论《庄子》的真心--“心”与“道”一

《庄子》的思想主题是“游”,其实质是“心”游于“道”。具体来说,涵盖了三个方面,一是真心的内涵,即以“道”为“心”;二是真心的修养,重在养生与虚心;三是真心修养所达到的“见独”境界。     

以关、洛为宗：吕祖谦心论探析及定位

《宋元学案》以“兼取朱陆之长”评价吕祖谦之学，今人研究也多以心、理并重来论定吕祖谦哲学。吕祖谦非常重视“心”概念，以实然义、活动义和主宰义论之，对心与理、气、性之关系均有讨论，认为心是为学工夫的入手之处，通过“存心”“正心”建立工夫次第，以安顿道问学与尊德性两大重要命题，吕祖谦建立了相当规模、内容丰富的心论系统。本文认为，吕祖谦虽重视心，却仍是“以关、洛为宗”,其心概念并无本体义，其关于心的种种讨论不宜称之为“心学”,而是“理学”下的心论。     

从《管子》心、气、水、时论看文人画之特质

《管子》作为稷下学派的思想论纲,提出了独具特色的“心”范畴。“心”,同“仁”、“道”一样处于伺等重要的本体地位。长期以来学术界惯于西方分别性思维方式,对于颇具齐文化综合特色的“心”论关注和研究不够。本文还历史以本面,并且联系《管子)中“气”论、“水”论、“时”论,进行了整体性观照。本体是最富于启示性的。从“轴心时代”《管子》之“心”本体视角透视文人画的心灵化特色及气韵当首、水墨为尚、时间性主导等特质,具有更为直接而深刻的启示,从而坚信文人画的持久生命力,更加自觉地守望文人画的独特品质。     

做医德高尚的医务工作者

毛泽东同志在《纪念白求恩》、为延安中国医科大学的题词、《论联合政府》等文章中,对医务工作者要具备什么样的理想人格,要遵循什么样的医德原则等都作了精辟阐述。这是我们医务工作者进行医德教育和医德修养的指导思想和理论依据。     

先秦文化对中医藏象学说的渗透和影响——心的认识源流析

1　心为血肉之心心是象形字 ,象人和动物的心脏。王筠在《文字蒙求》中说 :“心 ,中象心形 ,外兼象心包络也。”心的初义是指称人和动物的心脏器官。《说文》 :“心 ,人心 ,土藏 ,在身之中 ,象形。”《庄子·秋水》 :“目怜心。”为眼睛羡慕心 ,此文提及的“心”是指实体的心。中医理论中 ,心主血脉的心亦为血肉之心。《难经·四十二难》对心的实体作了如下论述 :“心重十二两 ,中有七孔三毛 ,盛精汁三合。”《黄帝内经》认为心有主管血液在脉中运行的生理功能 ,对全身各脏腑组织起到滋润濡养的作用。如《素问·痿论》曰 :“心主身之血脉。…     

支遁"逍遥论"的内容与特点

本文通过支遁逍遥论与向秀、郭象逍遥论的比较,认为支遁逍遥论正是针对向、郭“各适性以逍遥”的观点而发,其核心内容表现在“至人之心”和“分”这两个概念中。通过对这两个概念的辨析,与向、郭逍遥论所呈现出的多元论倾向相比,可以认为支遁的逍遥论呈现出某种一元论倾向,并且同样为魏晋玄学“名教与自然”的命题提出了自己的论证。这种佛玄交融的特点是佛教中国化过程的表现之一,对当时及后来佛学思想的发展都产生了较大的影响。     

从“认知心”到“统合心”——早期儒家心论思想新探

在早期儒家认知理论与形而上学之间游走无隙的是心论。从孔子通过经验学习、理性思考以及日常实践循环往复到达的“乐之”境界，到孟子通过具体而微的道德实践扩充善端成为“性”之本体，再到荀子通过“虚壹而静”的经验学习与理性思虑而最终实现的“大清明”境界，早期儒家的“心”在认知过程和实现形而上境界之中起着关键作用。在这一过程中的“心”或体现为认知心，或体现为道德心，或体现为形而上之心。“心”的这些面向并不是静止的，它们在动态的转化之中共同构成了一幅关于早期儒家心论的丰富图景。     

即心即佛

即心即佛,又作是心即佛、心即是佛。也就是说,无论凡夫心、佛心,其心之体与佛无异,此心即是佛。这是由《华严经》“心佛及众生,是三无差别”的思想而来。禅宗史上历代禅师都主张即心即佛的修行主张。如《达摩血脉论》云:“即心是佛,亦复如是,除此心外终无别佛可得。心即是佛,佛即是心:心外无佛,佛外无心。”     

真德秀《心经》与韩国儒学

所谓心法学,即系统阐释儒家圣贤认识心性、修养心性、自觉地把自己纳入道统谱系的学说。《心经》是真德秀辑录传统儒家经典与程朱理学关于心法学理论而辑成的一部有关心性修养的书,它始终围绕"治心"的主题,集中阐发了儒家的心性之学,极力倡导儒学心性修养工夫论,表现为与陆王心学迥然不同的心法学传统。1592年,程敏政附注《心经》并很快传入韩国。李退溪是韩国大儒,自称通过《心经》而把握朱子学乃至儒家心性之学的实质与精髓。退溪对《心经》的尊崇深深影响了韩国儒学的文化生态,促使韩国儒学心性论一步步走向心法学,并自觉地排斥陆王一系的心学范式。退溪在研究与接受《心经》心法学思想过程中,通过对门人弟子讲授《心经》及其"附注"而形成了退溪学派对《心经》的推崇,并影响到以栗谷为宗的畿湖学派和以丁若镛为代表的实学派。可见,《心经》和《心经附注》已成为韩国心性之学的阐释与建构的重要思想载体,对韩国儒学影响至深。     

从玄、气、心看扬雄的性善恶混论

本文认为应从宇宙本体论的视域理解扬雄的性善恶混论。"玄"遵循异质相生的原理生成万物,性善恶混就是"玄"成物之理贯注于人性的结果。"玄"措摛阴阳之气而生发万物,抟聚于人则表现为神明之气与阴阳之气的并用而为功。扬雄论心,兼具知行的能力,在修养工夫上,既强调养心的纯正刚毅,又注重耳目感官的合理之欲,这正是"玄"成物之理在修养论上的体现。     

Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality

Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds-a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering-that is, interpersonal harm-even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.     

Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality

Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering—that is, interpersonal harm—even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.     

The problem of mind in Confucianism

This essay explores the Confucian theory of mind. Doing so, it first examines the early Confucian concept of the human mind as a substance that has both moral and cognitive functions and a universal nature. It then explores the neo-Confucian concept of the human mind, the original mind, and the relationships between the human mind and human nature, as well as between the human mind and the human body. Finally, it explores the Confucian concept of cultivation of the mind.     

Mencius's Vertical Faculties and Moral Nativism

This paper compares and contrasts Mencius's moral philosophy with recent development in cognitive science regarding mental capacity to understand moral rules and principles. Several cognitive scientists argue that the human mind has innate cognitive and emotive foundations of morality. In this paper, Mencius's moral theory is interpreted from the perspective of faculty psychology and cognitive modularity, a theoretical hypothesis in cognitive science in which the mind is understood as a system of specialized mental components. Specifically, Mencius's Four Beginnings (the basic human emotions that serve as the foundations of morality) are interpreted as vertical faculties, comparable to Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid's moral faculties.     

论医务人员在医疗事故技术鉴定过程中的法律地位

世界上究竟有没有“心”、“心”是什么、心与身的关系如何,这一直是医学与心理学的基本问题。随着科学的发展和认识的深化,经由语言学的心灵剥离、科学主义的心灵放逐、实证科学的心灵祛魅,古老神秘的灵魂不断地“祛魅”,心理的本质得到了还原与澄清,灵魂问题亦演变为心理问题、心脑问题,而心灵哲学也正朝着自然化的方向重建。     

INTERNISTS OF THE MIND OR PHYSICIANS OF THE SOUL: DOES PSYCHIATRY NEED A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY?

Although psychiatry is interested in what both body and mind contribute to behavior, it sometimes emphasizes one more than the other. Since the early 1980s, American psychiatry has shifted its interest from mind and psyche to body and brain. Neuroscience and psychopharmacology are increasingly at the core of psychiatry. Some experts claim that psychiatry is no longer interested in problems in living and positive goals such as mental health, happiness, and morality but rather has narrowed its focus to mental disorders addressed with psychotropic drugs. In view of this trend, psychiatry needs to confront two questions in social philosophy. If it is no longer directly concerned with health and happiness, how does it relate to these positive goals? And how does it relate as a medical institution to religious institutions, schools, and other organizations that directly promote health, happiness, morality, and the purposes of life? It is not enough for psychiatry to renounce its moral role; its practices still shape cultural values. Psychiatry should take more responsibility for developing a public philosophy that addresses these issues.     

RATIONALITY AND MORAL REALISM

What can a moral realist say about why we should take morality seriously and about the relation between morality and rationality? I take off from Christine Korsgaard's criticism of moral realism on this score. The aim is to achieve an understanding of the relation between moral and rational properties and of the role of practical deliberation on a realist view. I argue that the justification for being concerned with rational and moral normative properties may not be an aspect of our minds to which we have access. I argue against a view that gives automatic pride of place to the rational properties of our mind by drawing attention to valuable non‐rational modes of thought such as creative, imaginative and instinctive thought. Thus the value of taking account of rationality is contingent on its benefits. But this is not why we should be taking account of morality.     

论道德的本真形态与派生形态

道德的本真形态是“天理”和“良心”,即普遍的、至高无上的实践法则及其在人心中的体现。道德要通过人的理论和实践体现出来,就需要实现道德的学理化和规范化,从而形成道德理论与社会规范两种道德的派生形态。     

道德心理学的哲学思考--论心理学与伦理学的会通与融合

道德心理学把规范伦理学与实证心理学在哲学层面上结合起来,为理解人的道德行为提供了一种新的视角。伦理学与心理学的这种融合具体体现为：个人同一性与道德行为必须在心理上保持一致,才能形成真正的道德同一性,因此,美德有其独特的气质和情绪心理学机制。道德是在社会生活中形成的,处理好道德的社会关系是培养良好美德的基础。道德既有理性的层面,也有非理性的层面,培养和确立人的内在理性是成为道德人的心理学基础。基于心理学对道德生活的重要性,一种以心理学为基础的美德伦理学正在出现。     

道德判断的分级现象

Blair(1996)发现即使没有心理理论的孤独症儿童,也具备道德判断能力。而Kahn(2004)认为没有心理理论就不可能完成道德判断。已有研究表明,道德判断可能需要一定程度的心理理论。孤独症儿童心理理论存在困难,影响他们理解道德情景并进行正确的道德判断,但这是否与任务的要求道德判断能力的程度不同有关呢?研究增加道德情景的复杂程度,进一步考察儿童道德判断规律。结果发现,道德判断有分级现象,第一级是直接对道德行为进行判断,孤独症和正常儿童都能完成该任务,可能是以原始情绪为基础的;第二级道德判断是对简单道德情景进行判断,需要以心理理论为基础,只有正常儿童才能完成;而对行为与意图不一致的复杂道德判断则需要以更加丰富的经历或者经验为基础,但其属于三级道德判断还是二级道德判断的高级形式还需要进一步的研究。