The role of the self in mindblindness in autism

Since its inception the 'mindblindness' theory of autism has greatly furthered our understanding of the core social-communication impairments in autism spectrum conditions (ASC). However, one of the more subtle issues within the theory that needs to be elaborated is the role of the 'self'. In this article, we expand on mindblindness in ASC by addressing topics related to the self and its central role in the social world and then review recent research in ASC that has yielded important insights by contrasting processes relating to both self and other. We suggest that new discoveries lie ahead in understanding how self and other are interrelated and/or distinct, and how understanding atypical self-referential and social-cognitive mechanisms may lead to novel ideas as to how to facilitate social-communicative abilities in ASC.     

The (In)flexible self: Psychopathology,mindfulness, and neuroscience

Clinical and neuroscientific evidence indicates that transdiagnostic processes contribute to the generation and maintenance of psychopathological symptoms and disorders. Rigidity (inflexibility) appears a core feature of most transdiagnostic pathological processes. Decreasing rigidity may prove important to restore and maintain mental health. One of the primary domains in which rigidity and flexibility plays a role concerns the self. We adopt the pattern theory of self (PTS) for a working definition of self. This incorporates the pluralist view on self as constituted by multiple aspects or processes, understood to constitute a self-pattern, i.e. processes organized in non-linear dynamical relations across a number of time scales. The use of mindfulness meditation in the format of Mindfulness Based Interventions (MBIs) has been developed over four decades in Clinical Psychology. MBIs are promising as evidence-based treatments, shown to be equivalent to gold-standard treatments and superior to specific active controls in several randomized controlled trials. Notably, MBIs have been shown to target transdiagnostic symptoms. Given the hypothesized central role of rigid, habitual self-patterns in psychopathology, PTS offers a useful frame to understand how mindfulness may be beneficial in decreasing inflexibility. We discuss the evidence that mindfulness can alter the psychological and behavioral expression of individual aspects of the self-pattern, as well as favour change in the self-pattern as a whole gestalt.We discuss neuroscientific research on how the phenomenology of the self (pattern) is reflected in associated cortical networks and meditation-related alterations in cortical networks. Creating a synergy between these two aspects can increase understanding of psychopathological processes and improve diagnostic and therapeutic options.     

Towards autonomous artificial agents with an active self: Modeling sense of control in situated action

In this paper we present a computational modeling account of an active self in artificial agents. In particular we focus on how an agent can be equipped with a sense of control and how it arises in autonomous situated action and, in turn, influences action control. We argue that this requires laying out an embodied cognitive model that combines bottom-up processes (sensorimotor learning and fine-grained adaptation of control) with top-down processes (cognitive processes for strategy selection and decision-making). We present such a conceptual computational architecture based on principles of predictive processing and free energy minimization. Using this general model, we describe how a sense of control can form across the levels of a control hierarchy and how this can support action control in an unpredictable environment. We present an implementation of this model as well as first evaluations in a simulated task scenario, in which an autonomous agent has to cope with un-/predictable situations and experiences corresponding sense of control. We explore different model parameter settings that lead to different ways of combining low-level and high-level action control. The results show the importance of appropriately weighting information in situations where the need for low/high-level action control varies and they demonstrate how the sense of control can facilitate this.     

Linking self and ingroup: Self‐anchoring as distinctive cognitive route to social identification

The present paper investigates how cognitive projection processes instigate social identification. We complement the classical self‐stereotyping approach (i.e., conforming to prototypical group norms) by investigating self‐anchoring (i.e., projection from self to group) as a distinct cognitive route to social identification. Self‐anchoring has mainly been investigated as predictor of intergroup differentiation. Surprisingly, no reliable link has been provided yet between self‐anchoring and social identification. In Study 1, we provide first evidence for this positive link. In Study 2, we add self‐stereotyping to our model and show that self‐anchoring is still positively related to social identification when controlling for self‐stereotyping. Additionally, we show that self‐anchoring is positively related to affective components of identification, while self‐stereotyping is positively related to cognitive components. Moreover, we examined the impact of self‐concept stability on self‐anchoring. Self‐concept stability was positively related to self‐anchoring, and hence to social identification (Study 1), independently from self‐stereotyping (Study 2). In the discussion, we argue that disentangling self‐anchoring from self‐stereotyping is important as it increases our insight in how people identify, and how this may vary depending on self‐concept and group context. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The self as a system of multilevel interacting mechanisms

This paper proposes an account of the self as a multilevel system consisting of social, individual, neural, and molecular mechanisms. It argues that the functioning of the self depends on causal relations between mechanisms operating at different levels. In place of reductionist and holistic approaches to cognitive science, I advocate a method of multilevel interacting mechanisms. This method is illustrated by showing how self-concepts operate at several different levels.     

Varieties of the extended self

This article provides an overview and analysis of recent work on the extended self, demonstrating that the boundaries of selves are fluid, shifting across biological, artifactual, and sociocultural structures. First, it distinguishes the notions of minimal self, person, and narrative self. Second, it surveys how philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists argue that embodiment, cognition, emotion, consciousness, and moral character traits can be extended and what that implies for the boundaries of selves. It also reviews and responds to various criticisms and counterarguments against the extended self. The main focus is on the link between the extended mind and extended self, which has received the most attention in recent literature. But accounts of the extended self developed independently of the extended mind are also briefly discussed. This article ends by drawing out some of the conceptual, methodological, and normative implications of the extended self and suggesting some directions for future research.     

Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science

Several recently developed philosophical approaches to the self promise to enhance the exchange of ideas between the philosophy of the mind and the other cognitive sciences. This review examines two important concepts of self: the 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, and the 'narrative self', which involves personal identity and continuity across time. The notion of a minimal self is first clarified by drawing a distinction between the sense of self-agency and the sense of self-ownership for actions. This distinction is then explored within the neurological domain with specific reference to schizophrenia, in which the sense of self-agency may be disrupted. The convergence between the philosophical debate and empirical study is extended in a discussion of more primitive aspects of self and how these relate to neonatal experience and robotics. The second concept of self, the narrative self, is discussed in the light of Gazzaniga's left-hemisphere 'interpreter' and episodic memory. Extensions of the idea of a narrative self that are consistent with neurological models are then considered. The review illustrates how the philosophical approach can inform cognitive science and suggests that a two-way collaboration may lead to a more fully developed account of the self.     

Space, self, and the theater of consciousness

Over a decade ago, I introduced a large-scale theory of the cognitive brain which explained for the first time how the human brain is able to create internal models of its intimate world and invent models of a wider universe. An essential part of the theoretical model is an organization of neuronal mechanisms which I have named the Retinoid Model [Trehub, A. (1977). Neuronal models for cognitive processes: Networks for learning, perception and imagination. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 65, 141-169; Trehub, A. (1991). The Cognitive Brain: MIT Press]. This hypothesized brain system has structural and dynamic properties enabling it to register and appropriately integrate disparate foveal stimuli into a perspectival, egocentric representation of an extended 3D world scene including a neuronally tokened locus of the self which, in this theory, is the neuronal origin of retinoid space. As an integral part of the larger neuro-cognitive model, the retinoid system is able to perform many other useful perceptual and higher cognitive functions. In this paper, I draw on the hypothesized properties of this system to argue that neuronal activity within the retinoid structure constitutes the phenomenal content of consciousness and the unique sense of self that each of us experiences.     

Cognitive Dissonance in Groups

Cognitive dissonance theory, as originally set out by Festinger ( 1957 ), described dissonance as an intraindividual phenomenon in a social context. Much of the research on dissonance has focused on the intraindividual aspect of dissonance. The limited research that has looked at cognitive dissonance in groups has done so from a range of different perspectives. These perspectives seem to result in contradictory predictions about the role of social information on the arousal and reduction of cognitive dissonance, despite generally sharing a model of the social self based on, or consistent with, social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978 ). Thinking about how these group‐based models of cognitive dissonance fit together may better illuminate the nature of dissonance and also suggest productive avenues for research to integrate these various perspectives on dissonance.     

Narrating the self: Freud,Dennett and complexity theory

Abstract

Adopting a materialist approach to the mind has far reaching implications for many presuppositions regarding the properties of the brain, including those that have traditionally been consigned to “the mental” aspect of human being. One such presupposition is the conception of the disembodied self. In this article we aim to account for the self as a material entity, in that it is wholly the result of the physiological functioning of the embodied brain. Furthermore, we attempt to account for the structure of the self by invoking the logic of the narrative. While our conception of narrative selfhood incorporates the work of both Freud and Dennett, we offer a critique of these two theorists and then proceed to amend their theories by means of complexity theory. We argue that the self can be characterised as a complex system, which allows us to account for the structure of the material self.     

Enacting the self: Buddhist and Enactivist approaches to the emergence of the self

In this paper, I take up the problem of the self through bringing together the insights, while correcting some of the shortcomings, of Indo–Tibetan Buddhist and enactivist accounts of the self. I begin with an examination of the Buddhist theory of non-self (anātman) and the rigorously reductionist interpretation of this doctrine developed by the Abhidharma school of Buddhism. After discussing some of the fundamental problems for Buddhist reductionism, I turn to the enactive approach to philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I argue that human beings, as dynamic systems, are characterized by a high degree of self-organizing autonomy. Therefore, human beings are not reducible to the more basic mental and physical events that constitute them. I critically examine Francisco Varela’s enactivist account of the self as virtual and his use of Buddhist ideas in support of this view. I argue, in contrast, that while the self is emergent and constructed, it is not merely virtual. Finally I sketch a Buddhist-enactivist account of the self. I argue for a non-reductionist view of the self as an active, embodied, embedded, self-organizing process—what the Buddhists call ‘I’-making (ahaṃkāra). This emergent process of self-making is grounded in the fundamentally recursive processes that characterize lived experience: autopoiesis at the biological level, temporalization and self-reference at the level of conscious experience, and conceptual and narrative construction at the level of intersubjectivity. In Buddhist terms, I will develop an account of the self as dependently originated and empty, but nevertheless real.     

中国人三重自我建构加工中的相对优先性:来自ERP的证据

借助事件相关电位技术,采用启动范式的变式探讨了中国人三重自我建构的加工特点。结果发现,具体哪种自我建构占据加工优势取决于具体的加工阶段:早期加工阶段集体自我占加工优势;晚期加工阶段个体自我占加工优势;而在N2成分上,三种自我建构加工优势相当。该结果在一定程度上支持了情境性假设,拓展了三重自我建构理论的研究,为该领域的理论争论提供了新的认知神经科学证据。     

Specifying the self for cognitive neuroscience

Cognitive neuroscience investigations of self-experience have mainly focused on the mental attribution of features to the self (self-related processing). In this paper, we highlight another fundamental, yet neglected, aspect of self-experience, that of being an agent. We propose that this aspect of self-experience depends on self-specifying processes, ones that implicitly specify the self by implementing a functional self/non-self distinction in perception, action, cognition and emotion. We describe two paradigmatic cases - sensorimotor integration and homeostatic regulation - and use the principles from these cases to show how cognitive control, including emotion regulation, is also self-specifying. We argue that externally directed, attention-demanding tasks, rather than suppressing self-experience, give rise to the self-experience of being a cognitive-affective agent. We conclude with directions for experimental work based on our framework.     

The superordinate self in psychoanalytic theory and in the self psychologies

The concept of the self has been used in several attempts to resolve the epistemological problems of what is subjective and what is objective, what is personal and what is organismic. In addition, it has been used to mediate between the hermeneutic and natural-science approaches to psychoanalytic explanation, between the motivational and causal dimensions of our theory and experience. In the case of Kohut, the self was initially invoked to deal with clinical difficulties associated with the analysis of patients with narcissistic personality disorders more recently, it has become the central article in a "self psychology" that addresses presumed deficiencies in the traditional psychoanalytic picture of psychopathology. But the concept of the self is not suited to be a panacea for resolving theoretical or clinical difficulties. The self as person refers to an entity that is both enduring and changing; it describes continuity in the face of change and change in the face of continuity. Abend (1974) comes closest to capturing this attribute of the self in his image of the tidal beach with a configuration that changes but an essence that remains the same. Eisnitz (1980) evokes something similar in his figure-ground conception of the self-representation. The crux of the matter is that the notion of self-experience includes a variety of phenomena that cannot be contained within a single self-construct--be it normal pathologic, grandiose, or otherwise. As a result of these considerations, I have argued against the use of the self as a superordinate concept in psychoanalytic theory and have focused on the shortcomings of three self psychologies that use the self in this way. I believe that Klein, Gedo, and Kohut all offer the self as a kind of conceptual tranquilizer for the philosophical, theoretical, and clinical dualities that are inherent in psychoanalytic work. Grossman addressed himself to these dualities as far back as 1967 and elaborated on the problems with Simon (1969) in a pathbreaking paper on anthropomorphism in psychoanalysis. Grossman and Simon contended that the controversy about anthropomorphism in psychoanalytic theory pertains to the basic confusion in psychology between meaning and causality. They submitted that until this confusion was dispelled and until some superordinate concept was found that could "encompass both kinds of discourse", attempts to transform psychoanalysis into a general psychology would result in failure.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Love and expansion of the self: The state of the model

The self-expansion model of love developed out of a confluence of research on attraction and arousal, Eastern psychology, motivation theory, and the social psychology of personal relationships. The model treats love (the desire for a relationship with a particular other) as arising from a desire to expand the self by including that other in the self, as well as by associating expansion with that particular other. First, the model is described, including its function as a source of heuristically important metaphors for common human experiences of love and its unique focus in relation to other approaches to love. The remainder of the article examines its application, including supporting research, to predictors of falling in love, motivations for unrequited love, consequences of falling in love, love as including each other in each other's self, and how love changes (and how it can be maintained) in long-term relationships. The conclusion examines current trends in which the model serves as both a very general integration of useful perspectives and as a set of precise mini-theories.     

A model of the synchronic self

The phenomenology of the self includes the sense of control over one's body and mind, of being bounded in body and mind, of having perspective from within one's body and mind and of being extended in time. I argue that this phenomenology is to be accounted for by a set of five dissociable cognitive capacities that compose the self. The focus of this paper is on the four capacities that compose the synchronic self: the agentive(B) self, which underlies the sense of control over one's body; the boundary(B) self, which underlies the sense of being bounded within one's body; the agentive(M) self which underlies the sense of control over one's thoughts; and the boundary(M) self which underlies the sense of being bounded within one's mind. I model the agentive(B) and agentive(M) selves as parts of the motor control system and the boundary(B) self as the capacity to form and integrated map of the body. I point to the delusion of thought broadcast as a possible source of evidence for future research on the boundary(M) self.     

Egotism and evaluation in self and other attributions for achievement related outcomes

A critical appraisal of the existing motivational versus cognitive controversies in the area of attributional research led to the formulation of a model which contains the dimension of Evaluation conceptualized independently from Locus of causality. The model was tested, with Nigerian undergraduate students serving as subjects, in an experiment on self versus other attributions for success and failure outcomes. The data revealed two major findings: (1) Positive evaluation, and not attributional asymmetry, is the pattern of self-perception in the achievement-related contexts; (2) The pattern of positive evaluation in other-perception is self-outcome mediated, it shows a high level of generalization in the co-shared experience and an egotistic reversal if opposite outcomes occur.     

奖赏与自我加工对记忆的影响

【摘 要】目的:从外显和内隐层面探讨奖赏与自我加工对记忆的影响。方法：以大学生为被试,以人格形容词为实验材料,采用R/K范式,测量被试对识记词语的记忆效果。结果：（1）外显记忆层面,奖赏与自我加工均促进了记忆效果;（2）在内隐记忆层面,自我存在记忆的加工优势,但是没有发现奖赏加工对记忆的影响。结论：自我相关刺激促进了内隐和外显记忆的加工,奖赏刺激只对外显记忆有影响,实验结果支持独立平行模型,即在不同记忆层面,奖赏加工与自我参照加工存在不同加工机制。     

Autobiographical memory and conceptions of self: getting better all the time

We examine links between self-assessment and autobiographical memory. People generally view themselves as improving over time, relative to their peers. We suggest that this sense of improvement is sometimes illusory, and motivated by the desire to enhance the current self. Our research focuses on people's subjective feeling of temporal distance between an earlier period and the present, a feeling that is only modestly associated with actual time. Research participants praise or criticize the same former self, depending on how far away it feels. An equally distant episode feels close or remote, depending on whether it has favorable or damaging implications for evaluations of the current self. The identical achievement boosts evaluations of the current self or has little impact, depending on how far away it feels. The same failure does or does not harm appraisals of the current self, depending on how far away it feels.