A disgust mood state causes a negative interpretation bias, but not in the specific domain of body-related concerns

The present study was designed to examine the effects of a disgust mood state on negative interpretation bias, in particular in the domain of body and weight concerns. Participants (N = 120) were randomly assigned to one of four mood induction groups (i.e., disgust, anxiety, happy, and neutral) and were afterwards asked to respond to various types of ambiguous scenarios to index general threat interpretations, negative body-related interpretations, and neutral/positive interpretations. Results demonstrated that both the anxiety and disgust mood induction groups displayed higher levels of negative interpretations of the ambiguous threat scenarios than the neutral and happy groups. However, no evidence was obtained for a negative interpretation bias in the body-related domain for these negative mood groups, and this conclusion was also true for participants scoring high on a scale of eating disorder symptoms. Altogether, these findings suggest that disgust does not play a role in eating pathology by inducing a negative interpretation bias in the specific domain of body and weight concerns.     

Memory for emotional faces in naturally occurring dysphoria and induced sadness

The aim was to establish if the memory bias for sad faces, reported in clinically depressed patients (Gilboa-Schechtman, Erhard Weiss, & Jeczemien, 2002; Ridout, Astell, Reid, Glen, & O'Carroll, 2003) generalises to sub-clinical depression (dysphoria) and experimentally induced sadness. Study 1: dysphoric (n = 24) and non-dysphoric (n = 20) participants were presented with facial stimuli, asked to identify the emotion portrayed and then given a recognition memory test for these faces. At encoding, dysphoric participants (DP) exhibited impaired identification of sadness and neutral affect relative to the non-dysphoric group (ND). At memory testing, DP exhibited superior memory for sad faces relative to happy and neutral. They also exhibited enhanced memory for sad faces and impaired memory for happy relative to the ND. Study 2: non-depressed participants underwent a positive (n = 24) or negative (n = 24) mood induction (MI) and were assessed on the same tests as Study 1. At encoding, negative MI participants showed superior identification of sadness, relative to neutral affect and compared to the positive MI group. At memory testing, the negative MI group exhibited enhanced memory for the sad faces relative to happy or neutral and compared to the positive MI group. Conclusion: MCM bias for sad faces generalises from clinical depression to these sub-clinical affective states.     

Sex differences in interpretation bias in adolescents

Interpretation biases, in which ambiguous information is interpreted negatively, have been hypothesized to place adolescent females at greater risk of developing anxiety and mood disorders than same‐aged males. We tested the hypothesis that adolescent girls interpret ambiguous scenarios more negatively, and/or less positively, than same‐aged males using the Adolescent Interpretation and Belief Questionnaire (N = 67, 11–15 years old). We also tested whether adolescent girls and boys differed in judging positive or negative interpretations to be more believable and whether the scenario content (social vs. non‐social) affected any sex difference in interpretation bias. The results showed that girls had higher average negative interpretation scores than boys, with no sex differences in positive interpretation scores. Girls and boys did not differ on which interpretation they found to be most believable. Both sexes reported that positive interpretations were less likely to come to mind, and were less believable, for social than for non‐social scenarios. These results provide preliminary evidence for sex differences in interpretation biases in adolescence and support the hypothesis that social scenarios are a specific source of anxiety to this age group. A greater understanding of the aetiology of interpretation biases will potentially enhance sex‐ and age‐specific interventions for anxiety and mood disorders.     

Prospective and positive mental imagery deficits in dysphoria

We know less about positive mental imagery than we do about negative mental imagery in depression. This study examined the relationship between depressed mood and the subjective experience of emotion in imagined events; specifically, prospective imagery, and imagery in response to emotionally ambiguous stimuli. One hundred and twenty-six undergraduates completed measures of depression, imagery vividness for future events, and a homograph interpretation task in which they generated images and subsequently rated image pleasantness and vividness. As predicted, compared to low dysphoria, high dysphoria was associated with poorer ability to vividly imagine positive (but not negative) future events. These findings were augmented by the observation that high dysphorics provided lower pleasantness ratings of images generated in response to homographs they interpreted as positive. We suggest that an imbalance in the inability to vividly imagine positive but not negative future events may curtail the ability of high dysphorics to be optimistic. High dysphoric individuals are further disadvantaged: even when they interpret ambiguity positively, the resulting images they generate are associated with less positive affect. Therapeutic strategies that address both such positive-specific imagery biases hold promise for depression treatment innovation.     

Effects of verbal information on fear-related reasoning biases in children

The present study made an attempt to induce fear-related reasoning biases by providing children with negative information about a novel stimulus. For this purpose, non-clinical children aged 9-12 years (N = 318) were shown a picture of an unknown animal for which they received either negative, ambiguous, positive, or no information. Then children completed a series of tests for measuring various types of reasoning biases (i.e., confirmation bias and covariation bias) in relation to this animal. Results indicated that children in the negative and, to a lesser extent, the ambiguous information groups displayed higher scores on tests of fear-related reasoning biases than children in the positive and no information groups. Altogether, these results support the idea that learning via negatively tinted information plays a role in the development of fear-related cognitive distortions in youths.     

Empathy towards individuals of the same and different ethnicity when depicted in negative and positive contexts

Individuals can show different empathy responses towards others depending on in-group and out-group biases. The present research tested empathy biases related to ethnicity when targets were depicted in negative and positive contexts. Caucasian (n = 99) and Asian (n = 99) participants gave subjective ratings for images depicting same or other ethnicity individuals in socially-relevant negative and positive contexts. Participants rated significantly higher on all three dimensions of empathy (affect, perspective taking, and understanding) for same ethnicity targets than for other ethnicity targets. However, this bias was found only for targets depicted in negative contexts. Moreover, no ethnicity bias was found for ratings of valence, arousal, distress, and interest. The results suggest that ethnicity-related biases in empathy are present, are limited to negative contexts, and are not merely a manifestation of a more general cognitive or affective bias.     

Practice makes perfect: Training the interpretation of emotional ambiguity

The interpretation of emotionally ambiguous words, sentences, or scenarios can be altered through training procedures that are collectively called cognitive bias modification for interpretation (CBM-I). In three experiments, we systematically manipulated the nature of the training in order to discriminate between emotional priming and ambiguity resolution accounts of training effects. In Experiment 1 participants completed word fragments that were consistently related to either a negative or benign interpretation of an ambiguous sentence. In a subsequent semantic priming task they demonstrated an interpretation bias, in that they were faster to identify relatedness of targets that were associated with the training-congruent meaning of an emotionally ambiguous homograph. We then manipulated the training sentences to show that interpretation bias was eliminated when participants simply completed valenced word fragments following unrelated sentences (Experiment 2), or completed fragments that were related to emotional but unambiguous sentences (Experiment 3). Only when participants were required to actively resolve emotionally ambiguous sentences during training did changes in interpretation emerge at test. Findings suggest that CBM-I achieves its effects by altering a production rule that aids the selection of meaning from emotionally ambiguous alternatives, in line with an ambiguity resolution account.     

Groups in space: Stereotypes and the spatial agency bias

We propose that spatial imagery is systematically linked to stereotypic beliefs, such that more agentic groups are envisaged to the left of less agentic groups. This spatial agency bias was tested in three studies. In Study 1, a content analysis of over 200 images of male-female pairs (including artwork, photographs, and cartoons) showed that males were over-proportionally presented to the left of females, but only for couples in which the male was perceived as more agentic. Study 2 (N = 40) showed that people tend to draw males to the left of females, but only if they hold stereotypic beliefs that associate males with greater agency. Study 3 (N = 61) investigated whether scanning habits due to writing direction are responsible for the spatial agency bias. We found a tendency for Italian-speakers to position agentic groups (men and young people) to the left of less agentic groups (females and old people), but a reversal in Arabic-speakers who tended to position the more agentic groups to the right. Together, our results suggest a subtle spatial bias in the representation of social groups that seems to be linked to culturally determined writing/reading habits.     

Interpretation and judgmental biases in social phobia

Previous research demonstrated that social phobia is characterized by content-specific interpretation and judgmental biases. The present study investigated whether this interpretation bias occurs not only in ambiguous, but also in positive and negative social events, and whether social phobic patients (SPs) are more characterized by a judgmental bias in costs than in probability. Besides, we argued that the judgmental bias observed in former studies could also be attributed to accurate estimations of SPs (of, for example, stuttering). Therefore, we assessed judgmental bias by the ratings of probability and costs of a negative evaluation (e.g. ‘people dislike me’) and not, as in previous studies, of negative social events (e.g. ‘stuttering’). SPs (n=228) and normal controls (n=33) were presented social and non-social events ranging from positive to profoundly negative. They ranked four different interpretations on likelihood to assess interpretation bias, and rated the profoundly negative interpretation on probability and cost to assess judgmental bias. SPs demonstrated content-specific interpretation and judgmental biases that also occurred in positive and negative social events. In contrast with expectations, SPs were characterized by a judgmental bias in both costs and probability.     

List of Reviewers

ABSTRACT

Anxious individuals report disproportionately negative expectations concerning the future, termed the negative expectancy bias. In contrast, ageing is associated with an inflated expectancy for positive future events. A recent study [Steinman, S. A., Smyth, F. L., Bucks, R. S., MacLeod, C., &; Teachman, B. A. (2013). Anxiety-linked expectancy bias across the adult lifespan. Cognition and Emotion, 27, 345–355. doi:10.1080/02699931.2012.711743] found using an interpretation bias task, a negative expectancy bias in young adults and positive expectancy bias in older adults with high trait anxiety. Extending this, the current study examined expectancy bias for positive, negative and ambiguously emotionally toned information in younger and older adults with clinical levels of depression and anxiety to community control groups, thus allowing examination of both disorder status and age on biases. Clinical participants reported a pervasive tendency to expect negative events relative to positive regardless of whether the current scenarios were positive, negative or ambiguous. Older adults showed greater expectancy for future positive scenarios when the initial scenario was negative or ambiguous. Age moderated the negative expectancy bias shown by clinical participants for ambiguous scenarios. Clinical disorders in older adults attenuated the positive expectancy bias that was otherwise strong in community participants. These findings provide further evidence for age differences in processing of emotionally toned information, with older adults showing a greater expectancy for positive future events.     

“Where is the sun” for hemi-neglect patients?

Human observers use prior constraints to disambiguate a scene; in particular, light is preferentially seen as coming from above but also slightly from the left. One explanation of this lateral bias could be a cerebral hemispheric difference. The aim of the present study was to determine the preferred light source position for neglect patients. For this purpose, we used the ambiguous shaded “Polo Mint” stimulus, a ring divided into eight equal sectors. All sectors but one were the same shape, convex or concave, as determined by the light source position. Participants had to report the side (left or right) of the odd sector or, in a separate experiment, to report its shape (convex or concave). Eight patients with spatial neglect (left neglect N = 7, right neglect N = 1) after a right or left temporo-parietal or thalamic lesion and 14 control participants ran the experiment. Left neglect patients showed a significantly different light bias from the bias observed for controls and for the right neglect patient (i.e., a reduction of the left bias or a right bias rather than a left bias). We conclude that some disabilities presented by patients with spatial neglect may be due to difficulties processing information that is not present in the visual field or imagined in the representational scene.     

Interpretation bias and social anxiety: does interpretation bias mediate the relationship between trait social anxiety and state anxiety responses?

Two studies aimed to examine whether high socially anxious individuals are more likely to negatively interpret ambiguous social scenarios and facial expressions compared to low socially anxious individuals. We also examined whether interpretation bias serves as a mediator of the relationship between trait social anxiety and state anxiety responses, in particular current state anxiety, bodily sensations, and perceived probability and cost of negative evaluation pertaining to a speech task. Study 1 used ambiguous social scenarios and Study 2 used ambiguous facial expressions as stimuli to objectively assess interpretation bias. Undergraduate students with high and low social anxiety completed measures of state anxiety responses at three time points: baseline, after the interpretation bias task, and after the preparation for an impromptu speech. Results showed that high socially anxious individuals were more likely to endorse threat interpretations for ambiguous social scenarios and to interpret ambiguous faces as negative than low socially anxious individuals. Furthermore, negative interpretations mediated the relationship between trait social anxiety and perceived probability of negative evaluation pertaining to the speech task in Study 1 but not Study 2. The present studies provide new insight into the role of interpretation bias in social anxiety.     

The Effects of Dysphoria and Personality on Negative Self-Referent Attitudes and Perceptions of the Attitudes of Others

The cognitive model of depression posits that depressed individuals harbor more dysfunctional self-referent attitudes, but little is known about how depressed individuals perceive the attitudes and perceptions of others in their social arena. This study examined whether dysphoric individuals perceive others to hold equally negative attitudes about themselves, and whether such perceptions depend on sociotropic (i.e., highly invested in social approval and relationship success) and autonomous (i.e., highly invested in vocational or academic achievement and goal attainment) personality styles. A sample of undergraduate students (N = 197) was recruited, and after the assessment of their depression symptoms and personality style, participants read vignettes that described negative scenarios, and imagined that these scenarios occurred to themselves or the general university student. After reading each vignette, participants also rated their agreement with a number of statements that assessed dysfunctional attitudes. Results indicated that elevated dysphoria (i.e., showing signs of depression) scores were positively associated with dysfunctional self-referent attitudes. Further, moderational analyses examining the interaction of sociotropy and dysphoria did not support the hypothesis that individuals higher on dysphoria and sociotropy were less likely to perceive others as harboring negative attitudes about themselves in comparison to those with elevated dysphoria and lower levels of sociotropy. Last, individuals showing elevated dysphoria and higher scores on subdomains of autonomy were more likely to perceive others as exhibiting negative attitudes about themselves than those with low levels of the trait. These findings, their implications, and strengths and limitations of the current investigation are further discussed.     

A processing fluency explanation of bias against migrants

This research investigated whether people are biased against migrants partly because they find migrants more difficult to cognitively process than nonmigrants. In Study 1, 181 undergraduate students evaluated migrant and nonmigrant members of two minimal groups and reported the difficulty that they experienced in thinking about each type of target. Participants rated migrants less positively than nonmigrants, and difficulty ratings partially mediated this effect. Study 2 (N = 191) replicated these findings and demonstrated similar findings for individuals who had been excluded from minimal groups. This evidence implies that migrant bias can be explained partly in terms of the difficulty that people have in processing information about migrants, and that it is related to migrants’ exclusion from their original group.     

Don’t be afraid of the General Factor of Personality (GFP): Its relationship with behavioral inhibition and anxiety symptoms in children

Two studies examined the relationship between the General Factor of Personality (GFP) and behavioral inhibition and anxiety symptoms in primary school children. The GFP is assumed to reflect effectiveness in interaction with others. In Study 1, using self-reports and parent ratings of 226 non-clinical children, we found GFP scores to be negatively related to behavioral inhibition and anxiety symptoms. In Study 2 we compared non-clinical children (N = 81) with children with anxiety disorders (N = 45). In both groups we obtained child and parent ratings. The clinically referred children scored significantly lower on the GFP than the non-clinical children. Moreover, as in Study 1, higher GFP scores were associated with lower levels of behavioral inhibition and anxiety symptoms. The two studies support the view that the GFP is a relevant construct in anxiety proneness and anxiety problems.     

Inducing an interpretation bias changes self-imagery: a preliminary investigation

Prior work suggests that variations in self-imagery can influence the emotional interpretations people make about social situations. The current experiment investigated the converse possibility: that inducing an inferential bias can change the content of self-related images. The effects of repeated practice in accessing either negative or positive social outcomes was tested by having participants report on self-images generated during subsequent experience with ambiguous social situations. Participants and independent judges rated the content of participants’ self-images as being more negative after prior practice in accessing negative rather than positive social outcomes. Furthermore, participants who practiced accessing negative outcomes rated their anticipated anxiety in an imagined stressful social situation as being greater, and their expected social performance as poorer than participants in the positive outcome group. Groups did not differ in state anxiety levels when making their ratings, so it is unlikely that any observed differences between groups can be attributed to mood effects. We suggest that this finding is consistent with the hypothesis that inferential biases and content of self-images can interact with each other and may together serve to maintain social anxiety.     

Age-related changes in cognitive processing of moral and social conventional violations

Moral and conventional violations are usually judged differently: Only moral violations are treated as independent of social rules. To investigate the cognitive processing involved in the development of this distinction, undergraduates (N = 34), adolescents (N = 34), and children (N = 14) read scenarios presented on a computer that had 1 of 3 endings: moral violations, conventional violations, or neutral acts. Participants judged whether the act was acceptable or unacceptable in a condition in which social rules were assumed, or in a condition in which they imagined the absence of rules (rule-removed condition). At all ages reaction times (RTs) were faster for moral than conventional violations when a rule was assumed. RTs in the rule-removed condition were longer than in the rule-assumed condition, only for adults’ moral judgments. In addition to this age difference, adolescents made more normative judgments than children. These findings extend previous work by showing different time courses of processing conventional versus moral violations and revealing age-related differences in the tendency to make normative judgments.     

Cognitive adjustment as an indicator of psychological health at work: Development and validation of a measure

Based on organizational socialization literature (e.g., Bauer, Bodner, Erdogan, Truxillo, & Tucker, 2007; Kammeyer-Mueller & Wanberg, 2003; Saks, Uggerslev, & Fassina, 2007) and Conservation of Resources theory (COR theory; Hobfoll, 1989, 2001), this article aims to develop a conceptualization and a measurement of cognitive adjustment at work (CAW), as an indicator of psychological health in the workplace. Two studies, including three independent samples (N_A = 296, N_B = 350, N_C = 139), were conducted to test an operational proposal of CAW. In Study 1, exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, as well as reliability and temporal invariance analyses, were performed to test the structure of both the construct and the instrument. In Study 2, nomological network analysis was conducted. Results suggest strong empirical support for the structure and validity of CAW, defined as a second-order factor, which includes task adjustment, work group adjustment and organizational adjustment.     

Individual differences in positivity offset and negativity bias: Gender-specific associations with two serotonin receptor genes

Individual differences in the evaluation of affective stimuli, such as the positivity offset and negativity bias may have a biological basis. We tested whether two SNPs (HTR2A; 102T>C and HTR1A; 1019C>G) related to serotonin receptor function, a biological pathway associated with affective regulation, were differentially related to positivity offset and negativity bias for males and females. Participants were 109 cigarette smokers who rated a series of affective stimuli to assess reactions to positive and negative pictures. Gender × genotype interactions were found for both SNPs. Males with the 102T allele showed a greater positivity offset than males with the 102C allele. For females, in contrast, the 1019C allele was associated with a greater positivity offset than the 1019G allele, whereas the 102T allele was associated with a greater negativity bias than the 102C allele. Identifying how gender differences may moderate the effect of serotonin receptor genes on affective information processing may provide insight into their role in guiding behavior and regulating affect.