Truth,knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law

Could it be right to convict and punish defendants using only statistical evidence? In this paper, I argue that it is not and explain why it would be wrong. This is difficult to do because there is a powerful argument for thinking that we should convict and punish defendants using statistical evidence. It looks as if the relevant cases are cases of decision under risk and it seems we know what we should do in such cases (i.e., maximize expected value). Given some standard assumptions about the values at stake, the case for convicting and punishing using statistical evidence seems solid. In trying to show where this argument goes wrong, I shall argue (against Lockeans, reliabilists, and others) that beliefs supported only by statistical evidence are epistemically defective and (against Enoch, Fisher, and Spectre) that these epistemic considerations should matter to the law. To solve the puzzle about the role of statistical evidence in the law, we need to revise some commonly held assumptions about epistemic value and defend the relevance of epistemology to this practical question.

     

Neuroprediction,Truth-Sensitivity,and the Law

A recent argument by Nadelhoffer et al. defends a cautious optimism regarding the use of neuroprediction in relation to sentencing based, in part, on an assessment of the offender’s dangerousness. While this optimism may be warranted, Nadelhoffer et al.’s argument fails to justify it. Although neuropredictions provide individualized, non-statistical evidence they will often be problematic for the same reason that basing sentencing on statistical evidence is, to wit, that such predictions are insensitive to the offender’s dangerousness in relevant counterfactual situations and, accordingly, fail to provide the court with knowledge of the offender’s dangerousness. Admittedly, it could be replied that standard clinical assessments of dangerousness possess the same objectionable feature, but doing so undermines a different part of Nadelhoffer et al.’s argument. Finally, I criticize an incentives-based rationale for sentencing informed by neuropredictions of dangerousness.     

Rationality and reflective equilibrium

Cohen (1981) and others have made an interesting argument for the thesis that humans are rational: normative principles of reasoning and actual human reasoning ability cannot diverge because both are determined by the same process involving our intuitions about what constitutes good reasoning as a starting point. Perhaps the most sophisticated version of this argument sees reflective equilibrium as the process that determines both what the norms of reasoning are and what actual cognitive competence is. In this essay, I will evaluate both the general argument that humans are rational and the reflective equilibrium argument for the same thesis. While I find both accounts initially appealing, I will argue that neither successfully establishes that humans are rational.     

Further evidence for Coren and Hakstian's "Methodological implications of interaural correlation: count heads not ears" and an alternative correction formula.

Coren and Hakstian (1990) identified a serious methodological problem that arises in auditory research because of interaural correlation. When measures from both ears of the subjects are pooled together in an experimental design that assumes independence of measures, there can be spuriously high apparent statistical significance. The present paper provides further evidence in support of Coren and Hakstian's argument and also derives a formula that effectively corrects inflated test statistics resulting from interaural correlation. This formula is a special case of a more general one that applies in many other experimental contexts in which nonindependence of measures is a problem. We found that statistical tests based on our formula have somewhat greater power to detect differences than the kind of correction method advocated by Coren and Hakstian.     

The contingency argument—A reply

Conclusion Brian Medlin has excluded the possibility of something being self-explanatory in anything but a logical sense. Hence any non-logical necessity has always to be in terms of something other than the explicand. In this context, the principle of sufficient reason cannot escape contraction to a form so patently useless that no proponent of the contingency argument would want to employ it. Many of the objections in Section 4 have point, however, only against an argument which uses such an unacceptable form of the principle. The objections in Section 5 are directed against an argument framed in the only other way allowable under Medlin’s dichotomy, but which is of no use to the theist, for the simple-reason that its conclusion is not existential in the required (present actuality) sense. Objections against such an argument would concern the theist only if their validity were so wide as to embrace a truly existential argument as well. As we have-seen it is in just that case that they break down. In neither Section 4 nor 5, therefore, does the article come to grips with the contingency argument. The objections leave it untouched, because neither of Medlin’s notions of contingency and necessity corresponds to that which is operative in the argument.     

The soft constraints hypothesis: a rational analysis approach to resource allocation for interactive behavior

Soft constraints hypothesis (SCH) is a rational analysis approach that holds that the mixture of perceptual-motor and cognitive resources allocated for interactive behavior is adjusted based on temporal cost-benefit tradeoffs. Alternative approaches maintain that cognitive resources are in some sense protected or conserved in that greater amounts of perceptual-motor effort will be expended to conserve lesser amounts of cognitive effort. One alternative, the minimum memory hypothesis (MMH), holds that people favor strategies that minimize the use of memory. SCH is compared with MMH across 3 experiments and with predictions of an Ideal Performer Model that uses ACT-R's memory system in a reinforcement learning approach that maximizes expected utility by minimizing time. Model and data support the SCH view of resource allocation; at the under 1000-ms level of analysis, mixtures of cognitive and perceptual-motor resources are adjusted based on their cost-benefit tradeoffs for interactive behavior.     

Further evidence for Coren and Hakstian’s “Methodological implications of interaural correlation: Count heads not ears” and an alternative correction formula

Coren and Hakstian (1990) identified a serious methodological problem that arises in auditory research because of interaural correlation. When measures from both ears of the subjects are pooled together in an experimental design that assumes independence of measures, there can be spuriously high apparent statistical significance. The present paper provides further evidence in support of Coren and Hakstian’s argument and also derives a formula that effectively corrects inflated test statistics resulting from interaural correlation. This formula is a special case of a more general one that applies in many other experimental contexts in which nonindependence of measures is a problem. We found that statistical tests based on our formula have somewhat greater power to detect differences than the kind of correction method advocated by Coren and Hakstian.     

A neural cognitive model of argumentation with application to legal inference and decision making

Formal models of argumentation have been investigated in several areas, from multi-agent systems and artificial intelligence (AI) to decision making, philosophy and law. In artificial intelligence, logic-based models have been the standard for the representation of argumentative reasoning. More recently, the standard logic-based models have been shown equivalent to standard connectionist models. This has created a new line of research where (i) neural networks can be used as a parallel computational model for argumentation and (ii) neural networks can be used to combine argumentation, quantitative reasoning and statistical learning. At the same time, non-standard logic models of argumentation started to emerge. In this paper, we propose a connectionist cognitive model of argumentation that accounts for both standard and non-standard forms of argumentation. The model is shown to be an adequate framework for dealing with standard and non-standard argumentation, including joint-attacks, argument support, ordered attacks, disjunctive attacks, meta-level attacks, self-defeating attacks, argument accrual and uncertainty. We show that the neural cognitive approach offers an adequate way of modelling all of these different aspects of argumentation. We have applied the framework to the modelling of a public prosecution charging decision as part of a real legal decision making case study containing many of the above aspects of argumentation. The results show that the model can be a useful tool in the analysis of legal decision making, including the analysis of what-if questions and the analysis of alternative conclusions. The approach opens up two new perspectives in the short-term: the use of neural networks for computing prevailing arguments efficiently through the propagation in parallel of neuronal activations, and the use of the same networks to evolve the structure of the argumentation network through learning (e.g. to learn the strength of arguments from data).     

The cognitive structure of choice dilemma decisions

We tried to find out why Ss chose a specific risk level. We, therefore, constructed a questionnaire with 30 statements about aspects of the contents of the choice dilemmas. A factor analysis of the 30 statements over ten choice dilemmas and 61 field-officers led to a structure of four cognitive elements. With these four factors as predictors we could explain a main part of the variance of the individual risk level of each choice dilemma. This regression analysis was done with normal product-moment-correlations and with scalar-products. Both analyses show great similarity, although it seemed to be better to use scalar-products because one can use the information of the means. The four cognitive elements could be interpreted as: (1) Decision-making strategy; (2) Responsibility for others; (3) Reputation; (4) Socially valued riskiness.     

Why We Care Whether Our Beliefs Are True: An Answer to Stephen Stich?

Do we really care whether our beliefs are true? Stephen Stich gives us a very surprising but challenging answer: Once we find out what it means for a belief to be true, the answer to the above question is “a consistently negative” one. He argues that there is neither intrinsic nor instrumental value in having true beliefs. However, his argument is based on some very dubious reasons. For instance, one of his reasons is that if we value true beliefs intrinsically, we will leave out a huge space of mental states that have no truth values but would vastly increase their user’s power or happiness or biological fitness. But this is false because we can value different things intrinsically at the same time. He is even less successful in arguing against instrumental value in having true beliefs. He admits that he does not establish a knockdown argument against the value of having true beliefs, but he insists that the burden of argument be surely on those who maintain that there is value in having true beliefs. To meet his challenge, we have shown that there is cognitive intrinsic value in holding true beliefs and that generally, true beliefs are more conducive to our survival than false beliefs. If we completely depend on our false beliefs to achieve our goals, we will act like a blind cat who can only catch a mouse by chance.     

Commentary on "Quantifying the value of human life

...In his article, "Quantifying the value of human life for cost accounting of safeguards," L. Eugene Arnold proposes a cost-benefit analysis to address three allocation issues concerning the very expensive program of blood monitoring proposed by Sandoz at the time it placed Clozaril...on the American market....It is important to realize that the use of seemingly value-free procedures to arrive at answers to ethically complex questions does not eliminate the values that underlie the choice of variables to be analyzed. The analyses employed by the author to three ethical questions illustrate this point very well....     

The Immorality of Having Children

This paper defends the Famine Relief Argument against Having Children, which goes as follows: conceiving and raising a child costs hundreds of thousands of dollars; that money would be far better spent on famine relief; therefore, conceiving and raising children is immoral. It is named after Peter Singer’s Famine Relief Argument because it might be a special case of Singer’s argument and because it exposes the main practical implication of Singer’s argument—namely, that we should not become parents. I answer five objections: that disaster would ensue if nobody had children; that having children cannot be wrong because it is so natural for human beings; that the argument demands too much of us; that my child might be a great benefactor to the world; and that we should raise our children frugally and give them the right values rather than not have them. Previous arguments against procreation have appealed either to a pessimism about human life, or to the environmental impact of overpopulation, or to the fact that we cannot obtain the consent of the non-existent. The argument proposed here appeals to the severe opportunity costs of parenting.     

Capital Punishment, Restoration and Moral Rightness

In order to show that opposition to capital punishment cannot be both moral and entirely unconditional, Hugo Bedau proposes a fantasy–world scenario in which the execution of a murderer restores his murder victim to life. Were such a world to exist, argues Bedau, the death penalty would then be morally right. The aim of this article is to show that Bedau's argument is mistaken, largely because capital punishment in his fantasy world would not be an instrument of perfect restitution, as he thinks, but instead would be an instrument of unfair restitution. Two attempts are made to repair Bedau's fantasy–world argument, but neither of them is found to be successful. Consequently his fantasy world does not successfully provide the conditions under which opposition to capital punishment morally would have to cease. However, because capital punishment is morally wrong in his fantasy world it does not follow that it is morally wrong in this world.     

Learning the unlearnable: the role of missing evidence

Syntactic knowledge is widely held to be partially innate, rather than learned. In a classic example, it is sometimes argued that children know the proper use of anaphoric one, although that knowledge could not have been learned from experience. Lidz et al. [Lidz, J., Waxman, S., & Freedman, J. (2003). What infants know about syntax but couldn't have learned: Experimental evidence for syntactic structure at 18 months. Cognition, 89, B65-B73.] pursue this argument, and present corpus and experimental evidence that appears to support it; they conclude that specific aspects of this knowledge must be innate. We demonstrate, contra Lidz et al., that this knowledge may in fact be acquired from the input, through a simple Bayesian learning procedure. The learning procedure succeeds because it is sensitive to the absence of particular input patterns--an aspect of learning that is apparently overlooked by Lidz et al. More generally, we suggest that a prominent form of the "argument from poverty of the stimulus" suffers from the same oversight, and is as a result logically unsound.     

Interpreting the texts of nature and culture: A reply to Jahoda

In his Tajfel Memorial lecture Gustav Jahoda (1986) proposes that experimental findings infrequently reflect natural laws of human action, but are reflections of cultural conventions. In developing his arguments he finds it useful to criticize a number of my earlier ideas (Gergen, 1982). The present paper demonstrates that this critique is not only misguided, but that if the implications of my earlier work had been properly elaborated neither the argument for cultural convention nor general laws could be adequately sustained. Because of the non-objective character of behavioural interpretation, neither of these positions can be empirically warranted. Their justification is more properly considered in ethical, or ideological terms.     

Reading ‘is’ Existentially in Republic 476–80

An existential reading of ‘is’ in the argument at Republic 476–480 is widely thought to be objectionable because it commits Plato to belief in degrees of existence. In this paper, I argue that neither proposed alternative—the veridical reading or the predicative reading—can be reconciled with the text, thus forcing the existential reading upon us. Further, I show that when Plato's doctrine of existence is properly understood, his commitment to degrees of existence is not at all absurd.     

Molecular reduction: reality or fiction?

Neurophysiological research suggests our mental life is related to the cellular processes of particular nerves. In the spirit of Occam’s razor, some authors take these connections as reductions of psychological terms and kinds to molecular- biological mechanisms and patterns. Bickle’s ‘intervene cellularly/molecularly and track behaviourally’ reduction is one example of this. Here the mental is being reduced to the physical in two steps. The first is, through genetically altered mammals, to causally alter activity of particular nerve cells, i.e. neurons, at the molecular level and then, under controlled experimental conditions, to use generally-accepted rules of behaviour within psychology to monitor the results of these manipulations. In this article, we argue that Bickle’s case example for molecular reduction, i.e. the reduction of long-term memory to its cellular-molecular mechanisms, cannot support his claims, because it turns out that his chosen molecular pathway is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for the memory consolidation switch, and thus, instead of rejecting the multiple realization argument, Bickle’s argument actually speaks in favour of it. Therefore the idea of reductive connections between our mental life and the activity of particular nerves is, at present, still more fiction than reality.     

Reconstructing and Evaluating Genetic Arguments in Judicial Decisions

Although the genetic argument is a widely used interpretative argument, what it amounts to does not seem to be altogether clear. Basic forms of the genetic argument that are distinguished are often too rough to provide an adequate basis for the evaluation of an interpretative decision. In this article I attempt to provide a more detailed analysis of the genetic argument by making use of pragma-dialectical insights. The analysis clarifies the character and the structure of different forms of the genetic argument and thus the elements that are relevant for the evaluation of the argument.* * An earlier version of this paper was presented at 21st IVR World Congress (Lund, 2003).     

Life satisfaction,ethical reflection,and the science of happiness

Life satisfaction is widely considered to be a central aspect of human welfare. Many have identified happiness with it, and some maintain that well-being consists largely or wholly in being satisfied with one’s life. Empirical research on well-being relies heavily on life satisfaction studies. The paper contends that life satisfaction attitudes are less important, and matter for different reasons, than is widely believed.] For such attitudes are appropriately governed by ethical norms and are perspectival in ways that make the relationship between life satisfaction and welfare far more convoluted than we tend to expect. And the common identification of life satisfaction with happiness, as well as widespread views about the centrality of life satisfaction for well-being, are problematical at best. The argument also reveals an unexpected way in which philosophical ethics can inform scientific psychology: specifically, ethical reflection can help explain empirical results insofar as they depend on people’s values.