conclusions about the form of consciousness. We tested the proposal that a 21-point awareness scale produces dichotomous awareness state reports. The experiment described in this article randomly assigned participants to use one of four scale lengths used in previous studies in a backward masking task. Our findings suggest that all scales indicate the presence of graded awareness states, but that the resulting proportion of degraded state reports differed across the scales. Consequently, we argue that the decision of whether the form of consciousness observed in a given study is dichotomous or graded is dependent on an interpretation of the relative degree of degradation.     

The levels of perceptual processing and the neural correlates of increasing subjective visibility

According to the levels-of-processing hypothesis, transitions from unconscious to conscious perception may depend on stimulus processing level, with more gradual changes for low-level stimuli and more dichotomous changes for high-level stimuli. In an event-related fMRI study we explored this hypothesis using a visual backward masking procedure. Task requirements manipulated level of processing. Participants reported the magnitude of the target digit in the high-level task, its color in the low-level task, and rated subjective visibility of stimuli using the Perceptual Awareness Scale. Intermediate stimulus visibility was reported more frequently in the low-level task, confirming prior behavioral results. Visible targets recruited insulo-fronto-parietal regions in both tasks. Task effects were observed in visual areas, with higher activity in the low-level task across all visibility levels. Thus, the influence of level of processing on conscious perception may be mediated by attentional modulation of activity in regions representing features of consciously experienced stimuli.     

Visual awareness and the levels of processing hypothesis: A critical review

Does a visual percept emerge to consciousness in a graded manner (i.e. evolving through increasing degrees of clarity), or according to a dichotomous, “all-or-none” pattern (i.e. abruptly transitioning from unawareness to awareness)? The level of processing hypothesis (LoP; B. Windey and A. Cleeremans, 2015) recently proposed a theoretical framework where the transition from unaware to aware visual experience is graded for low-level stimulus representations (i.e. stimulus “energy” or “feature” levels) whereas it is dichotomous for high-level (i.e. the perception of “letters”, “words” or “meaning”) stimulus perception. Here, we will critically review current behavioral and brain-based evidence on the LoP hypothesis and discuss potential challenges (such as differences in LoP conceptualizations, awareness scale related issues, attentional confounds and divergences on experimental factors or statistical analyses) which might be of use for future research within the field. Overall, the LoP hypothesis is a recent and promising proposal that attempts to integrate divergent evidence on the graded vs. dichotomous emergence of awareness debate. Whereas current evidence validates some of the assumptions proposed by the LoP account, there is still much work to do on both methodological and experimental levels. Future neuroimaging studies might help to disentangle the current complex pattern of results found in LoP studies and, importantly, shed some light on the ongoing debate about the search for the Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC).     

A Multi‐Factor Account of Degrees of Awareness

In this paper we argue that awareness comes in degrees, and we propose a novel multi‐factor account that spans both subjective experiences and perceptual representations. At the subjective level, we argue that conscious experiences can be degraded by being fragmented, less salient, too generic, or flash‐like. At the representational level, we identify corresponding features of perceptual representations—their availability for working memory, intensity, precision, and stability—and argue that the mechanisms that affect these features are what ultimately modulate the degree of awareness. We conclude the paper by demonstrating why the original interpretations of certain empirical findings that apparently pose problems for our account are, in fact, flawed.     

The electrophysiological correlates of stimulus visibility and metacontrast masking

There are conflicting views concerning the electrophysiological correlates of visual consciousness. Whereas one view considers a relatively late positive deflection (LP) as a primary correlate of consciousness, another model links consciousness with earlier negativity (VAN). The present experiment utilized metacontrast masking in investigating the electrophysiological correlates of visual consciousness. The participants were presented with target-mask sequences in three stimulus onset asynchronies. The target stimuli were followed by either a metacontrast mask or a similar-looking, but ineffective pseudomask. The results showed that the first deflection that correlated with target visibility was VAN which was followed by LP. We argue that the VAN is the primary correlate target visibility, while the LP reflects later, postperceptual processing stages.     

Comparing theories of consciousness: Object position,not probe modality,reliably influences experience and accuracy in object recognition tasks

People often claim seeing images completely despite performing poorly. This highlights an issue with conscious representations. We introduce an experimental manipulation aiming to disentangle two prevalent positions: Rich views posit that people virtually represent the external world with unlimited capacity; Sparse views state that representations are reconstructed from expectations and information. In two experiments using the object recognition task, we tested two probe types: Images, which should aid reconstruction more, and Words, which should aid it less. From a sparse view, one should expect that Images lead to greater accuracy and reported experience. We found no reliable differences in accuracy and reported experience across probe types; however, we observed that the object positions influenced both accuracy and reported experience, which is surprising from a Rich view as it seemingly requires assumptions of different access across the visual field. Both theoretical positions thus currently need further development to explain our results.     

The role of levels of processing in disentangling the ERP signatures of conscious visual processing

We aimed to distinguish electrophysiological signatures of visual awareness from other task-related processes through manipulating the level of processing of visual stimuli. During an event-related EEG experiment, 36 subjects performed either color (low-level condition) or magnitude (high-level condition) evaluations of masked digits. Participants also assessed subjective visibility of each stimulus using the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS). Mean amplitude of the components of interest was analyzed (VAN − 140–240 ms; LP − 380–480 ms) with weighted regression mixed model. In the VAN component time window the mean amplitude correlated with PAS rating in both conditions. Mean amplitude in the LP time window correlated with PAS ratings in the high-level condition, but not in the low-level condition. Our results support the temporal unfolding of ERP makers of conscious processing, with an early component reflecting the initial perceptual experience and a late component being a correlate of the conscious experience of non-perceptual information.     

Measuring consciousness: task accuracy and awareness as sigmoid functions of stimulus duration

When consciousness is examined using subjective ratings, the extent to which processing is conscious or unconscious is often estimated by calculating task performance at the subjective threshold or by calculating the correlation between accuracy and awareness. However, both these methods have certain limitations. In the present article, we propose describing task accuracy and awareness as functions of stimulus intensity (thus obtaining an accuracy and an awareness curve) as suggested by Koch and Preuschoff (2007). The estimated lag between the curves describes how much stimulus intensity must increase for awareness to change proportionally as much as accuracy and the slopes of the curves are used to assess how fast accuracy and awareness increases and whether awareness is dichotomous. The method is successfully employed to assess consciousness characteristics on data from four different awareness scales.     

Preferential processing of self-relevant stimuli occurs mainly at the perceptual and conscious stages of information processing

Self-related stimuli, such as one’s own name or face, are processed faster and more accurately than other types of stimuli. However, what remains unknown is at which stage of the information processing hierarchy this preferential processing occurs. Our first aim was to determine whether preferential self-processing involves mainly perceptual stages or also post-perceptual stages. We found that self-related priming was stronger than other-related priming only because of perceptual prime-target congruency. Our second aim was to dissociate the role of conscious and unconscious factors in preferential self-processing. To this end, we compared the “self” and “other” conditions in trials where primes were masked or unmasked. In two separate experiments, we found that self-related priming was stronger than other-related priming but only in the unmasked trials. Together, our results suggest that preferential access to the self-concept occurs mainly at the perceptual and conscious stages of the stimulus processing hierarchy.     

Implicit processing of tactile information: evidence from the tactile change detection paradigm

People can maintain accurate representations of visual changes without necessarily being aware of them. Here, we investigate whether a similar phenomenon (implicit change detection) also exists in touch. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants detected the presence of a change between two consecutively-presented tactile displays. Tactile change blindness was observed, with participants failing to report the presence of tactile change. Critically, however, when participants had to make a forced choice response regarding the number of stimuli presented in the two displays, their performance was significantly better than chance (i.e., implicit change detection was observed). Experiment 3 demonstrated that tactile change detection does not necessarily involve a shift of spatial attention toward the location of change, regardless of whether the change is explicitly detected. We conclude that tactile change detection likely results from comparing representations of the two displays, rather than by directing spatial attention to the location of the change.     

Dissociation of processing time and awareness by the inattentional blindness paradigm

Consciousness researchers are interested in distinguishing between mental activity that occurs with and without awareness (i.e., explicit versus implicit processes). The inattentional blindness (IB) paradigm is an excellent tool for this question because it permits the independent manipulation of processing time and awareness. In the present study, we show that implicit texture segregation can occur during inattentional blindness, provided that the texture is exposed for a sufficient duration. In contrast, a Simon effect does not occur during inattentional blindness, even with similar exposure duration of the critical stimulus. This reveals a dissociation between processing time and awareness, consistent with the possibility of separate processing streams for explicit and implicit visual perception.     

The level of subjective visibility at different stages of memory processing

Recent research suggests that the content of iconic memory (IM) and fragile visual short-term memory could be associated with a similar level of conscious accessibility as working memory (WM). The results of our studies, in which we used a subjective visibility scale in a partial-report change detection paradigm, indicate that it is possible to distinguish separate stages of memory based on both discriminative accuracy and conscious accessibility. The highest scores were associated with IM and the lowest with WM, while somewhere in the middle there was fragile memory. Based on classical assumptions, WM accessibility should be greater than the other two types of memory; however, our study showed that this might not always be the case. We discuss the potential sources of this outcome, of which one may be the task construction, as we only tested items that were directly in the focus of attention.     

Depth of facial expression processing depends on stimulus visibility: Behavioral and electrophysiological evidence of priming effects

Participants performed a priming task during which emotional faces served as prime stimuli and emotional words served as targets. Prime-target pairs were congruent or incongruent, and two levels of prime visibility were obtained by varying the duration of the masked primes. To probe a neural signature of the impact of the masked primes, lateralized readiness potentials (LRPs) were recorded over motor cortex. In the high-visibility condition, responses to word targets were faster when the prime-target pairs were congruent than when they were incongruent, providing evidence of priming effects. In line with the behavioral results, the electrophysiological data showed that high-visibility face primes resulted in LRP differences between congruent and incongruent trials, suggesting that prime stimuli initiated motor preparation. Contrary to the above pattern, no evidence for reaction time or LRP differences was observed in the low-visibility condition, revealing that the depth of facial expression processing is dependent on stimulus visibility.     

The conscious awareness of time distortions regulates the effect of emotion on the perception of time

This study examined how the awareness of emotion-related time distortions modifies the effect of emotion on time perception. Before performing a temporal bisection task with stimulus durations presented in the form of neutral or emotional facial expressions (angry, disgusted and ashamed faces), some of the participants read a scientific text providing either correct or incorrect information on the emotion–time relationship. Other participants did not receive any information. The results showed that the declarative knowledge allowed the participants to regulate (decrease) the intensity of emotional effects on the perception of time, but did not trigger temporal effects when the emotional stimuli did not automatically induce emotional reactions that distorted time.     

Likert量表分析中不同IRT模型的有效性

5级Likert量表可直接分析,也可以转化为3级评分,或转化为2级评分。前二者可以采用等级IRT模型,后者可以采用2级IRT模型。研究表明2级IRT模型中的2参数模型是最适合的模型。多级评分模型与数据拟合也很好,而且等级越多测量精度越大。     

Tracking the processes behind conscious perception: a review of event-related potential correlates of visual consciousness

Event-related potential (ERP) studies have attempted to discover the processes that underlie conscious visual perception by contrasting ERPs produced by stimuli that are consciously perceived with those that are not. Variability of the proposed ERP correlates of consciousness is considerable: the earliest proposed ERP correlate of consciousness (P1) coincides with sensory processes and the last one (P3) marks postperceptual processes. A negative difference wave called visual awareness negativity (VAN), typically observed around 200 ms after stimulus onset in occipitotemporal sites, gains strong support for reflecting the processes that correlate with, and possibly enable, aware visual perception. Research suggests that the early parts of conscious processing can proceed independently of top-down attention, although top-down attention may modulate visual processing even before consciousness. Evidence implies that the contents of consciousness are provided by interactions in the ventral stream, but indispensable contributions from dorsal regions influence already low-level visual responses.     

Confidence depends on level of aggregation

The credible intervals that people set around their point estimates are typically too narrow (cf. Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982). That is, a set of many such intervals does not contain the actual values of the criterion variables as often as it should given the probability assigned to this event for each estimate. The typical interpretation of such data is that people are overconfident about the accuracy of their judgments. This paper presents data from two studies showing the typical levels of overconfidence for individual estimates of unknown quantities. However, data from the same subjects on a different measure of confidence for the same items, their own global assessment for the set of multiple estimates as a whole, showed significantly lower levels of confidence and overconfidence than their average individual assessment for items in the set. It is argued that the event and global assessments of judgment quality are fundamentally different and are affected by unique psychological processes. Finally, we discuss the implications of a difference between confidence in single and multiple estimates for confidence research and theory.     

Temporal dynamics of awareness for facial identity revealed with ERP

In this study, we investigated the scalp recorded event-related potential (ERP) responses related to visual awareness. A backward masking procedure was performed while high-density EEG recordings were carried out. Subjects were asked to detect a familiar face, presented at durations that varied parametrically between 16 and 266 ms. ERPs were computed and awareness was assessed using a sensitivity measure from signal detection theory (d'). Modifications in the electrical scalp topographies were found to reflect visual awareness of the stimulus. In particular, an early map topography was found to emerge progressively around 230 ms, showing a pattern of increase similar to the measure of visual awareness. This was followed by an increase in duration of a second, P300-like map. Source localisation for the early awareness-related topography revealed the activation of a distributed network of brain areas including frontal and temporo-occipital regions. Our results suggest that conscious experience emerges in parallel with the activation of a specific neural network that occurs in a time window beginning from about 200 ms.     

New evidence of animal consciousness

This paper reviews evidence that increases the probability that many animals experience at least simple levels of consciousness. First, the search for neural correlates of consciousness has not found any consciousness-producing structure or process that is limited to human brains. Second, appropriate responses to novel challenges for which the animal has not been prepared by genetic programming or previous experience provide suggestive evidence of animal consciousness because such versatility is most effectively organized by conscious thinking. For example, certain types of classical conditioning require awareness of the learned contingency in human subjects, suggesting comparable awareness in similarly conditioned animals. Other significant examples of versatile behavior suggestive of conscious thinking are scrub jays that exhibit all the objective attributes of episodic memory, evidence that monkeys sometimes know what they know, creative tool-making by crows, and recent interpretation of goal-directed behavior of rats as requiring simple nonreflexive consciousness. Third, animal communication often reports subjective experiences. Apes have demonstrated increased ability to use gestures or keyboard symbols to make requests and answer questions; and parrots have refined their ability to use the imitation of human words to ask for things they want and answer moderately complex questions. New data have demonstrated increased flexibility in the gestural communication of swarming honey bees that leads to vitally important group decisions as to which cavity a swarm should select as its new home. Although no single piece of evidence provides absolute proof of consciousness, this accumulation of strongly suggestive evidence increases significantly the likelihood that some animals experience at least simple conscious thoughts and feelings. The next challenge for cognitive ethologists is to investigate for particular animals the content of their awareness and what life is actually like, for them.Donald R. Griffin died on 7 November 2003