Superior perception of phasic physiological arousal and the detrimental consequences of the conviction to be aroused on worrying and metacognitions in GAD

Although people suffering from generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) often report arousal symptoms, psychophysiological studies show no evidence of autonomic hyperarousal. Hypersensitivity toward and catastrophic interpretation of phasic arousal cues may explain this discrepancy. The authors tested (a) whether GAD sufferers perceive nonspecific skin conductance fluctuations (NSCFs), an indicator of phasic autonomic arousal, better than controls do and (b) whether the conviction to be aroused contributes to the maintenance of worrying and metacognitive beliefs about worrying. Thirty-three GAD sufferers and 34 healthy controls participated in 2 experiments. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to detect their own NSCFs during a signal detection task. GAD sufferers accurately detected more of their NSCFs than did controls, who tended to miss NSCFs. In Experiment 2, participants were instructed to relax following worry induction. While relaxing, they received nonveridical feedback indicating either arousal or relaxation. Arousal feedback conserved negative metacognitive beliefs regarding worrying and also maintained negative mood and worry exclusively in GAD participants. These findings suggest that superior perception of phasic arousal cues and their catastrophic misinterpretation increases worrying, negative metacognitive beliefs about worrying, and anxious mood in GAD.     

Accuracy, error, and bias in predictions for real versus hypothetical events

Participants made predictions about performance on tasks that they did or did not expect to complete. In three experiments, participants in task-unexpected conditions were unrealistically optimistic: They overestimated how well they would perform, often by a large margin, and their predictions were not correlated with their performance. By contrast, participants assigned to task-expected conditions made predictions that were not only less optimistic but strikingly accurate. Consistent with predictions from construal level theory, data from a fourth experiment suggest that it is the uncertainty associated with hypothetical tasks, and not a lack of cognitive processing, that frees people to make optimistic prediction errors. Unrealistic optimism, when it occurs, may be truly unrealistic; however, it may be less ubiquitous than has been previously suggested.     

Mental Imagery and Post-Event Processing in Anticipation of a Speech Performance Among Socially Anxious Individuals

The present study investigated whether post-event processing (PEP) involving mental imagery about a past speech is particularly detrimental for socially anxious individuals who are currently anticipating giving a speech. One hundred fourteen high and low socially anxious participants were told they would give a 5 min impromptu speech at the end of the experimental session. They were randomly assigned to one of three manipulation conditions: post-event processing about a past speech incorporating imagery (PEP-Imagery), semantic post-event processing about a past speech (PEP-Semantic), or a control condition, (n = 19 per experimental group, per condition [high vs low socially anxious]). After the condition inductions, individuals’ anxiety, their predictions of performance in the anticipated speech, and their interpretations of other ambiguous social events were measured. Consistent with predictions, high socially anxious individuals in the PEP-Imagery condition displayed greater anxiety than individuals in the other conditions immediately following the induction and before the anticipated speech task. They also interpreted ambiguous social scenarios in a more socially anxious manner than socially anxious individuals in the control condition. High socially anxious individuals made more negative predictions about their upcoming speech performance than low anxious participants in all conditions. The impact of imagery during post-event processing in social anxiety and its implications are discussed.     

Cognitive processing specificity of anxious apprehension: impact on distress and performance during speech exposure

The present study examined the impact of different modes of processing anxious apprehension on subsequent anxiety and performance in a stressful speech task. Participants were informed that they would have to give a speech on a difficult topic while being videotaped and evaluated on their performance. They were then randomly assigned to one of three conditions. In a specific processing condition, they were encouraged to explore in detail all the specific aspects (thoughts, emotions, sensations) they experienced while anticipating giving the speech; in a general processing condition, they had to focus on the generic aspects that they would typically experience during anxious anticipation; and in a control, no-processing condition, participants were distracted. Results revealed that at the end of the speech, participants in the specific processing condition reported less anxiety than those in the two other conditions. They were also evaluated by judges to have performed better than those in the control condition, who in turn did better than those in the general processing condition.     

Effects of anxiety on attentional allocation and task performance: An information processing analysis

An information processing signal detection methodology was employed to examine attentional allocation and its correlates in both normal comparison (NC) and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) participants. In particular, the impact of neutral distractor and negative feedback cues on performance of an attention vigilance task was investigated. Individuals with GAD (N = 15) evidenced impaired performance on an attention vigilance task relative to NC participants (N = 15) when neutral distractor cues were presented. Contrary to prediction, no group differences in performance were detected under conditions in which participants were presented negative feedback cues they were told were relevant to their performance. Instead, GAD participants exhibited improvement during the experimental task such that their performance was equivalent to NC participants. Across trials, the clinically anxious group endorsed significantly higher levels of worry and negative affectivity; however, they failed to respond with concomitant physical arousal (e.g. increased muscle tension). These data are discussed within the context of Eysenck and Calvo's (1992, Cognition and Emotion, 6, 409–434) processing efficiency theory. Additionally, the results of this investigation provide support for Barlow's (1988, Anxiety and its disorders: The nature and treatment of anxiety and panic) conceptualization of anxiety as requiring the interaction of cognitive schema and physiological arousal.     

Why do people need self-esteem? Converging evidence that self-esteem serves an anxiety-buffering function.

Three studies were conducted to assess the proposition that self-esteem serves an anxiety-buffering function. In Study 1, it was hypothesized that raising self-esteem would reduce anxiety in response to vivid images of death. In support of this hypothesis, Ss who received positive personality feedback reported less anxiety in response to a video about death than did neutral feedback Ss. In Studies 2 and 3, it was hypothesized that increasing self-esteem would reduce anxiety among individuals anticipating painful shock. Consistent with this hypothesis, both success and positive personality feedback reduced Ss' physiological arousal in response to subsequent threat of shock. Thus, converging evidence of an anxiety-buffering function of self-esteem was obtained.     

The Power of Positive Recollections: Reducing Test Anxiety and Enhancing College Student Efficacy and Performance

This research sought to develop an intervention (targeting positive emotions and thoughts) as a mechanism for reducing test anxiety and raising confidence and performance in a sample of college students. Participants were randomly assigned to a positive thought task or a control task. Those in the positive‐thought condition, who were assigned to write about successful personal experiences, derived several benefits, when compared with control participants who wrote about their morning routines. Specifically, they experienced more positive affect and less negative affect, exhibited a more optimistic outlook, and reported less test anxiety. They were more likely to appraise the quiz confidently, perceiving it as a challenge rather than a threat. Perhaps most importantly, they exhibited superior performance on the quiz.     

The Fears of Evaluation About Performance (FEAP) Task: Inducing Anxiety-Related Responses to Direct Exposure to Negative and Positive Evaluations

Fears of negative and positive evaluation (i.e., evaluative fears) manifest within performance-based situations (e.g., public speaking, group presentations), particularly among those experiencing social anxiety. Within these performance-based situations, individuals experiencing such evaluative fears frequently display a variety of impairments (e.g., avoidance, nervousness) that might manifest within and across various settings (e.g., employment, school). How do those who experience these fears react to in-the-moment feedback about their performance? We constructed the Fear of Evaluation About Performance (FEAP) task to examine ecologically valid experiences with anxiety when reacting to positive and negative feedback. During the task, participants gave a speech, and subsequent to this and in counterbalanced order, received positive and negative feedback about their speech, with continued assessment of anxiety-related arousal throughout the task. We tested the FEAP task among 127 adults, who provided self-reports of fears of positive and negative evaluation before completing the task. Fears of positive evaluation uniquely predicted arousal following receipt of positive feedback, whereas fears of negative evaluation uniquely predicted arousal following receipt of negative feedback. Relative to participants receiving positive feedback first, those receiving negative feedback first experienced elevated post-feedback arousal, followed by a steep decline in arousal post-positive feedback. Conversely, participants receiving positive feedback first experienced a buffer effect whereby arousal post-negative feedback remained low, relative to the arousal experienced post-negative feedback among those who received negative feedback first. We expect the FEAP task to inform basic science on fears of negative and positive evaluation, as well as treatment planning in applied clinical settings.     

Justifying Optimistic Predictions With Minimally Diagnostic Information Under Conditions of Outcome Dependency

Participants in 2 studies received information varying in diagnosticity about another person whom they were motivated to view positively or negatively. In Study 1, participants' chances of winning a prize depended on whether another player won or lost an 11-trial game. Although estimates of this player's chances of winning were identical prior to the game, participants who wanted him to win were more optimistic than those who wanted him to lose after he was said to have won the first trial. Predictions following later trials also showed evidence of motivation, but only when participants had not made pregame predictions. Ratings after individual trials were also sensitive to whether the yoked player won or lost. In Study 2, participants received information that did or did not relate to the probable performance of their partner, opponent, or a control target in an upcoming creativity game. After receiving the information, participants rated their opponent more negatively than they did the control target, regardless of information diagnosticity, and despite the fact that participants acknowledged the difference in diagnosticity. Evidently, when seeking evidence for optimistic predictions, people may apply different standards to minimally diagnostic information depending on its favorability, despite understanding the information's low utility.     

Causal uncertainty,claimed and behavioural self‐handicapping

Background: Causal uncertainty beliefs involve doubts about the causes of events, and arise as a consequence of non‐contingent evaluative feedback: feedback that leaves the individual uncertain about the causes of his or her achievement outcomes. Individuals high in causal uncertainty are frequently unable to confidently attribute their achievement outcomes, experience anxiety in achievement situations and as a consequence are likely to engage in self‐handicapping behaviour. Aims: Accordingly, we sought to establish links between trait causal uncertainty, claimed and behavioural self‐handicapping. Sample: Participants were N=72 undergraduate students divided equally between high and low causally uncertain groups. Method: We used a 2 (causal uncertainty status: high, low) × 3 (performance feedback condition: success, non‐contingent success, non‐contingent failure) between‐subjects factorial design to examine the effects of causal uncertainty on achievement behaviour. Following performance feedback, participants completed 20 single‐solution anagrams and 12 remote associate tasks serving as performance measures, and 16 unicursal tasks to assess practice effort. Participants also completed measures of claimed handicaps, state anxiety and attributions. Results: Relative to low causally uncertain participants, high causally uncertain participants claimed more handicaps prior to performance on the anagrams and remote associates, reported higher anxiety, attributed their failure to internal, stable factors, and reduced practice effort on the unicursal tasks, evident in fewer unicursal tasks solved. Conclusions: These findings confirm links between trait causal uncertainty and claimed and behavioural self‐handicapping, highlighting the need for educators to facilitate means by which students can achieve surety in the manner in which they attribute the causes of their achievement outcomes.     

Coffee cues elevate arousal and reduce level of construal

Coffee and tea are two beverages commonly-consumed around the world. Therefore, there is much research regarding their physiological effects. However, less is known about their psychological meanings. Derived from a predicted lay association between coffee and arousal, we posit that exposure to coffee-related cues should increase arousal, even in the absence of actual ingestion, relative to exposure to tea-related cues. We further suggest that higher arousal levels should facilitate a concrete level of mental construal as conceptualized by Construal Level Theory. In four experiments, we find that coffee cues prompted participants to see temporal distances as shorter and to think in more concrete, precise terms. Both subjective and physiological arousal explain the effects. We situate our work in the literature that connects food and beverage to cognition or decision-making. We also discuss the applied relevance of our results as coffee and tea are among the most prevalent beverages globally.     

Overcoming the planning fallacy through willpower: effects of implementation intentions on actual and predicted task‐completion times

Previous work has shown that people often underestimate their task‐completion times (Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 1994 ). The present research examined whether this optimistic bias may be reduced through the formation of implementation intentions. In an experimental study, participants were requested to complete an assignment within a specified time period. Half of these participants made implementation intentions about where and when they would complete the assignment. The remaining participants were simply given the goal of completing the assignment. The results showed that furnishing participants' goals with implementation intentions led to (a) more optimistic completion predictions, (b) an even greater increase in actual rates of goal completion, and, consequently, (c) a significant reduction in optimistic bias in completion predictions. Furthermore, the reduction in optimistic bias among implementation–intention participants was found to be mediated by a smaller number of interruptions while working on the assignment. Together, these findings attest to the importance of implementation planning in overcoming unrealistic optimism in task‐completion predictions. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Anxiety and impression formation: Direct information rather than priming explains affect-congruity

Both affect-priming and affect-as-information theories predict that when people are anxious they will form affect-congruent impressions of others, but via different mechanisms. Affect-priming asserts that memory mediates the influence of anxiety on judgement, whereas affect-as-information asserts that people attribute anxiety to the target of judgement. As these theories predicted, anxious participants in Study 1 found an impression-formation target to be more threatening than did control participants. However, this effect was not mediated by memory, and was attenuated in Study 2 when anxious participants attributed their affect to a source other than the target. These findings suggest that anxious people form affect-congruent impressions of others because they attribute their anxiety to the impression-formation target rather than because anxiety primes affect-congruent memory.     

Action Phases and Goal Setting: Being Optimistic After Decision Making Without Getting into Trouble

According to Gollwitzer's mindset theory, people in postdecisional action phases, who are about to implement a chosen action or goal, are supposed to be more optimistic than people in predecisional action phases, who are deliberating on different actions or goals (P. M. Gollwitzer, 1990). The present experiments were designed to test the hypothesis that postdecisional people are optimistic in a way that does not set them up for failure and disappointment. In three experiments it is shown that people who are in an implemental mindset neither set more demanding goals than do deliberative people nor do they inflate their performance predictions. Instead, they are more confident in reaching their goals and more cautious when predicting future performance. This behavior is interpreted in terms of a strategy that allows people to hold optimistic beliefs without facing the danger of exaggerated goal setting or a disconfirmation of their beliefs.     

Negative self-focused cognitions mediate the effect of trait social anxiety on state anxiety

The cognitive model of social anxiety predicts that negative self-focused cognitions increase anxiety when anticipating social threat. To test this prediction, 36 individuals were asked to anticipate and perform a public-speaking task. During anticipation, negative self-focused cognitions or relaxation were experimentally induced while self-reported anxiety, autonomic arousal (heart rate, heart rate variability, skin conductance level), and acoustic eye-blink startle response were assessed. As predicted, negative self-focused cognitions mediated the effects of trait social anxiety on self-reported anxiety and heart rate variability during negative anticipation. Furthermore, trait social anxiety predicted increased startle amplitudes. These findings support a central assumption of the cognitive model of social anxiety.     

The effect of question order on evaluations of test performance: how does the bias evolve?

Weinstein and Roediger (Memory & Cognition 38:366-376, 2010) found that manipulating the order of questions on a general knowledge quiz resulted in differing evaluations of performance at the end of the quiz: Irrespective of their actual performance, participants were consistently more optimistic about their performance when questions were given in an easy-to-hard order. In the present experiment, the participants were stopped 10 times throughout a 100-item test and asked to evaluate their performance on the last 10 questions they had answered, as well as rating their impressions of the test so far and predicting their final performance. Arranging the questions from the easiest to the hardest produced more optimistic performance evaluations on each block than did an analogous hard-easy question order, even though performance on the two versions did not differ significantly as a function of question order. Furthermore, the ratings of item difficulty on each block of 10 questions were asymmetrical in the two conditions, with a higher sensitivity to increasing as compared to decreasing question difficulty. On the other hand, the item-by-item ratings and predictions remained unaffected by question order. Our findings are best explained by an anchoring interpretation, which suggests that students fail to adjust their evaluations of performance as the difficulty of the questions changes across the test.     

Planning, personality, and prediction: The role of future focus in optimistic time predictions

The present studies examined cognitive processes underlying the tendency to underestimate project completion times. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that people generate overly optimistic predictions, in part, because they focus narrowly on their future plans for the target task and thus neglect other useful sources of information. Consistent with the hypothesis, instructing participants to adopt a “future focus”—in which they generated concrete, specific plans for the task at hand—led them to make more optimistic predictions about when they would complete their intended Christmas shopping (Study 1) and major school assignments (Study 2). The future focus manipulation did not have a corresponding effect on actual completion times, and thus increased the degree of optimistic bias in prediction. The studies also demonstrated that the optimistic prediction bias generalized across different task domains, relevant individual differences (i.e., trait optimism and procrastination), and other contextual variations.     

People focus on optimistic scenarios and disregard pessimistic scenarios while predicting task completion times

Task completion plans normally resemble best-case scenarios and yield overly optimistic predictions of completion times. The authors induced participants to generate more pessimistic scenarios and examined completion predictions. Participants described a pessimistic scenario of task completion either alone or with an optimistic scenario. Pessimistic scenarios did not affect predictions or accuracy and were consistently rated less plausible than optimistic scenarios (Experiments 1-3). Experiment 4 independently manipulated scenario plausibility and optimism. Plausibility moderated the impact of optimistic, but not pessimistic, scenarios. Experiment 5 supported a motivational explanation of the tendency to disregard pessimistic scenarios regardless of their plausibility. People took pessimistic scenarios into account when predicting someone else's completion times. The authors conclude that pessimistic-scenario generation may not be an effective debiasing technique for personal predictions.     

Self-affirmation moderates effects of unrealistic optimism and pessimism on reactions to tailored risk feedback

We examined whether self-affirmation would facilitate intentions to engage in colorectal cancer (CRC) screening among individuals who were off-schedule for CRC screening and who were categorised as unrealistically optimistic, realistic or unrealistically pessimistic about their CRC risk. All participants received tailored risk feedback; in addition, one group received threatening social comparison information regarding their risk factors, a second received this information after a self-affirmation exercise and a third was a no-treatment control. When participants were unrealistically optimistic about their CRC risk (determined by comparing their perceived comparative risk to calculations from a risk algorithm), they expressed greater interest in screening if they were self-affirmed (relative to controls). Non-affirmed unrealistic optimists expressed lower interest relative to controls, suggesting that they were responding defensively. Realistic participants and unrealistically pessimistic participants who were self-affirmed expressed relatively less interest in CRC screening, suggesting that self-affirmation can be helpful or hurtful depending on the accuracy of one's risk perceptions.     

Responses to messages about health behaviors: The influence of repressive coping

This study examined the impact of messages that promoted health behaviors on repressors (persons who report low levels of anxiety and a high need to appear socially desirable), high anxiety participants (persons who report high levels of anxiety and a low need to appear socially desirable), and low anxiety participants (persons who report low anxiety and a low need to appear socially desirable). It was hypothesized that repressors would be more influenced by messages encouraging health promotion behaviors than messages encouraging disease detection behaviors. Also it was hypothesized that low anxiety participants and high anxiety participants would be equally influenced by messages about both types of behavior. To test these hypotheses 40 repressors, 40 high anxiety, and 40 low anxiety participants were randomly assigned to read a message that encouraged the performance of either a disease detection or health promotion behavior. Then participants were asked to indicate their intention to perform the behavior and then were asked to recall the message. The results indicated that repressors spent less time reading the messages and recalled less of the messages about detection behaviors than messages about promotion behaviors.