Fallibility and Insight in Moral Judgment

This article investigates the relationship between moral judgments, fallibility, and imaginative insight. It will draw heavily from the canon of classical American philosophy, the members of which (from Ralph Waldo Emerson, to C.S. Peirce, E.L. Cabot, to Jane Addams, to John Dewey) took up this relationship as pivotally important in moral theorizing. It argues that the process of hypothesis formation—characterized as “insight” by Emerson and extended by Peirce in his notion of “abduction”—is a necessary condition of moral progress for it allows individuals to think through the boundaries of social and ethical life. In a world of unexpected occurrences and uncertainty, the ability to generate novel explanatory frameworks and normative ideals is a crucial, if normally underappreciated, moral faculty. This paper attempts to respond to this relative neglect.     

Psychoanalysis and cultural change: Perspectives based on Lacan's rereading of Freud

Psychoanalysis cannot distance itself from culture and its transformations. It cannot ignore cultural ideals, which each individual uniquely appropriates to produce identifications, find his place within the human community, express his desires, and manifest the suffering occasioned by each difficult experience. This article will try to demonstrate this necessity of taking culture into account by drawing on Lacan's approach, which is based on the lessons of Freud. The author emphasizes the fact that every culture has its “discontents,” which stem from the incompleteness at the very heart of human experience, and that our cultural constructions are therefore constantly being reworked. By doing so, she aims to cast a different perspective on the relationship between the psyche and culture, and bring out the inherent complexity of the now fashionable notion of the “decline of the father,” which is systematically used to explain the new symptoms and ills of modern society. By detecting this decline, by searching for the visible signs of this deficit, do we not instead end up creating them ourselves?     

Speciesism as a Moral Heuristic

In the last decade, the study of moral heuristics has gained in importance. I argue that we can consider speciesism as a moral heuristic: an intuitive rule of thumb that substitutes a target attribute (that is difficult to detect, e.g. “having rationality”) for a heuristic attribute (that is easier to detect, e.g. “looking like a human being”). This speciesism heuristic misfires when applied to some atypical humans such as the mentally disabled, giving them rights although they lack rationality. But I argue that it is not necessarily irrational or inconsistent to hold on to this heuristic rule, because we have to take time and knowledge constraints, uncertainty aversion and emotional costs into account. However, this “heuristic defense” of speciesism uses a target attribute (rationality) that has implications of disrespect towards some atypical humans. Therefore, based on notions of impartiality and compassion, I argue for a morally better target attribute: sentience (“having a sense of well-being”). “Being a vertebrate” is suitable as a corresponding heuristic attribute because it is easy to detect and has a strong correlation with the target attribute of sentience.     

THE ENCHANTMENTS OF MAMMON: NOTES TOWARD A THEOLOGICAL HISTORY OF CAPITALISM

Tales of “disenchantment” dominate modern intellectual life, and especially accounts of the cultural history of capitalism. Yet Weberian sociology, and especially Marxist notions of “commodity fetishism”, point to the persistence of “enchantment” in the capitalist imagination. If we reformulate these notions of “enchantment” and “disenchantment” in theological terms of sacrament, then we can write new histories of capitalism, as well as articulate new forms of political and cultural criticism. Borrowing from “radical orthodoxy”, the author takes a Cook's Tour of “disenchantment”, explores the possibilities afforded by “sacramental” conceptions of materialism, and gestures toward an account of American cultural history shaped by a sacramental materialism.     

On ethics in personal construct theory

Abstract

In personal construct theory, people interpret the world in unique ways. Constructions are subjective representations rather than objective truths. This means that our ethical constructions are (a) potentially wrong, if there is an external moral reality we cannot access, or (b) no more inherently defensible than others’ ethical constructions, if all notions of “right” and “wrong” are personally constructed. Constructions promoting violence, hatred, and intolerance are as viable as those promoting peace, love, and acceptance. To overcome this ethical quandary individuals must create meaningful ethical constructions and have faith in them. This is difficult because, as constructivists, we see each person's constructions as legitimate and our own world views as merely constructions, themselves. Implications for moral righteousness are discussed.     

EVOLUTION,NATURALISM, AND THE WORTHWHILE: A CRITIQUE OF RICHARD JOYCE'S EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING OF MORALITY

Abstract: In The Evolution of Morality, Richard Joyce argues there is good reason to think that the “moral sense” is a biological adaptation, and that this provides a genealogy of the moral sense that has a debunking effect, driving us to the conclusion that “our moral beliefs are products of a process that is entirely independent of their truth, … we have no grounds one way or the other for maintaining these beliefs.” I argue that Joyce's skeptical conclusion is not warranted. Even if the moral sense is a biological adaptation, developed moralities (such as Aristotelian eudaimonism) can “co‐opt” it into new roles so that the moral judgments it makes possible can come to transcend the evolutionary process that is “entirely independent of their truth.” While evolutionary theory can shed much light on our shared human nature, moral theories must still be vindicated, or debunked, by moral arguments.     

“Internally Wicked”: Investigating How and Why Essentialism Influences Punitiveness and Moral Condemnation

Kant argued that individuals should be punished “proportional to their internal wickedness,” and recent work has demonstrated that essentialism—the notion that observable characteristics reflect internal, biological, unchanging “essences”—influences moral judgment. However, these efforts have yielded conflicting results: essentialism sometimes increases and sometimes decreases moral condemnation. To resolve these discrepancies, we investigated the mechanisms by which essentialism influences moral judgment, focusing on perceptions of actors’ control over their behavior, the target of essentialism (particular behaviors vs. actors’ character), and the component of essentialism (biology vs. immutability). Participants punished people described as having a criminal essence more than those with a non-criminal essence or no essence. Probing potential mechanisms underlying this effect, we found a mediating role for perceptions of control and weak influences of essentialism focus (behavior vs. character) and component of essentialism (biology vs. immutability). These results extend prior work on essentialism and moral cognition, demonstrating a causal link between perceptions of “internal wickedness” and moral judgment. Our findings also resolve discrepancies in past work on the influence of essentialism on moral judgment, highlighting the role that perceptions of actors’ control over their behavior play in moral condemnation.     

Spiritual But Not Religious? Beyond Binary Choices in the Study of Religion

“Spirituality” often has been framed in social science research as an alternative to organized “religion,” implicitly or explicitly extending theoretical arguments about the privatization of religion. This article uses in‐depth qualitative data from a religiously diverse U.S. sample to argue that this either/or distinction not only fails to capture the empirical reality of American religion, it does no justice to the complexity of spirituality. An inductive discursive analysis reveals four primary cultural “packages,” or ways in which people construct the meaning of spirituality in conversation: a Theistic Package tying spirituality to personal deities, an Extra‐Theistic Package locating spirituality in various naturalistic forms of transcendence, an Ethical Spirituality focusing on everyday compassion, and a contested Belief and Belonging Spirituality tied to cultural notions of religiosity. Spirituality, then, is neither a diffuse individualized phenomenon nor a single cultural alternative to “religion.” Analysis of the contested evaluations of Belief and Belonging Spirituality allows a window on the “moral boundary work” being done through identifying as “spiritual but not religious.” The empirical boundary between spirituality and religion is far more orous than is the moral and political one.     

Metaphysical Rationalism

The Principle of Sufficient Reason states that everything has an explanation. But different notions of explanation yield different versions of this principle. Here a version is formulated in terms of the notion of a “grounding” explanation. Its consequences are then explored, with particular emphasis on the fact that it implies necessitarianism, the view that every truth is necessarily true. Finally, the principle is defended from a number of objections, including objections to necessitarianism. The result is a defense of a “rationalist” metaphysics, one that constitutes an alternative to the contemporary dogmas that some aspects of the world are “metaphysically brute” and that the world could in so many ways have been different.     

Ideology and the Harms of Self-Deception: Why We Should Act to End Poverty

In thinking about global poverty, the question of moral motivation is of central importance: Why should the average person in the West feel morally compelled to do anything to help the poor? Various answers to this question have been constructed—and yet poverty persists. In this paper I will argue that, among other difficulties, the current approaches to the problem of poverty (from Peter Singer and Thomas Pogge) overlook a critical element: that poverty not only harms the poor, it harms every human being. Its existence forces us to live in a world where we are compelled by a pervasive ideology to eviscerate our own humanity and neglect our human impulses. Drawing on Karl Marx’s Aristotelian-influenced notion of our human essence as “species-being,” I will construct an account of moral motivation in the face of poverty that stems from a selfish desire to avoid these harms. Thus our moral impetus for acting to help the poor comes not from feelings of guilt about how poverty harms them, but rather from recognizing that poverty is harming all of us. By fighting against global poverty, we seek to make the world a better place for ourselves and the poor alike.     

A Preface to Ethics:

This essay outlines a new preface for ethics demanded by the massive developments of the global age. It does so in and through the comparative use of “myths” to explicate the lived structure of experience. The essay begins by isolating main features of global dynamics, including proximity, the compression of the world and the expansion of consciousness, and also global, cultural reflexivity. In the second step of the “preface,” it is argued that globality itself is a moral space in which peoples must orient their lives. It is a moral space defined by the massive extension of human power in the modern world. In light of the challenge that global dynamics and the extension of human power now pose, the essay then isolates, methodologically, options for developing a global ethics, and advocates a distinctly hermeneutical approach. This approach is practiced in the last section of the “preface” by engaging ethically the biblical “myth” of creation and its reinterpretation in an epitome of Jesus's Torah teaching. The intention is to show how current religious thought can speak to massive challenges in a distinctive way. It is, again, to offer a preface to ethics.     

Queerin’ the PGD Clinic

Disability activists influenced by queer theory and advocates of “human enhancement” have each disputed the idea that what is “normal” is normatively significant, which currently plays a key role in the regulation of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). Previously, I have argued that the only way to avoid the implication that parents have strong reasons to select children of one sex (most plausibly, female) over the other is to affirm the moral significance of sexually dimorphic human biological norms. After outlining the logic that generates this conclusion, I investigate the extent to which it might also facilitate an alternative, progressive, opening up of the notion of the normal and of the criteria against which we should evaluate the relative merits of different forms of embodiment. This paper therefore investigates the implications of ideas derived from queer theory for the future of PGD and of PGD for the future of queerness.     

The Perils of Shape Shifting: Harry Potter and Christian Fundamentalism

Some conservative Christians have condemned the Harry Potter series, claiming that the stories lure children into witchcraft and contain a completely relative morality. In this article, I posit that both of these concerns are deeply related to fundamentalist Christians’ perceptions of appropriate selfhood. Employing Robert Jay Lifton’s work on the evolving shape of postmodern personalities, I demonstrate that J. K. Rowling’s portrayal of magic is what Lifton would call “symbolic self-projection.” In so doing, I will show that these fundamentalist concerns are really objections to the notion that a “centered self” is the locus of moral control. The divide between the world of Harry Potter and that of fundamentalist Christians is really a struggle over the appropriate shape of the human personality.     

Well Founding Grounding Grounding

Those who wish to claim that all facts about grounding are themselves grounded (“the meta-grounding thesis”) must defend against the charge that such a claim leads to infinite regress and violates the well-foundedness of ground. In this paper, we defend. First, we explore three distinct but related notions of “well-founded”, which are often conflated, and three corresponding notions of infinite regress. We explore the entailment relations between these notions. We conclude that the meta-grounding thesis need not lead to tension with any of the three notions of “well-founded”. Finally, we explore the details of and motivations for further conditions on ground that one might add to generate a conflict between the meta-grounding thesis and a well-founded constraint. We explore these topics by developing and utilizing a formal framework based on the notion of a grounding structure.     

Consciousness as a logically consistent and prognostic model of reality

The work demonstrates that brain might reflect the external world causal relationships in the form of a logically consistent and prognostic model of reality, which shows up as consciousness. The paper analyses and solves the problem of statistical ambiguity and provides a formal model of causal relationships as probabilistic maximally specific rules. We suppose that brain makes all possible inferences from causal relationships. We prove that the suggested formal model has a property of an unambiguous inference: from consistent premises we infer a consistent conclusion. It enables a set of all inferences to form a consistent model of the perceived world. Causal relationships may create fixed points of cyclic inter-predictable properties. We consider the “natural” classification introduced by John St. Mill and demonstrate that a variety of fixed points of the objects’ attributes forms a “natural” classification of the external world. Then we consider notions of “natural” categories and causal models of categories, introduced by Eleanor Rosch and Bob Rehder and demonstrate that fixed points of causal relationships between objects attributes, which we perceive, formalize these notions. If the “natural” classification describes the objects of the external world, and “natural” concepts the perception of these objects, then the theory of integrated information, introduced by G. Tononi, describes the information processes of the brain for “natural” concepts formation that reflects the “natural” classification. We argue that integrated information provides high accuracy of the objects identification. A computer-based experiment is provided that illustrates fixed points formation for coded digits.     

Morally we Roll Along: (Optimistic Reflections) on Moral Progress

Changes over time in many large scale human practices such as science and technology seem best understood in terms of progress. Further, regarding such practices as slavery, we seem to have moved on and for the better, that is, to have progressed morally. But moral progress seems something different from other forms of progress. If possible at all, in what can it consist? Progress is understood as falling into three distinguishable categories; namely, progress as mere change, as change culminating in some end-state, and as change involving improvement or betterment. While scientific or economic progress seem of the last sort, moral progress is best understood as a hybrid of culminative change and improvement, a variety of progress labelled millenarian. Though there is an end towards which moral progress must tend, we do not know what it is. Further, moral progress must occupy a special superordinate and regulatory role regarding other progressive practices; that is, for moral progress to be possible, other progressive practices must come under the aegis of increasingly stringent moral regulation. This paper elaborates a model of moral progress, speculates upon signs of its presence, considers various relativist objections, and makes an exhortative plea for the need to have such a notion as a condition of the very possibility of moral progress.     

Intersubjectivity,otherness, and thirdness: A necessary relationship

The author proposes an interplay among the notions of otherness, intersubjectivity and thirdness with its coincidences and oppositions. Its polysemic nature is analyzed in this paper. The relation internal world–external world is at stake and concerns both the construction of subjectivity as well as the way the analytic relation is deemed to assume. This review focuses on the psychoanalytic developments from Freud to posfreudian and contemporary authors plus, at the same time, interdisciplinary proposals are also included. It is also revisited the notion of “analytic field”, proposed by Willy and Madeleine Baranger who, early as 1961‐62, underlined the transition from “the unipersonal to the intersubjective”, emphasizing that this was an expression of a change in the understanding of the analytic treatment. In this paper, the author argues that the concept of otherness introduces a symbolic aspect of decentring into the seeming interactive symmetry of intersubjectivity. At the same time, it is stressed that thirdness places a wedge into the between‐subjects, which opens the way from and to recognition of the other and others.     

Plumbing the Depths: A Recovery of Natural Law and Natural Wisdom in the Context of Debates about Evolutionary Purpose

I argue that the theological traditions of natural law and wisdom offer helpful meeting points in discussions about evolutionary “purpose” and contingency in relation to theological purpose, and serve to form the basis for a theology of nature. Natural law offers a way of describing the ordered action of God toward complexity in a contingent world without using the language of either “design” or “progress.” The theological tradition of wisdom as implicit in the natural world, learned in the human community, and received as gift of grace offers a further means of interconnecting biological reality with spiritual experience, while retaining distinctions. Wisdom and natural law intersect inasmuch as natural law is participation in Eternal Wisdom, although the latter makes sense only from the prior perspective of faith.