Religious diversity beyond the cosmopolis: Immigration and the religious field in the City of Turku, Finland

International migration has fundamentally changed local population demographics in many corners of the world. This article discusses the religious implications of an increase in the population of immigrant origin in the city of Turku, Finland, which serves as an example of a regional immigration centre. Migration started at the turn of the 1990s and by 2006, about 9% of the city's population were first and second generation migrants with backgrounds mainly in Europe and Asia. The main countries of origin are Russia, Iraq, former Yugoslavia and Estonia. The migrants have brought increasing religious diversity to the local religious fields, including internal diversification of membership in many Christian churches (Lutheran, Protestant free church, Orthodox and Catholic), and have founded new Muslim, Buddhist and Mandaean congregations. This article argues that the founding of religious organisations is a main form of structural adaptation to the local social context. In addition, there is a discussion of religious activities and transnational connections in relation to immigration, as well as, the local, national and transnational implications of increasing globality.     

Secularism,Fundamentalism, or Catholicism? The Religious Composition of the United States to 2043

We provide a cohort‐component projection of the religious composition of the United States, considering differences in fertility, migration, intergenerational religious transmission, and switching among 11 ethnoreligious groups. If fertility and migration trends continue, Hispanic Catholics will experience rapid growth and expand from 10 to 18 percent of the American population between 2003 and 2043. Protestants are projected to decrease from 47 to 39 percent over the same period, while Catholicism emerges as the largest religion among the youngest age cohorts. Liberal Protestants decline relative to other groups due to low fertility and losses from religious switching. Immigration drives growth among Hindus and Muslims, while low fertility and a mature age structure causes Jewish decline. The low fertility of secular Americans and the religiosity of immigrants provide a countervailing force to secularization, causing the nonreligious population share to peak before 2043.     

The End of Secularisation through Demography? Projections of Spanish Religiosity

This article presents the first projection, to our knowledge, of the intensity of religiosity in a population, which has a strong bearing on the critical question of the religious future of Europe. Spain has, in recent decades, simultaneously experienced rapid religious decline and marked demographic change through high immigration and declining fertility. To investigate future trends, we carry out population projections by religion and religiosity to the year 2050. We find that both fertility and immigration increase the share of the highly religious, as the more religious tend to have more children and immigrants tend to be more religious than non-immigrants. The non-religious population grows because people switch from religion to no-religion and because they are younger. Our findings suggest that in the longer term (2050), there may be growth in the no-religion population, a decline in the share of highly religious Christians, and moderate development of low religious Christians. The Muslim population would substantially increase, unless there is an end to migration and fertility differentials.     

“And Who Is My Neighbor?” Religion and Immigration Policy Attitudes

This study explores immigration reform as a possible new "moral" issue upon which American religious elites and organizations take public positions. It is argued that religion is a key independent variable necessary for understanding the determinants of public attitudes regarding immigration policy. Theoretical expectations are formed from the ethnoreligious, religious restructuralism, and minority marginalization frameworks. Quantitative evidence is presented, that demonstrates that those who attend religious services more frequently are more likely to support liberal immigration reform policies. Members of minority religions, notably Jews and Latter-day Saints, are also more likely to empathize with the plight of undocumented immigrants and support liberal immigration reform measures.     

Explaining the Cause of Muslim-Christian Conflicts in Indonesia: Tracing the Origins of Kristenisasi and Islamisasi

Within the last decade, Indonesia has experienced numerous incidents of communal violence between conservative Muslims, who are the religious majority in the country, and the Christian minority. This has been caused by mutual prejudices and suspicions that have gradually developed between the two groups. This article will explain the origins of such sentiments by looking at the history of Muslim–Christian relations in Indonesia. It argues that the origins of tensions between the two religions date from the Dutch colonial period in Indonesia and persisted throughout Indonesia's post-independence history. First, the article will survey the roots of Kristenisasi suspicions among Indonesian Muslims, from the Dutch colonial period until the New Order regime under Suharto. Next, it will examine government policies designed to appease conservative Muslims and restrict the religious freedom of Indonesian Christians. Finally, it will discuss how these policies helped to create the fear of Islamisasi among Indonesian Christians.     

Generations of Decline: Religious Change in 20th-Century Britain

This article analyzes the best available evidence from the major British social surveys to describe and explain the continuous decline of religion throughout the 20th century. This decline is overwhelmingly generational in nature rather than a product of particular periods such as World War II or the 1960s. Measures of religious affiliation, regular attendance at worship, and religious belief show nearly identical rates of intergenerational decline. Decline has not been offset by any positive age effects in an aging society: Britons do not get more religious as they get older. The intergenerational decline follows clear patterns of transmission of parental religious characteristics to children. Two potential modulators of decline are identified and investigated: immigration of people who are more religious than the existing population and higher fertility rates among the religiously active population. Of these only the former appears of importance. The nonwhite ethnic minority immigrant population is far more religious than the white population; however, the rates of intergenerational decline (between immigrant parents and native-born children) are almost as high as for the white population, leading to an intergenerational convergence of levels of religiosity. Although ethnic minority populations tend to be more religious and have higher fertility rates, there is no differential fertility by religiosity among the population as a whole.     

Religion and society in present‐day Albania

Albania is the only European country with a majority Muslim population (with the arguable exception of Bosnia). In this age of religious prejudice and in view of the terrible policies of ethnic cleansing in its neighbouring countries, Albania's religious climate has remained remarkably tolerant. The intermingling of religions is epitomized by Albania's national hero Skanderbeg who was born an Orthodox, lived as a Muslim, and died a Catholic. The most extreme demands were made on Albania's people of faith during a 23‐year period of state‐proclaimed atheism. A widespread revival of all religions after 1991 is generally thought to be in similar proportions to those at the start of the century. As we near its close, we can only hope that interaction between religious groups continues to remain peaceful and tolerant.     

The Contemporary Study of Religion,Society and Politics in Russia: A Scholar’s Reflections1

Over the past decade, religious issues in France have come to the fore in the public debate. The 1905 law on the separation of church and state structures the concept of ‘laïcité’ as a configuration for the treatment of religions in France. This political and media debate has highlighted the representative institutions of mainstream religions in France, including the Orthodox Church. Obliged to take a position, both collectively with other religious actors and individually, Orthodoxy in France seems to be only marginally affected by this controversy. However, through press releases, memos, articles in the national press and online resources, the Orthodox Church has appropriated the issue of ‘laïcité à la française’. Behind these different messages lie the issues of the place of Orthodoxy in the French religious landscape and the (suspected) resistance of Orthodoxy against secularising forces in the minority context of the diaspora in Western Europe. Orthodoxy in France constitutes a key element of identity for the national Orthodox communities of the diaspora. Laïcité shapes and to a large extent justifies the anticanonical compromise of the ecclesiological treatment of the Orthodox communities in the diaspora, which are grouped by ethnicity. In this context, I assess how the legal and societal contexts of laïcité influence the main configurations of Orthodoxy in France, in terms of relations with the public authorities, relations with other religions and confessions, and the inter-Orthodox situation.     

Religiosity as a buffer against suicidal ideation: a comparison between Christian and Muslim-Arab adolescents

The majority of existing studies on the impact of religious beliefs on adolescents’ suicidal ideation have been conducted among Christians living in Western countries. This study explored the association between religious beliefs and suicidal thoughts among Muslim and Christian adolescents from the Arab minority population of the State of Israel. An estimated 219 late-adolescents participated in this study, including 110 Muslims and 99 Christians, with the same proportion of boys and girls. Participants completed questionnaires on reasons for living, suicidal ideation and religiosity. A significant negative correlation (r =??.33) was found between level of religiosity and suicidal ideation, but only among the Christian adolescents. Religious devoutness may not be a universal buffer against suicidal ideation, across different religions.     

Between Baghdad and Birmingham: Minorities--Christian and Muslim

This paper deals with majority-minority relations that very much condition relations between Muslims and Christians. The first part gives some factual data about Muslim minorities in Europe and Christian minorities in Muslim countries and makes some comparisons between their situations at present. The second part questions the very idea of speaking of Muslims and Christians in terms of majority and minority, since this imposes a political scheme on human reality, neglecting existing diversities within the communities and in the relations between them. More important questions are: what have Muslims and Christians done with their religions in minority and majority situations? How can a model of participation in civil society replace the traditional Middle Eastern model of social separateness with religiously justified antagonisms? How can the positive potential of minorities be better appreciated? The author pleads for practical realism and enlightened participation instead of fixing and quantifying Muslim and Christian religious communities as closed social entities.     

Minority religions in the census: the case of British Muslims

Abstract

This article considers the impact of census data on British Muslims, as well as the potential consequences of changes to the UK census beyond 2011 for minority religions. Focusing on the Muslim case, it reflects on data generated in previous censuses and the ways in which they have been used. The discussion explores the perceived need for social statistics on religion, particularly in relation to the increased identification of ‘Muslim’ as a religious rather than ethnic classification. It gives an overview of insights gained as a result of having data on religion in addition to ethnicity, notably: the high levels of socioeconomic disadvantage experienced by British Muslims and the ability to access information on Muslims that was hitherto hidden. Finally, the article provides a brief summary of proposed changes to the new census format and considers the likely outcomes for British Muslims if the scope of data collected on religion is reduced.     

The Catholic Church and Croatia's Two Transitions1

Abstract

In this article we examine the religious situation in postsoviet Estonia. Traditionally a Christian country, Estonia today is strongly influenced by its Soviet past. Only one third of the population belongs to a particular religion, while nearly half the population say that religion plays no role in their lives. The state's attitude towards the various religions is remarkably positive and the legislation concerning religious organisations is very liberal. Most believers in Estonia belong to Lutheran and Orthodox churches. The biggest non-Christian religion is Estonian Native Religion, and there are also Buddhist, Jewish and Muslim communities. In the late 1990s several problems arose concerning legislation and religious studies at schools. Discussion of these topics found the Christian denominations on one side and non-Christian religions on the other. Although the question whether Religious Studies should be a compulsory subject in schools is still fervently disputed, this now happens in the secular media, while discussion has more or less ceased amongst the various religions. The dialogue between Christian and non-Christian religions is nearly non-existent and there seems to be no will to intensify interrelations. If problems emerge, the representatives of the various religions turn to the state rather than discuss them among themselves.     

Mahometans on the Edge of Colonial Empire: Antipodean Experiences

ABSTRACT

The public conceptualization of Muslim immigration and settlement in New Zealand has become synonymous with the comparatively recent influx of Asian and African migrants and refugees over the past two decades. However, a noteworthy minority of Muslim immigrants arrived during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in the colonial period. This article surveys the immigration and settlement of Muslims from the 1850s to the 1950s, focusing on the biographies of the most prominent individuals, broadly tracing their arrival and participation in the Anglo-European Christian society they chose to settle in, through to the creation of the Islamic institutions in this country from the 1950s to 1980s. I will conclude with a brief overview of the significance of this pioneer period in view of more recent immigration and the proliferation of Islam in New Zealand, together with some observations upon the interactions of Muslims with a largely Christian society and what that may indicate for the understanding of relations between Muslims and Christians within New Zealand from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. Although the first century of Muslim settlement has been largely overlooked, or marginalized, much can be revealed about the broader Muslim experience at this extremity of the (former) British Empire.     

Towards an anthropology of doubt: the case of religious reproduction in Orthodox Judaism

As Israel’s Orthodox Jews struggle to live up to high fertility norms rooted in religious and Zionist ideals, an obscured model of stratified critique has emerged. Based on an ethnography of Israel’s reproductive landscape, I demonstrate how critique of high fertility standards is based on particular social and cultural capital only available to the religious elite. While well-established, knowledgeable and assertive religious members find private ways to bypass the almost unachievable levels of fertility, a veil of secrecy leaves less privileged groups, particularly ba`aley teshuva (returnees) to carry most of the fertility load. Whereas scholars of religious transformation have demonstrated how religious elites act as actors and leaders of resistance, my findings illustrate an opposite pattern. Instead of disseminating this critique publicly, religious elites engage in private strategies of secrecy and creative performances of failure that enable these individuals to diverge from norms without publicly contesting them. I argue that not only is stratified critique based on social and cultural capital, it also reproduces social inequalities. By focusing on doubt, struggles, and failures engendered in “everyday Judaism,” these findings require us to refocus our inquiry on power structures within different sub-groups of Israel’s Orthodox Jews. Further, this unique case study highlights how stratified reproduction takes new shape as social and religious convictions gain and lose their force at a particular moment in history.     

Cross-sex versus same-sex experience and relationship satisfaction: addressing diverse social networks among Orthodox Jews

Romantic experiences in adolescence often predict relationship stability and marital status in adulthood. Religious practice and belief also have been linked to increased marital satisfaction and overall wellbeing. However, certain religions limit cross-sex interaction in areas of education, social and romantic relationships. Although gender segregation has been studied in educational and occupational contexts, no previous research has addressed religious gender segregation and its impact on relationship development, marital satisfaction, and overall wellbeing. The present study addressed the generalisability of data on cross-sex experience derived from normative populations to a religious subculture, outlining predictors for marital satisfaction and wellbeing in an Orthodox Jewish sample. Results showed some similarities between the general population and the Orthodox Jews represented by the study sample. However, some factors illustrated divergent paths and outcomes for this sample. This study demonstrates the influence of societal norms and the importance of addressing cultural context when evaluating marital satisfaction.     

Religion and Disparities: Considering the Influences of Islam on the Health of American Muslims

Both theory and data suggest that religions shape the way individuals interpret and seek help for their illnesses. Yet, health disparities research has rarely examined the influence of a shared religion on the health of individuals from distinct minority communities. In this paper, we focus on Islam and American Muslims to outline the ways in which a shared religion may impact the health of a racially, ethnically, and socioeconomically diverse minority community. We use Kleinman’s “cultural construction of clinical reality” as a theoretical framework to interpret the extant literature on American Muslim health. We then propose a research agenda that would extend current disparities research to include measures of religiosity, particularly among populations that share a minority religious affiliation. The research we propose would provide a fuller understanding of the relationships between religion and health among Muslim Americans and other minority communities and would thereby undergird efforts to reduce unwarranted health disparities.     

‘Interfaith dialogue’ as a form of opposition of ‘minority religions’ to governmental pressure in Russia

Russian governmental policy toward non-traditional religious groups, especially so-called New Religious Movements (NRMs), is discriminatory. Despite Russia’s formal secularity, the government strongly supports the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), a position which results in various limitations on many other religious groups. As a result, legal actions have been initiated against new religious groups, for example the Bhagavad Gita trial in Tomsk, Siberia, and the designation of the literature of the Jehovah’s Witnesses as ‘extremist’. However, pressure by the government can sometimes lead to the development of spontaneous interreligious oppositional associations. One important example is the ‘interfaith dialogue’ in Tomsk, where local leaders or representatives of religious groups, such as the Episcopal, Jewish, and Latter-day Saints (Mormon) churches as well as the Hare Krishna movement, unorthodox Buddhist groups, and local pagan movements, united to oppose governmental and ROC efforts to disband a Hare Krishna group in the Tomsk area. This research note presents results of a case study, which involved participant observation, of the phenomenon of oppositional interfaith dialogue in Tomsk in the period 2011–2014. I discuss factors that influenced its appearance, its relationship with the local government, and the methods of cooperation between the different religious groups within this association and offer some theoretical interpretations of these developments. The results of this case study illustrate new and important modern relationships between minority religions and the government in Russia.     

Focusing on the emergencies or on their roots? The role of nonprofit organisations in immigration policymaking in Italy

Religious organisations are a relevant actor in immigration policymaking in Italy; they usually work in networks with institutions and other actors from the nonprofit sector to implement projects and services for migrants. However, the collaboration might lead to disagreement on which is the best way to face social problems related to immigration. In the province of Foggia, the reports on the precarious conditions of migrants employed in agriculture led to the development of a range of activities for improving their status and fighting their exploitation. While an issue network on the receipt and first assistance for migrants has arisen, there is no agreement on deeper interventions between nonprofit organisations (NPOs) which want to provide help for migrants in actual situations of precariousness and NPOs committed to face the causes of these situations. The tension between these two conceptions of nonprofit role in public policies might be divisive inside the religious associationism.     

Christians,Muslims, Jews,and their religions

Depending on the context, Christians, Muslims and Jews have constructed their own religion, perceived the religions of others, and articulated relations between religions in different ways. This paper examines the rise in history of the three communities, which came to identify themselves through their religions and have been highly sensitive to differences. It indicates common features and parallels of which adherents may have been more or less conscious. The central question in such research is what persons and groups mean in particular situations when they call themselves Christian, Muslim or Jewish. The variety of personal and group identities in the three religious communities has been concealed partly by religious leaderships concerned with the survival of their flocks, and partly by the use of the general concepts of Christianity, Islam and Judaism with which believers have been called to identify. These concepts have shut people into separate religious pigeonholes and could thus be used to support ethnic, social and other rivalries. This pigeonholing has also confronted more spiritually‐oriented people with problems of social identity, religious belonging and spiritual authenticity.     

The Social Integration of Practitioners of Non-Western Religions in the United States

Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus have become an increasingly significant part of American religion in recent years. Yet scholarship on these groups has been limited largely to case studies and qualitative observations. We analyze data from a large national survey that permits comparisons among Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, and Christians. The data reveal that members of non-Western religions in the United States resemble Jews in having notably higher socioeconomic status than Christians. They resemble the rest of the population on other measures of actual or potential social integration, including political knowledge, generalized trust, neighborhood contacts, and interreligious ties. However, low levels of voting, a tendency to express feelings of alienation, and fewer connections with community elites suggest a continuing lack of political integration.