An Adaptation for Altruism? The Social Causes, Social Effects, and Social Evolution of Gratitude

ABSTRACT— People feel grateful when they have benefited from someone's costly, intentional, voluntary effort on their behalf. Experiencing gratitude motivates beneficiaries to repay their benefactors and to extend generosity to third parties. Expressions of gratitude also reinforce benefactors for their generosity. These social features distinguish gratitude from related emotions such as happiness and feelings of indebtedness. Evolutionary theories propose that gratitude is an adaptation for reciprocal altruism (the sequential exchange of costly benefits between nonrelatives) and, perhaps, upstream reciprocity (a pay-it-forward style distribution of an unearned benefit to a third party after one has received a benefit from another benefactor). Gratitude therefore may have played a unique role in human social evolution.     

On Gratitude to Nature

In this article, I argue that it cannot be fitting to be grateful to nature. I start by arguing that gratitude to someone/something can be fitting even if they do not intentionally benefit one. I then argue that a recent view on which it can be fitting to be grateful to nature faces counterexamples. Finally, I argue that it cannot be fitting to be grateful to nature, because it is fitting to be grateful to someone/something only if they manifest the right kind of goodwill or care toward one. In particular, I argue that it is fitting to be grateful to someone/something only if they manifest a level of final care toward one beyond what can be legitimately expected or demanded of them. However, because nature does not manifest any level of goodwill or care, it cannot be fitting to be grateful to nature. I end by noting that it can still be fitting to be grateful that certain things are true about nature (e.g. that it provides many benefits to humans).     

The ethical significance of gratitude in Epicureanism

ABSTRACT

Many texts in the Epicurean tradition mention gratitude but do not explicitly explain its function in Epicurean ethics. I review passages that mention or discuss gratitude and ingratitude and consider what they have to say about its importance for a good Epicurean life. I argue that, for Epicureans, gratitude functions as something like a virtue, developed as a disposition of character through regular reflection and practice, that focuses attention on present goods, consolidates memories of past pleasures, and thus provides resources for facing the future confidently and joyfully. I also suggest that recognizing the role of gratitude in Epicureanism can provide a more expansive interpretation of an Epicurean life, one that includes both openness to variety and philanthropic concern. If my interpretation is right, Epicureans anticipate findings from recent positive psychology showing strong links between gratitude and happiness.     

Gender Differences in Gratitude: Examining Appraisals, Narratives, the Willingness to Express Emotions, and Changes in Psychological Needs

ABSTRACT Previous work suggests women might possess an advantage over men in experiencing and benefiting from gratitude. We examined whether women perceive and react to gratitude differently than men. In Study 1 , women, compared with men, evaluated gratitude expression to be less complex, uncertain, conflicting, and more interesting and exciting. In Study 2 , college students and older adults described and evaluated a recent episode when they received a gift. Women, compared with men, reported less burden and obligation and greater gratitude. Upon gift receipt, older men reported the least positive affect when their benefactors were men. In Studies 2 and 3, women endorsed higher trait gratitude compared with men. In Study 3, over 3 months, women with greater gratitude were more likely to satisfy needs to belong and feel autonomous; gratitude had the opposite effect in men. The willingness to openly express emotions partially mediated gender differences, and effects could not be attributed to global trait affect. Results demonstrated that men were less likely to feel and express gratitude, made more critical evaluations of gratitude, and derived fewer benefits. Implications for the study and therapeutic enhancement of gratitude are discussed.     

Gratitude, Ressentiment, and Citizenship Education

Patricia White (Stud Philos Educ 18:43–52, 1999) argues that the virtue gratitude is essential to a flourishing democracy because it helps foster universal and reciprocal amity between citizens. Citizens who participate in this reciprocal relationship ought to be encouraged to recognize that “much that people do does in fact help to make communal civic life less brutish, pleasanter and more flourishing.” This is the case even when the majority of citizens do not intentionally seek to make civic life better for others. Were citizens to recognize the appropriateness of gratitude in these situations, the bonds of our democratic communities would be strengthened. In this paper, I examine White’s argument more carefully, arguing that it fails to address adequately the difficulties that arise when we attempt to encourage the virtue of gratitude in our students. To address these difficulties, I turn to an unlikely source for democratic inspiration: Friedrich Nietzsche. In spite of his well-known anti-democratic sentiments, Nietzsche offers democratic citizens insights into the social value of gratitude. I argue that Nietzsche’s ideas resolve the educational difficulties in White’s argument and viably establish gratitude as an important democratic virtue that ought to be cultivated.     

What We Can Intend: Recognition and Collective Intentionality

The concept of recognition has played a role in two debates. In political philosophy, it is part of a communitarian response to liberal theories of distributive justice. It describes what it means to respect others’ right to self‐determination. In ethics, Stephen Darwall argues that it comprises our judgment that we owe others moral consideration. I present a competing account of recognition on the grounds that most accounts answer the question of why others deserve recognition without answering the question of what is involved in recognizing them. This paper answers the latter. I argue that, in general, recognition is something that we do to others rather than something that we think about others. In particular, recognition is an intentional action to treat another individual as a legitimate, self‐determining agent. I then show that recognition's realizability requires that agents understand their intentions as dependent on others for their satisfaction. Thus, relations of recognition are instances of collective intentionality.     

Witnessing excellence in action: the ‘other-praising’ emotions of elevation,gratitude, and admiration

People are often profoundly moved by the virtue or skill of others, yet psychology has little to say about the ‘other-praising’ family of emotions. Here we demonstrate that emotions such as elevation, gratitude, and admiration differ from more commonly studied forms of positive affect (joy and amusement) in many ways, and from each other in a few ways. The results of studies using recall, video induction, event-contingent diary, and letter-writing methods to induce other-praising emotions suggest that: elevation (a response to moral excellence) motivates prosocial and affiliative behavior, gratitude motivates improved relationships with benefactors, and admiration motivates self-improvement. Mediation analyses highlight the role of conscious emotion between appraisals and motivations. Discussion focuses on implications for emotion research, interpersonal relationships, and morality.     

Thanks, but I'm used to better: a relative rank model of gratitude

We argue that more help does not necessarily lead to more gratitude. Rather, gratitude depends on how a given instance of help compares with the help that a person is used to receiving. Participants read vignettes detailing an event in which 11 different friends either lent them varying amounts of money or spent varying amounts of time providing help. The amount of gratitude elicited by a given amount of help (e.g., a loan of ￡36 [about $56] or 49 min help) differed substantially depending on how this amount ranked among the help they were getting from their other friends. Comparison across four experimental conditions suggested that these judgments operated via the same general cognitive mechanisms used to judge other social events and psychophysical stimuli (as outlined by range frequency theory). Although more help does lead to more gratitude, people appear to be sensitive to how that help compares with what others are providing, and experienced gratitude depends on these relative judgments.     

Sexual minorites as a challenge to: christian fellowship

It may be that the following comments will appear to some readers aplicable to all 'sexual minorites'. I myself do not so apply them. I jhave trans-sexuals entirely in mind as I write, and not merely because they tend to be the most seriously discriminated against. Howver, it is not for me to dictate to others how they should or should not make suse of these ideas. It readers wish to see the trans-sexual's dilemma as a paradigm of some larger or even quite different dilemma, then so be it     

Intending,knowing how,infinitives

Intellectualists tell us that a person who knows how to do something therein knows a proposition. Along with others, they may say that a person who intends to do something intends a proposition. I argue against them. I do so by way of considering ‘know how ——’ and ‘intend ——’ together. When the two are considered together, a realistic conception of human agency can inform the understanding of some infinitives: the argument need not turn on what semanticists have had to say about (what they call) ‘the subjects of infinitival clauses’.     

Gratitude reception and physical health: Examining the mediating role of satisfaction with patient care in a sample of acute care nurses

ABSTRACT

Literature examining well-being benefits of gratitude experiences is currently thriving in psychological science. However, evidence of the physical health benefits of gratitude remains limited. Research and theory in affective science suggests an indirect relationship between gratitude and physical health. This study examines how receiving expressions of gratitude predicts physical health outcomes in a sample of acute care nurses over time. Registered nurses (N = 146) practicing in Oregon completed weekly surveys over 12 consecutive weeks describing their positive and negative events, health, and work-related experiences. Multilevel mediation models revealed that being thanked more often at work was positively related to a nurse’s satisfaction with the care they provided within that week, which subsequently predicted sleep quality, sleep adequacy, headaches, and attempts to eat healthy. These findings contribute to literature demonstrating the health benefits of gratitude by indicating that benefactors may experience improvements in subjective physical health through positive domain-relative satisfaction.     

Libertarianism,Climate Change,and Individual Responsibility

Much has been written about climate change from an ethical view in general, but less has been written about it from a libertarian point of view in particular. In this paper, I apply the libertarian moral theory to the problem of climate change. I focus on libertarianism’s implications for our individual emissions. I argue that (i) even if our individual emissions cause no harm to others, these emissions cross other people’s boundaries, (ii) although the boundary-crossings that are due to our ‘subsistence emissions’ are implicitly consented to by others, there is no such consent to our ‘non-subsistence emissions’, and (iii) there is no independent justification for these emissions. Although offsetting would provide such a justification, most emitters do not offset their non-subsistence emissions. Therefore, these emissions violate people’s rights, which means that they are impermissible according to libertarianism’s non-aggression principle.

     

Subsistence Needs,Human Rights,and Imperfect Duties

I address the usefulness of thinking about a human right to subsistence within conceptions of human rights grounded in ordinary moral reasoning. I argue that that natural rights should be understood as rights in rem, with their dynamism constrained by the requirements of justification and their scope constrained by the distinction between perfect and imperfect duty. I then suggest that many of the most pressing demands which the moral significance of subsistence needs create are plausibly imperfect duties, and so cannot correlate to a natural right to subsistence. This restricts the helpfulness of a human right to subsistence in our reasoning about what we owe to others.     

Glass Panels and Peepholes: Nonhuman Animals and the Right to Privacy

In this paper, I defend the claim that many sentient nonhuman animals have a right to privacy. I begin by outlining the view that the human right to privacy protects our interest in shaping different kinds of relationships with one another by giving us control over how we present ourselves to others. I then draw on empirical research to show that nonhuman animals also have this interest, which grounds a right to privacy against us. I further argue that we can violate this right even when other animals are unaware that we are watching them.     

Philosophical Counselling, Truth and Self-Interpretation

Philosophical counselling, Ran Lahav and others claim, helps clients deepen their philosophical self-understanding. The counsellor's role is the minimalist one of providing the client with the philosophical tools needed for reflective self-evaluation. Respect for the client's autonomy entails refraining from intervening with substantive moral criticism, theories, and methods; the client's ways of working out fundamental questions like ‘Who am I and what do I really want?’cannot be assessed by the counsellor in terms of their truth-value, but only in terms of whether they reflect the client's autonomous choice to express him/herself in a certain way. I argue that this view, which is informed by an anti-realist account of self and life-history, undermines the distinction between self-knowledge and self-deception. Once interpretive and criteriological free rein is given to the client, and once personal, pragmatic and aesthetic considerations take precedence over truth-value, then the way is left open to clients to generate the most morally convenient self-interpretation to suit their current needs. I defend the view that truth matters in philosophical counselling; more specifically, that there is a basic distinction between true and false forms of self-understanding. To do this, I offer a broadly realist account of self and reflective self-evaluation. If this is right, then philosophical counsellors shoulder a significant burden of responsibility in helping their clients achieve an accurate, defensible, action-guiding and truth-oriented self-understanding.     

Gratitude and parents' rights over their children's religious upbringing

Although most parents claim their children owe them obligations of gratitude, there has been no attempt to analyze gratitude as a basis for parental rights over children's religious upbringing. Parents' provision of benefits to their children in an altruistic fashion requires that children ought normally to honor parental requests that they participate in religious rituals and attend sectarian education. However, the limits on parental altruism and the self‐defeating nature of extreme demands for requital of gratitude suggest that gratitude is not a sufficiently strong basis to justify the rights of parents to prevent their children's exposure to religious beliefs inconsistent with their own. The state acts consistently with children's obligation of gratitude when it offers an education providing children the right to exit their religious communities, but not when it seeks to promote radical religious autonomy.     

Care for one's own future experiences

We care for our own future experiences. Most of us, trivially, would rather have them pleasurable than painful. When we care for our own future experiences we do so in a way that is different from the way we care for those of others (which is not to say that we necessarily care more about our own experience). Prereflectively, one would think this is because these experiences will be ours and no one else's. But then, of course, we need to explain what it means to say that a future experience will be mine and how knowledge of this fact renders it rational for me to care for this experience in a special way. Indeed most philosophers take this route. But in doing so, they quickly stumble on insuperable problems. I shall argue that the problem of egocentric care, as it is sometimes called, can be solved by turning things upside down: it is much more fruitful to think that the special kind of care we feel for some future experiences (and not others) is part of what makes them ours should they occur. This requires an explanation of egocentric care for future experiences that does not draw in a theory of personal identity, but rather contributes to one. I will attempt to provide this explanation by making use of the idea of a diachronic mental holism.     

A social-cognitive model of trait and state levels of gratitude

Three studies tested a new model of gratitude, which specified the generative mechanisms linking individual differences (trait gratitude) and objective situations with the amount of gratitude people experience after receiving aid (state gratitude). In Study 1, all participants (N = 253) read identical vignettes describing a situation in which they received help. People higher in trait gratitude made more positive beneficial appraisals (seeing the help as more valuable, more costly to provide, and more altruistically intended), which fully mediated the relationship between trait and state levels of gratitude. Study 2 (N = 113) replicated the findings using a daily process study in which participants reported on real events each day for up to 14 days. In Study 3, participants (N = 200) read vignettes experimentally manipulating objective situations to be either high or low in benefit. Benefit appraisals were shown to have a causal effect on state gratitude and to mediate the relationship between different prosocial situations and state gratitude. The 3 studies demonstrate the critical role of benefit appraisals in linking state gratitude with trait gratitude and the objective situation.     

The Relationship Between Prosociality,Meaning, and Happiness in Everyday Life

Journal of Happiness Studies - Prosocial behaviors benefit others, but what benefits do they hold for those who enact them? Prosociality can enhance the actor’s well-being, yet whether it is...