Chalcedonian Christology and beyond: Luther's understanding of the Communicatio Idiomatum

Luther, Zwingli and Calvin are in full accord with the Chalcedonian definition of Christ as one person in two natures, which are united unconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly and inseparably. The main point of disagreement among them concerns the usage of the so-called communicatio idiomatum . Luther refers to this mainly in his disputes with other theologians such as Nestorius and Zwingli, whereas when he engages in constructive theology or in biblical interpretation, it seems that he does not use it. He could use it because he found it to be in harmony with his own Christological thinking which, he believed, was rooted in the Bible. The doctrine is, for him, an ontological deduction from the cross and the incarnation. The primary purpose of this article is to see how Luther understood the Christological predication, and only in a limited scope bring him in conversation with Zwingli's and Calvin's understanding. Although the traditional interpretation, that the properties of Christ's two natures are communicated to the concretum of his person, predominates in Luther's thought, he went beyond it, affirming a real communication between the two natures. The logic of his usage of the doctrine of the communication of properties enables Luther to move beyond Chalcedonian understanding of Christology, and also sets him apart from the Reformed tradition. Special attention will be given to Luther's usage of the doctrine in relation to the passibility motif, demonstrating that the human idiomatum of suffering and dying belong to God's very being.     

Buddhist Fictionalism

Questions regarding what exists are central to various forms of Buddhist philosophy, as they are to many traditions of philosophy. Interestingly, there is perhaps a clearer consensus in Buddhist thought regarding what does not exist than there may be regarding precisely what does exist, at least insofar as the doctrine of anātman (no self, absence of self) is taken to be a fundamental Buddhist doctrine. It may be noted that many forms of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy in particular are considered to offer a quite austere ontology—a rather ‘empty’ account of what exists. Continuing in this vein of ontological austerity, here I will attempt to lay out a relatively novel approach to Buddhist ontology, viz. Buddhist fictionalism.     

Lgbt Catholics: a paradigmatic case of intra-confessional pluralism

ABSTRACT

I will reflect on the reconciliation between “subjective” life and “objective” doctrine experienced by Catholic lgbt couples. Even though their particular experience cannot be considered as universal it can nevertheless constitute a case study for theological reflection. I will propose a theological model for the integration of lgbt Catholics into Christian communities. The case of lgbt Catholics also helps us address the theoretical difficulties of religious pluralism. Their experience of faith is an example of “lived pluralism”. In the lexicon of religious pluralism, this experience is an intra-system or intra-theistic diversity, but it also touches upon the meta-theological issue of the model of reason that is to be applied to every system. I believe that every possible case of pluralism is worth considering if we want to theorize this concept. This may lead us to consider pluralism as a premise from which to start, articulated at different levels.     

TRANSVALUATIONISM ABOUT VAGUENESS: A PROGRESS REPORT

The philosophical account of vagueness I call “transvaluationism” makes three fundamental claims. First, vagueness is logically incoherent in a certain way: it essentially involves mutually unsatisfiable requirements that govern vague language, vague thought‐content, and putative vague objects and properties. Second, vagueness in language and thought (i.e., semantic vagueness) is a genuine phenomenon despite possessing this form of incoherence—and is viable, legitimate, and indeed indispensable. Third, vagueness as a feature of objects, properties, or relations (i.e., ontological vagueness) is impossible, because of the mutually unsatisfiable conditions that such putative items would have to meet. In this paper I set forth the core claims of transvaluationism in a way that acknowledges and explicitly addresses a challenging critique by Timothy Williamson of my prior attempts to articulate and defend this approach to vagueness. I sketch my favored approach to truth and ontological commitment, and I explain how it accommodates the impossibility of ontological vagueness. I argue that any approach to the logic and semantics of vagueness that both (i) eschews epistemicism and (ii) thoroughly avoids positing any arbitrary sharp boundaries (either first‐order or higher‐order) will have to be not an alternative to transvaluationism but an implementation of it. I sketch my reasons for repudiating epistemicism. I briefly describe my current thinking about how to accommodate intentional mental properties with vague content within an ontology that eschews ontological vagueness. And I revisit the idea, which played a key role in my earlier articulations of transvaluationism, that moral conflicts provide an illuminating model for understanding vagueness.     

Metalinguistic negotiation and logical pluralism

Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one right logic. A particular version of the view, what is sometimes called domain-specific logical pluralism, has it that the right logic and connectives depend somehow on the domain of use, or context of use, or the linguistic framework. This type of view has a problem with cross-framework communication, though: it seems that all such communication turns into merely verbal disputes. If two people approach the same domain with different logics as their guide, then they may be using different connectives, and hence talking past each other. In this situation, if we think we are having a conversation about “\(\lnot A\)”, but are using different “\(\lnot \)”s, then we are not really talking about the same thing. The communication problem prevents legitimate disagreements about logic, which is a bad result. In this paper I articulate a possible solution to this problem, without giving up pluralism, which requires adopting a notion of metalinguistic negotiation, and allows people to communicate and disagree across domains/contexts/frameworks.

     

Explorations in a Theological Metaphor: Boethius,Calvin, and Torrance on the Creator/Creation Distinction

This article explores a theological metaphor, comparing God and creation to an author and story. Framed as an Einsteinian thought experiment, and broadly in the genre of theological retrieval, it seeks to resource the use of this metaphor in contemporary theology by bringing it into dialogue with three areas of theological reflection throughout church history: Boethius' doctrine of divine foreknowledge, the so‐called extra Calvinisticum, and Thomas Torrance's account of Christ's ascension. It is suggested that the story metaphor brings into greater visibility what unites and determines each of these different doctrines, namely, a simultaneously robust and dynamic Creator/creation relation. In particular, it is suggested that the metaphor of story illumines the ontological priority of God over creation, as well as the importance of the incarnation and ascension as the determining events for their relationship.     

'Willing Is Not Choosing': Some Anthropological Implications of Dyothelite Christology

Abstract:  The dyothelite Christology of Maximus the Confessor provides a basis for countering modern worry that an Augustinian doctrine of the bondage of the will undermines human integrity. Modern discomfort with Augustine presupposes an anthropology that equates genuine agency with freedom of choice. In defending the principle that Christ has a fully human will, Maximus challenges this presupposition by denying that a human agent's willing is to be identified with choosing. Thus, while Maximus does not share Augustine's doctrine of original sin, he offers a framework within which to explore possible convergence between Eastern and Western understandings of the will.     

Engaging in imagery versus verbal processing of worry: Impact on negative intrusions in high worriers

Chronic, excessive, and uncontrollable worry is the defining characteristic of generalised anxiety disorder. Worry largely consists of verbal thought and it has been postulated that this predominance of verbal thought in worry may contribute to its perseveration. In an investigation of this issue, high worriers were trained to engage in either imagery or verbal processing. Mentation was sampled before and after a five-minute period of worry during which participants engaged in either imagery of the worry topic or verbal processing of the worry topic. Verbal worry resulted in a significant increase in negative intrusions, consistent with previous research. Furthermore, imagery was associated with a decrease in negative intrusions. The results support the theory that the predominantly verbal nature of worry may be responsible for the uncontrollability and maintenance of worry.     

A note on mathematical pluralism and logical pluralism

Mathematical pluralism notes that there are many different kinds of pure mathematical structures—notably those based on different logics—and that, qua pieces of pure mathematics, they are all equally good. Logical pluralism is the view that there are different logics (consequence relations), which are, in an appropriate sense, equally good. Some, such as Shapiro (Varieties of logic, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014), have argued that mathematical pluralism entails logical pluralism. In this brief note I argue that this does not follow. There is a crucial distinction to be drawn between the preservation of truth (simpliciter) and the preservation of truth-in-a-structure; and once this distinction is drawn, this suffices to block the argument. The paper starts by clarifying the relevant notions of mathematical and logical pluralism. It then explains why the argument from the first to the second does not follow. A final section considers a few objections.

     

Can Truthmaker Theorists Claim Ontological Free Lunches?

Truthmaker theorists hold that propositions about higher‐level entities (e.g. the proposition that there is a heap of sand) are often made true by lower‐level entities (e.g. by facts about the configuration of fundamental particles). This generates a problem: what should we say about these higher‐level entities? On the one hand, they must exist (since there are true propositions about them), on the other hand, it seems that they are completely superfluous and should be banished for reasons of ontological parsimony. Some truthmaker theorists—most prominently David Armstrong—have tried to solve this puzzle by arguing that these entities are ‘an ontological free lunch’, i.e. real existents that are still ‘no addition of being’. This answer is prima facie attractive, but I argue in this paper that the standard approaches to truthmaking—modal theories and grounding theories—are unable to vindicate the doctrine of the ontological free lunch, and thus fail to solve the problem of higher‐level entities. Fortunately, there is a non‐standard account of truthmaking available, the reductive explanation account, which succeeds where the standard approaches fail.     

The effect of attention modification with explicit vs. minimal instructions on worry

In this experiment we investigated the effect of different instructions on the modification of attentional biases, and subsequently on worry persistence. Participants without excessive worry completed a modified dot-probe task, designed to train attention either to threat or neutral words. Half of each group was given explicit instructions regarding the relationship between word valence and target location, and half were given the more usual minimal instructions. Impact on worry persistence was assessed by categorizing the valence of thought intrusions before and after a period of instructed worry. Response latencies to test items on the dot-probe task showed that attention had been successfully manipulated in the expected direction, and explicit instructions led to more effective attention modification. Moreover, participants in the attend-threat group who received explicit instructions reported significantly more negative thought intrusions following instructed worry, as rated by an assessor, whereas participants in the attend-neutral group did not. These findings suggest that an attentional bias towards threatening information plays a role in worry persistence, and that explicit instructions may be helpful in modifying this bias.     

A critical discussion of Prior’s philosophical and tense-logical analysis of the ideas of indeterminism and human freedom

This paper is a critical discussion of A.N. Prior’s contribution to the modern understanding of indeterminism and human freedom of choice. Prior suggested that these ideas should be conceived in terms of his tense logic. It can be demonstrated that his approach provides an attractive formalization that makes it possible to discuss indeterminism and human freedom of choice in a very precise manner and in a broader metaphysical context. It is also argued that Prior’s development of this approach was closely linked to his very personal struggles with fundamental religious and metaphysical questions. In his opinion, holding the doctrine of divine foreknowledge together with the doctrine of human freewill gives rise to difficult logical and philosophical problems. It appears that Prior, rather early on, decided to support what was later known as the Peircean solution, although he also analysed what he considered to be the most important alternative solution—the Ockhamist solution. This paper offers a discussion of some of Prior’s published books and papers as well as some of the papers in his Nachlass.

     

Constructing formal semantics from an ontological perspective. The case of second-order logics

In a first part, I defend that formal semantics can be used as a guide to ontological commitment. Thus, if one endorses an ontological view \(O\) and wants to interpret a formal language \(L\) , a thorough understanding of the relation between semantics and ontology will help us to construct a semantics for \(L\) in such a way that its ontological commitment will be in perfect accordance with \(O\) . Basically, that is what I call constructing formal semantics from an ontological perspective. In the rest of the paper, I develop rigorously and put into practice such a method, especially concerning the interpretation of second-order quantification. I will define the notion of ontological framework: it is a set-theoretical structure from which one can construct semantics whose ontological commitments correspond exactly to a given ontological view. I will define five ontological frameworks corresponding respectively to: (i) predicate nominalism, (ii) resemblance nominalism, (iii) armstrongian realism, (iv) platonic realism, and (v) tropism. From those different frameworks, I will construct different semantics for first-order and second-order languages. Notably I will present different kinds of nominalist semantics for second-order languages, showing thus that we can perfectly quantify over properties and relations while being ontologically committed only to individuals. I will show in what extent those semantics differ from each other; it will make clear how the disagreements between the ontological views extend from ontology to logic, and thus why endorsing an ontological view should have an impact on the kind of logic one should use.     

Quine: Peter HyltonReference, Ontological Relativity, and Realism

Section I of this essay discusses Quine's views about reference,, contrasting them with those of Russell. For the latter, our language and thought succeed in being about the world because of our acquaintance with objects; the relation of reference—roughly, the relation between a name and its bearer—is thus fundamental. For Quine, by contrast, the fundamental relation by which our language comes to be about the world, and to have empirical content, is that between a sentence and stimulations of our sensory surfaces; reference, while important, is a derivative notion. Section II shows how this view of reference as derivative makes possible the notorious Quinean doctrine of ontological relativity. Section III raises the issue of realism. It argues that somewhat different notions of realism are in play for Quine and for Russell—for Russell, objects, and our knowledge of objects, play the fundamental role, while for quine objectivity and truth are fundamental, with ontology being derivative.     

A NEW PROBLEM FOR ONTOLOGICAL EMERGENCE

It is becoming increasingly common to find phenomena described as emergent. There are two sorts of philosophical analysis of emergence. Ontological analyses ground emergence in real, distinct, emergent properties. Epistemological analyses deny emergent properties and stress instead facts about our epistemic status. I review a standard worry for ontological analyses of emergence, that they entail a surfeit of metaphysics, and find that it can easily be sidestepped. I go on to present a new worry, that ontological emergentism entails a highly implausible ontology, which is harder for the ontological emergentist to avoid.     

The early Russell on the metaphysics of substance in Leibniz and Bradley

While considerable ink has been spilt over the rejection of idealism by Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore at the end of the 19th Century, relatively little attention has been directed at Russell’s A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, a work written in the early stages of Russell’s philosophical struggles with the metaphysics of Bradley, Bosanquet, and others. Though a sustained investigation of that work would be one of considerable scope, here I reconstruct and develop a two-pronged argument from the Philosophy of Leibniz that Russell fancied—as late as 1907—to be the downfall of the traditional category of substance. Here, I suggest, one can begin to see Russell’s own reasons—arguments largely independent of Moore—for the abandonment of idealism. Leibniz, no less than Bradley, adhered to an antiquated variety of logic: what Russell refers to as the subject-predicate doctrine of logic. Uniting this doctrine with a metaphysical principle of independence—that a substance is prior to and distinct from its properties—Russell is able to demonstrate that neither a substance pluralism nor a substance monism can be consistently maintained. As a result, Russell alleges that the metaphysics of both Leibniz and Bradley has been undermined as ultimately incoherent. Russell’s remedy for this incoherence is the postulation of a bundle theory of substance, such that the category of “substance” reduces to the most basic entities—properties.     

On the Innocence and Determinacy of Plural Quantification

Plural logic is widely assumed to have two important virtues: ontological innocence and determinacy. It is claimed to be innocent in the sense that it incurs no ontological commitments beyond those already incurred by the first‐order quantifiers. It is claimed to be determinate in the sense that it is immune to the threat of non‐standard (Henkin) interpretations that confronts higher‐order logics on their more traditional, set‐based semantics. We challenge both claims. Our challenge is based on a Henkin‐style semantics for plural logic that does not resort to sets or set‐like objects to interpret plural variables, but adopts the view that a plural variable has many objects as its values. Using this semantics, we also articulate a generalized notion of ontological commitment which enables us to develop some ideas of earlier critics of the alleged ontological innocence of plural logic.     

Husserl’s Foundation of the Formal Sciences in his “Logical Investigations”

This article is composed of three sections that investigate the epistemological foundations of Husserl’s idea of logic from the Logical Investigations. First, it shows the general structure of this logic. Husserl conceives of logic as a comprehensive, multi-layered theory of possible theories that has its most fundamental level in a doctrine of meaning. This doctrine aims to determine the elementary categories that constitute every possible meaning (meaning-categories). The second section presents the main idea of Husserl’s search for an epistemological foundation for knowledge, science and logic. Their epistemological clarification can only be reached through a detailed analysis of the structure of those intentions that give us what is meant in our intentions. To reveal the intuitive giveness of logical forms is the ultimate aim of Husserl’s epistemology of logic. Logical forms and meaning-categories can only be given in a certain higher-order intuition that Husserl calls categorical intuition. The third section of this article distinguishes different kinds of categorical intuition and shows how the most basic logical categories and concepts are given to us in a categorical abstraction.