The role of feedback in shaping responses to risky road scenarios: Evidence from electrodermal activity

When faced with hazardous driving situations, rapid and effective risk perception and decision-making processes are of crucial importance for avoiding crashes. In these cases, the processes are accompanied and influenced by underlying psychophysiological mechanisms such as electrodermal activity (EDA) modulations. The present work aims to assess the psychophysiological mechanisms underlying participants’ risk perception and decision-making when facing risky road scenarios, as correlated to the feedback role in modulating participants’ behavior. Study 1 (n = 32) explores the behavioral effects of administering a contingent feedback in a decision (decision-making) and an evaluation (risk perception) task in response to a set of risky and not risky images. The behavioral data reveal an effect on the participants’ probability of response, independently from the type of image presented, when the feedback was administered. In the decision task, the effect is accompanied by a change in the amplitude and percentage of the skin conductance responses (SCRs), which are moderated by block of trials. Study 2 (n = 44) better assesses the role of task and block on participants’ physiological activation, as measured by EDA signal. The results show an increase in psychophysiological activation when the feedback is delivered, in the first part of the tasks, both in terms of SCRs amplitude and percentage to the presented road scenarios, followed by a decrease in the second part of the tasks. Moreover, this effect is more evident in the decision task than the evaluation task. These findings suggest that the role exerted by feedback when facing risky traffic images may be described as based on an associative process that, once the correct response has been learned, tends to be reduced as it becomes automatic. Overall, the results of the two studies represent an important step toward the development of training programs aimed at promoting safer behaviors in risky driving contexts.     

Does the feedback from previous trials influence current decisions? A study on the role of feedback processing in making decisions under explicit risk conditions

Decision situations frequently provide information about the amount of gains and losses and winning probabilities. In decisions under these conditions, also called risk conditions, both the use of feedback and executive functions have been shown to influence the decision‐making process, as revealed in different patient populations. However, the influence of offering feedback in tasks examining decisions under risk conditions has not been investigated experimentally, so far. This was the aim of the present study. For this purpose, a sample of healthy individuals was examined with the Game of Dice Task, a decision‐making task that explicitly provides the rules for gains and losses and in which participants receive feedback after each trial. In addition, a modified version of this task was performed, in which the feedback after each trial and all associated feedback components were removed. Results indicate that participants had a lower performance in the modified Dice Task without feedback. They selected the disadvantageous alternatives more frequently, when they did not receive feedback following their choices. Task performance in either version was correlated with executive functioning. Conclusion: In decisions under risk conditions, both executive functions as well as the use of feedback following previous trials are important components for optimal performance. Results have implications for the interpretation of deficient decision making in patients with neuropsychological impairments as both disturbances in categorization and other cognitive processes as well as emotional dysfunctions can compromise decision making in risky situations.     

The role of strategies in deciding advantageously in ambiguous and risky situations

In decision situations of everyday life, the potential positive or negative consequences of a decision are often specified and the associated probabilities are known or they are principally calculable ("decisions under risk"). On the basis of correlations reported in patient studies, it has been recently proposed that decisions under risk involve strategic components, i.e. calculation of the risk, as well as emotional processes, i.e. processing feedback from previous decisions. However, the potential impact of calculative strategies on decision-making under risk has not been investigated systematically, so far. In the current study, we examined 42 healthy subjects (21 females) with the Game of Dice Task measuring decisions under risk, and a questionnaire assessing strategy application in items comparable to the choices in the Game of Dice Task. In addition, the subjects performed the Iowa Gambling Task, examining decision-making under ambiguity, and a neuropsychological test battery focusing on executive functions. Results indicate that deciding advantageously in a decision-making task with explicit and stable rules is linked to applying calculative strategies. In contrast, individuals who decide intuitively prefer risky or disadvantageous choices in the Game of Dice Task. Applying calculative strategies was correlated with executive functions but not with performance on the Iowa Gambling Task. The results support the view that calculative processes and strategies may improve decision-making under explicit risk conditions.     

结果评价中自我体验与替代体验的参照点效应:一项赌博游戏的ERPs研究

本研究采用"投注—反馈"的虚拟赌博游戏范式,通过2个实验分别检测个体在评价自己决策结果 (实验1)和观察他人决策结果 (实验2)过程中赌注大小(即参照点)对大脑活动的影响。结果发现:(1)体验自我决策结果时,输钱比赢钱诱发更负的FRN,仅有一个负反馈(-10元)表现出以赌注为界的分离,且相对效价一样的反馈值诱发的FRN差异不显著;(2)体验他人决策结果时,无论输赢,有赌注比无赌注诱发的FRN更负;而且相对效价相同的反馈值诱发的FRN差异不显著。据此可以认为,FRN一定程度上反映了以赌注为基准的主观标准对社会信息的评价判断:自我体验中的个体对损失的敏感度远高于收益;而替代体验中的个体更倾向于将"损失更多"看作一种负性结果。     

Short- and long-term consequences in decision-making under risk: immediate feedback about long-term prospects benefits people tending to impulsive processing

Many decisions in everyday life involve weighing up immediate and expected future outcomes that may be conflictive. Yet, it is still unclear which cognitive functions may affect decision-making in such situations. We examined 150 healthy subjects using a new decision-making task that measures people’s ability at handling short- and long-term consequences under objective risk. Two task versions were developed to investigate the effects of feedback about long-term consequences on decision-making. One version includes feedback about changes in long-term prospects while the other does not. Both groups revealed that advantageous decision-making correlated with reasoning and working-memory abilities, however, no correlations with executive functions were found. The effect of feedback on decision-making performance was moderated by impulsivity and need for cognition. Our findings contribute to recent dual-system approaches for risky decision-making by showing that individuals with predispositions towards impulsive rather than reflective information processing could profit from feedback about long-term prospects.     

驾驶决策的研究现状与展望

驾驶决策是驾驶员对不同交通场景进行判断、选择,并产生驾驶行为的过程。驾驶决策的研究起源于人因工程学,并随着认知心理学的发展而逐渐受到关注。驾驶决策的研究范式主要采用心理测量与实验法;并与年龄、性别、风险感知、情绪以及决策风格相关;为了有效防止交通事故的发生,驾驶决策的改善逐步成为研究的新热点。今后的研究可以从认知与情绪角度综合探讨适合中国国情的驾驶决策的结构与特征,以提高驾驶员的决策能力。     

Sadder but wiser or happier and smarter? A demonstration of judgment and decision making

Researchers have debated whether positive or negative emotions will positively improve decision performance (B. Kuvaas & G. Kaufmann, 2004). The author explored (a) which coping strategies decision makers use when they experience positive or negative emotions and (b) how cognitive processes are influenced by negative and positive emotions. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 120) in positive emotional states (i.e., happier and smarter) were better at problem-focused coping than were participants with negative emotions (i.e., sadder but wiser). In Experiment 2, participants (N = 124) displayed greater accuracy of choice, took longer to research information, and processed a larger amount of information when they were in positive emotional states. The two experiments showed similar results between judgment and decision-making contexts in which positive emotion enhances problem solving.     

Dual-task effects of simulated lane navigation and story recall in older adults with and without memory impairment

ABSTRACT

While driving is a complex task, it becomes relatively automatic over time although unfamiliar situations require increased cognitive effort. Much research has examined driving risk in cognitively impaired elders and found little effect. This study assessed whether mildly memory impaired elders made disproportionate errors in driving or story recall, under simultaneous simulated driving and story recall. Forty-six healthy (61% women; mean age = 76.4) and 15 memory impaired (66% women, mean age = 79.4) elders participated. Cognitive status was determined by neuropsychological performance. Results showed that during dual-task conditions, participants stayed in lane more, and recalled stories more poorly, than when they did the tasks separately. Follow-up analysis revealed that verbatim recall, in particular, was reduced while driving for healthy participants. While memory impaired participants performed more poorly than healthy controls on both tasks, cognitive status was not associated with greater dual-task costs when driving and story recall were combined.     

Predicting risk decisions in a modified Balloon Analogue Risk Task: Conventional and single-trial ERP analyses

Event-related potential (ERP) has the potential to reveal the temporal neurophysiological dynamics of risk decision-making, but this potential has not been fully explored in previous studies. When predicting risk decision with ERPs, most studies focus on between-trial analysis that reflects feedback learning, while within-trial analysis that could directly link option assessment with behavioral output has been largely ignored. Suitable task design is crucial for applying within-trial prediction. In this study, we used a modified version of the classic Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). In each trial of the task, participants made multiple rounds of decisions between a risky option (pump up the balloon) and a safe option (cash out). Behavioral results show that as the level of economic risk increased, participants were less willing to make a risky decision and also needed a longer response time to do so. In general, the ERP results showed distinct characteristics compared with previous findings based on between-trial prediction, particularly about the role of the P1 component. Specifically, both the P1 (amplitude and latency) and P3 (amplitude) components evoked by current outcomes predicted subsequent decisions. We suggest that these findings indicate the importance of selective attention (indexed by the P1) and motivational functions (indexed by the P3), which may help clarify the cognitive mechanism of risk decision-making. The theoretical significance of these findings is discussed.     

Developmental changes in decision making under risk: The role of executive functions and reasoning abilities in 8- to 19-year-old decision makers

Previous studies have shown that children and adolescents often tend toward risky decisions despite explicit knowledge about the potential negative consequences. This phenomenon has been suggested to be associated with the immaturity of brain areas involved in cognitive control functions. Particularly, “frontal lobe functions,” such as executive functions and reasoning, mature until young adulthood and are thought to be involved in age-related changes in decision making under explicit risk conditions. We investigated 112 participants, aged 8–19 years, with a frequently used task assessing decisions under risk, the Game of Dice Task (GDT). Additionally, we administered the Modified Card Sorting Test assessing executive functioning (categorization, cognitive flexibility, and strategy maintenance) as well as the Ravens Progressive Matrices assessing reasoning. The results showed that risk taking in the GDT decreased with increasing age and this effect was not moderated by reasoning but by executive functions: Particularly, young persons with weak executive functioning showed very risky decision making. Thus, the individual maturation of executive functions, associated with areas in the prefrontal cortex, seems to be an important factor in young peoples’ behavior in risky decision-making situations.     

The effect of facial feedback on the evaluation of statements describing everyday situations and the role of awareness

According to theories of embodiment enacting a smile or a frown can positively or negatively influence one’s evaluations, even without awareness of one’s facial activity. While some previous studies found evidence for facial feedback effects, recent replication attempts could not confirm these findings. Are our decisions throughout the day amenable to the state of our facial muscles? We tested the effect of smiling and frowning on the evaluation of emotional sentences describing everyday situations. While most previous studies based their assessment of awareness on verbal debriefing interviews without explicitly defined criteria, we employed a written debriefing questionnaire in order to avoid potential bias when identifying participants’ awareness. Our results indicate that smiling/frowning increased/decreased sentence ratings only for participants aware of their expressions. This emphasizes the importance of more rigorous awareness tests in facial feedback studies. Our results support the view that facial feedback cannot necessarily influence us without conscious mediation.     

Decision-making,cognitive functions,impulsivity, and media multitasking expectancies in high versus low media multitaskers

In several studies, individuals who reported to frequently multitask with different media displayed reduced cognitive performance, for example in fluid intelligence and executive functioning. These cognitive functions are relevant for making advantageous decisions under both objective risk (requiring reflection and strategical planning) and ambiguous risk (requiring learning from feedback). Thus, compared to low media multitaskers (LMMs), high media multitaskers (HMMs) may perform worse in both types of decision situations. The current study investigated HMMs and LMMs in a laboratory setting with the Game of Dice Task (GDT; objective risk), the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; ambiguous risk), various tests quantifying cognitive functions (logical reasoning, working memory, information processing, general executive functions), and self-report measures of impulsivity, media multitasking expectancies, and problematic Internet use. From 182 participants, 25 HMMs and 19 LMMs were identified using the Media Multitasking Index. Results show that HMMs compared to LMMs performed weaker on the IGT but not on the GDT. Furthermore, HMMs had slightly decreased performance in tests of logical reasoning and working memory capacity. HMMs tended to increased information processing speed but this difference was not significant. Furthermore, HMMs have more positive expectancies regarding media multitasking and reported higher tendencies toward problematic Internet use. HMMs and LMMs did not differ significantly with respect to impulsivity and executive functions. The results give a first hint that HMMs may have difficulties in decision-making under ambiguous but not under objective risk. HMMs may be more prone to errors in tasks that require feedback processing. However, HMMs appear not to be impaired in aspects of long-term strategic decision-making.

     

It's immoral,but I'd do it! Psychopathy traits affect decision‐making in sacrificial dilemmas and in everyday moral situations

This research investigated whether emotional hyporeactivity affects moral judgements and choices of action in sacrificial moral dilemmas and in everyday moral conflict situations in which harm to other's welfare is differentially involved. Twenty‐six participants with high trait psychopathy (HP) and 25 with low trait psychopathy (LP) were selected based on the primary psychopathy scale of the Levenson Self‐Report Psychopathy Scale. HP participants were more likely to sacrifice one person to save others in sacrificial dilemmas and to pursue a personal advantage in everyday moral situations entailing harm to another's good. While deciding in these situations, HP participants experienced lower unpleasantness as compared to LP participants. Conversely, no group differences emerged in choice of action and unpleasantness ratings for everyday moral situations that did not entail harm to others. Importantly, moral judgements did not differ in the two groups. These results suggest that high psychopathy trait affects choices of action in sacrificial dilemmas because of reduced emotional reactivity to harmful acts. The dissociation between choice of action and moral judgement suggests that the former is more closely related to emotional experience. Also, emotion seems to play a critical role in discriminating harmful from harmless acts and in driving decisions accordingly.     

Culture of honour theory and social anxiety: Cross-regional and sex differences in relationships among honour-concerns,social anxiety and reactive aggression

According to the Appraisal-Tendency Framework (Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007), certainty-associated emotions increase risk taking compared with uncertainty-associated emotions. To date, this general effect has only been shown in static judgement and decision-making paradigms; therefore, the present study tested the effect of certainty on risk taking in a sequential decision-making task. We hypothesised that the effect would be reversed due to the kind of processing involved, as certainty is considered to encourage heuristic processing that takes into account the emotional cues arising from previous decisions, whereas uncertainty leads to more systematic processing. One hundred and one female participants were induced to feel one of three emotions (film clips) before performing a decision-making task involving risk (Game of Dice Task; Brand et al., 2005). As expected, the angry and happy participants (certainty-associated emotions) were more likely than the fearful participants (uncertainty-associated emotion) to make safe decisions (vs. risky decisions).     

Do (un)certainty appraisal tendencies reverse the influence of emotions on risk taking in sequential tasks?

According to the Appraisal-Tendency Framework (Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007), certainty-associated emotions increase risk taking compared with uncertainty-associated emotions. To date, this general effect has only been shown in static judgement and decision-making paradigms; therefore, the present study tested the effect of certainty on risk taking in a sequential decision-making task. We hypothesised that the effect would be reversed due to the kind of processing involved, as certainty is considered to encourage heuristic processing that takes into account the emotional cues arising from previous decisions, whereas uncertainty leads to more systematic processing. One hundred and one female participants were induced to feel one of three emotions (film clips) before performing a decision-making task involving risk (Game of Dice Task; Brand et al., 2005). As expected, the angry and happy participants (certainty-associated emotions) were more likely than the fearful participants (uncertainty-associated emotion) to make safe decisions (vs. risky decisions).     

Reinforcement,Rationality, and Intentions: How Robust Is Automatic Reinforcement Learning in Economic Decision Making?

Reinforcement learning is often observed in economic decision making and may lead to detrimental decisions. Because of its automaticity, it is difficult to avoid. In three experimental studies, we investigated whether this process could be controlled by goal intentions and implementation intentions. Participants' decisions were investigated in a probability‐updating task in which the normative rule to maximize expected payoff (Bayes' rule) conflicted with the reinforcement heuristic as a simple decision rule. Some participants were asked to set goal intentions designated to foster the optimization of rational decision making, while other participants were asked to furnish these goal intentions with implementation intentions. Results showed that controlling automatic processes of reinforcement learning is possible by means of goal intentions or implementation intentions that focus decision makers on the analysis of decision feedback. Importantly, such beneficial effects were not achieved by simply instructing participants to analyze the feedback, without defining a goal as the desired end state from a first‐person perspective. Regarding intentions supposed to shut down reinforcement processes by controlling negative affect, effects were more complex and depended on the specified goal‐directed behavior. The goal intention to suppress the disappointment elicited by negative feedback was not effective in controlling reinforcement processes. Furnishing this goal with an implementation intention even backfired and strengthened unwanted reinforcement processes. In contrast, asking participants to keep cool in response to negative decision outcomes through the use of goal intentions or implementation intentions increased decisions in line with Bayes' rule. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Attitudes and evaluations: a social cognitive neuroscience perspective

Automatic evaluations are crucial for survival, but conscious self-reflection enables the formulation of nuanced evaluations to serve long-term goals. To operate effectively, both automatic and reflective evaluative processes need to integrate stored representations from previous experience (attitudes) with current contexts and goals, but contexts and goals have a more prominent role in reflective evaluation. Recent neuroimaging data provide new insights into the structure and function of evaluation and the dynamic ways that attitudes and reflective processing contribute to evaluation. In this paper, we propose a new iterative-reprocessing (IR) model of the neural bases of evaluation that highlights the role of the prefrontal cortex in the reprocessing of evaluative information. This model makes predictions that inform social-cognitive and cognitive-neuroscientific accounts of evaluation.     

Framing effects under cognitive load: The role of working memory in risky decisions

Framing effects occur in a wide range of laboratory and natural decision contexts, but the underlying processes that produce framing effects are not well understood. We explored the role of working memory (WM) in framing by manipulating WM loads during risky decisions. After starting with a hypothetical stake of money, participants were then presented a lesser amount that they could keep for certain (positive frame) or lose for certain (negative frame). They made a choice between the sure amount and a gamble in which they could either keep or lose all of the original stake. On half of the trials, the choice was made while maintaining a concurrent WM load of random letters. In both load and no-load conditions, we replicated the typical finding of risk aversion with positive frames and risk seeking with negative frames. In addition, people made fewer decisions to accept the gamble under conditions of higher cognitive load. The data are congruent with a dual-process reasoning framework in which people employ a heuristic to make satisfactory decisions with minimal effort.