Can seeking happiness make people unhappy? [corrected] Paradoxical effects of valuing happiness

Happiness is a key ingredient of well-being. It is thus reasonable to expect that valuing happiness will have beneficial outcomes. We argue that this may not always be the case. Instead, valuing happiness could be self-defeating, because the more people value happiness, the more likely they will feel disappointed. This should apply particularly in positive situations, in which people have every reason to be happy. Two studies support this hypothesis. In Study 1, female participants who valued happiness more (vs. less) reported lower happiness when under conditions of low, but not high, life stress. In Study 2, compared to a control group, female participants who were experimentally induced to value happiness reacted less positively to a happy, but not a sad, emotion induction. This effect was mediated by participants' disappointment at their own feelings. Paradoxically, therefore, valuing happiness may lead people to be less happy just when happiness is within reach.     

In the mood to get over yourself: mood affects theory-of-mind use

Understanding others' behavior often involves attributing mental states to them by using one's "theory of mind." We argue that using theory of mind to recognize differences between one's own perspective and another's perspective is a deliberate process of inference that may be influenced by incidental mood. Because sadness is associated with more systematic and deliberate processing whereas happiness is associated with more heuristic processing, we predicted that theory-of-mind use would be facilitated by sadness compared with happiness. Two experiments supported this prediction, demonstrating that participants were more likely to utilize knowledge about others to make inferences about their mental states when they were induced to feel sad than when they were induced to feel happy. These results provide both theoretical insight into the psychological mechanisms that govern theory of mind as well as practical insight into a common source of variability in its use.     

Effects of discrete emotions on young children's suggestibility

Two experiments investigated the effects of sadness, anger, and happiness on 4- to 6-year-old children's memory and suggestibility concerning story events. In Experiment 1, children were presented with 3 interactive stories on a video monitor. The stories included protagonists who wanted to give the child a prize. After each story, the child completed a task to try to win the prize. The outcome of the child's effort was manipulated in order to elicit sadness, anger, or happiness. Children's emotions did not affect story recall, but children were more vulnerable to misleading questions about the stories when sad than when angry or happy. In Experiment 2, a story was presented and emotions were elicited using an autobiographical recall task. Children responded to misleading questions and then recalled the story for a different interviewer. Again, children's emotions did not affect the amount of story information recalled correctly, but sad children incorporated more information from misleading questions during recall than did angry or happy children. Sad children's greater suggestibility is discussed in terms of the differing problem-solving strategies associated with discrete emotions.     

Misery loves company: mood-congruent emotional responding to music

We examined emotional responding to music after mood induction. On each trial, listeners heard a 30-s music excerpt and rated how much they liked it, whether it sounded happy or sad, and how familiar it was. When the excerpts sounded unambiguously happy or sad (Experiment 1), the typical preference for happy-sounding music was eliminated after inducing a sad mood. When the excerpts sounded ambiguous with respect to happiness and sadness (Experiment 2), listeners perceived more sadness after inducing a sad mood. Sad moods had no influence on familiarity ratings (Experiments 1 and 2). These findings imply that "misery loves company." Listeners in a sad mood fail to show the typical preference for happy-sounding music, and they perceive more sadness in music that is ambiguous with respect to mood.     

Effects of children's emotional state on their reactions to emotional expressions: A search for congruency effects

Abstract

Three groups of 30 six-year-old children were tested to examine whether one's own happy or sad mood state causes a specific preference for happy or sad expressions in others, a systematic bias in the labelling of ambiguous expressions, and a selective memory for happy or sad expressions. In two of these groups, a happy or sad mood state was induced by a mental imagery procedure. The third group served as control subjects. It was found that all groups showed a distinct preference for happy faces. Happy children, however, tended to opt for extremely happy faces, whereas sad children chose mildly happy expressions. Furthermore, children (especially the children that received a happy mood induction) were inclined to interpret ambiguous expressions as being congruent with their own mood state. Finally, the “sad” group recalled fewer expressions correctly than the other two, irrespective of the nature of these expressions. Overall, the happy face was more often correctly identified than the sad one.     

Not all happy people are lazy or stupid: Evidence of systematic processing in happy moods

Two experiments investigated the effects of mood on the use of global trait information in impression formation tasks. Participants in both experiments formed an impression of a target based on traits and a series of behaviors that were both consistent and inconsistent with the traits. In Experiment 1, participants in happy moods, relative to those in unhappy moods, made impression judgments that reflected the evaluative implications of the trait information to a greater extent than the behaviors, regardless of the order in which they received the information. In Experiment 2, both happy and sad participants engaged in systematic processing, as reflected by the recall data, but only happy participants’ recall of target information was significantly biased by the global trait information they received. These findings are consistent with the affect-as-information model in which affective cues influence the extent to which individuals rely on general knowledge and, importantly, are inconsistent with models that posit that happiness results in reduced motivation or ability to process information carefully.     

Emotional language processing: how mood affects integration processes during discourse comprehension

This research tests whether mood affects semantic processing during discourse comprehension by facilitating integration of information congruent with moods’ valence. Participants in happy, sad, or neutral moods listened to stories with positive or negative endings during EEG recording. N400 peak amplitudes showed mood congruence for happy and sad participants: endings incongruent with participants’ moods demonstrated larger peaks. Happy and neutral moods exhibited larger peaks for negative endings, thus showing a similarity between negativity bias (neutral mood) and mood congruence (happy mood). Mood congruence resulted in differential processing of negative information: happy mood showed larger amplitudes for negative endings than neutral mood, and sad mood showed smaller amplitudes. N400 peaks were also sensitive to whether ending valence was communicated directly or as a result of inference. This effect was moderately modulated by mood. In conclusion, the notion of context for discourse processing should include comprehenders’ affective states preceding language processing.     

Effects of emotional state on lexical decision performance

The effect of emotional state on lexical processing was investigated. Subjects were randomly assigned to either a happy or sad mood condition. Emotional state was then induced by listening to 8 min of classical music previously rated to induce happy or sad moods. Response times and error rates were analyzed in a lexical decision task involving sad words, happy words, and pseudowords. Results suggest that emotion aided the participants in responding to emotion-congruent stimuli. The sad group responded faster than the happy group to sad words and the happy group responded faster than the sad group to happy words. Results are discussed with regard to information processing and emotion.     

Seeing the big picture: Broadening attention relieves sadness and depressed mood

We examined whether the broadened attentional scope would affect people's sad or depressed mood with two experiments, enlightened by the meaning of “seeing the big picture” and the broaden‐and‐build model. Experiment 1 (n = 164) is a laboratory‐based experiment, in which we manipulated the attentional scope by showing participants zoomed‐out or zoomed‐in scenes. In Experiment 2 (n = 44), we studied how depressed mood and positive and negative emotions were affected when participants watched distant versus proximal scenes for eight weeks in real life. Healthy participants in Experiment 1, who were induced to feel sad, could return to the baseline mood after having the broadened attention task but not after having the narrowed attention task, which indicated that immediate attention broadening manipulation could function as antidotes for the lingering effects of induced negative emotions. Participants with depressed mood in Experiment 2 showed reduced depressed mood, increased positive affect, and decreased negative affect after receiving attention broadening training compared to those receiving attention narrowing training. Our findings suggest a robust role of broadened attentional scope in relieving negative emotions and even mildly depressed mood in the long run.     

When the ends outweigh the means: mood and level of identification in depression

Research in healthy controls has found that mood influences cognitive processing via level of action identification: happy moods are associated with global and abstract processing; sad moods are associated with local and concrete processing. However, this pattern seems inconsistent with the high level of abstract processing observed in depressed patients, leading Watkins (2008, 2010) to hypothesise that the association between mood and level of goal/action identification is impaired in depression. We tested this hypothesis by measuring level of identification on the Behavioural Identification Form after happy and sad mood inductions in never-depressed controls and currently depressed patients. Participants used increasingly concrete action identifications as they became sadder and less happy, but this effect was moderated by depression status. Consistent with Watkins' (2008) hypothesis, increases in sad mood and decreases in happiness were associated with shifts towards the use of more concrete action identifications in never-depressed individuals, but not in depressed patients. These findings suggest that the putatively adaptive association between mood and level of identification is impaired in major depression.     

Effects of induced sad mood on facial emotion perception in young and older adults

Older adults perceive less intense negative emotion in facial expressions compared to younger counterparts. Prior research has also demonstrated that mood alters facial emotion perception. Nevertheless, there is little evidence which evaluates the interactive effects of age and mood on emotion perception. This study investigated the effects of sad mood on younger and older adults’ perception of emotional and neutral faces. Participants rated the intensity of stimuli while listening to sad music and in silence. Measures of mood were administered. Younger and older participants’ rated sad faces as displaying stronger sadness when they experienced sad mood. While younger participants showed no influence of sad mood on happiness ratings of happy faces, older adults rated happy faces as conveying less happiness when they experienced sad mood. This study demonstrates how emotion perception can change when a controlled mood induction procedure is applied to alter mood in young and older participants.     

Influence of mood on health-relevant cognitions

Three experiments assessed the effects of mood on symptom appraisal, health behavior self-efficacy, outcome expectations, and perceptions of vulnerability. Ss in Experiments 1 and 2 were acutely ill, whereas Ss in Experiment 3 were healthy. In each experiment, happy, sad, and neutral moods were induced. In Experiment 1, Ss who experienced sadness reported more aches and pains and greater discomfort than happy Ss. Sad Ss were less confident that they could carry out illness-alleviating behaviors. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that mood's influence on vulnerability perceptions is moderated by health status. Although mood had little impact on perceptions of vulnerability among ill Ss, probability estimates of future negative health-relevant events among healthy Ss were mood sensitive. Seeing oneself as invulnerable to future negative events was accentuated among happy Ss and attenuated among sad Ss. Mood may be an important determinant of care seeking, adherence, and recovery from illness.     

Aggressive Outcomes and Videogame Play: The Role of Length of Play and the Mechanisms at Work

We conducted three experiments to rectify methodological limitations of prior studies on selective exposure to music and, thereby, clarify the nature of the impact of sad mood on music preference. In all studies, we experimentally manipulated mood (sad vs. neutral in Experiments 1 and 2; sad vs. neutral vs. happy in Experiment 3) and then assessed participants' preferences for expressively happy versus sad musical selections. To further help illuminate the reasons for their music preferences, we also asked participants to indicate how they believed listening to each song would affect their current emotional state as well as how appropriate they felt it would be to select a given song. Results suggested that individuals in sad moods were not reliably inclined to listen to sad songs, but rather, were strongly averse to listening to happy songs, apparently out of concern that choosing such songs would feel inappropriate. We discuss implications of these findings for theories of selective media exposure and emotion regulation.     

Further evidence for mixed emotions

Emotion theorists have long debated whether valence, which ranges from pleasant to unpleasant states, is an irreducible aspect of the experience of emotion or whether positivity and negativity are separable in experience. If valence is irreducible, it follows that people cannot feel happy and sad at the same time. Conversely, if positivity and negativity are separable, people may be able to experience such mixed emotions. The authors tested several alternative interpretations for prior evidence that happiness and sadness can co-occur in bittersweet situations (i.e., those containing both pleasant and unpleasant aspects). One possibility is that subjects who reported mixed emotions merely vacillated between happiness and sadness. The authors tested this hypothesis in Studies 1-3 by asking subjects to complete online continuous measures of happiness and sadness. Subjects reported more simultaneously mixed emotions during a bittersweet film clip than during a control clip. Another possibility is that subjects in earlier studies reported mixed emotions only because they were explicitly asked whether they felt happy and sad. The authors tested this hypothesis in Studies 4-6 with open-ended measures of emotion. Subjects were more likely to report mixed emotions after the bittersweet clip than the control clip. Both patterns occurred even when subjects were told that they were not expected to report mixed emotions (Studies 2 and 5) and among subjects who did not previously believe that people could simultaneously feel happy and sad (Studies 3 and 6). These results provide further evidence that positivity and negativity are separable in experience.     

Visual search for emotional faces in children

The ability to rapidly detect facial expressions of anger and threat over other salient expressions has adaptive value across the lifespan. Although studies have demonstrated this threat superiority effect in adults, surprisingly little research has examined the development of this process over the childhood period. In this study, we examined the efficiency of children's facial processing in visual search tasks. In Experiment 1, children (N=49) aged 8 to 11 years were faster and more accurate in detecting angry target faces embedded in neutral backgrounds than vice versa, and they were slower in detecting the absence of a discrepant face among angry than among neutral faces. This search pattern was unaffected by an increase in matrix size. Faster detection of angry than neutral deviants may reflect that angry faces stand out more among neutral faces than vice versa, or that detection of neutral faces is slowed by the presence of surrounding angry distracters. When keeping the background constant in Experiment 2, children (N=35) aged 8 to 11 years were faster and more accurate in detecting angry than sad or happy target faces among neutral background faces. Moreover, children with higher levels of anxiety were quicker to find both angry and sad faces whereas low anxious children showed an advantage for angry faces only. Results suggest a threat superiority effect in processing facial expressions in young children as in adults and that increased sensitivity for negative faces may be characteristic of children with anxiety problems.     

When the ends outweigh the means: Mood and level of identification in depression

Research in healthy controls has found that mood influences cognitive processing via level of action identification: happy moods are associated with global and abstract processing; sad moods are associated with local and concrete processing. However, this pattern seems inconsistent with the high level of abstract processing observed in depressed patients, leading Watkins (2008, 2010) to hypothesise that the association between mood and level of goal/action identification is impaired in depression. We tested this hypothesis by measuring level of identification on the Behavioural Identification Form after happy and sad mood inductions in never-depressed controls and currently depressed patients. Participants used increasingly concrete action identifications as they became sadder and less happy, but this effect was moderated by depression status. Consistent with Watkins' (2008) hypothesis, increases in sad mood and decreases in happiness were associated with shifts towards the use of more concrete action identifications in never-depressed individuals, but not in depressed patients. These findings suggest that the putatively adaptive association between mood and level of identification is impaired in major depression.     

Abstract recall of a happy memory to repair sad mood in dysphoria: A possible link to negative cognition

The capacity to repair sad mood through the deliberate recall of happy memories has been found to be impaired in dysphoric individuals. Rumination, or adopting an abstract processing mode, has been proposed as a possible mechanism underpinning this effect. In low and high dysphoric participants, we examined the relative consequences of adopting an abstract or concrete processing mode during happy memory recall or engaging in distraction for (1) mood repair and (2) cognitive content. Recalling a happy memory in either an abstract or concrete way resulted in greater happiness than distraction. Engaging in abstract recall of a happy memory resulted in high dysphoric participants generating negative evaluations and negative generalisations. These findings raise the interesting possibility that abstract processing of positive memories has the potential to generate negative cognition.     

Mood-congruent and mood-incongruent learning

We report two experiments that investigate the effect of an induced mood on the incidental learning of emotionally toned words. Subjects were put in a happy or sad mood by means of a suggestion technique and rated the emotional valence of a list of words. Later on, they were asked to recall the words in a neutral mood. For words with a strong emotional valence, mood-congruent learning was observed: strongly unpleasant words were recalled better by sad subjects and strongly pleasant words were recalled better by happy subjects. The reverse was true for slightly toned words: here, mood-incongruent learning was observed. Both effects are predicted by a two component processing model that specifies the effect of the mood on the cognitive processes during learning. Further evidence for the model is given by rating times measured in Experiment 2.     

Null effect of mood as a semantic prime.

Semantic tasks, such as lexical decision making and word recognition, have not produced a mood priming effect. Earlier studies have been criticized because they included (a) mood induction techniques that required instruction to feel the mood, and (b) the use of overlearned tasks that did not require controlled processing. In this pair of experiments, the authors attempted to address these criticisms. However, the results of this study did not demonstrate a mood priming effect for happy and sad subjects who appraised sentence content as being happy or sad. The results of this study supported the dissociation of semantic and episodic memory.