Dialogue representation

We consider question-answer dialogues between participants who may disagree with each other. The main problems are: (a) How different speech-acts affect the information in the dialogue; and (b) How to represent what was said in a dialogue, so that we can summarize it even when it involves disagreements (i.e., inconsistencies).We use a fully-typed many-sorted language L with a possible-worlds semantics. L contains nominals representing short answers. The speech-acts are uniformly represented in a dialogue language DL by focus structures, consisting of a mood operator, a topic component and a focus component. Each stage of the dialogue is associated with a set of information functions (g-functions), which are partial functions taking a topic component (representing a question raised) to a set of propositions determined by the corresponding focus component (to the set of answers given to it).Asserting is answering a question and, hence, it causes a new g-function to be defined. Asking is an attempt to cause the hearer to define a new g-function satisfying certain conditions. A question asked requests a true and complete answer. A reaction answers a question if it satisfies some of the conditions of the question. Indirect questions are viewed as indirect answers.A dialogue representation consists of: commitment sets, each representing the commitments expressed by one participant; sets of questions under discussion associated with each stage of the dialogue, and the common ground, containing the g-functions and representing consistently what was said in the dialogue.Concepts of informativeness are naturally defined within the theory. Whether an utterance is informative depends on which question it answers and how the question was answered previously. These concepts yield that uttering mathematical and logical truths is as informative as uttering a contingency.     

Permutation analysis of data with multiple binary category choices

In many studies, respondents may mark all answers that apply when responding to a multiple-choice question, i.e., a cafeteria or multiple-response question. One exact and two approximate permutation methods are described to analyze multiple-response questions. The methods provide the probability, under the null hypothesis, that the multiple binary responses do not differ among specified groups.     

Inquisitive Heyting Algebras

In this paper we introduce a class of inquisitive Heyting algebras as algebraic structures that are isomorphic to algebras of finite antichains of bounded implicative meet semilattices. It is argued that these structures are suitable for algebraic semantics of inquisitive superintuitionistic logics, i.e. logics of questions based on intuitionistic logic and its extensions. We explain how questions are represented in these structures (prime elements represent declarative propositions, non-prime elements represent questions, join is a question-forming operation) and provide several alternative characterizations of these algebras. For instance, it is shown that a Heyting algebra is inquisitive if and only if its prime filters and filters generated by sets of prime elements coincide and prime elements are closed under relative pseudocomplement. We prove that the weakest inquisitive superintuitionistic logic is sound with respect to a Heyting algebra iff the algebra is what we call a homomorphic p-image of some inquisitive Heyting algebra. It is also shown that a logic is inquisitive iff its Lindenbaum–Tarski algebra is an inquisitive Heyting algebra.

     

Leading questions and the eyewitness report

A total of 490 subjects, in four experiments, saw films of complex, fast-moving events, such as automobile accidents or classroom disruptions. The purpose of these experiments was to investigate how the wording of questions asked immediately after an event may influence responses to questions asked considerably later. It is shown that when the initial question contains either true presuppositions (e.g., it postulates the existence of an object that did exist in the scene) or false presuppositions (e.g., postulates the existence of an object that did not exist), the likelihood is increased that subjects will later report having seen the presupposed object. The results suggest that questions asked immediately after an event can introduce new—not necessarily correct—information, which is then added to the memorial representation of the event, thereby causing its reconstruction or alteration.     

Three Pervasive Presuppositions about Human Life and Ethics Strongly Warrant Analysis

Common philosophical discussions concerning the ethics of human interaction with the biosphere and universe have been significantly informed by certain presuppositions: (1) nature is conquerable; (2) human cultural and social (contrasted with moral) progress is somewhat like a thing, beyond human control, and is inevitable and benevolent; and (3) Homo sapiens is the superior life‐form. Although arguments, such as whether humans should conquer nature, founded upon these presuppositions have sometimes been challenged, each of these three presuppositions wants direct analysis. The three have become so ingrained in professional and everyday discourse that they have mythic proportions, as though beyond question. Because of the weightiness of the relevant philosophical issues, they merit overt analysis. Although they are independent and may be analyzed separately, this article treats them as whole, as they often work together in arguments. After finding substantial problems, the article suggests alternative ways of building sustainable presuppositions in similar territory.     

THEORIZING RELIGION AND QUESTIONING THE FUTURE OF ISLAM AND SCIENCE

Will there be any joint future for science and Islam? Although such questions have recently received considerable attention, more basic questions are often ignored. This article aims at addressing some of those more basic questions through exploring the assumptions that underlie different possible understandings of the question about the future of Islam and science. By investigating the relation between conceptualizations of religion and the question about the future of Islam and science, it will be argued that different understandings of the concept of religion (i.e., whether it denotes real objects, whether it is universal, and whether it is belief centered) lead to extremely different readings of the question. Besides, it will be argued that different answers to the question about the future of Islam and science can be understood in terms of the inference to best theological explanation; thus, the criteria that one assumes for the best theological explanation result in different criteria for evaluation of the answers.     

Metacognitive effects of initial question difficulty on subsequent memory performance

In two experiments, we examined whether relative retrieval fluency (the relative ease or difficulty of answering questions from memory) would be translated, via metacognitive monitoring and control processes, into an overt effect on the controlled behavior—that is, the decision whether to answer a question or abstain. Before answering a target set of multiple-choice general-knowledge questions (intermediate-difficulty questions in Exp. 1, deceptive questions in Exp. 2), the participants first answered either a set of difficult questions or a set of easy questions. For each question, they provided a forced-report answer, followed by a subjective assessment of the likelihood that their answer was correct (confidence) and by a free-report control decision—whether or not to report the answer for a potential monetary bonus (or penalty). The participants’ ability to answer the target questions (forced-report proportion correct) was unaffected by the initial question difficulty. However, a predicted metacognitive contrast effect was observed: When the target questions were preceded by a set of difficult rather than easy questions, the participants were more confident in their answers to the target questions, and hence were more likely to report them, thus increasing the quantity of freely reported correct information. The option of free report was more beneficial after initial question difficulty than after initial question ease, in terms of both the gain in accuracy (Exp. 2) and a smaller cost in quantity (Exps. 1 and 2). These results demonstrate that changes in subjective experience can influence metacognitive monitoring and control, thereby affecting free-report memory performance independently of forced-report performance.     

Language context guides memory content

The relationship between language and memory was examined by testing accessibility of general knowledge across two languages in bilinguals. Mandarin-English speakers were asked questions such as “name a statue of someone standing with a raised arm while looking into the distance” and were more likely to name the Statue of Liberty when asked in English and the Statue of Mao when asked in Mandarin. Multivalent information (i.e., multiple possible answers to a question) and bivalent information (i.e., two possible answers to a question) were more susceptible to language dependency than univalent information (i.e., one possible answer to a question). Accuracy of retrieval showed language-dependent memory effects in both languages, while speed of retrieval showed language-dependent memory effects only in bilinguals’ more proficient language. These findings suggest that memory and language are tightly connected and that linguistic context at the time of learning may become integrated into memory content.     

Does mentioning "some people" and "other people" in a survey question increase the accuracy of adolescents' self-reports?

A great deal of developmental research has relied on self-reports solicited using the "some/other" question format ("Some students think that… but other students think that…"). This article reports tests of the assumptions underlying its use: that it conveys to adolescents that socially undesirable attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors are not uncommon and legitimizes reporting them, yielding more valid self-reports than would be obtained by "direct" questions, which do not mention what other people think or do. A meta-analysis of 11 experiments embedded in four surveys of diverse samples of adolescents did not support the assumption that the some/other form increases validity. Although the some/other form led adolescents to think that undesirable attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors were more common and resulted in more reports of those attitudes and behaviors, answers to some/other questions were lower in criterion validity than were answers to direct questions. Because some/other questions take longer to ask and answer and require greater cognitive effort from participants (because they involve more words), and because they decrease measurement accuracy, the some/other question format seems best avoided.     

A philosophical examination of coercion for mental health issues

This article considers two philosophical questions about coercion and mental disorders: (1) an analytical question, i.e., what is meant by the concept of coercion? (2) a normative question, i.e., what justifies the use of coercion? The article distinguishes between coercion from other forms of power such as inducement, persuasion, and authority. It then considers a range of arguments for the paternalistic use of coercion for the benefit of mentally disordered persons and the use of coercion to restrain mentally disordered dangerous persons. This article rests on the assumption that there is something to be said for an academic division of labour, that empirical research in mental health and the law can benefit from conceptual clarification and the analysis of normative arguments. In this article I distinguish between two importantly different sorts of questions that we can ask about coercion and then offer some answers to those questions in broad strokes.     

Social comparison and optimism about one's relational future: order effects in social judgment

This research tested the hypothesis that when individuals first answer a question about relative evaluation, i.e. the degree in which they feel they are better or worse off than comparison others and next a question about general evaluation, i.e. the general judgment of one's situation or one's characteristics, the correlations between both variables will be higher than when the order of the questions is reversed. In the first case individuals will use social comparison information as a reference point for making a judgment of their situation, whereas general evaluations not preceded by relative evaluations may be based on a variety of factors. The content of the questions concerned optimism with respect to one's own prospects concerning intimate relationships, i.e. the perceived chances of having a happy intimate relationship in the future, and the perceived chance of not becoming involved in a divorce. The results of two studies—a questionnaire study among students (n=274), and a computer administered survey among single adults (n=275)—confirmed the predictions. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-wh

Reductionists about knowledge- wh hold that " s knows- wh " (e.g. "John knows who stole his car") is reducible to "there is a proposition p such that s knows that p , and p answers the indirect question of the wh -clause." Anti-reductionists hold that " s knows- wh " is reducible to " s knows that p , as the true answer to the indirect question of the wh -clause." I argue that both of these positions are defective. I then offer a new analysis of knowledge- wh as a special kind of de re knowledge.     

Sound symbolic naming of novel objects is a graded function

Although linguistic traditions of the last century assumed that there is no link between sound and meaning (i.e., arbitrariness), recent research has established a nonarbitrary relation between sound and meaning (i.e., sound symbolism). For example, some sounds (e.g., /u/ as in took) suggest bigness whereas others (e.g., /i/ as in tiny) suggest smallness. We tested whether sound symbolism only marks contrasts (e.g., small versus big things) or whether it marks object properties in a graded manner (e.g., small, medium, and large things). In two experiments, participants viewed novel objects (i.e., greebles) of varying size and chose the most appropriate name for each object from a list of visually or auditorily presented nonwords that varied incrementally in the number of “large” and “small” phonemes. For instance, “wodolo” contains all large-sounding phonemes, whereas “kitete” contains all small-sounding phonemes. Participants' choices revealed a graded relationship between sound and size: The size of the object linearly predicted the number of large-sounding phonemes in its preferred name. That is, small, medium, and large objects elicited names with increasing numbers of large-sounding phonemes. The results are discussed in relation to cross-modal processing, gesture, and vocal pitch.     

Double-Negation Elimination in Some Propositional Logics

This article answers two questions (posed in the literature), each concerning the guaranteed existence of proofs free of double negation. A proof is free of double negation if none of its deduced steps contains a term of the formn(n(t)) for some term t, where n denotes negation. The first question asks for conditions on the hypotheses that, if satisfied, guarantee the existence of a double-negation-free proof when the conclusion is free of double negation. The second question asks about the existence of an axiom system for classical propositional calculus whose use, for theorems with a conclusion free of double negation, guarantees the existence of a double-negation-free proof. After giving conditions that answer the first question, we answer the second question by focusing on the Lukasiewicz three-axiom system. We then extend our studies to infinite-valued sentential calculus and to intuitionistic logic and generalize the notion of being double-negation free. The double-negation proofs of interest rely exclusively on the inference rule condensed detachment, a rule that combines modus ponens with an appropriately general rule of substitution. The automated reasoning program Otter played an indispensable role in this study.     

Answer comparison in automated question answering

In the context of Question Answering (QA) on free text, we assess the value of answer comparison and information fusion in handling multiple answers. We report improvements in answer re-ranking using fusion on a set of location questions and show the advantages of considering candidates as allies rather than competitors. We conclude with some observations about answer modeling and evaluation methodology, arising from a more recent experiment with a larger set of questions and a greater diversity of question types and candidates.     

Constitutive Rules: Games,Language, and Assertion

Many philosophers think that games like chess, languages like English, and speech acts like assertion are constituted by rules. Lots of others disagree. To argue over this productively, it would be first useful to know what it would be for these things to be rule-constituted. Searle famously claimed in Speech Acts that rules constitute things in the sense that they make possible the performance of actions related to those things (Searle 1969). On this view, rules constitute games, languages, and speech acts in the sense that they make possible playing them, speaking them and performing them. This raises the question what it is to perform rule-constituted actions (e. g. play, speak, assert) and the question what makes constitutive rules distinctive such that only they make possible the performance of new actions (e. g. playing). In this paper I will criticize Searle's answers to these questions. However, my main aim is to develop a better view, explain how it works in the case of each of games, language, and assertion and illustrate its appeal by showing how it enables rule-based views of these things to respond to various objections.     

Who Knows? Knowledge Activation,Belief in Certainty of Knowledge,Maximization Tendencies and Need for Cognition in Answerability Judgments

In this study, investigating answerability judgments, 123 participants judged whether each of 46 general knowledge questions could currently be answered by themselves, by someone else, or by no one. There were 26 consensus questions (high expected consensus about their answerability) and 20 non-consensus questions. Before each question, half of the participants rated the extent of their knowledge related to the question. Results showed that answering consensus questions compared with non-consensus led to a lower proportion of “No one knows” answers. Moreover, in the knowledge rating condition compared with the control condition, participants choose “No one knows” proportionally less. Participants’ ratings of belief in certainty of knowledge were associated with more “Someone else knows” for the non-consensus questions. Moreover, tendency to maximization led to a higher proportion of “Someone else knows” options for the non-consensus questions. Finally, high need for cognition was associated with fewer choices of “Someone else knows.”     

What's Context Got to Do with It? Comparative Difficulty of Test Questions Influences Metacognition and Corrected Scores for Formula‐scored Exams

Summary: On formula‐scored exams students receive points and penalties for correct and incorrect answers, respectively, but they can avoid the penalty by withholding incorrect answers. However, test‐takers have difficulty strategically regulating their accuracy and often set an overly conservative metacognitive response bias (e.g., Higham, 2007). The current experiments extended these findings by exploring whether the comparative difficulty of surrounding test questions (i.e., easy vs. hard)—a factor unrelated to the knowledge being tested—impacts metacognitive response bias for medium‐difficulty test questions. Comparative difficulty had no significant influence on participants' ability to choose correct answers for medium questions, but it did affect willingness to report answers and confidence ratings. This difference carried over to corrected scores (scores after penalties are applied) when comparative difficulty was manipulated within‐subjects: Scores were higher in the hard condition. Results are discussed in terms of implications for interpreting formula‐scored tests and underlying mechanisms of performance.Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.