Differential roles for visuospatial and verbal working memory in situation model construction

Two experiments investigated the processing of the spatial and causal dimensions of situation models. In Experiment 1, participants read texts varying in spatial and causal demands while responding to on-line spatial and causal probes. Experiment 2 used the same design, but used texts that more tightly integrated spatial and causal information. In both experiments, spatially oriented dependent measures were generally influenced by spatial, but not causal, demands, whereas causally oriented measures were influenced by causal, but not spatial, demands. In addition, spatially oriented dependent measures were generally correlated with a measure of spatial working memory capacity, whereas causally oriented measures were correlated with a measure of verbal working memory capacity. These results indicate that spatial and causal dimensions of situation models are maintained and elaborated independently in different working memory subsystems.     

Independence and dependence in human causal reasoning

Causal graphical models (CGMs) are a popular formalism used to model human causal reasoning and learning. The key property of CGMs is the causal Markov condition, which stipulates patterns of independence and dependence among causally related variables. Five experiments found that while adult’s causal inferences exhibited aspects of veridical causal reasoning, they also exhibited a small but tenacious tendency to violate the Markov condition. They also failed to exhibit robust discounting in which the presence of one cause as an explanation of an effect makes the presence of another less likely. Instead, subjects often reasoned “associatively,” that is, assumed that the presence of one variable implied the presence of other, causally related variables, even those that were (according to the Markov condition) conditionally independent. This tendency was unaffected by manipulations (e.g., response deadlines) known to influence fast and intuitive reasoning processes, suggesting that an associative response to a causal reasoning question is sometimes the product of careful and deliberate thinking. That about 60% of the erroneous associative inferences were made by about a quarter of the subjects suggests the presence of substantial individual differences in this tendency. There was also evidence that inferences were influenced by subjects’ assumptions about factors that disable causal relations and their use of a conjunctive reasoning strategy. Theories that strive to provide high fidelity accounts of human causal reasoning will need to relax the independence constraints imposed by CGMs.     

The selective power of causality on memory errors

We tested the influence of causal links on the production of memory errors in a misinformation paradigm. Participants studied a set of statements about a person, which were presented as either individual statements or pairs of causally linked statements. Participants were then provided with causally plausible and causally implausible misinformation. We hypothesised that studying information connected with causal links would promote representing information in a more abstract manner. As such, we predicted that causal information would not provide an overall protection against memory errors, but rather would preferentially help in the rejection of misinformation that was causally implausible, given the learned causal links. In two experiments, we measured whether the causal linkage of information would be generally protective against all memory errors or only selectively protective against certain types of memory errors. Causal links helped participants reject implausible memory lures, but did not protect against plausible lures. Our results suggest that causal information may promote an abstract storage of information that helps prevent only specific types of memory errors.     

The contribution of logical reasoning to the learning of mathematics in primary school

It has often been claimed that children's mathematical understanding is based on their ability to reason logically, but there is no good evidence for this causal link. We tested the causal hypothesis about logic and mathematical development in two related studies. In a longitudinal study, we showed that (a) 6‐year‐old children's logical abilities and their working memory predict mathematical achievement 16 months later; and (b) logical scores continued to predict mathematical levels after controls for working memory, whereas working memory scores failed to predict the same measure after controls for differences in logical ability. In our second study, we trained a group of children in logical reasoning and found that they made more progress in mathematics than a control group who were not given this training. These studies establish a causal link between logical reasoning and mathematical learning. Much of children's mathematical knowledge is based on their understanding of its underlying logic.     

A Symbolic Model of the Nonconscious Acquisition of Information

This article presents counter evidence against Smolensky's theory that human intuitive/nonconscious congnitive processes can only be accurately explained in terms of subsymbolic computations carried out in artificial neural networks. We present symbolic learning models of two well-studied, complicated cognitive tasks involving nonconscious acquisition of information: learning production rules and artificial finite state grammars. Our results demonstrate that intuitive learning does not imply subsymbolic computation, and that the already well-established, perceived correlation between “conscious” and “symbolic” on the one hand, and between “nonconscious” and “subsymbolic” on the other, does not exist.     

Blaming leaders for organizational accidents: Proxy logic in collective- versus individual-agency cultures

The current research investigates whether observers blame leaders for organizational accidents even when these managers are known to be causally uninvolved. Past research finds that the public blames managers for organizational harm if the managers are perceived to have personally played a causal role. The present research argues that East Asian perceivers, who are culturally oriented to focus on the causal influence of groups [Menon, T., Morris, M. W., Chiu, C., & Hong, Y. (1999). Culture and the construal of agency: Attribution to individual versus group dispositions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 701–717.], blame managers based on the behavior of the group, not only based on the behavior of the individual managers. We argue that perceivers first assign responsibility to the collectivity, the organizational unit or some group within it, and then extend responsibility to the manager representing it. We tested this proposal in a series of studies with a community sample in Japan and matched student samples of Japanese and Americans. Results show that perceivers who are culturally oriented to focus on collective-level causality (Japanese, more so than Americans; Asian Americans, more so than European Americans) blame leaders through proxy logic. Implications of this intuitive logic and of the cultural difference are discussed.     

Causal uncertainty and metacognitive inferences about goal attainment

These four studies investigated G. Weary and J. A. Edwards’ (1996) hypothesis that causal uncertainty feelings serve as input to perceivers regarding the adequacy of their causal knowledge and thus determine the amount of processing accorded a given task. Participants worked on a task until they had satisfied an assigned stop rule. In three experiments, high causally uncertain people processed more information under a sufficiency of information rule and less under an enjoyment rule, whereas low causally uncertain people generally did not differentiate between the rules. In the last experiment, low causally uncertain people exhibited a similar pattern to the chronic causally uncertain individuals in the first experiments, but only after their causal uncertainty beliefs and feelings had been primed.     

基本心理能力老化的认知机制

基本心理能力老化机制是认知老化领域研究热点之一。横断研究与追踪研究表明, 感觉功能、加工速度、工作记忆等信息加工资源的衰退导致了基本心理能力的衰退。但由于相关研究不能进行因果推论, 基本心理能力老化的认知机制尚存在争论。因此本项目拟采用实验室研究和干预实验设计, 通过操纵感觉功能(知觉压力水平)、干预加工速度与工作记忆, 考察基本心理能力的年龄差异的变化, 以期为认知老化理论的深化和拓展提供实验依据。     

Dissociable spatial memory systems revealed by typical and atypical human development

Rodent lesion studies have revealed the existence of two causally dissociable spatial memory systems, localized to the hippocampus and striatum that are preferentially sensitive to environmental boundaries and landmark objects, respectively. Here we test whether these two memory systems are causally dissociable in humans by examining boundary‐ and landmark‐based memory in typical and atypical development. Adults with Williams syndrome (WS)—a developmental disorder with known hippocampal abnormalities—and typical children and adults, performed a navigation task that involved learning locations relative to a boundary or a landmark object. We found that boundary‐based memory was severely impaired in WS compared to typically‐developing mental‐age matched (MA) children and chronological‐age matched (CA) adults, whereas landmark‐based memory was similar in all groups. Furthermore, landmark‐based memory matured earlier in typical development than boundary‐based memory, consistent with the idea that the WS cognitive phenotype arises from developmental arrest of late maturing cognitive systems. Together, these findings provide causal and developmental evidence for dissociable spatial memory systems in humans.     

The Referential Process,Consciousness, and the Sense of Self

The concepts of multiple code theory and the referential process are examined in relation to levels of awareness and the sense of self as characterized in recent work in neuropsychology by Damasio. The juxtaposition of subsymbolic and symbolic systems in working memory, as this operates in the referential process, is central to both consciousness and the sense of self. The roots of pathology lie in dissociation within emotion schemas; this applies at different levels for all forms of neurosis. The goal of psychoanalytic treatment is integration of dissociated schemas; this requires activation of subsymbolic, including bodily experience, in the session itself, in relation to symbolic representations of present and past experience. Implications concerning repression, resistance, the primary process, the role of language in therapeutic change, and other psychoanalytic concepts are discussed.     

Dynamic visual noise interferes with storage in visual working memory

Several studies have demonstrated that dynamic visual noise (DVN) does not interfere with memory for random matrices. This has led to suggestions that (a) visual working memory is distinct from imagery, and (b) visual working memory is not a gateway between sensory input and long-term storage. A comparison of the interference effects of DVN with memory for matrices and colored textures shows that DVN can interfere with visual working memory, probably at a level of visual detail not easily supported by long-term memory structures or the recoding of the visual pattern elements. The results support a gateway model of visuospatial working memory and raise questions about the most appropriate ways to measure and model the different levels of representation of information that can be held in visual working memory.     

Knowledge of Rules,Causal Systematicity,and the Language of Thought

Martin Davies' criterion for the knowledge of implicit rules, viz. the causal systematicity of cognitive processes, is first exposed. Then the inference from causal systematicity of a process to syntactic properties of the input states is examined. It is argued that Davies' notion of a syntactic property is too weak to bear the conclusion that causal systematicity implies a language of thought as far as the input states are concerned. Next, it is shown that Davies' criterion leads to a counterintuitive consequence: it groups together distributed connectionist systems with look-up tables. To avoid this consequence, a modified construal of causal systematicity is proposed and Davies' argument for the causal systematicity of thought is shown to be question-begging. It is briefly sketched how the modified construal links up with multiple dispositions of the same categorical base. Finally, the question of the causal efficacy of single rules is distinguished from the question of their psychological reality: implicit rules might be psychologically real without being causally efficacious. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Inductive reasoning about causally transmitted properties

Different intuitive theories constrain and guide inferences in different contexts. Formalizing simple intuitive theories as probabilistic processes operating over structured representations, we present a new computational model of category-based induction about causally transmitted properties. A first experiment demonstrates undergraduates’ context-sensitive use of taxonomic and food web knowledge to guide reasoning about causal transmission and shows good qualitative agreement between model predictions and human inferences. A second experiment demonstrates strong quantitative and qualitative fits to inferences about a more complex artificial food web. A third experiment investigates human reasoning about complex novel food webs where species have known taxonomic relations. Results demonstrate a double-dissociation between the predictions of our causal model and a related taxonomic model [Kemp, C., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2003). Learning domain structures. In Proceedings of the 25th annual conference of the cognitive science society]: the causal model predicts human inferences about diseases but not genes, while the taxonomic model predicts human inferences about genes but not diseases. We contrast our framework with previous models of category-based induction and previous formal instantiations of intuitive theories, and outline challenges in developing a complete model of context-sensitive reasoning.     

Clinical psychologists' theory-based representations of mental disorders predict their diagnostic reasoning and memory

The theory-based model of categorization posits that concepts are represented as theories, not feature lists. Thus, it is interesting that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) established atheoretical guidelines for mental disorder diagnosis. Five experiments investigated how clinicians handled an atheoretical nosology. Clinicians' causal theories of disorders and their responses on diagnostic and memory tasks were measured. Participants were more likely to diagnose a hypothetical patient with a disorder if that patient had causally central rather than causally peripheral symptoms according to their theory of the disorder. Their memory for causally central symptoms was also biased. Clinicians are cognitively driven to use theories despite decades of practice with the atheoretical DSM.     

Electrophysiological difference between the representations of causal judgment and associative judgment in semantic memory

Causally related concepts like “virus” and “epidemic” and general associatively related concepts like “ring” and “emerald” are represented and accessed separately. The Evoked Response Potential (ERP) procedure was used to examine the representations of causal judgment and associative judgment in semantic memory. Participants were required to remember a task cue (causal or associative) presented at the beginning of each trial, and assess whether the relationship between subsequently presented words matched the initial task cue. The ERP data showed that an N400 effect (250–450 ms) was more negative for unrelated words than for all related words. Furthermore, the N400 effect elicited by causal relations was more positive than for associative relations in causal cue condition, whereas no significant difference was found in the associative cue condition. The centrally distributed late ERP component (650–750 ms) elicited by the causal cue condition was more positive than for the associative cue condition. These results suggested that the processing of causal judgment and associative judgment in semantic memory recruited different degrees of attentional and executive resources.     

Causal relevance and Nonreductive physicalism

It has been argued that nonreductive physicalism leads to epiphenominalism about mental properties: the view that mental events cannot cause behavioral effects by virtue of their mental properties. Recently, attempts have been made to develop accounts of causal relevance for irreducible properties to show that mental properties need not be epiphenomenal. In this paper, I primarily discuss the account of Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit. I show how it can be developed to meet several obvious objections and to capture our intuitive conception of degrees of causal relevance. However, I argue that the account requires large-scale miraculous coincidence for there to be causally relevant mental properties. I also argue that the same problem arises for two apparently very different accounts of causal relevance. I suggest that this result does not show that these accounts, on appropriate readings, are false. Therefore, I tentatively conclude that we have reason to believe that irreducible mental properties are causally irrelevant. Moreover, given that there is at leastprima facie evidence that mental properties can be causally relevant, my conclusion casts doubt on nonreductive physicalist theories of mental properties.     

Explaining prompts children to privilege inductively rich properties

Four experiments with preschool-aged children test the hypothesis that engaging in explanation promotes inductive reasoning on the basis of shared causal properties as opposed to salient (but superficial) perceptual properties. In Experiments 1a and 1b, 3- to 5-year-old children prompted to explain during a causal learning task were more likely to override a tendency to generalize according to perceptual similarity and instead extend an internal feature to an object that shared a causal property. Experiment 2 replicated this effect of explanation in a case of label extension (i.e., categorization). Experiment 3 demonstrated that explanation improves memory for clusters of causally relevant (non-perceptual) features, but impairs memory for superficial (perceptual) features, providing evidence that effects of explanation are selective in scope and apply to memory as well as inference. In sum, our data support the proposal that engaging in explanation influences children’s reasoning by privileging inductively rich, causal properties.     

Encoding specific associative memory: evidence from behavioral and neural manipulations

Within-subjects procedures with rats assessed the associative structures acquired during conditioning trials in which the interval between the stimuli and food was either short or long (i.e., A-10 s→food and B-40 s→food). In Experiments 1 and 2, after these conditioning trials, A and B served as second-order reinforcers for 2 further stimuli (i.e., X→A and Y→B); whereas Experiment 3 used a sensory preconditioning procedure in which X→A and Y→B trials occurred before the conditioning trials, and rats were finally tested with X and Y. In each experiment, Y elicited greater responding at test than did X. This finding supports the contention that the long-lived trace of B (associated with food on B-40 s→food trials) is more similar to the memory of B that was associatively provoked by Y, than is the short-lived trace of A (associated with food on A-10 s→food trials) to the memory of A that was associatively provoked by X. These conclusions were reinforced by the effects of a neural manipulation that disrupted discrimination learning involving the short traces of stimuli but not the long traces of the same stimuli.     

视觉工作记忆的巩固加工：时程、模式及机制

在视觉工作记忆加工过程中, 对记忆项目的维持及操作需要将转瞬即逝的感觉输入转换为稳定的记忆表征, 这一加工过程被定义为视觉工作记忆巩固。鉴于巩固在视觉工作记忆中所起到的“门控”作用, 研究者们已经发展出多种研究范式对其可能涉及的运作机制进行探讨。然而, 在不同范式下所观察到的巩固时程存在较大差异, 其所遵循的巩固模式也尚不清晰。此外, 对于巩固所涉及的理论及神经机制亦存在不同的观点。通过对比不同范式的差异性及梳理各方的观点, 可以有效推动这些问题的解决。未来研究除了可以在多种范式下对巩固模式进行验证, 还可以探究注意在巩固中的作用, 以及项目熟悉性等因素会对巩固加工产生何种影响。     

The perception of causality in infancy

Michotte proposed a rationalist theory of the origin of the human capacity to represent causal relations among events. He suggested that the input analyzer that underlies the causal perception in launching, entraining, and expulsion events is innate and is the ultimate source of all causal representations. We review the literature on infant causal representations, providing evidence that launching, entraining and expulsion events are interpreted causally by young infants. However, there is as of yet no good evidence that these representations are innate. Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that these representations are not the sole source of the human capacity for causal representation.