Constructing naive theories of motion on the fly

People often make erroneous predictions about the trajectories of moving objects. McCloskey (1983a, 1983b) and others have suggested that many of these errors stem from well-developed, but naive, theories of motion. The studies presented here examine the role of naive impetus theory in people’s judgments of motion. Subjects with and without formal physics experience were asked to draw or select from alternatives the trajectories of moving objects that were presented in various manners. Results from two experiments indicate that both trajectory judgments and explanations were affected by specific response and display features of the problem. In addition, these data provide little evidence that naive impetus theory plays a significant role in subjects’ performance; instead, they suggest that motion judgments and explanations are constructed on the fly from contextual cues and knowledge that is not necessarily naive.     

The influence of naive causal theories on lay concepts of mental illness

Two experiments, incorporating both real-life (Experiment 1) and artificial (Experiment 2) stimuli, demonstrated that lay concepts of mental disorders can be reliably predicted from subjects' naive causal theories about those disorders. Symptoms that are deeper causes (X, where X causes Y, which causes Z) are more important in lay concepts than intermediate causes (Y), which in turn are more important than terminal effects (Z). In addition, symptoms that cause or are caused by other symptoms are more important in lay concepts than symptoms not participating in any causal relationships. Implications of these results for current models of categorization and for research on lay theories of mental disorders are discussed, and future directions for research are suggested.     

The relation between essentialist beliefs and evolutionary reasoning

Historians of science have pointed to essentialist beliefs about species as major impediments to the discovery of natural selection. The present study investigated whether such beliefs are impediments to learning this concept as well. Participants (43 children aged 4–9 and 34 adults) were asked to judge the variability of various behavioral and anatomical properties across different members of the same species. Adults who accepted within-species variation—both actual and potential—were significantly more likely to demonstrate a selection-based understanding of evolution than adults who denied within-species variation. The latter demonstrated an alternative, incorrect understanding of evolution and produced response patterns that were both quantitatively and qualitatively similar to those produced by preschool-aged children. Overall, it is argued that psychological essentialism, although a useful bias for drawing species-wide inductions, leads individuals to devalue within-species variation and, consequently, to fail to understand natural selection.     

Chilean children's essentialist reasoning about poverty

Two studies are reported that examine the hypothesis that children construct representations of poverty based on a theory of causal essentialism. One hundred and twenty Chilean kindergartners, half from low socio‐economic status (SES) schools and the other half from high‐SES schools, participated in the study. The results showed children's tendency towards an essentialist reasoning about poverty. All children in the study privileged internal features over external ones when deciding who is poor, and also used wealth category as a preferred clue to make inferences about people's attributes. However, only high‐SES children's answers were consistent with the belief that poverty is inherited and resistant to growth. Implications of these findings for theory and practice, as well as remaining questions, are addressed.     

Effects of product type and contextual cues on eliciting naive theories of popularity and exclusivity

This research shows in a series of studies that exposing consumers to functional products evokes the naive theory of popularity, whereas exposing them to self-expressive products induces belief in the naive theory of exclusivity. The research further demonstrates that when the naive theory elicited by product type is matched by the appropriate contextual purchasing cues regarding the interest of others, it results in greater purchase intentions than when those cues are mismatched. The research specifies that the matching effect for functional products is mediated by consumers' perceptions of product quality, whereas mediation for self-expressive products occurs through consumers' self-perceptions regarding the extent to which the product conveys uniqueness. Finally, the research illustrates that an explicit signal of product quality (e.g., a favorable rating in Consumer Reports) attenuates the effect associated with the contextual cues regarding the interest of others.     

Children's essentialist reasoning about language and race

Across four studies, we directly compared children's essentialist reasoning about the stability of race and language throughout an individual's lifespan. Monolingual English-speaking children were presented with a series of images of children who were either White or Black; each face was paired with a voice clip in either English or French. Participants were asked which of two adults each target child would grow up to be - one who was a 'match' to the target child in race but not language, and the other a 'match' in language but not race. Nine- to 10-year-old European American children chose the race-match, rather than the language-match. In contrast, 5-6-year-old European American children in both urban, racially diverse, and rural, racially homogeneous environments chose the language-match, even though this necessarily meant that the target child would transform racial categories. Although surprising in light of adult reasoning, these young children demonstrated an intuition about the relative stability of an individual's language compared to her racial group membership. Yet, 5-6-year-old African American children, similar to the older European American children, chose the race-match, suggesting that membership in a racial minority group may highlight children's reasoning about race as a stable category. Theoretical implications for our understanding of children's categorization of human kinds are discussed.     

Scattered naive theories:: why the human mind is isomorphic to the internet web

This paper constitutes an attempt to derive the epistemological consequences of what is known in cognitive, developmental, and social psychology on the nature of naive theories. The process of cognitive development and knowledge acquisition is such that uncoordinated knowledge must result. There is no process active in long-term memory to harmonize inconsistent parts. Coordination takes place in working memory (WM), and cognitive psychology has long established its extreme exiguity. Units of explanation and domains of coherence are therefore small. This is, indeed, a limitation of our cognition, but it is tenable pragmatically. Naive theories, on any one issue, do not form, psychologically, cognitively, a natural kind. These theses about how our knowledge is acquired, organized, accessed, and used help to bring out how one should think about naive theories.     

Correction to: Reconsidering the dispositional essentialist canon

Philosophical Studies - A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01620-5     

Mental disorder as a black box essentialist concept.

This is a reply to commentaries on the target article (J. C. Wakefield, 1999) on the evolutionary foundations of the concept of mental disorder in defense of the harmful dysfunction analysis (HDA) of disorder. The author argues that the HDA is adequate to explain disorder and nondisorder judgments and is not disconfirmed by any of the claimed counterexamples put forward by the commentators; the commentators' proposed alternatives to the HDA are inadequate to explain disorder and nondisorder judgments; and the concept of natural function is a factual, scientific concept, contrary to K. W. M. Fulford's (1999) claim that it is inherently evaluative. The foundations of the HDA are clarified by providing a black box essentialist analysis (H. Putnam, 1975; J. C. Wakefield, 1997, in press) of the concept of natural function that underlies the concept of disorder.     

The integration problem for naive realism

This paper makes explicit the basic problem perfect hallucinations pose for perceptual naive realists, more fundamental than the well-trodden Screening-off Problem. The deeper problem offers the basis for an overarching classification of the available naive- realist-friendly approaches to perfect hallucinations. In the course of laying out the challenges to the different types of response, the paper makes a case for the superiority of a particular approach to perfect hallucinations, on which they would be understood as a special kind of perceptual anomaly—arising from a secondary mode of perceptual processing.     

The dimensions of stage theories

Stage theories are commonly used to represent the structure of cognitive processes in the domains of cognitive processing and cognitive development. Hierarchical unidimensional theories consisting of a single sequence of stages through which development proceeds in one direction only have predominated. However, a review of stage theories revealed that a two-dimensional, interactive (multidimensional) structure is warranted. Particularly in the area of cognitive development, results of research have supported subdivision of the stages of prominent unidimensional theories. Following this trend a small number of theorists have developed multidimensional theories, most of which consist of a sequence of stages in which each stage contains a number of subsidiary stages or levels. The emergence of a similar trend in other domains is examined, and the prospects of using an existing multidimensional framework to enable future comparisons and integration of different stage theories is explored.