Individual Moral Development and Moral Progress

At first glance, one of the most obvious places to look for moral progress is in individuals, in particular in moral development from childhood to adulthood. In fact, that moral progress is possible is a foundational assumption of moral education. Beyond the general agreement that moral progress is not only possible but even a common feature of human development things become blurry, however. For what do we mean by ‘progress’? And what constitutes moral progress? Does the idea of individual moral progress presuppose a predetermined end or goal of moral education and development, or not? In this article we analyze the concept of moral progress to shed light on the psychology of moral development and vice versa; these analyses are found to be mutually supportive. We suggest that: moral progress should be conceived of as development that is evaluated positively on the basis of relatively stable moral criteria that are the fruit and the subject of an ongoing conversation; moral progress does not imply the idea of an end-state; individual moral progress is best conceived of as the development of various components of moral functioning and their robust integration in a person’s identity; both children and adults can progress morally - even though we would probably not speak in terms of progress in the case of children - but adults’ moral progress is both more hard-won and to a greater extent a personal project rather than a collective effort.     

Measuring Moral Progress

The study provides an in-depth analysis of two young adult subjects from a longitudinal study who underwent successive and significant developmental changes. Their developmental patterns, however, are only revealed by a new conception of moral stages, which is both more comprehensive and more detailed than Kohlberg’s original approach. In particular, the suggested alternative taxonomy neatly accommodates what appears as developmental anomalies in the Kohlbergian frame of reference. What is more, apart from merely matching with the observed data, the new theory also explains why the subjects developed the way they did, since it reveals the inherent cognitive conflicts at each stage and how these are resolved at the following one. Although the theory stands against the Kohlberg theory as it is, it may be understood as an extension and further development of the latter, in the sense that Kohlbergian stages are differentiated, supplemented, and theoretically substantiated within the new framework.

Moral Progress and Human Agency

The idea of moral progress is a necessary presupposition of action for beings like us. We must believe that moral progress is possible and that it might have been realized in human experience, if we are to be confident that continued human action can have any morally constructive point. I discuss the implications of this truth for moral psychology. I also show that once we understand the complex nature and the complicated social sources of moral progress, we will appreciate why we cannot construct a plausible comprehensive action-guiding theory of moral progress. Yet while the nature and sources of moral progress consistently thwart many theoretical hopes, the idea of moral progress is a plausible, critically important and morally constructive principle of historical interpretation.     

Moral Dilemmas,Collective Responsibility,and Moral Progress

Ruth Marcus has offered an account of moral dilemmas in which the presence of dilemmas acts as a motivating force, pushing us to try to minimize predicaments of moral conflict. In this paper, I defend a Marcus-style account of dilemmas against two objections: first, that if dilemmas are real, we are forced to blame those who have done their best, and second, that in some cases, even a stripped down version of blame seems inappropriate. My account highlights the importance of collective responsibility in understanding dilemmas, and I suggest that it sheds light on understanding moral progress.     

中西方心理健康标准的比较与整合

心理健康标准是心理健康研究中的重要理论问题。比较中西方心理健康标准,在研究恩路、自我观念、人格观念等方面存在差异,在重视人际关系的和谐、重视对自我和现实的认识、重视对人生意义的探索等方面有相似之处。整合中西方心理健康标准应重视探讨社会群体的心理健康标准;引导青少年树立正确的自我观念;塑造具有独立性与创造性的现代社会人格。     

A Biological Alternative to Moral Explanations

Some moral realists claim that moral facts are a species of natural fact, amenable to scientific investigation. They argue that these moral facts are needed in the best explanations of certain phenomena and that this is evidence that they are real. In this paper I present part of a biological account of the function of morality. The account allows the identification of a plausible natural kind that could play the explanatory role that a moral kind would play in naturalist realist theories. It is therefore a candidate for being the moral kind. I argue, however, that it will underdetermine the morally good, that is, identifying the kind is not sufficient to identify what is good. Hence this is not a natural moral kind. Its explanatory usefulness, however, means that we do not have to postulate any further (moral) facts to provide moral explanations. Hence there is no reason to believe that there are any natural moral kinds.     

Unpackaging Manager Mistrust in Allowing Telework: Comparing and Integrating Theoretical Perspectives

Purpose

We developed and tested an integrative model centering on the significance of trust as a basis for managers’ decisions about allowing versus prohibiting their employees to telework. We examined the importance of trust in relation to several other factors managers may consider in making telework decisions including coordination and communication, equity, and a desire to accommodate employees.

Design/Methodology/Approach

Study 1 was a policy capturing investigation of 71 respondents intended to document the relative importance and interactions among trust and these other theoretically based factors. Study 2 was a test of the full theoretical model based on the responses of 85 managers who reported on these considerations for the 191 employees about whom they make telework decisions.

Findings

Results from the two studies were largely consistent. Managers’ assessments of employees’ conscientiousness and trustworthiness were paramount in predicting telework allowance, with the other theoretically based considerations generally failing to attenuate the importance of those personal assessments.

Implications

Organizations wishing to increase the use of telework (e.g., by implementing manager telework training) must directly address managers’ mistrust as a factor underlying this resistance. Job-related and technological changes may not dampen the effects of mistrust.

Originality

To our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive and theoretically grounded assessment of the various considerations factoring into managers’ telework decisions.

     

The Idea of Moral Progress

This paper shows that moral progress is a substantive and plausible idea. Moral progress in belief involves deepening our grasp of existing moral concepts, while moral progress in practices involves realizing deepened moral understandings in behavior or social institutions. Moral insights could not be assimilated or widely disseminated if they involved devising and applying totally new moral concepts. Thus, it is argued, moral failures of past societies cannot be explained by appeal to ignorance of new moral ideas, but must be understood as resulting from refusals to subject social practices to critical scrutiny. Moral philosophy is not the main vehicle for disseminating morally progressive insights, though it has an important role in processes that lead to moral progress. Yet we have grounds for cautious optimism, since progressive moral insights can be disseminated and can, sometimes, have constructive social effects.     

Slavery,Carbon, and Moral Progress

My goal in this paper is to shed light on how moral progress actually occurs. I begin by restating a conception of moral progress that I set out in previous work, the “Naïve Conception,” and explain how it comports with various normative and metaethical views. I go on to develop an index of moral progress and show how judgments about moral progress can be made. I then discuss an example of moral progress from the past—the British abolition of the Atlantic slave trade—with a view to what can be learned from this for a contemporary struggle for moral progress: the movement to decarbonize the global economy. I close with some thoughts about how moral progress actually occurs.     

Rationalizing our Way into Moral Progress

Research suggests that the explicit reasoning we offer to ourselves and to others is often rationalization, that we act instead on instincts, inclinations, stereotypes, emotions, neurobiology, habits, reactions, evolutionary pressures, unexamined principles, or justifications other than the ones we think we’re acting on, then we tell a post hoc story to justify our actions. This is troubling for views of moral progress according to which moral progress proceeds from our engagement with our own and others’ reasons. I consider an account of rationalization, based on Robert Audi’s, to make clear that rationalization, unlike simple lying, can be sincere. Because it can be sincere, and because we also have a desire to be consistent with ourselves, I argue that rationalization sets us up for becoming better people over time, and that a similar case can be made to explain how moral progress among groups of people can proceed via rationalization.     

A Working Definition of Moral Progress

Essentially everyone agrees that the outlawing of slavery, or the beginning of women’s suffrage, or the defeat of Nazism constitute paradigmatic examples of moral progress in human history. But this consensus belies a deep division about the nature of moral progress more generally, a consequence of the foundational differences among and within normative traditions regarding the nature and scope of the ‘moral’ in moral progress. This essay proposes that philosophers might nonetheless converge on a working definition of moral progress by identifying a proxy property that reliably tracks moral progress, but which does not purport to be coextensive with the philosophically-relevant property. The aim of this essay is to identify this proxy property with emerging empirical measures of population welfare, and to show why this indicator of moral progress can garner overlapping consensus from a variety of normative traditions.     

论中国优秀道德传统的“文化土壤”

中华民族的传统道德源远流长,它的产生和发展是由中国的特定自然环境、社会历史条件和文化传统所决定的.中华民族优秀道德深深植根在肥沃的“文化土壤”中.所谓“文化土壤”,一般是指文化产生发展的背景.……     

The Varieties of Moral Improvement,or why Metaethical Constructivism must Explain Moral Progress

Among the available metaethical views, it would seem that moral realism—in particular moral naturalism—must explain the possibility of moral progress. We see this in the oft-used argument from disagreement against various moral realist views. My suggestion in this paper is that, surprisingly, metaethical constructivism has at least as pressing a need to explain moral progress. I take moral progress to be, minimally, the opportunity to access and to act in light of moral facts of the matter, whether they are mind-independent or -dependent. For the metaethical constructivist, however, I add that moral progress ought also mean that agents come to be or could come to be motivated to act in light of the right kind of moral judgments. Together I take this to mean that, for all forms of constructivism, moral progress must be explained as a form of moral improvement, or agents aspiring to be better sorts of moral agents. In what moral improvement consists differs for various forms of constructivism. Here I distinguish between three different versions of metaethical constructivism: Humean constructivists as represented by Street (2008, 2010, 2012), Kantian constitutivist constructivists as represented by Korsgaard, and constructivists about practical reason as represented by Carla Bagnoli (2002, 2013). I conclude by showing that only constructivism as a view about practical reason can fully account for moral progress qua the opportunity for moral improvement.     

道德理论的新进展--道德判断的社会直觉模式

道德判断的研究一直遵循皮亚杰和柯尔伯格的理性主义模式．但随着人们对认知双重过程论的逐渐认可,传统的道德判断理论受到了挑战。本文介绍了道德判断的一种新的理论模式——道德判断的社会直觉模式。该理论认为,道德判断是由迅速、自动的评价(直觉)所导致。