共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 281 毫秒
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Karen Green 《Philosophia》2001,28(1-4):511-529
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Sarah Hutton 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2019,27(4):684-701
ABSTRACTIt is only in the last 30 years that any appreciable work has been done on women philosophers of the past. This paper reflects on the progress that has been made in recovering early-modern women philosophers in that time and the role of the history of philosophy in that process. I argue that as women are integrated into the broader picture of philosophy, there is a danger of overlooking the different conditions under which they originally philosophized and which shaped their philosophies. Having retrieved them from oblivion, we now face the challenge of avoiding a ‘new amnesia’ by developing historical narratives and modes of analysis which acknowledge the different conditions within which they worked, without diminishing their contribution to philosophy. I offer these remarks as a contribution to current debates about the forms that historical narrative should take, and the best way to promote women in philosophy today, in the belief that we can learn from our own more recent history. 相似文献
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Stephen Buckle 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(1):111-150
Humanism is most commonly used as a prefabricated answer, covering the injunction to place man at the centre of our preoccupations, not to succumb to the risk of subordinating him to anything else, when dealing with nature, history, economics or politics, with means and with ends. In this sense humanism is supposed to be the remedy for all evils. But this sort of answer is only possible against a background where the question of humanism is forgotten. To return to the question of humanism is to open a line of questioning about the presuppositions of a thinking which makes man the centre of nature and of history. But if we bring these presuppositions to light, will humanism still be able to remain an acceptable answer? Shouldn't we, on the contrary, call it radically into question? – as the instrument, or the mask, of a project for domination – a project of which man has forever sought to be the vector. Levinas showed the invalidity of the conception of humanism which is dominant in the philosophical tradition, not in order to give way to the shortcomings of anti-humanism, but to re-found humanism in a different way. 相似文献
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Charles L. Griswold Jr. 《Continental Philosophy Review》1996,29(2):187-213
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Thora Ilin Bayer 《The Journal of value inquiry》1993,27(3-4):431-441
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Ignatius J. H. Ts'ao 《Studies in East European Thought》1972,12(3):231-244
In Ai Ssu-ch'i is exemplified and substantiated the Soviet influence on the official definition of philosophy in the history of Communist Party of China, i.e., the assertion about and the method for knowledge of the world. Such a philosophical knowledge has as its formal object the most fundamental laws of the universe.In order to acquire such a genuine philosophical knowledge, one needs a desire to change the world and a proletarian point of view. For only by aiming at changing the world is inevitability reflected; only in the proletarian viewpoint are the objective laws reflected. In order to substantiate these assertions, one has to point out that, first, man's thinking is determined by his social relations (economic relationships) and, secondly, social relations are determined by practice. Since the proletariat is in the right kind of practice, it is both in the proper locus of social relations and, therefore, it perceives both inevitability and objectivity. Yet, due to man's subjective dynamism, it is possible for other classes to adopt the standpoint of the proletariat.For Paper I seeSST 12 (April 1972) 2–36. The reader will find there the Chinese titles and Ai's bibliographical data (Numbers in brackets in this study refer to the list of Chinese names at the end of Paper I.) 相似文献
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Sanford C. Goldberg 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):105-117
The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary
condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some
of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and reject some candidate
solutions, compare the issue with ones arising in discussions about disagreement, and offer a brief assessment of our predicament.
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Sanford C. GoldbergEmail: |