If I am only my genes, what am I? Genetic essentialism and a Jewish response

With the advent of the Genetic Age comes a unique new set of problems and ethical decisions. There is a tendency to take the scientific developments presented by modern genetics at face value, as if the science itself were value-neutral and not influenced by cultural and religious images. One example of the fallout of the Genetic Age is the development of a "genetic self," the idea that our essential selfhood lies in our genes. It is important to understand the assumptions of the Genetic Age, the development of genetic selfhood, and the broader cultural trends and assumptions that underlie modern genetic thinking. It is equally important, however, to shape a reaction to the concept of a genetic self. Judaism has long carried on a unique discussion about the nature of selfhood in different times and places and about the relation of the corporeal self to the essential self. Insights from Judaism therefore may help to craft a reaction to the modern genetic self that incorporates the best of modern genetics as well as the integrity of a more transcendent selfhood.     

What do I think you're doing? Action identification and mind attribution

The authors examined how a perceiver's identification of a target person's actions co-varies with attributions of mind to the target. The authors found in Study 1 that the attribution of intentionality and cognition to a target was associated with identifying the target's action in terms of high-level effects rather than low-level details. In Study 2, both action identification and mind attribution were greater for a liked target, and in Study 3, they were reduced for a target suffering misfortune. In Study 4, it was again found that action identification and mind attribution were greater for a liked target, but like that for the self or a liked other, positive actions were identified at higher levels than negative actions, with the reverse being true for disliked others. In Study 5, the authors found that instructing participants to adopt the target's perspective did not affect mind attribution but did lead to higher level identifications of the target's actions.     

What am I supposed to be looking at? Controls and measures in inter-modal preferential looking

Intermodal preferential looking (IMPL) is widely used in experimental studies of infant development, especially language development. Control measures vary, and it is not clear how these affect findings. We examined effects of parental awareness of stimuli. Infants (17–19 months) looked at paired pictures, one name-known and one name-unknown, each assigned target status in 50 % of trials. Infants looked longer at a name-known than a name-unknown target, regardless of parents’ awareness. When parents were aware, looking to a name-unknown target increased over a paired name-known non-target. There is evidence that infants’ looking at pictures in this paradigm is not due to direct matching of targets to novel names, but is influenced by additional cues present, in a way that could alter the conclusions of studies of infant word learning and other aspects of infant learning. Implications of these findings are discussed, emphasising replicability and theoretical conclusions drawn from studies using this method.     

What is my evidence that here is a cup?

This paper is about Susanna Schellenberg's view on the explanatory role of perceptual experience. I raise a basic question about what the argument for her view might be. Then I develop two new problem cases: one involving “seamless transitions” between perception and hallucination and another involving the graded character of perceptual evidence and justification.     

I think,therefore I am? Examining conceptions of the self,soul, and mind

In order to delineate among conceptions of the self, soul, and mind, participants reported where they believe these entities are located in the body and provided definitions of each entity. Results indicated that most people consider the self, soul, and mind localized in specific regions in the body. In contrast to previous research, however, some participants reported that the self is not centralized in one location. Participants tended to locate the self and mind in the head and the soul in the chest. The self and mind were commonly defined in mental terms and the soul as one’s essence. These results suggest that people tend to distinguish the soul from the mind, both in how they define each entity and where they locate them in the body. Although some people locate the soul in the same region as the self, most people more closely align the mind with the self.     

Where am I and how will I get there from here? A role for posterior parietal cortex in the integration of spatial information and route planning

The ability of an organism to accurately navigate from one place to another requires integration of multiple spatial constructs, including the determination of one's position and direction in space relative to allocentric landmarks, movement velocity, and the perceived location of the goal of the movement. In this review, we propose that while limbic areas are important for the sense of spatial orientation, the posterior parietal cortex is responsible for relating this sense with the location of a navigational goal and in formulating a plan to attain it. Hence, the posterior parietal cortex is important for the computation of the correct trajectory or route to be followed while navigating. Prefrontal and motor areas are subsequently responsible for executing the planned movement. Using this theory, we are able to bridge the gap between the rodent and primate literatures by suggesting that the allocentric role of the rodent PPC is largely analogous to the egocentric role typically emphasized in primates, that is, the integration of spatial orientation with potential goals in the planning of goal-directed movements.     

Overconfidence in interval estimates: What does expertise buy you?

People’s 90% subjective confidence intervals typically contain the true value about 50% of the time, indicating extreme overconfidence. Previous results have been mixed regarding whether experts are as overconfident as novices. Experiment 1 examined interval estimates from information technology (IT) professionals and UC San Diego (UCSD) students about both the IT industry and UCSD. This within-subjects experiment showed that experts and novices were about equally overconfident. Experts reported intervals that had midpoints closer to the true value—which increased hit rate—and that were narrower (i.e., more informative)—which decreased hit rate. The net effect was no change in hit rate and overconfidence. Experiment 2 showed that both experts and novices mistakenly expected experts to be much less overconfident than novices, but they correctly predicted that experts would provide narrower intervals with midpoints closer to the truth. Decisions about whether to consult experts should be based on which aspects of performance are desired.     

I know you're me, but who am I? Perspective taking and seeing the other in the self

Research examining the consequences of perspective-taking on cognition suggests that through perceiver–target overlap, perspective-taking can lead to greater valuing of targets, greater helping of targets, and a reduction in stereotyping of targets and the groups to which they belong. Research has also begun to focus more closely on the ways perceivers come to think and act like targets. This research, however evocative, is not conclusive. The current studies set out to provide firmer support. Reported here, two studies found that perspective-taking influences perceiver–target overlap, which mediates changes in self-concept (ratings of the self on researcher-related attributes and beliefs after taking the perspective of a researcher in Study 1 and attitudes toward African Americans after taking the perspective of a racist in Study 2). In the same studies, overlap simultaneously mediated valuing of the targets (target ratings on positive attributes in Study 1 and liking for the target in Study 2).     

I’m merciful,am I not? Facets of narcissism and forgiveness revisited

Narcissists are said to be particularly unforgiving, yet previous research remains inconclusive. This is likely because most previous studies focused on narcissism as a unitary construct, thereby neglecting its multiple facets. The present study (N = 1101) thus aimed to clarify the nuanced associations between different facets of narcissism and forgiveness, the latter being assessed via self-report and non-self-report measures. The results of a structural equation model (SEM) showed that antagonistic aspects of narcissism were negatively correlated with explicit forgiveness. Importantly, agentic as well as communal aspects of narcissism were positively correlated with explicit forgiveness. Aspects of narcissistic personality were not correlated with implicit forgiveness. Results suggest that not all facets of narcissism are associated with an unforgiving stance.     

What happens in a psychoanalysis?

A group of experienced analysts has developed scales and a coding manual illustrated with clinical examples to evaluate recorded analyses and psychodynamic therapies. The analytic process scales (APS) assesses three dimensions: (1) the contribution of the analyst: helping to develop a relationship in which the analyst can provide clarification and interpretation of transference and resistance; (2) the contribution of the patient: the communication of experience and the expression of feeling in ways which provide information about needs, wishes and conflicts, accompanied by self-reflection; and (3) interactional characteristics of the emerging relationship, explored by studying sessions divided into psychoanalytically coherent segments. A preliminary study of nine sessions has established that the variables assessed by the APS can be rated reliably. Study of the analysts' contributions illuminated their varied and complexstructure. Important differences emerged among the three patient-analyst pairs studied, and changes in scores over time tracked developments in the analytic work which would imply different treatment outcomes. The APS appears to be a reliable tool facilitating the systematic study of psychoanalyses.     

Comparative Philosophy and the Tertium: Comparing What with What,and in What Respect?

Comparison is fundamental to the practice and subject-matter of philosophy, but has received scant attention by philosophers. This is even so in “comparative philosophy,” which literally distinguishes itself from other philosophy by being “comparative.” In this article, the need for a philosophy of comparison is suggested. What we compare with what, and in what respect it is done, poses a series of intriguing and intricate questions. In Part One, I offer a problematization of the tertium comparationis (the third of comparison) by examining conceptualizations of similarity, family resemblance, and analogy, which it is sometimes argued can do without a tertium comparationis. In Part Two, I argue that a third of comparison is already required to determine what is to be compared, and insofar as that determination precedes the comparison that tertium may be called “pre-comparative.” This leads me to argue against incomparability and to show how anything can indeed be compared to anything. In Part Three, I relate my arguments to what is today commonly labelled “comparative philosophy.” Finally, I raise some questions of ontology and politics in order to demonstrate the relevance of a philosophy of comparison.     

What if I am the one? Measuring individual differences in emotional sensitivity to probability and emotional reactivity to possibility

Current theories of risk perception point to the powerful role of emotion and the neglect of probabilistic information in the face of risk, but these tendencies differ across individuals. We propose a method for measuring individuals' emotional sensitivity to probability to assess how feelings about probabilities, rather than the probabilities themselves, influence decisions. Participants gave affective ratings (worry or excitement) to 14 risky events, each with a specified probability ranging from 1 in 10 to 1 in 10,000,000. For each participant, we regressed these emotional responses against item probabilities, estimating a slope (the degree to which emotional responses change with probability) and an intercept (the emotional reaction to an event with a fixed probability). These two parameters were treated as individual difference scores and included in models predicting reactions to several health risk scenarios. Both emotional sensitivity to probability (slope) and emotional reactivity to possibility (intercept) significantly predicted responses to these scenarios, above and beyond the predictive power of other well‐established individual difference measures.     

Scientific societies and research integrity: What are they doing and how well are they doing it?

Scientific societies can play an important role in promoting ethical research practices among their members, and over the past two decades several studies have addressed how societies perform this role. This survey continues this research by examining current efforts by scientific societies to promote research integrity among their members. The data indicate that although many of the societies are working to promote research integrity through ethics codes and activities, they lack rigorous assessment methods to determine the effectiveness of their efforts. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the AAAS-Office of Research Integrity (ORI) meeting in Washington DC on the theme: “The Role and Activities of Scientific Societies in Promoting Research Integrity” held on April 10–11, 2000.     

What’s in a Dao?: Ontology and Semiotics in Laozi and Zhuangzi

The present essay examines the conflicting ontological assumptions that one can find behind the word dao in the texts of the Laozi and Zhuangzi and argues that the relative indifference to these texts toward whether or not dao has an ontic reality should not be considered a flaw of early Daoism. Rather, the historical process by which the term dao collects various possible ontological implications can be thought of as a philosophical stance in its own right. That is, if the terms which one is obliged to use in discussing the immaterial necessarily hide, at least as much as they explain, the nature of Being, then it is a reasonable response to decline to ground one??s ethics in an ontology, and that while the resulting philosophy may not qualify as a fully-adumbrated system, this does not diminish its potential usefulness.     

“I am doing okay”: Intrapersonal Coping Strategies of Children Living in an Institution

In this case study, we utilized a Resilience framework and Sense of Coherence theory to understand how a group of children coped while living in an institution as a consequence of HIV/AIDS. We followed a qualitative and interpretivist approach. The experiences of nine children (5 girls and 4 boys) aged between 11 and 15 years is highlighted. The primary data generation strategy was informal interviews. However, we based these interviews upon participatory task-based and multimodal activities incorporating visual (drawings, pictures), auditory (stories, conversation), tactile (clay modeling) and kinaesthetic (role play) activities to stimulate conversation and discussion. All interviews were voice recorded and the contents thereof, thematically analysed. Children living in this institution use the following intrapersonal coping strategies: a sense of spiritual connectedness, disengagement (fantasy, denial and detachment), and positive intrapersonal characteristics. Intrapersonal sources of resilience help children to establish meaningfulness and comprehensibility in their lives on a continuum of engagement or disengagement. They use spiritual connectedness and socially responsible behaviour to engage and fantasy, denial and detachment to disengage.     

Can I Make a Difference? Efficacy,Employment, and Disability

Political efficacy is a widely studied phenomenon and an important predictor of political participation, but little is known about the political efficacy of the millions of people with disabilities in the United States. This paper reports the results of a nationally representative telephone survey of 1,240 people—stratified to include 700 people with disabilities—following the November 1998 elections. Several measures of efficacy that help predict political activity were found to be significantly lower among people with disabilities than among otherwise similar people without disabilities. Although lower levels of internal efficacy and civic skills could largely be explained by educational and employment gaps, lower levels of other variables (external efficacy, perceived influence of people with disabilities, and perceived treatment of people with disabilities) remained after applying a wide range of controls, indicating that people with disabilities are less likely to see the political system as responsive to them. This perception is concentrated among non–employed people with disabilities. The lower efficacy levels linked to "disability gaps" in employment, income, education, and group attendance appear to account for as much as half of the disability political participation gap; hence, policies intended to increase employment and educational opportunities for people with disabilities have potentially important political effects.     

What is a philosophical stance? Paradigms,policies and perspectives

Since van Fraassen first put forward the suggestive idea that many philosophical positions should be construed as ‘stances’ rather than factual beliefs, there have been various attempts to spell out precisely what a philosophical stance might be, and on what basis one should be adopted. In this paper I defend a particular account of stances, the view that they are pragmatically justified perspectives or ways of seeing the world, and compare it to some other accounts that have been offered. In Sect. 2 I consider van Fraassen’s argument for construing empiricism as a stance, and look at some responses to it. In Sect. 3 I outline my conception of stances as perspectives or ways of seeing, and explain how stances so understood may be justified. I illustrate this conception by way of a discussion of the model pluralist position with respect to the units of selection debate in biology, and suggest that on the model pluralist view different perspectives on the units of selection, such as the gene’s eye view, are in fact van Fraassian stances. In Sect. 4 I discuss the view put forward by Teller and Chakravartty among others that stances should be understood as epistemic policies, and argue that it is consistent with the conception of stances as perspectives. In the final section I criticise Rowbottom’s attempt to assimilate stances to Kuhnian paradigms. I argue that he has overlooked some important disanalogies between stances and paradigms, so that the comparison obscures more than it reveals.     

What will I be? The role of temporal perspective in predictions of affect, traits, and self-narratives

This article examined the effect of temporal perspective on the multifaceted future self (i.e., affect, traits, and self-narratives). Participants imagined themselves in the near versus distant future, and subsequently predicted their affect (Experiment 1), traits (Experiment 2), and naturalistic self-concepts (Experiment 3). Drawing from the Construal Level Theory and self-enhancement literatures, we hypothesized and found across three experiments that predictions of one's self in the distant future are more positive than predictions of one's self in the near future. Furthermore, building upon literature on the existence of normative and culturally sanctioned implicit theories of positive growth throughout the life span, we hypothesized and found that increased temporal distance yielded less variable predictions of affect, traits, and self-narratives (all three experiments) and that higher-level attributions mediated the effect of temporal perspective on the positivity of self-narratives (Experiment 3) and that time distance leads to more positive and less variable future selves.