Substitution Logic: An Extension of Syllogism

I examine the theoretical difficulties of Aristotle’s syllogism and the traditional syllogism. I propose a more unified ordinary thinking logic different from the syllogism. I show that the new logic based on the substitution of thinking elements can be used to describe the reasoning process of human minds more properly, bypassing rigid figures, moods and cumbersome rules of the syllogism. I also show that the new logic combines the categorical inference with relation and modal inferences, expanding the scope of the syllogism so that more complex quantification inferences can be captured. I conclude that the substitution of thinking elements is the basic characteristics of human thinking, and the substitutions can be further applied not only to all research fields of abstract and image thinking but also to practical fields of action methodology.     

Influence of familiar features on diagnosis: instantiated features in an applied setting

Medical diagnosis can be viewed as a categorization task. There are two mechanisms whereby humans make categorical judgments: "analytical reasoning," based on explicit consideration of features and "nonanalytical reasoning," an unconscious holistic process of matching against prior exemplars. However, there is evidence that prior experience can also operate at the level of individual "instantiated" features (Brooks & Hannah, 2006). The present studies examined instantiated features in medical diagnosis. Four "pseudopsychiatric" conditions, each described by four characteristic features, were taught to undergraduate psychology students. They practiced on additional cases, then were tested on new cases with features from two conditions. In Experiment 1, diagnoses associated with familiar features presented one or three times during practice were assigned a higher probability than those with novel features. Experiment 2 showed that the impact of feature frequency was dependent on its consistency with the case diagnosis. Experiment 3 showed that the effect of feature familiarity was not confined to cases with two equiprobable diagnoses. Experiment 4 showed that the effect remained after a 24 hour delay. These four studies demonstrated that features seen in practice have a greater influence on diagnosis than novel synonyms. In fact, seeing a feature once within the appropriate context (a patient case in which it is a member of the primary diagnosis) was sufficient to form a diagnostic association equivalent to instantiations seen four times in a different context. The results of these studies have implications for theories of categorization and for teaching clinical reasoning.     

The three paradoxes lost a response to Moore and Hutchins

Moore and Hutchin's [1] assertion that the application of classical logic as the method of diagnostic reasoning may result in three paradoxes is critically examined.     

中外两种推理理论的实验比较研究

通过两个实验对中国学者提出的“推理题与推理者的推理知识双重结构模型”和Evans提出的“双重加工理论”进行了实验比较研究。实验一通过两种评定方法对相应性质命题进行评定后所得实验结果表明Evans等(1983)有关“信念效应”研究中的“结论可信性”变量可以视为与胡竹菁等(1996)实验中的“内容正确性”变量是同一性质的变量; 实验二根据“形式正确性”和“内容正确性”两个自变量设计的推理实验结果与Evans等(1983)的研究结果基本一致; 但增加“内容熟悉性”这一自变量设计的推理实验结果表明“推理题与推理者的推理知识双重结构模型”比Evans提出的“双重加工理论”能更好地解释推理者对性质三段论的推理结果。     

What is diagnosis? Some critical reflections

It is argued that the common definition of diagnosis as ‘the determination of the nature of a disease’ is misleading. Many diagnoses are not the names of disease entities. This finding reflects the integral relation of the diagnostic task to the rest of clinical reasoning. Diagnosis has no separate goal of its own, in particular it does not have the goal of determining the nature of a disease. Instead, diagnosis contributes to the general goals of clinical medicine. Any attempt to model diagnostic reasoning abstracted from the rest of clinical reasoning will yield an inadequate representation of diagnosis. Such a distortion of medical reasoning will blind us to whatever implications an adequate epistemology of medicine may have for an understanding of the relation between theoretical and practical knowledge in other contexts.     

论推类逻辑与中国古代医学

推类逻辑就是基于“推类”的中国古代逻辑。易数推类为中医科学提供了一个有效工具,提供了一个有效地认识自然、机体（肌体）、疾病的方法。取象比类是中医思维的核心,推类是中国古代医学辨证论治的基本方法。推类具有很强的具象性,并以比类为基础。     

Do Hypothetical Imperatives Require Categorical Imperatives?

Abstract: Recently, the idea that every hypothetical imperative must somehow be 'backed up' by a prior categorical imperative has gained a certain influence among Kant interpreters and ethicists influenced by Kant. Since instrumentalism is the position that holds that hypothetical imperatives can by themselves and without the aid of categorical imperatives explain all valid forms of practical reasoning, the influential idea amounts to a rejection of instrumentalism as internally incoherent. This paper argues against this prevailing view both as an interpretation of Kant and as philosophical understanding of practical reason. In particular, it will be argued that many of the arguments that claim to show that hypothetical imperatives must be backed up by categorical imperatives mistakenly assume that the form of practical reasoning must itself occur as a premise within the reasoning. An alternative to this assumption will be offered. I will conclude that while instrumentalism may well be false, there is no reason to believe it is incoherent.     

Evidence for parallel semantic memory retrieval in dual tasks

In this dual-task study, we applied both cross-talk logic and locus-of-slack logic to test whether participants can retrieve semantic categories in Task 2 in parallel to Task 1 bottleneck processing. Whereas cross-talk logic can detect parallel memory retrieval only in conditions of categorical overlap between tasks, the locus-of-slack approach is independent of such restrictions. As was expected, using the cross-talk logic, we found clear evidence for parallel retrieval of semantic categories when there was categorical overlap between tasks (Experiment 1). Locus-of-slack-based evidence for parallel semantic retrieval was found, however, both in conditions with (Experiment 1) and in those without (Experiment 2) categorical overlap between tasks. Crucially,however, increasing the demand for resources required to switch from Task 1 to Task 2 eliminated even the locus-of-slack-based evidence for parallel memory retrieval during the psychological refractory period (Experiment 3). Together, our results suggest that parallel retrieval is not bound to conditions of categorical overlap between tasks but, instead, is contingent upon resources needed for switching between tasks (e.g., Oriet, Tombu, & Jolicoeur, 2005).     

Who is susceptible to conjunction fallacies in category-based induction?

Recent evidence suggests that the conjunction fallacy observed in people’s probabilistic reasoning is also to be found in their evaluations of inductive argument strength. We presented 130 participants with materials likely to produce a conjunction fallacy either by virtue of a shared categorical or a causal relationship between the categories in the argument. We also took a measure of participants’ cognitive ability. We observed conjunction fallacies overall with both sets of materials but found an association with ability for the categorical materials only. Our results have implications for accounts of individual differences in reasoning, for the relevance theory of induction, and for the recent claim that causal knowledge is important in inductive reasoning.     

逻辑训练对不同理性思维方式大学生三段论推理的影响

采用理性—经验思维方式量表对105名大学生进行测量,选出高、低理性思维方式各35名大学生进行实验,探讨了逻辑训练对不同理性思维方式大学生三段论推理的影响。结果表明：(1)高理性思维方式个体三段论推理的平均反应时快于低理性思维方式个体;非冲突类型题目推理的平均正确率高于冲突类型题目;逻辑训练可以提高个体三段论推理的平均反应时和正确率;(2)逻辑训练后非冲突任务类型题目的平均正确率高于冲突任务类型题目;(3)逻辑训练对低理性思维方式个体冲突任务类型题目平均正确率的提高效果更明显。这意味着逻辑训练可以显著提升个体的推理成绩,但不能完全消除信念偏差对推理的影响,而且逻辑训练对低理性思维方式个体推理成绩的提升效果更加明显。     

Husserl’s Foundation of the Formal Sciences in his “Logical Investigations”

This article is composed of three sections that investigate the epistemological foundations of Husserl’s idea of logic from the Logical Investigations. First, it shows the general structure of this logic. Husserl conceives of logic as a comprehensive, multi-layered theory of possible theories that has its most fundamental level in a doctrine of meaning. This doctrine aims to determine the elementary categories that constitute every possible meaning (meaning-categories). The second section presents the main idea of Husserl’s search for an epistemological foundation for knowledge, science and logic. Their epistemological clarification can only be reached through a detailed analysis of the structure of those intentions that give us what is meant in our intentions. To reveal the intuitive giveness of logical forms is the ultimate aim of Husserl’s epistemology of logic. Logical forms and meaning-categories can only be given in a certain higher-order intuition that Husserl calls categorical intuition. The third section of this article distinguishes different kinds of categorical intuition and shows how the most basic logical categories and concepts are given to us in a categorical abstraction.     

存在图的逻辑地位——批评与回应

存在图是继欧拉图、文恩图和皮尔士一文恩图之后的又一种逻辑图。逻辑图是指用于表示命题和推理的二维图形。然而由于存在图之前的逻辑图在表达能力上的缺陷以及现代数理逻辑的成功,长期以来存在图并未引起人们的关注。直到近来计算机表示的图示推理发展起来以后人们才认识到它的重要性,并把它作为一种图式逻辑纳入了哲学逻辑的范畴。人们对存在图逻辑地位的认可经历了一个复杂的过程。存在图在被认可道路上遇到了逻辑系统身份、推理效率和阐述的精确性三个问题,随着这三个问题的解决,人们逐渐认可了存在图的逻辑地位。     

Dimensional models for research and diagnosis: a current dilemma

This commentary focuses on the current dilemma regarding the application of dimensional models for research and diagnosis. Four articles are used to review the positive contributions of dimensional approaches. Although categorical approaches are integral in deciding the characteristics of the group to be studied (i.e., development of inclusion/exclusion criteria), the generation of cutpoints for categorical classification is, in reality, working with dimensional data. Ultimately, new methodological strategies need to be incorporated that address both categorical and dimensional aspects of the overall diagnostic framework. These refinements will be vital in determining the extent and reality of co-occurrence of disorder and the determination of boundaries across specific disorders.     

Hypothetico-nomological aspects of medical diagnosis Part I: General structure of the diagnostic process and its hypothesis-directed stage

In medical diagnostic examination three main stages may be distinguished: (a) initial exploration, (b) hypothesis-directed investigation, and (c) final diagnosis making. The purpose of this work is to study some methodological problems concerning the second of the above stages of the diagnosis and to prepare a background for a mathematical model [30] of this process. In diagnostic problem solving, the reasoning proceeds along the main lines traced by some initial suggestions and passes through various intermediate elements which are connected with one another forming ramifying chains and nets of inferences and hypotheses. Such a complex mental construction is based on laws which form medical knowledge and reflect various regularities and relations, causal, structural, functional, and others. The main components of diagnostic reasoning may be divided into several classes according to their function and content: leading hypotheses, working hypotheses, main diagnostic hypotheses, statements accepted as certain, intermediary and reserve hypotheses, therapeutic suggestions of immediate consequence. In an example of diagnostic problem solving these types of propositions are defined and analysed. In diagnostic reasoning, as in every other process of rational problem solving, explanation of the observed symptoms and signs and testing of the explaining hypotheses play a predominant role. These procedures form successive, frequently numerous and diversified steps and stages of the reasoning, leading to the construction of a mental model of the patient's state. Some problems relative to the scheme of explanation, especially to that which is based on causal laws, are discussed.     

The Relevance of Logic to Reasoning and Beleif Revision: Harman on 'Change in View'

In Change of View: Principles of Reasoning , Gilbert Harman argues that (i) all genuine reasoning is a matter of belief revision, and that, since (ii) logic is not "specially relevant" to belief revision, (iii) logic is not specially relevant to reasoning, either. Thus, Harman suggests, what is needed is a "theory of reasoning"–which, incidentally, will be psychologistic, telling us both how we do and how we should reason. I argue that Harman fails to establish the need for such a theory, because (a) reasoning is not always a matter of belief revision, and (b) logic is, in fact, of the utmost relevance to both reasoning and belief revision.     

Three paradoxes of medical diagnosis

Sadegh-zadeh [23] has proposed a theory of the relativity of medical diagnosis in terms of the time at which a diagnosis is accepted, the patient to whom the diagnosis applies, the physician who renders the diagnosis, the medical knowledge used, the diagnostic method applied, and the set of patient observations. Use of classical formal logic as the ‘diagnostic method’ may result in three paradoxes: the paradoxes of consistency, completeness, and justifiable ignorance. These paradoxes may be resolved by the addition of two non-classical operators, the ‘certainty’ and ‘effort’ operators, akin to the non-classical operators of modal logic.     

Causal reasoning and the diagnostic process

Background: Causal reasoning as a way to make a diagnosis seems convincing. Modern medicine depends on the search for causes of disease and it seems fair to assert that such knowledge is employed in diagnosis. Causal reasoning as it has been presented neglects to some extent the conception of multifactorial disease causes. Goal: The purpose of this paper is to analyze aspects of causation relevant for discussing causal reasoning in a diagnostic context. Procedures: The analysis will discuss different conceptions of causal reasoning in medical diagnosis, discriminating primarily between narrow causal diagnosis and more thorough causal explanation. The theory of causes as non-redundant factors in effective causal complexes is used as an analytical background. Causal explanations are performed according to different causal models. Such models of diagnosis are assumptions concerning structure and mechanisms, which cannot be directly or immediately observed. Conceptions and results of causal search strategies differ, according to the focus of the searcher. Causal reasoning is also seen in diagnosis in a more extensive meaning: the pin-pointing of factors responsible for the condition of the patient at any time during the course of disease. Conclusion: Causal reasoning and diagnosis go well in hand, especially if both concepts are widened. The theory of causes as non-redundant components in effective causal complexes, modulated by what is referred to as the stop problem and causal fields, is valuable for explaining the many aspects of causal reasoning in medical diagnosis.     

Helmut Reich's Proposal

A form of logic called relational and contextual reasoning is put forward as an improvement over other, more familiar types of logic. Developmental ideas are used to show how maturity ordinarily leads people away from binary (true/false) logic to systems of reasoning that are more subtle and better suited to making decisions in the face of ambiguity.     

The resolution of two paradoxes by approximate reasoning using a fuzzy logic

Summary The method of approximate reasoning using a fuzzy logic introduced by Baldwin (1978 a,b,c), is used to model human reasoning in the resolution of two well known paradoxes.It is shown how classical propositional logic fails to resolve the paradoxes, how multiple valued logic partially succeeds and that a satisfactory resolution is obtained with fuzzy logic.The problem of precise representation of vague concepts is considered in the light of the results obtained.