Neurological knowledge and complex behaviors

Some scholars believe thot Cognitive Science is the attempt to achieve in artificial systems what has already been achieved in the brain. Others, by contrast, argue that the study of ideal adaptive mechanisms could go on without reference to the brain. The author points out that the brain may not be the ideal cognitive device because of biological limitotions on its capacity. Although it may not be ideal, it is still of major interest to cognitive scientists because of the great interest in the human mind, and, in addition, because at this moment the brain is the most important single reservoir of odoptive mechanisms. The paper discusses several areas of neuroscience which are likely to shed light on mechanisms of adaptation. The study of simple nervous systems is likely to reveal important design principles of cognitive devices. The study of complex nervous systems will, of course, exert a major influence. The study of such systems leads to certain general principles concerning the neural circuits involved in complex odoptive behaviors: (1) There exist innate specialized systems for the learning of many specific behaviors that at first might appeor to be purely cultural. (2) There is no evidence for the existence of any all-purpose computer in the brain. (3) There are many surprising dissociations manifested by the specialized systems in the brain, e.g., a special system for recognition of faces as against other visual patterns. (4) The study of the nervous system enables one to formulate more precise mechanisms for the role of emotion in cognitive function.(5) Some human behoviors con probably be understood poorly or not at all if the neural substrate is not considered. (6) The cognitive systems designed for dealing with ottentionol processes may be among the most complex neural structures which underlie behavior. There are certain other properties of brains that should be kept in mind by the cognitive scientists who are studying human behovior: (1) Brains differ from each other in structure, and it is very likely that the strategy for the solution of certain problems differs from person to person. (2) The presence of certain innate cognitive strategies in the brain may prevent that organism from employing other strategies which might be optimal for other problems. (3) Any theory about a particular cognitive strategy will have implications as to the particular mode of breakdown that might be expected after brain lesions. The study of disordered function from brain disease may thus be a valuable way to test certain cognitive theories.     

The layers of presence: a bio-cultural approach to understanding presence in natural and mediated environments.

This paper proposes a bio-cultural theory of presence based on four different positions related to the role and structure of presence, as follows. First, presence is a defining feature of self and it is related to the evolution of a key feature of any central nervous system: the embedding of sensory-referred properties into an internal functional space. Without the emergence of the sense of presence it is impossible for the nervous system to experience distal attribution: the referencing of our perception to an external space beyond the limits of the sensory organs themselves. Second, even if the experience of the sense of presence is a unitary feeling, conceptually it can be divided in three different layers, phylogenetically different and strictly related to the three levels of self identified by Damasio. In particular we can make conceptual distinctions between proto presence (self vs. non self), core presence (self vs. present external world), and extended presence (self relative to present external world). Third, given that each layer of presence solves a particular facet of the internal/external world separation, it is characterized by specific properties. Finally, in humans the sense of presence is a direct function of these three layers: the more they are integrated, the more we are present. In the experience of optimal presence, biologically and culturally determined cognitive processes are working in harmony--to focus all levels of the self on a significant situation in the external world, whether this is real or virtual.     

Emotion,core affect,and psychological construction

As an alternative to using the concepts of emotion, fear, anger, and the like as scientific tools, this article advocates an approach based on the concepts of core affect and psychological construction, expanding the domain of inquiry beyond “emotion”. Core affect is a neurophysiological state that underlies simply feeling good or bad, drowsy or energised. Psychological construction is not one process but an umbrella term for the various processes that produce: (a) a particular emotional episode's “components” (such as facial movement, vocal tone, peripheral nervous system change, appraisal, attribution, behaviour, subjective experience, and emotion regulation); (b) associations among the components; and (c) the categorisation of the pattern of components as a specific emotion.     

THE COGNITIVE IMPLICATIONS OF STUDIES ON FACIAL ASYMMETRY: A GENERAL DISCUSSION

This General Discussion surveys studies on asymmetry and neuropsychological deficits in the production of several kinds of facial activities, with the main purpose of scrutinizing the field in search of its contribution to neuropsychology considered as a particular domain (or method) of cognitive psychology. In this respect, four points are emphasized: the object of research (cognitive processes, not brain mechanisms), the information-processing approach of a complex process of which the facial behavior is only the overt end-product, the specificity of mechanisms underlying facial expression, and the single-case methodology.     

Consciousness as a concrete physical phenomenon

The typical empirical approach to studying consciousness holds that we can only observe the neural correlates of experiences, not the experiences themselves. In this paper we argue, in contrast, that experiences are concrete physical phenomena that can causally interact with other phenomena, including observers. Hence, experiences can be observed and scientifically modelled. We propose that the epistemic gap between an experience and a scientific model of its neural mechanisms stems from the fact that the model is merely a theoretical construct based on observations, and distinct from the concrete phenomenon it models, namely the experience itself. In this sense, there is a gap between any natural phenomenon and its scientific model. On this approach, a neuroscientific theory of the constitutive mechanisms of an experience is literally a model of the subjective experience itself. We argue that this metatheoretical framework provides a solid basis for the empirical study of consciousness.     

Exemplarization and self-presentation: Lehrer and Meinong on consciousness

Alexius Meinong??s specific use of the term ??self-presentation?? had a significant influence on modern epistemology and philosophical psychology. To show that there are remarkable parallels between Meinong??s account of the self-presentation of experiences and Lehrer??s account of the exemplarization of experiences is one of this paper??s main objectives. Another objective is to put forward some comments and critical remarks to Lehrer??s approach. One of the main problems can be expressed by the following: The process of using a particular experience as a sample, that is, an exemplar that we use to stand for and refer to a plurality of experiences, Lehrer calls ??exemplarization??. As concrete experiences are multifarious (red and round, for example), how can we single out a specific sort of experiences (the red ones) by the process of exemplarization when we use such a multifarious experience as a sample?     

Words and Drugs: Same Mechanisms of Action?

The therapeutic effects of words, rituals and, more in general, of the whole psychosocial context around the patient, have been investigated over the past few years by using the placebo response as a model. Today we are in a good position to study all these complex psychological factors by using a physiological and neuroscientific approach that uses modern neurobiological tools to probe different brain functions. Since a placebo is represented by the whole ritual of the therapeutic act, the main concept that has emerged today is that words and rituals may modulate the same biochemical pathways that are modulated by drugs. Most of our knowledge about these mechanisms comes from the field of pain, and represents a biomedical, psychological and philosophical enterprise that is changing the way we approach and interpret medicine, psychology and human biology. If on the one hand we know some of the mechanisms of drug action in the central nervous system, on the other we can now understand how the therapist’s words may affect different physiological functions. In fact, the placebo effect and the therapist–patient relationship can be approached by using the same biochemical, cellular and physiological tools of the materia medica. Although the responses to the therapist’s words cannot be reduced merely to the action of a single drug, this represents an epochal transition, in which the distinction between psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy is progressively getting thinner, and which helps us overcome the old dichotomy between psychology and biology.     

The effect of a commercial game on children's block design scores on the WISC-R IQ test

Two experiments investigated the extent to which 10-year old children's scores on the WISC-R Block Design subtest were affected by prior experience with a specific commercial game that involved blocks and matching patterns. Experiment 1 found that 12 10-year old children who happened to have experience with the particular commercial game scored approximately three scaled score points higher on the WISC-R Block Design subtest than 24 matched children without game experience. In Experiment 2, 24 children who did not have prior experience with this particular commercial game were randomly assigned either to a Game condition (involving two 15-minute sessions with the game) or to a No-Game condition (which involved no further game experience). Children in the Game condition subsequently increased their WISC-R Block Design scores more than children in the No-Game condition. Taken together, the experiments indicate that relatively brief interactions with a commercial game can cause a significant improvement in children's performance on an IQ subtest.     

THE ROLE OF COGNITION AND FEELING IN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

Abstract Inquiry into religious experience is informed by conceptualizations of emotion. Although a long history of theoretical and empirical work has provided considerable insight into the philosophical, psychological, and (more recently) neurobiological structure of emotion, the role of cognition and feeling in religious emotional states remains poorly conceived, and, hence, so does the concept of religious experience. The lack of a clear understanding of the role of emotion in religious experience is a consequence of a lack of an adequate interdisciplinary account of emotions. Our primary aim here is to examine the consequences of a properly interdisciplinary understanding of emotions for the analysis of religious experience. To this end, we note points of convergence between psychological, philosophical, and neuroscientific accounts of emotion and between such accounts and reports on the neurobiology of religious experience, in particular two recent human brain imaging studies. We conclude that emotions are richer phenomena than either pure feeling or pure thought and that, rightly understood, emotion affords religious experience its distinctive content and quality. Accordingly, we argue that religious experience cannot be reduced to pure feeling or pure thought. Rather, on our analysis, religious experience emerges as “thinking that feels like something.”     

Neuroendocrine mechanisms involved in the physiological effects caused by skin-to-skin contact – With a particular focus on the oxytocinergic system

The positive clinical effects caused by skin-to-skin contact immediately after birth or after repeated skin-to-skin contact of premature infants (kangaroo care) or fullterm infants are well documented in the literature. However, information regarding the physiological mechanisms mediating these effects are surprisingly scarce and incomplete. In this article the oxytocinergic system and the cutaneous sensory pathways by which the oxytocinergic system is activated in response to skin-to-skin contact are presented in more detail. In addition, we discuss how the effects of skin-to-skin treatment can be attributed to different aspects of the effect spectrum of the oxytocinergic or calm and connection system.The structure of the oxytocinergic system, comprising the peripheral (circulating, hormonal) and the central (neurotransmitter) components, as well as, the pathways and mechanisms by which these functions are coordinated are described. Also the various effects induced by the oxytocinergic system (the calm and connection system) are reviewed.The sensory pathways, which include visual, auditory, olfactory and tactile stimuli, given and received by both mother and newborn and which activate the oxytocinergic system in response to skin-to-skin contact, are reviewed. A special emphasis is placed on the role of cutaneous sensory nerves and their activation by touch, light pressure and in particular warmth. The important role of the rise and the pulsatility of maternal temperature in mediating the positive effects of skin-to-skin contact in the newborn is highlighted. The concept of maternal giving of warmth and its possible link to the experience of trust and safety in the newborn is discussed from an evolutionary perspective.The effects induced by skin-to-skin contact can be attributed to the different functions of the oxytocinergic system. Ameliorated social interaction (e.g., more tactile and auditory interaction, more sensitive and synchronous interaction between mother and baby, the baby’s crawling behavior) are expressions of oxytocin’s ability to stimulate social interaction. The decreased levels of fear and stress are expressions of oxytocin’s ability to reduce the activity of the amygdala and of the stress system, e.g. the activity in the HPA-axis and the sympathetic nervous system. Increased HRV, increased activity in endocrine system of the gastrointestinal tract as well as stimulation of growth and maturation are examples of oxytocin’s ability to stimulate the activity of the parasympathetic nervous system and other peripheral and central mechanisms related to restoration and growth.The propensity of different types of treatment with skin-to-skin contact to induce long-term effects is also highlighted. We propose that the sustained effects caused by skin-to-skin contact are induced by an enduring shift in the balance between the oxytocinergic system (the calm and connection system) and the stress system (fight flight reaction) in favor of the oxytocinergic system. This shift leads to a sustained decrease in the HPA-axis and the sympathetic nervous system probably involving alpha 2-adrenoceptors.It is of clinical importance to be aware of the mechanisms by which skin-to-skin contact induces short and longterm positive effects in parents and newborns. If ward routines are adapted to ascertain a maximal stimulation of these mechanisms, the function of the oxytocinergic system will be optimized, which will be linked to a better clinical outcome for parents and newborns.     

Models of Machines and Models of Phenomena

Experimental engineering models have been used both to model general phenomena, such as the onset of turbulence in fluid flow, and to predict the performance of machines of particular size and configuration in particular contexts. Various sorts of knowledge are involved in the method—logical consistency, general scientific principles, laws of specific sciences, and experience. I critically examine three different accounts of the foundations of the method of experimental engineering models (scale models), and examine how theory, practice, and experience are involved in employing the method to obtain practical results. Models of machines and mechanisms can be (and generally are) involved in establishing criteria for similar phenomena, which provide guidance in using events to model other events. Conversely, models of phenomena such as events that model other events can be (and generally are) involved in experimentation on models of machines. I conclude that often it is not more detailed models or the more precise equations they engender that leads to better understanding, but rather an insightful use of knowledge at hand to determine which similarity principles are appropriate in allowing us to infer what we do not know from what we are able to observe.     

Researching stigma as an outsider: considerations for qualitative outsider research

In this article, we discuss a number of important considerations that we have encountered in the process of researching health stigma topics as “outsiders”: researchers (personally) unfamiliar with the experience or topic under study. In particular, we discuss the importance of the following: a reflective stance, challenging negative representations, flexible and sensitive recruitment strategies, validating experiences of stigma, and participant control and power. We see these points as particularly important in the context of researching stigma as outsiders, where our privilege may contribute to unhelpful, narrow, de-politicized or overly simplistic representations of particular “groups” or experiences. We share these considerations in hope of assisting other researchers to reflect on, and articulate, how they negotiate their positionings within their research and the ways in which they shape and construct the research agenda and, by implication, the people or topics under examination.     

A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness

Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual "filling in," visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.     

Epistemic Presuppositions and their Consequences

Traditional epistemology has, in the main, presupposed that the primary task is to give a complete account of the concept knowledge and to state under what conditions it is possible to have it. In so doing, most accounts have been hierarchical, and all assume an idealized knower. The assumption of an idealized knower is essential for the traditional goal of generating an unassailable account of knowledge acquisition. Yet we, as individuals, fail to reach the ideal. Perhaps more important, we have epistemic goals not addressed in the traditional approach – among them, the ability to reach understanding in areas we deem important for our lives. Understanding is an epistemic concept. But how we obtain it has not traditionally been a focus. Developing an epistemic account that starts from a set of assumptions that differ from the traditional starting points will allow a different sort of epistemic theory, one on which generating understanding is a central goal and the idealized knower is replaced with an inquirer who is not merely fallible but working from a particular context with particular goals. Insight into how an epistemic account can include the particular concerns of an embedded inquirer can be found by examining the parallels between ethics and epistemology and, in particular, by examining the structure and starting points of virtue accounts. Here I develop several interrelated issues that contrast the goals and evaluative concepts that form the structure of both standard, traditional epistemological and ethical theories and virtue–centered theories. In the end, I sketch a virtue–centered epistemology that accords with who we are and how we gain understanding.     

Epistemic Presuppositions and their Consequences

Traditional epistemology has, in the main, presupposed that the primary task is to give a complete account of the concept knowledge and to state under what conditions it is possible to have it. In so doing, most accounts have been hierarchical, and all assume an idealized knower. The assumption of an idealized knower is essential for the traditional goal of generating an unassailable account of knowledge acquisition. Yet we, as individuals, fail to reach the ideal. Perhaps more important, we have epistemic goals not addressed in the traditional approach – among them, the ability to reach understanding in areas we deem important for our lives. Understanding is an epistemic concept. But how we obtain it has not traditionally been a focus. Developing an epistemic account that starts from a set of assumptions that differ from the traditional starting points will allow a different sort of epistemic theory, one on which generating understanding is a central goal and the idealized knower is replaced with an inquirer who is not merely fallible but working from a particular context with particular goals. Insight into how an epistemic account can include the particular concerns of an embedded inquirer can be found by examining the parallels between ethics and epistemology and, in particular, by examining the structure and starting points of virtue accounts. Here I develop several interrelated issues that contrast the goals and evaluative concepts that form the structure of both standard, traditional epistemological and ethical theories and virtue–centered theories. In the end, I sketch a virtue–centered epistemology that accords with who we are and how we gain understanding.     

The sequential view: From rapidly fading stimulus traces to the organization of memory and the abstract concept of number

The development of the sequential approach to instrumental learning from about 1958 to the present is described. The sequential model began as an attempt to explain a particular class of neglected partial reward phenomena, those in which performance in acquisition and extinction is influenced by the particular sequence in which rewarded and nonrewarded trials occur in acquisition, and it was subsequently applied to a variety of other phenomena. Over time, the sequential model grew, sometimes through the replacement of older assumptions by novel ones, as when retrieved memories replaced stimulus traces, and sometimes simply through the addition of novel assumptions, such as that animals are capable of remembering retrospectively one, two, three or more prior nonrewarded outcomes—the N-length assumption. The most recent assumption added to the sequential model is that on a given trial the animal may utilize its memory of prior reward outcomes to anticipate both the current reward outcome and one or more subsequent reward outcomes. One way to view the sequential model is to say that it is a specific theory in various degrees of competition with other specific theories. Several examples of this are provided. Another way to view the sequential model, a more important way in my opinion, is to see it as a representative of a general theoretical approach, intertrial theory, which differs in fundamental respects from another much more generally utilized theoretical approach, intra-trial theory. I suggest that there is a substantial body of data that can be explained by inter-trial mechanisms but not by intratrial mechanisms. The future may well reveal that the inter-trial mechanisms have greater explanatory potential than the currently more popular intratrial mechanisms.     

Ownership as a social status

The authors suggest that ownership may be one of the critical entry points into thinking about social constructions, a kind of laboratory for understanding status. They discuss the features of ownership that make it an interesting case to study developmentally. In particular, ownership is a consequential social fact that is alterable by an individual, even a child. Children experience changes in ownership in a way they do not experience changes in other social facts (such as word meanings or social norms). Ownership is also an individual rather than a general property; two objects can be identical, but differ in ownership.     

MOTIVATIONAL INTERVENTION: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN EMPLOYMENT COUNSELING

The function of employment counseling has benefitted from a problem analysis approach based on the concepts of vocational choice, change, and adjustment. Continued growth, however, might be facilitated by the development of a more positive point of view that includes an analysis of the motivational process that clients experience in their attempts to attain employment. If we perceive motivation as a series of stages, we can then provide ourselves with a tool by which we can explore various points where the counselor can intervene to help clients overcome resistance and frustration.     

Taste and Acquaintance

The analogy between gustatory taste and critical or aesthetic taste plays a recurring role in the history of aesthetics. Our interest in this article is in a particular way in which gustatory judgments are frequently thought to be analogous to critical judgments. It appears obvious to many that to know how a particular object tastes we must have tasted it for ourselves; the proof of the pudding, we are all told, is in the eating. And it has seemed just as obvious to many philosophers that aesthetic judgment requires first‐person experience. In this article we argue that, despite its initial appeal, the claim that gustatory and critical judgments are analogous in this way is mistaken. The two sorts of judgments are, as a matter of fact, similar in their epistemology, but earlier theorists have got things entirely backward—neither gustatory judgment nor aesthetic judgment requires first‐hand acquaintance with their objects. Our particular focus in this article is on arguing that first‐person experience is not required to know how an item of food or drink tastes. In fact, there are a wide variety of ways in which we can acquire this knowledge.     

Performing DISCO-SCA to search for distinctive and common information in linked data

Behavioral researchers often obtain information about the same set of entities from different sources. A main challenge in the analysis of such data is to reveal, on the one hand, the mechanisms underlying all of the data blocks under study and, on the other hand, the mechanisms underlying a single data block or a few such blocks only (i.e., common and distinctive mechanisms, respectively). A method called DISCO-SCA has been proposed by which such mechanisms can be found. The goal of this article is to make the DISCO-SCA method more accessible, in particular for applied researchers. To this end, first we will illustrate the different steps in a DISCO-SCA analysis, with data stemming from the domain of psychiatric diagnosis. Second, we will present in this article the DISCO-SCA graphical user interface (GUI). The main benefits of the DISCO-SCA GUI are that it is easy to use, strongly facilitates the choice of model selection parameters (such as the number of mechanisms and their status as being common or distinctive), and is freely available.