Don’t Ever Do That! Long-term Duties in <Emphasis Type="Italic">PD</Emphasis><Subscript><Emphasis Type="Italic">e</Emphasis></Subscript><Emphasis Type="Italic">L</Emphasis>

This paper studies long-term norms concerning actions. In Meyer’s Propositional Deontic Logic (PD _e L), only immediate duties can be expressed, however, often one has duties of longer durations such as: “Never do that”, or “Do this someday”. In this paper, we will investigate how to amend PD _e L so that such long-term duties can be expressed. This leads to the interesting and suprising consequence that the long-term prohibition and obligation are not interdefinable in our semantics, while there is a duality between these two notions. As a consequence, we have provided a new analysis of the long-term obligation by introducing a new atomic proposition I (indebtedness) to represent the condition that an agent has some unfulfilled obligation. Presented by Jacek Malinowski     

That in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Martyā</Emphasis> Which is <Emphasis Type="Italic">Amṛta</Emphasis>: a Dialog with Ramchandra Gandhi

This philosophical meditation, which deals with death as question, presence, and even teacher, begins with Ramchandra Gandhi’s (RCG’s) penetrating essay ‘On Meriting Death.’ What does it mean ‘to merit’ death? To provide an answer, I travel through RCG’s corpus, in dialog with contemporary theorists such as Sri Aurobindo, Daya Krishna, and Mukund Lath. RCG implies that the question about ‘meriting’ death, and life, is not and cannot be ‘personal’ or ‘isolated’. For X to die, is for his close and distant samāj a matter of losing him and living without him. Hence meriting death, as also life, is a joint venture which involves deep understanding regarding non-isolation as the heart of the human situation. RCG’s creative thinking, or svarāj in ideas, reaches its peak when he dares to offer an answer of his own to the piercing question kim ā?caryam, ‘what is amazing?’ raised in the Yak?a-pra?na episode of the Mahābhārata. For RCG, the heart of the matter is not the ‘ungraspability’ of one’s unavoidable death, or the perennial search for ‘permanence’ in vain, but our failure to perceive ‘that in the martyā which is am?ta,’ i.e., a sense of solidarity in the face of death, connecting ‘I and Thou,’ which he derives from the icchā m?tyu of his grandfather, the famous Mahatma.     

The Real-Constitution in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ <Emphasis Type="Italic">Realontologie</Emphasis>

In this work we try to distinguish five levels of the constitution of reality in Conrad Martius’ Realontologie (1923) (Real Ontology). The difference between “existential autonomy” and “existential relativity” seems to be the first one. The second level of the constitution of reality concerns the problem of “whatness” (Washeit) and the substantial reality (Realität). We can find the third level in the materiality from the eidetical point of view. The fourth level of the constitution of reality concerns the material formation as presupposition of a personal essence. Finally we can distinguish a fifth level of the constitution of the reality in the essential stratification.     

Estimation and interpretation of 1/f<Superscript>α</Superscript> noise in human cognition

Recent analyses of serial correlations in cognitive tasks have provided preliminary evidence of the presence of a particular form of long-range serial dependence known as 1/fnoise. It has been argued that long-range dependence has been largely ignored in mainstream cognitive psychology even though it accounts for a substantial proportion of variability in behavior (see, e.g., Gilden, 1997, 2001). In this article, we discuss the defining characteristics of long-range dependence and argue that claims about its presence need to be evaluated by testing against the alternative hypothesis of short-range dependence. For the data from three experiments, we accomplish such tests with autoregressive fractionally integrated moving-average time series modeling. We find that long-range serial dependence in these experiments can be explained by any of several mechanisms, including mixtures of a small number of short-range processes.     

How is the Other Approached and Conceptualized in Terms of Schutz's Constitutive Phenomenology of the Natural Attitude?<Superscript>1</Superscript>

The problem of the other was one of the central problems for the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl. He investigated the other as the alter ego intensively in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, in which he introduced the conceptions of “analogical apperception' and “pairing' as fundamental forms of “passive synthesis.' Although it is no doubt Husserl who investigated the other most seriously and intensively, there is anaporiain his theory of the other. If the other is an object of ego's intentional consciousness, the other turns out to be no more than a modification of the ego. In the face of such anaporia, some phenomenologists embarked upon inquiry into the other. This paper focuses primarily on Alfred Schutz's discussion of the “other' in general and about the “stranger' in particular.     

Medical Disaster: Why Ken Mattingly Can’t Have Measles in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Apollo 13</Emphasis>

The film Apollo 13 depicts denial of illness and refusal of health care as key components of American masculinity. In the film, male astronauts and mission controllers deny vulnerability to measles and to urinary infections, as well as the need to sleep, to prove their manliness. This is symbolized by their ridicule of flight surgeon Dr. Chuck. Conversely, the astronauts’ wives are depicted admitting vulnerability, especially insomnia. Thus, the film exploits and reinforces existing strands of American culture that view admission of illness and help-seeking as appropriate for women but not men, reinforcing denial and noncompliance as desirable male behaviors.     

The Role of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Umwelt</Emphasis> in Husserl’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Aufbau</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Abbau</Emphasis> of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Natur/Geist</Emphasis> Distinction

In this essay I argue that Husserl’s development of the nineteenth century Natur/Geist distinction is grounded in the intentional correlate between the pre-theoretical natural attitude and environing world (Umwelt). By reconsidering the Natur/Geist distinction through its historical context in the nineteenth century debate between Wilhelm Dilthey and the Neo-Kantians from the Baden or Southwest school, it is possible to understand more clearly Husserl’s appropriations and novel contributions. One of Husserl’s contributions lies in his rigorous thematization and clarification of the constitutive features proper to the natural and human sciences as they arise from the pre-theoretical experience of an environing world. This ordinary lived experience between the lived body and environing world is presupposed by and forms a unity with both Natur and Geist, thereby acting as the unified ground that is inclusive of naturalized Geist and a geistig nature. This unbuilding (Abbau) of the Natur/Geist distinction is necessary, according to Husserl, for the radical clarification of the respective methodologies of the natural and human sciences.     

Dennett’s Rhetorical Strategies in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Consciousness Explained</Emphasis>

Dennett’s Consciousness Explained (1991) is an inspiring but also a highly frustrating book. The line of the argument seems to be clear, but then at second sight it fades away. It turns out that Dennett uses six of the seven strategies which I discuss in my “The Seven Strategies of the Sophisticated Pseudo-Scientist: A Look into Freud’s Rhetorical Tool Box” (J. Gen. Phil. Sci., 2001) Discussing important examples of these strategies I show why Consciousness Explained is such a frustrating book. As the examples used do not reflect minor problems but go to the heart of the matter and concern the book’s main areas of contention, it turns out that, in spite of the valuable and insightful details, Dennett’s materialistic view of consciousness is supported mainly by rhetorical sleights of hand.     

Defect and Recognition in Sophocles’ <Emphasis Type="Italic">Oedipus Rex</Emphasis>

This paper explores the relationships between experienced defect and the subsequent shame and longing for recognition. A clinical vignette is presented in which a young woman sought treatment for her infidelity to her husband: a behavior she found totally mystifying and deeply troubling. Using Bollas’ concept of “the unthought known,” parallels are drawn between this patient, who was adopted at 2 weeks of age, and Oedipus’ experience of knowing and not knowing his fate. A case is made for the idea that we both avoid and seek to know what is unbearable about ourselves, including our sense of defects. One motivation for this is the longing to be seen, recognized, known, and, finally, know one’s self.     

Depicting and seeing-in. The <Emphasis Type="Italic">‘Sujet’</Emphasis> in Husserl’s phenomenology of images

In this paper I investigate an underappreciated element of Husserl’s phenomenology of images: the consciousness of the depicted subject (Sujet or Bildsujet), which Husserl calls the Sujetintention, e.g. the awareness of the sitter of a portrait. Husserl claims that when a consciousness regards a figurative image, it is absorbed in the awareness of the depicted subject and yet this subject some how withholds its presence in the midst of its appearance in the image-object (Bildobjekt). Image-consciousness is an intuitive (anschaulich) consciousness that intends a being that is both ‘in’ and ‘beyond’ the image: the depicted subject haunts the image. Borrowing Richard Wollheim’s language, the aim of this study is to determine what it means for a consciousness to see a depicted-subject in an image-depiction, which happens on the basis of seeing an image-object in a material image-thing, like paint, canvas, ink, paper etc. Restricting myself to figurative images, I will argue against the view that the relation to the depicted subject is symbolic or signitive. I argue that the consciousness of the Sujet is quasi-perceptual, which allows for a better account of the depicted subject’s sense of absence. I develop this view on the basis of Husserl’s claims that the depicted subject is the bearer of norms inherent to intuitive appearances, which concern how the profiles and movements of an object ought to unfold, though they fail to do so for image-consciousness. This failure is not a mere privation for the image as a perceptual appearance but is inherent to its status as a mediated and artificial presence.     

“Master your Johnson”: Sexual rhetoric in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Maxim</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Stuff</Emphasis> magazines

This article reports the results of a content analysis of sexual rhetoric in editorial photographs (N=994) in 2001 issues of Maxim and Stuff magazines. Goffman’s (1979) classifications of gender in advertisements were used to examine how this new generation of “lad” magazines uses images to provide readers with cues about sexuality and sexual practice. The findings reveal that both magazines construct sexuality in similar ways. However, as expected, the overall message about sexuality in the photos is different for men than for women. Women are more likely than men to be portrayed as sex objects, such as the common practice of photographing them in contorting or demeaning positions. Both magazines also depict white people as sexier than other races and assume heterosexuality.     

Intuitions and objects in Allais’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">manifest reality</Emphasis>

Manifest reality is easily one of the best books in a long time on Kant’s transcendental idealism. So there is a great deal in Allais’s discussion to celebrate. But I want to focus here on two aspects of her views that I am not yet sure about: First, Allais’s understanding of the relationship between concepts and intuitions. And second, her characterization of the manner in which intuitions are object-dependent. I’ll close by making some general remarks about the significance of this for Allais’s understanding of the metaphysics of transcendental idealism.     

What is at Issue in Argumentation? Judgment in the Hellenistic Doctrine of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Krinomenon</Emphasis>

This paper offers an account of the Hellnistic doctrine of krinomenon, elaborating on the idea of rhetoric’s restoration as a major tool of contemporary research and philosophical study. As opposed to theories of argumentation that identify judgment with its propositional version and establish legitimization on speaker-audience identity, failing to acknowledge difference and controversy, the doctrine of krinomenon focuses on the question posed, connecting rhetoric to judgment. The crucial difference from classical rhetoric lies in the concept of zētēma: In the doctrine of krinomenon, participants in a common inquiry are reasonable, while logos refers to judgment itself – not the audience. Whereas a proposition dismisses its own problematization, controversy, i.e. non-identity that gives meaning to utterances, is inscribed in krinomenon, which is the product of dialectic between contradictory utterances. Beyond the two opposite logics of dogmatism and relativism, difference in the doctrine of krinomenon is judgment’s very condition.