The visual-auditory color-word Stroop asymmetry and its time course

Four experiments examined crossmodal versions of the Stroop task in order (1) to look for Stroop asymmetries in color naming, spoken-word naming, and written-word naming and to evaluate the time course of these asymmetries, and (2) to compare these findings to current models of the Stroop effect. Participants named color patches while ignoring spoken color words presented with an onset varying from 300 msec before to 300 msec after the onset of the color (Experiment 1), or they named the spoken words and ignored the colors (Experiment 2). A secondary visual detection task assured that the participants looked at the colors in both tasks. Spoken color words yielded Stroop effects in color naming, but colors did not yield an effect in spoken-word naming at any stimulus onset asynchrony. This asymmetry in effects was obtained with equivalent color- and spoken-word-naming latencies. Written color words yielded a Stroop effect in naming spoken words (Experiment 3), and spoken color words yielded an effect in naming written words (Experiment 4). These results were interpreted as most consistent with an architectural account of the color-word Stroop asymmetry, in contrast with discriminability and pathway strength accounts.     

The role of color diagnosticity in object recognition and representation

The role of color diagnosticity in object recognition and representation was assessed in three Experiments. In Experiment 1a, participants named pictured objects that were strongly associated with a particular color (e.g., pumpkin and orange). Stimuli were presented in a congruent color, incongruent color, or grayscale. Results indicated that congruent color facilitated naming time, incongruent color impeded naming time, and naming times for grayscale items were situated between the congruent and incongruent conditions. Experiment 1b replicated Experiment 1a using a verification task. Experiment 2 employed a picture rebus paradigm in which participants read sentences one word at a time that included pictures of color diagnostic objects (i.e., pictures were substituted for critical nouns). Results indicated that the “reading” times of these pictures mirrored the pattern found in Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, an attempt was made to override color diagnosticity using linguistic context (e.g., a pumpkin was described as painted green). Linguistic context did not override color diagnosticity. Collectively, the results demonstrate that color information is regularly utilized in object recognition and representation for highly color diagnostic items.     

Some effects of color on naming and recognition of objects

In this article, we investigated the role of color in the recognition and naming of everyday objects. In the first experiment we found that color pictures were named faster than black-and-white and that shape information did not facilitate color naming. Experiment 2 was carried out to determine at which stage of object processing the color facilitation occurred. We found that color had no effect on object recognition but did facilitate object naming, even when color was redundant for discrimination. This did not apply to naming abstract shapes. Experiment 3 replicated the findings of Experiment 2 using different objects and colors. The results showed that color could facilitate but not inhibit object naming and did not affect object recognition.     

Is color an intrinsic property of object representation?

The role of color in object representation was examined by using a variation of the Stroop paradigm in which observers named the displayed colors of objects or words. In experiment 1, colors of color-diagnostic objects were manipulated to be either typical or atypical of the object (eg a yellow banana versus a purple banana). A Stroop-like effect was obtained, with faster color-naming times for the typical as compared to the atypical condition. In experiment 2, naming colors on words specifying these same color-diagnostic objects reversed this pattern, with the typical condition producing longer response times than the atypical condition. In experiment 3, a blocked condition design that used the same words and colors as experiment 2 produced the standard Stroop-like facilitation for the typical condition. These results indicate that color is an intrinsic property of an object's representation at multiple levels. In experiment 4, we examined the specific level(s) at which color-shape associations arise by following the tasks used in experiments 1 and 2 with a lexical-decision task in which some items were conceptually related to items shown during color naming (eg banana/monkey). Priming for these associates was observed following color naming of words, but not pictures, providing further evidence that the color-shape associations responsible for the differing effects obtained in experiments 1 and 2 are due to the automatic activation of color-shape associations at different levels of representation.     

Color term knowledge does not affect categorical perception of color in toddlers

Categorical perception of color is shown when colors from the same category are discriminated less easily than equivalently spaced colors that cross a category boundary. The current experiments tested various models of categorical perception. Experiment 1 tested for categorical responding in 2- to 4-year-olds, the age range for the onset establishment of color term knowledge. Experiment 2 tested for categorical responding in Himba toddlers, whose language segments the color space differently from the way in which the English language does so. Experiment 3 manipulated the conditions of the task to explore whether the categorical responding in Experiments 1 and 2 was equivalent to categorical perception. Categorical perception was shown irrespective of naming and was not stronger in those children with more developed color term knowledge. Cross-cultural differences in the extent of categorical perception were not found. These findings support universalistic models of color categorization and suggest that color term knowledge does not modify categorical perception, at least during the early stages of childhood.     

Training and Stroop-like interference: evidence for a continuum of automaticity

Three experiments varied the extent of practice in an analog of the Stroop color-work task. Each experiment involved four phases: (a) baseline naming of four familiar colors, (b) training in consistently naming four novel shapes by using the names of the same four colors, (c) naming the colors when they appeared in the form of the shapes, and (d) naming the shapes when they appeared in color. In Experiment 1, with up to 2 hr of training in shape naming, colors were named much faster than shapes. Interference was observed only in Phase 4. In Experiment 2, with 5 hr of training, shape naming sped up, but was still slower than color naming. Nevertheless, there was symmetrical interference in Phases 3 and 4, and this persisted 3 months later without further training. Experiment 3 replicated this pattern and then extended practice to 20 hr, by which time shape and color naming were equally rapid. After 20 hr, interference appeared only in Phase 3, reversing the original asymmetry. The overall pattern is inconsistent with a simple speed of processing account of interference. The alternative idea of a continuum of automaticity--a direct consequence of training--remains plausible, and the implications of this perspective are considered.     

Color categories and color appearance

We examined categorical effects in color appearance in two tasks, which in part differed in the extent to which color naming was explicitly required for the response. In one, we measured the effects of color differences on perceptual grouping for hues that spanned the blue-green boundary, to test whether chromatic differences across the boundary were perceptually exaggerated. This task did not require overt judgments of the perceived colors, and the tendency to group showed only a weak and inconsistent categorical bias. In a second case, we analyzed results from two prior studies of hue scaling of chromatic stimuli (De Valois, De Valois, Switkes, & Mahon, 1997; Malkoc, Kay, & Webster, 2005), to test whether color appearance changed more rapidly around the blue-green boundary. In this task observers directly judge the perceived color of the stimuli and these judgments tended to show much stronger categorical effects. The differences between these tasks could arise either because different signals mediate color grouping and color appearance, or because linguistic categories might differentially intrude on the response to color and/or on the perception of color. Our results suggest that the interaction between language and color processing may be highly dependent on the specific task and cognitive demands and strategies of the observer, and also highlight pronounced individual differences in the tendency to exhibit categorical responses.     

Distinctive shapes benefit short-term memory for color associations, but not for color

In four experiments, we examined the effect of pairing colors with either homogeneous or heterogeneous shapes on a short-term memory task. In Experiment 1, we found no differences in color memory for displays in which colors were each associated with different shapes, paired with individual homogeneous shapes, or paired with heterogeneous shapes. In contrast, in Experiment 2, we found that when participants were asked to remember the specific pairings of colors, memory was improved for heterogeneous-shape displays. The benefit for heterogeneous shapes appears to be memorial, rather than one that occurs at the time of encoding (Experiment 3) or retrieval (Experiment 4). The present study suggests that distinctive shapes can be used to help bind color associations in visual short-term memory.     

Focal and nonfocal processing of color and form

Langley Porter Neuropychtatrte Institute, University of California, San Francisco. Californta 94122 Response latencies to color are usually shorter than those to form. but sometimes this difference is absent or reversed. Three experiments investigated whether these differences result from differential susceptibility of color and form to extra focal processing. Experiment I showed shorter same-difference latencies to color than to form when two stimuli were presented simultaneously. This difference disappeared or reversed when the two stimuh appeared sequentially. Experiment II. using a multistimulus matching task, found that differences between response latencies to form and color were minimal at the center of the display and increased peripherally. Experiment III showed that eye movements were more frequent in matching forms than colors. Tasks that produced many eye movements had long average latencies, but the relationship between eye movements and latency was not a simple one. There was evidence both for parallel and serial strategies tn the use of the eyes to gather information. The results of these experiments are considered in relation to a theory of distributed attention.     

Paired associate learning in Chinese children with dyslexia

A total of 82 Chinese 11- and 12-year-olds with and without dyslexia were tested on four paired associate learning (PAL) tasks, phonological awareness, morphological awareness, rapid naming, and verbal short-term memory in three different experiments. Experiment 1 demonstrated that children with dyslexia were significantly poorer in visual-verbal PAL than nondyslexic children but that these groups did not differ in visual-visual PAL performance. In Experiment 2, children with dyslexia had more difficulties in transferring rules to new stimuli in a rule-based visual-verbal PAL task as compared with children without dyslexia. Long-term retention of PAL was not impaired in dyslexic children across either experiment. In Experiment 3, rates of visual-verbal PAL deficits among children with dyslexia were all at or above 39%, the highest among all cognitive deficits tested. Moreover, rule-based visual-verbal PAL, in addition to morphological awareness and rapid naming ability, uniquely distinguished children with and without dyslexia even with other metalinguistic skills statistically controlled. Results underscore the importance of visual-verbal PAL for understanding reading impairment in Chinese children.     

联想启动与知觉启动的比较研究

采用快速命名方法探讨不同加工水平对联想启动效应的影响。被试分别在深、浅加工条件下学习一系列颜色词,然后完成颜色命名和再认任务,并设立词命名任务,以比较联想启动和知觉启动的异同。结果表明,在颜色命名任务中,深、浅加工条件下均可形成对颜色词的启动效应,但浅加工条件下的再认成绩明显低于深加工,出现了联想启动和再认的分离现象。词命名表现出与颜色命名相似的结果,但它们在有意识回忆方面仍存在一定的差异,提示知觉表征系统单独并不能支持联想启动,联想启动可能是多个记忆系统共同作用的结果。     

材料类型和颜色典型性影响颜色-物体Stroop效应

通过两个实验考查材料类型和颜色典型性对颜色-物体Stroop效应的影响。实验1,考查颜色-物体（图片）Stroop效应。结果颜色典型性差异显著,命名图片的颜色和图片的名称都产生显著的颜色-物体Stroop效应。实验2,考查颜色-物体（词语）Stroop效应。结果颜色典型性差异显著,命名词语的颜色产生颜色-物体Stroop效应,命名词语的名称未产生颜色-物体Stroop效应。结论,材料类型和颜色典型性影响颜色-物体Stroop效应。     

Categorical shape and color coding by pigeons

Categorical coding is the tendency to respond similarly to discriminated stimuli. Past research indicates that pigeons can categorize colors according to at least three spectral regions. Two present experiments assessed the categorical coding of shapes and the existence of a higher order color category (all colors). Pigeons were trained on two independent tasks (matching-to-sample, and oddity-from-sample). One task involved red and a plus sign, the other a circle and green. On test trials one of the two comparison stimuli from one task was replaced by one of the stimuli from the other task. Differential performance based on which of the two stimuli from the other task was introduced suggested categorical coding rules. In Experiment 1 evidence for the categorical coding of sample shapes was found. Categorical color coding was also found; however, it was the comparison stimuli rather than the samples that were categorically coded. Experiment 2 replicated the categorical shape sample effect and ruled out the possibility that the particular colors used were responsible for the categorical coding of comparison stimuli. Overall, the results indicate that pigeons can develop categorical rules involving shapes and colors and that the color categories can be hierarchical.     

Priming on verbal perceptual tests: Roles of lexical,surface, and conceptual processes

According to a lexical-access hypothesis, priming on verbal-completion tests requires previous access to higher-order nodes such as morphemes or words. In two experiments, subjects studied words presented in printed color, either by reading the words or by naming the printed colors. In Experiment 2, some of the words were to be ignored in both study conditions. The words presented in Experiment 2 were either conceptually related or unrelated to each other. And the cues in the test phase for repeated targets were either printed in the studied color or in a different color. In both experiments, the word stems of nouns studied and of new targets were presented with word-completion instructions (implicit test of memory). Consistent with the hypothesis, the amount of priming obtained was greater in the reading than in the color-naming condition. The least amount of priming was observed for targets that were to be ignored at study. In addition, Experiment 2 showed considerable effects of surface similarity (i.e., stronger priming effects with cues whose color was not changed from the study to the test phase) and some effects of conceptual processing, as was indicated by different amounts of priming for unrelated and for related nouns. Because these two effects were observed with both types of study task, it is concluded that perceptual and conceptual processes may make independent contributions to priming effects in verbal perceptual tests. This conclusion modifies and extends the original hypothesis, according to which previous lexical access is required in order to obtain effects of perceptual or conceptual processes on the priming scores.     

Negative priming effects in children engaged in nonspatial tasks: evidence for early development of an intact inhibitory mechanism

Three experiments are reported that examined conceptual negative priming effects in children 5 to 12 years of age. Experiment 1 used a negative priming variant of a flanker task requiring the naming of a central color blob flanked by irrelevant distractors. Experiment 2 used a negative priming variant of the Stroop color-word task. Experiment 3 used a same-different matching task with novel 3-D shapes. Results revealed significant and equivalent magnitudes of negative priming across the tested age groups for all 3 tasks. It is concluded that the inhibitory mechanism underlying conceptual (i.e., identity or semantic) negative priming in visual selective attention tasks is intact in young children. Because the findings and conclusions diverge from the developmental literature on negative priming, the authors attempt to reconcile the contradictions by pinning down the reasons for the discrepancies.     

Asymmetry in reception and retention of colors.

In Experiment 1 a same-different comparison task involving simultaneous discrimination of colors differing by 2.5 steps in hue and presented 2° in the left or right visual field was given to 24 male and 24 female familial righthanders. A significant left visual field superiority was obtained. In a color naming task, the higher the number of color pairs for which both members were given the same name, the larger the left visual field superiority. In Experiment 2 the tasks were replicated with a 10-sec memory interval inserted between the stimuli in each color pair. No significant effects were obtained.     

Habituation to auditory distractors in a cross-modal, color-word interference task

The speed of naming the color of a colored square was examined with acoustic distraction to study the effects of the formation of a mental representation (neural model) of distractors. In Experiment 1, practice with the distractors (color words, noncolor words, and tones) was examined, and in Experiments 2 and 3 each color-naming trial was preceded by preexposures to sounds that could be dissimilar, similar, or identical to the upcoming auditory distractor. Consistency in the identity of ignored sounds, whether during color-naming practice or between preexposures and test, reduced interference with color naming. Consistency in voice played no role, and attended preexposures were ineffective in reducing interference. Given these results, the authors propose that mental representations of distractors include information about their task relevance, which modulates disruption of the primary task.     

Fast color grouping and slow color inhibition: evidence for distinct temporal windows for separate processes in preview search

The authors report 4 experiments that examined color grouping and negative carryover effects in preview search via a probe detection task (J. J. Braithwaite, G. W. Humphreys, & J. Hodsoll, 2003). In Experiment 1, there was evidence of a negative color carryover from the preview to new items, using both search and probe detection measures. There was also a negative bias against probes on old items that carried the majority color in the preview. With a short preview duration (150 ms) carryover effects to new items were greatly reduced, but probe detection remained biased against the majority color in the old items. Experiments 2 and 4 showed that the color bias effects on old items could be reduced when these items had to be prioritized relative to being ignored. Experiment 3 tested and rejected the idea that variations in the probability of whether minority or majority colors were probed were crucial. These results show that the time course of color carryover effects can be separated from effects of early color grouping in the preview display: Color grouping is fast, and inhibitory color carryover effects are slow.     

The relation between children's conceptual functioning with color and color term acquisition

Young children experience considerable difficulty in learning their first few color terms. One explanation for this difficulty is that initially they lack a conceptual representation of color sufficiently abstract to support word meaning. This hypothesis, that prior to learning color terms children do not represent color as an abstraction, was tested in two experiments using samples of 25- to 39-month-olds and 20- to 32-month-olds. Children's ability to conceptually represent color and their knowledge of color terms were assessed, and a strong association was found between the ability to make inferences based on color and the comprehension of color words. Children who did not comprehend color terms were unsuccessful at a conceptual task that required them to represent color as a property independent of the particular objects that displayed it. The results suggest that the initial absence of an abstract representation of color contributes to the difficulty that young children encounter when first learning color words.     

Knowing color terms enhances recognition: further evidence from English and Himba

Two experiments attempted to reconcile discrepant recent findings relating to children’s color naming and categorization. In a replication of Franklin and colleagues (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 90 (2005) 114-141), Experiment 1 tested English toddlers’ naming and memory for blue-green and blue-purple colors. It also found advantages for between-category presentations that could be interpreted as support for universal color categories. However, a different definition of knowing color terms led to quite different conclusions in line with the Whorfian view of Roberson and colleagues (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133 (2004) 554-571). Categorical perception in recognition memory was now found only for children with a fuller understanding of the relevant terms. It was concluded that color naming can both underestimate and overestimate toddlers’ knowledge of color terms. Experiment 2 replicated the between-category recognition superiority found in Himba children by Franklin and colleagues for the blue-purple range. But Himba children, whose language does not have separate terms for green and blue, did not show a cross-category advantage for that set; rather, they behaved like English children who did not know their color terms.