共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Emmanuel Levinas proposed a philosophical critique that worked to unsettle and decenter generalizing, totalizing, and thematizing
attempts to define the self. However, on the other hand, Levinas provides the space for the formation of a configuration of
the self that has been conditioned by ethical relation and even points to some of the ingredients for (or shape of) such a
self. Throughout Levinas’ work, the concept of hineni (“Here I am”) is used to illustrate the moral event that best characterizes the “psyche.” In the following paper, we consider
how to apply the notion of hineni to modern psychological constructs of the human self. In the first section, we flesh out the characteristics of a self lived
as hineni. We argue that such a self is “shaped” or oriented morally toward the outside and is radically exposed to the Other (not
merely a bearer of moral consciousness or moral attributes). It is a remembering of the preoriginal and primordial ethical
relation. In the second section, we use the psychoanalytic concept of transference to illustrate how the moral shape of the
self can be forgotten, and how the self enters a state of “mineness” wherein the Other is reduced to one’s own history (Levinas
1990). In this state of forgetfulness, we argue that a “concreteness of egoism” (Levinas 1969) is maintained and a self lived toward the outside remains untenable. Transference, we argue, is an impoverished relation
and a forgetting of and violence to the Other. Its proper use, however, in the therapeutic alliance allows for the possibility
of a remembering of the Other and a calling beyond oneself.
相似文献
David M. GoodmanEmail: |
2.
Daphna Erdinast-Vulcan 《Continental Philosophy Review》2008,41(1):43-58
The essay draws on a little-known fragment from M.M. Bakhtin’s Draft Exercise Notebooks of 1943 to highlight both the affinities
and the divergences of the respective philosophical projects of Bakhtin and Emmanuel Levinas. The first part of the discussion
follows their parallel itineraries through several points of convergence, from a sense of profound philosophical disenchantment
to a conception of the ethical subject as living on borderlines, facing the other, irremediably vulnerable and infinitely
responsible. The second part focuses on the “dialogic impasse” and its attempted resolution through gestures of triangulation,
evidenced in Levinas’s “third” and Bakhtin’s “superaddresee.” The third part of the discussion, beginning with Bakhtin’s and
Levinas’s different readings of Dostoevsky, focuses on the ultimate divergence of their philosophical positions, and suggests
that Bakhtin’s discursive conception of subjectivity may point the direction towards a more viable thinking of a post-metaphysical
ethics.
相似文献
Daphna Erdinast-VulcanEmail: |
3.
William Edelglass 《Sophia》2006,45(2):43-59
This paper provides an analysis of suffering and compassion in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas describes compassion
as ‘the nexus of human subjectivity’ and the ‘supreme ethical principle’. In his early texts, suffering discloses the burden
of being, the limits of the self, and thus the approach of alterity. Levinas’s later phenomenology of suffering as passive,
meaningless, and evil, functions as a refutation of rational explanations of suffering. I argue that Levinasian substitution,
the traumatic election to an excessive responsibility, is the compassionate suffering that Levinas terms the nexus of human
subjectivity. For Levinas, ethics is the compassionate response to the vulnerable, suffering Other. 相似文献
4.
Scott Hill 《Argumentation》2009,23(2):277-283
Toomas Karmo claims that his taxonomy of ethical sentences has the result that there does not exist a sound argument with
all non-ethical premises and an ethical conclusion. In a recent paper, Mark T. Nelson argues against this claim. Nelson presents
a sound argument that he takes to be such that (i) Karmo’s taxonomy classifies that argument’s single premise as non-ethical
and (ii) Karmo’s taxonomy classifies that argument’s conclusion as ethical. I attempt to show that Nelson is mistaken about
(ii). For any possible world at which the premise of Nelson’s argument is true, Karmo’s taxonomy classifies the conclusion
of Nelson’s argument as non-ethical.
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Scott HillEmail: |
5.
Phillip Montague 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):125-131
This paper is a rejoinder to Thaddeus Metz’s article “Censure Theory Still Best Accounts for Punishment of the Guilty: Reply
to Montague.” In his article, Metz attempts to answer objections to censure theory that I had raised previously. I argue in
my rejoinder that Metz’s defense of censure theory remains seriously problematic despite what he says in his reply.
相似文献
Phillip MontagueEmail: |
6.
Imtiaz Moosa 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(2):159-182
In this article (1) I extract from Brentano’s works (three) formal arguments against “genealogical explanations” of ethical
claims. Such explanation can also be designated as “naturalism” (not his appellation); (2) I counter these arguments, by showing
how genealogical explanations of even apodictic moral claims are logically possible (albeit only if certain unlikely, stringent
conditions are met); (3) I show how Nietzsche’s ethics meets these stringent conditions, but evolutionary ethics does not.
My more general thesis is that naturalism and intuitionism in ethics need not be mutually incompatible.
相似文献
Imtiaz MoosaEmail: |
7.
Michael Nelson 《Philosophical Studies》2007,133(3):455-471
I discuss Stalnaker’s views on modality. In particular, his views on actualism, anti-essentialism, counterpart theory, and
the Barcan formulas.
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Michael NelsonEmail: |
8.
Michael Martin 《Sophia》2007,46(1):75-77
In this note I show that Noreen Johnson misunderstands my argument and consequently fails to refute my thesis that God’s omnipotence
conflicts with his omniscience.
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Michael MartinEmail: |
9.
Anti-Autonomism Defended: A Reply to Hill 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Stephen Maitzen 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):567-574
In the current issue of this journal, Scott Hill critiques some of my work on the “is”-“ought” controversy, the Hume-inspired
debate over whether an ethical conclusion can be soundly, or even validly, derived from only non-ethical premises. I’ve argued
that it can be; Hill is unconvinced. I reply to Hill’s critique, focusing on four key questions to which he and I give different
answers.
相似文献
Stephen MaitzenEmail: |
10.
Fred J. Kauffeld 《Argumentation》2009,23(2):239-257
The pragmatics underlying Paul Grice’s analysis of utterance-meaning provide a powerful framework for investigating the commitments
arguers undertake. Unfortunately, the complexity of Grice’s analysis has frustrated appropriate reliance on this important
facet of his work. By explicating Cicero’s use of apostrophe in his famous “First Catilinarian” this essay attempts to show
that a full complex of reflexive gricean speaker intentions in essentially to seriously saying and meaning something.
相似文献
Fred J. KauffeldEmail: |
11.
Kurt Mosser 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):1-20
Kant’s reputation for making absolutist claims about universal and necessary conditions for the possibility of experience
are put here in the broader context of his goals for the Critical philosophy. It is shown that within that context, Kant’s
claims can be seen as considerably more innocuous than they are traditionally regarded, underscoring his deep respect for
“common sense” and sharing surprisingly similar goals with Wittgenstein in terms of what philosophy can, and at least as importantly
cannot, provide.
相似文献
Kurt MosserEmail: |
12.
Peter van Schilfgaarde 《Res Publica》2009,15(2):121-136
Empowerment is a key word in Catherine Audard’s new book on Rawls and a central characteristic of Rawls’ approach to justice.
A very different “hermeneutic” approach to justice is presented by Paul Ricoeur, the French philosopher and theologian who,
against the background of his own work, examined Rawls’ views in several publications. This essay compares the two views and
defends the proposition that empowerment is the common denominator. The author suggests that Rawls would not have objected
to including some of Ricoeur’s ideas in the past-principle stage of his Theory.
相似文献
Peter van SchilfgaardeEmail: |
13.
Christian Miller 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(5):551-561
The purpose of this paper is to consider Joshua Gert’s novel view of subjective practical rationality in his book Brute Rationality. After briefly outlining the account, I present two objections to his view and then consider his own objections to a rival
approach to understanding subjective rationality which I take to be much more plausible.
相似文献
Christian MillerEmail: |
14.
Michael McKenna 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(1):29-37
In “Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment” Angela Smith defends her nonvoluntarist theory of moral responsibility
against the charge that any such view is shallow because it cannot capture the depth of judgments of responsibility. Only
voluntarist positions can do this since only voluntarist positions allow for control. I argue that Smith is able to deflect
the voluntarists’ criticism, but only with further resources. As a voluntarist, I also concede that Smith’s thesis has force,
and I close with a compromise position, one that allows for direct moral responsibility for the nonvoluntary, but also incorporates
a reasonable control condition.
相似文献
Michael McKennaEmail: |
15.
Kalle Puolakka 《Philosophia》2008,36(1):29-41
This article considers the validity and strength of Richard Rorty’s pragmatist theory of interpretation in the light of two
ethical issues related to literature and interpretation. Rorty’s theory is rejected on two grounds. First, it is argued that
his unrestrained account of interpretation is incompatible with the distinctive moral concerns that have been seen to restrict
the scope and nature of valid approaches to artworks. The second part of the paper claims that there is no indispensable relationship
between supporting Rorty’s pragmatist theory of interpretation and the important place that is attached to literature in the
liberal society outlined by him. A reading of Donald Davidson’s texts on literary language and interpretation implies that
an intentionalist theory of interpretation can accommodate those features that Rorty values in literature as well.
相似文献
Kalle PuolakkaEmail: |
16.
Albert Atkin 《Philosophia》2008,36(3):313-326
This paper traces a lost genealogical connection between Charles S. Peirce’s later theory of signs and contemporary work in
the philosophy of language by John Perry. As is shown, despite some differences, both accounts offer what might be termed
a multi-level account of meaning. Moreover, it is claimed that by adopting a ‘Peircian turn’ in his theory, Perry might overcome
alleged shortcomings in his account of cognitive significance.
相似文献
Albert AtkinEmail: |
17.
Erin Eaker 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):455-457
This paper raises questions concerning Ted Morris’ interpretation of Hume’s notion of meaning and investigates the private
and public aspects of Hume’s notion of meaning.
相似文献
Erin EakerEmail: |
18.
Stéphane Legrand 《Sophia》2008,47(3):281-291
This article aims at showing that in spite of Michel Foucault’s violent rejection of phenomenology, this discipline never
ceased to bear a crucial significance for his archaeological and genealogical analyses, in that it can be construed as a symptom
indicating the most serious challenge that the contemporary philosophy has to meet: thinking together Experience and Knowledge.
The author intends to prove, by resorting to the Marxian concept of ‘objectively necessary appearance’, that Foucault’s main
opposition to phenomenology stems from his original conception of the theory as a sort of experiment made by the philosopher
on himself and on his own historical a priori.
相似文献
Stéphane LegrandEmail: |
19.
Christopher Cordner 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):593-609
In his later writings on ethics Foucault argues that rapport à soi – the relationship to oneself – is what gives meaning to
our commitment to ‘moral behaviour’. In the absence of rapport à soi, Foucault believes, ethical adherence collapses into
obedience to rules (‘an authoritarian structure’). I make a case, in broadly Levinasian terms, for saying that the call of
‘the other’ is fundamental to ethics. This prompts the question whether rapport à soi fashions an ethical subject who is unduly
self-concerned. Here we confront two apparently irreconcilable pictures of the source of moral demands. I describe one way
of trying to reconcile them from a Foucaultian perspective, and I note the limitations in the attempt. I also try to clear
away what I think to be a misunderstanding on Foucault’s part about what is at stake in the choice between these pictures.
To clarify my critique of Foucault, I also relate it to a similar recent critique of virtue ethics by Thomas Hurka.
相似文献
Christopher CordnerEmail: |
20.